Video released for Aust Army BlackHawk crash

[ShyTorque]

Thanks, Walkabout, I'll read it all.

Something a bit odd about this accident, from what I've seen so far, including watching the video a few times.

I have my own theory but I always prefer to leave the verdict to the official inquiry; however I'm sure the quoted GPS problem is a red herring

Before anyone starts the usual "growling" with hackles raised; although it's been a while, I have a few hundred hours on the type and am reasonably familiar with this type of operation using the Blackhawk, including similar "lights out" ops by night using NVG; I have seen it go badly wrong too (from very close quarters). Thankfully it wasn't my aircraft and the other crew got away with their error - although a set of new main rotor blades and new trousers all round for those on board (about 20 pairs) were needed .

[eagle 86]

I wonder if the crew ever thought about aborting the approach and going around?
GAGS
E86

[thekite]

Thekite

Sorry Thomas, but I must reiterate: the pilot executed a downwind quickstop, according to the enquiry, (18.7.07) And fell into VR.
This was not a standard procedure, but since it was a special operation, it was attempted. And failed.
As I said before, there but for the god of your choice, go I!
My background is cattle, not soldiers. But the laws of physics overide any law of military manual.
Again, as I said before, this was VR. Go ahead, bust your arse; prove me wrong.
thekite

[Thomas coupling]

For the record, there is no mention that this was VR. The transcript attempts to invite Captain "11" to accept that it was INCIPIENT vortex ring (for a start, and not VRS), but doesn't get away with it. Capt "11" won't accept its VRS because the blackhawk isn't in the catchment zone for inducing VRS long enough.
To enter VRS you need not only low airspeed and a ROD>700'/min, but you need to become established in that zone before it takes hold - it isn't instantaneous and it most certainly isn't going to happen from 100' alongside the ship.
I have done hundreds of these approaches - taught them, flown them.
I have read the transcript carefully and my observations are this:
The blackhawk shot a "downwind" fast stop - into wind if you know what I mean. i.e. he finished up DOWNWIND. The a/c was heavy. Because of these two factors, as he rolled out experienced a descent, recognised it and corrected with collective (from an excessive nose up to combat the residual fwd g/s due to the tailwind) and drooped the Nr.
The rest as we say was history - The a/c continued to sink as it settled with power and struck the deck.
One more comment: Capt 11 who was the co-jo on another blackhawk 800m behind stated:
(a) he didn't think a downwind component had any adverse affect on the manouevre.
(b) He also stated that 5 troops onboard weighing close to 1/2 tonne total were not a consideration either.
Get a grip lads - what sort of pilot can call himself a professional after making statements like this

[Beetlenut2]

Would "half a tonne" make much difference to a Chinook? It's all relative. It may have been that being half a tonne lighter would have meant that they didn't crash, but it also says in the transcripts that they had a 25% power margin - that is 25% more power than they required to hover OGE.

The downwind comment is a little silly. 15 Kts downwind is well within the limits of the aircraft, but not at the end of the approach they conducted-Too fast and too close - within two rotor diametres of the ship!

-Left pedal in the termination to bring the nose round, speed washes off, stabilator programs down?

[Beetlenut2]

No one has to-it wasn't VRS or (I bet) incipient VRS-not mentioned as a causal factor anywhere in the BOI transcipts. The rotor drooped too far and too fast to arrest the rate of descent.

[Beetlenut2]

Boy oh boy. 171 are having a terrible time of it.
I am guessing there will be a big shake up now that they have CAT 4'ed (?) one in EM on sat.
It's been kept very quiet.

There you go Griffin - it's in the transcripts - 19 th of Jul is where I saw it.

[topendtorque]

15 Kts downwind is well within the limits of the aircraft

and VRS I dare say, as one decreases AS to arrive at a full stop??

maybe the expectant mission profilers forgot to tell the airframe the story.

once again I say, a pilot being put in a position....not trained for.... need to go higher up the chain... I reckon .... again.

Nothing has been said here or in the other VRS loop about what is often needed to set off your instantaneous drop from the sky, known by some as VRS, by others as a f'n big fright.

That is the simple catalyst of a litlle bit of pitch to help generate that vortex at the critical time. A useful analagy could be the principle of cloud seeding with the use of an agent or catalyst, just to get the raindrops falling?? on my head, -- da dah

Mind you an oft repeated quick stop procedure until you plack in the face, but INTO WIND and thus done safely every time, would not teach anyone any bad tricks. Higher, higher up the chain guys.

TC with respect, I am confused, do you say at the beginning that captain 11 is an ace and then at the end a dill?

But you do intimate that the questioning is trying to trap him into the VRS scenario..
THAT is sad.
The court trying to trap a person into an admission, but not trying get him to reveal the truth instead.

What is this BOI I wonder, a kangaroo court???

