SASless,
For those in Europe who do not know what a 'normal' category helicopter is; it is the same as 'small' helicopter in JARs/CS - i.e. certificated under Part 27.
The answer to your question is that the rule will be ignored because it serves no useful purpose - thus bringing the regulation into disrepute. Look at the dilemma it poses; I am an EMS operator and I have a mixed fleet of EC135s and EC145s; with the EC135s operations can be conducted, quite legally, to the scene (in Europe we would call it the HEMS Operating Site) and with the EC145s they cannot.
This limitation has no knowledge of operational context - it affects, equally, private operations and aerial work as well as commercial air transport - operations to runways, elevated sites as well as offshore operations and specialist activities contained in the description of aerial work.
Some years ago, there was a move to have the HV diagram put back into the information section; this was supported by the operational community and most manufacturers. Not only was this opposed by the FAA (and a small minority of manufacturers seeking commercial advantage) but a letter was issue by the Rotorcraft Directorate confirming its application.
212man has the correct approach but, in fact, most of what he asks for is already done. Look for example at the relationship between a Category A procedure and the HV diagram; AC 29-2C already makes the statement that the Category A profile may modify the HV diagram.
In fact this is at the root of the problem; when FAR 29 was modified in 1989, there was an implicit assumption that the next generation of helicopters would all operate in Performance Class 1 using Category A procedures - i.e. truly a transport category like the Boeing 737.
What this long-sighted vision failed to take into account was that, as with this accident, there is more to consider than the reserves of power. In a number of operations, the environment of the operating site does not permit the type of deterministic behaviour that is a feature of 'runway' operations. This is exemplified in offshore operations where the environment (turbulence, size of surfaces, obstacle environment, aircraft limitations, moving surfaces etc) does not map well onto the conditions under which Category A procedures are defined and tested. Hence the importance of the use of Performance Class 2 - particularly as it has now been descibed well enough (it can be scaled to fit the circumstance) to make it an extremely useful tool.
For the last two points in 212man's post, that is the norm and most manufacturers do, so define, their procedures.
What has this to do with the accident report above - well little except as background information to those who think that these are simple binary choices. In this I would echo 212man's remark and state that the premise of malabo's title has no validity. For the causes of this accident we will, as always, have to take into account human factors as well as mechanical and procedural circumstances.
It is no accident that the most important European contribution to the work of the IHST was to modify the analysis tool so that it took more account of Human Factors.
Jim