[Beetlenut2]

That's comedy gold

From the transcripts:

Q. Can you tell us what happened as the debrief after
that particular incident?
A. Once we had landed and shut down, MAJ 4 obviously made
notice to the crew that that was not what he intended. He
apologised, debriefed the crew on how it should have been
conducted, and we handed the aircraft over to maintenance
and further accident investigation team findings.

and this:

Q. Referring to the incident in East Timor, you said that
the captain debriefed the crew that that was not what he
intended. Am I to take from that that it wasn't a
controlled landing?
A. Obviously, it wasn't a controlled landing, sir,
because it resulted in a hard landing.
Q. Am I to interpret that the aircraft actually crash
landed?
A. No, it conducted a hard landing. My reference to a
crash landing would be something that has written the
aircraft off and it's no longer serviceable for future use.
Q. My understanding from that is that the aircraft is
actually category 4, which is only one category off
write-off. Is that the case?
A. Yes.

[topendtorque]

That's comedy gold

Beetlenut2
I don’t share your sense of comedy, I also wonder about your observations; your post #23, Chinooks?

I thought the passages of your post #28 very illuminating.

1) The witness got himself well tangled up, which is not to me a point of derision, merely a trait of someone batting on and unaware of the finer details to which he is trying to refer.

2) He appeared to be on another plane of understanding as to the expected outcomes and procedures for the exercise than the person, Major 4, even though both were in the same enterprise. (Perhaps even the same machine)

3) It follows that both of the pilots of the crashed machine must have also been on a plane of understanding different from Major 4.

Those three observations speak volumes to me about procedures of; allowable manoeuvres, briefing, planning and expectations. The expectations of whom, the client, the flying detachment on site or - some one or group back in headquarters who thinks that a certain procedure is required to effect a certain result from some hypothetical threat, without regard to basic helicopter flight characteristics.

The HQ bloke may have heard that “fifteen knots downwind is well within the performance parameters of the aircraft”. If no one else in the command chain knew better about the many forms and the dangers of VRS at low level and planned exercises accordingly then they plainly wouldn’t know what they were talking about.

That - is - how - people - get - killed.

I’ll bet that there is no SOP that says that descent manoeuvres to a negative airspeed should be avoided. If there were I do not believe that this pilot would have got caught the way he did.

Someone on here recently said that after 1500 hours in the military they thought they knew everything and realized with hindsight that the only thing that saved them was the flight authorisation process.

Very honest, I too reckoned that at about 1200 hours I was just becoming aware of what it was that I did not know about this low level game, but how to learn it??? And low level challenging the elements was all that I did, unlike the military which gets lots of routine straight and level stuff.

That was why I had a bit to say about the Townsville prang where I reckon vastly inexperienced types got thrust into a situation that was beyond them, obviously.

But it was the system that allowed it to happen, most possibly because the system didn’t know what it didn’t know and hadn’t catered for that. That is plainly wrong and needs to be transparently amended. That is why I treat the BOI with somewhat a jaundiced eye.

People come on this and other forums on most subjects to either learn or perhaps impart something to help others learn. I try to subscribe to both functions as I reckon you’re never too old to learn and I am most grateful for the thanks that I have often received for the practical training that I given, including the dangers of VRS.

I am also mindful of many who may like to say something on this Fiji subject but by dent of their profession or connection must refrain, even though these forums are “rumour networks.”

I think I have outlined where I am coming from, but where do you come from Beetlenut2?

[Brian Abraham]

Some figures arising from the inquiry.
(figures in bold seconds to impact)

45 IAS 100 Knots, Altitude 100 feet
22 Collective reduced, Flare commenced with a slight right turn
14 Left turn commenced at up to 20°/sec, Altitude 70 feet, Flare increased to 20° nose up
9 TQ 30%
7 TQ 20%
3 RRPM >100% TQ 20%
2.6 Bank angle reaches a max of 43°, Rapid descent commences, TQ 10% and begins increasing rapidly
1.5 16.5° pitch nose down (from a slight nose up position)
Impact ROD 1,320 to 1,800 FPM, RRPM 75%, TQ >100%, IAS Zero to 6 Knots

[before landing check list]

I have not been posting on here very much and just saw this thread a little while ago. I read the 1st and the last board meetings. So far it appears that the board is made up of not very informed/experienced pilots.
I read this from Brian:
45 IAS 100 Knots, Altitude 100 feet
22 Collective reduced, Flare commenced with a slight right turn
14 Left turn commenced at up to 20°/sec, Altitude 70 feet, Flare increased to 20° nose up
9 TQ 30%
7 TQ 20%
3 RRPM >100% TQ 20%
2.6 Bank angle reaches a max of 43°, Rapid descent commences, TQ 10% and begins increasing rapidly
1.5 16.5° pitch nose down (from a slight nose up position)
Impact ROD 1,320 to 1,800 FPM, RRPM 75%, TQ >100%, IAS Zero to 6 Knots
I am not sure what model H60 221 was BUT if it was a “A” model and the power was applied has rapidly as suggested yes it would droop that much and that fast. The “L” model with the T701’s greatly reduced that happening. I have not flown a 60 in several years but I do have 2200 hrs in them and when in flight (Ground RPM is higher before the Gens come off line due to a squat swith on the left main mount)and RPMR is reduced to the high 80’s you lose AC generators, consequently your SAS and AFCS and Stab Auto control but that portion of the flight the gens are a moot point. Someone mentioned the Stab position in a prior post, yes the Stab control has several inputs: Collective position, indicated A/S, pitch rate etc however the stab looked down to me not up. So if it was in “auto” mode it would seem to be set for low indicated airspeed, high power setting flight.
Quote from Thomas Coupling: Capt 11 who was the co-jo on another blackhawk 800m behind stated:
(a) he didn't think a downwind component had any adverse affect on the manouevre.
(b) He also stated that 5 troops onboard weighing close to 1/2 tonne total were not a consideration either.
Get a grip lads - what sort of pilot can call himself a professional after making statements like this
I agree, capt 11 is nuts. This thinking at least in my experience with the US Army and what I saw over and over again the desert stems from people getting most of their training in advanced helos and no experience in helos that demand extreme power management skills ie B206 (OH58) UH1H and a host of others
We do not know so far what the crew was attempting at the time. All we can imagine is the pilot(s) up to the very end were exercising the culmination of 100% of their past experience and it was not quite sufficient. But we do not know because we were not actually there. And since we do not know we should quit attempting to Monday Morning quarterback. They did their best.
Jerry

[Frazzled]

Thanks for the info from the BOI but I think the DSTO guy was talking about collective position from the 7 sec to 3 sec as he states that at 20% the engines were at idle.

Quote "At 3 seconds before impact, the collective

was increased from 20 per cent, thereby increasing the
engine torque from zero per cent. So at this stage, the

engine was basically idling."

Not good in any language

[before landing check list]

That is exactly what I was talking about. The "A" was more prone to this situation then the "L"(FADEC's). But still were not there nor was there a FDR nor a CVR.
Jerry

[Brian Abraham]

before landing check list - I should clarify, the info came from a FDR, with some input from photographic analysis. Frazzled, I pondered that portion, not well worded as you say, but from what else was said I concluded that he was inferring that 20% TQ is more or less idle. I would expect that 20% TQ could be in the range one might see with throttles at flight when sitting on the ground, perhaps another reason he had for saying they were at idle. Know nothing of Blackhawks myself.

[before landing check list]

My mistake, I did not know there was a FDR but yes, low tq (around 20%) in that aircraft would allow the NG to spool down but from that point the rest is purely conjecture.

Jerry

[topendtorque]

Not good in any language

simulating those numbers, in any machine, that close to the ground, jeeessus.

wouldn't these sorts of numbers, in the time to run sequence, have been briefed, prior to the event? They certainly were in fast jets a mate of mine told me once.

I agree that capt 11 said some pretty weird things, he may not be nuts, just inexperienced and therefore confused, ( a normal trait) and in the wrong bloody place.

I think i'll stick to defending the drivers if it's OK by you guys, the system I'll descibe again, below:-

We've all seen cricketers that reckoned they knew everything when facing up to Warne, get their bails knocked from way out side.

[before landing check list]

I agree with you Topend.

Jerry

[Dan Reno]

Topend quote: "I think i'll stick to defending the drivers if it's OK by you guys, the system I'll descibe again, below"

Do you think it was something other than plain old pilot error?

It looks to me he simply was coming in too fast and tried to "save" the landing by trying to "stick the landing". No?

[topendtorque]

I see from the press coverage that the BOI has adjourned. There were also some fairly robust scenes in the final curtain calls. It will be interesting to see how it is all called in the wash.

To answer Dan Reno

Do you think it was something other than plain old pilot error?

YES

It looks to me he simply was coming in too fast

I think he realized this at about the 3 seconds to impact mark and at that time made a very good decision to attempt recovery with cyclic forward, to wit the resultant 16.5 pitch down at the 1.5 secs mark. Pilot error would have been the instinctive pull back on the cyclic.

“and tried to "save" the landing by trying to "stick the landing". No?”

I doubt that during the last three seconds that he had any control over his descent. Note that it has increased to 1500 fpm at deck level. That’s a steep acceleration.

There is no way to hide it, what he was doing was a descending quick stop with a 15 knot downwind component, sheer lunacy if you ask any experienced mustering pilot.

Sure lots of us teach pilots downwind landings at the operational level, for dust abatement on mining work for example, but that always has one rule, no descent into your own turbulence, do it slowly and don’t get caught.

What I am delving into is why try a procedure like this where the a/c is being turned from a crosswind to descend into a dead downwind of fifteen knots. The risks are well known for any helicopter.

Had he the opportunity for understanding downwind theory and the different variants of LL VRS and done some major rehearsals up where it’s safe I am sure that the exercise would have been done into wind on final where full control is enjoyed with minimal power required for a variety of manoeuvres, including fast descent.

Through the downwind procedure not only is the A/C set to fall like a brick within many of the VRS scenarios, (as they do) but he would have required a whole heap of extra energy and time to slow the inertia of the A/C with the 15 knots blowing him forward.

How could any of that be beneficial in a situation where you wish to get in quick in the shortest time with the greatest amount of control? Being into wind uses a lot less power, which always equates to less noise.

I think it purely academic to postulate what might have happened had he anticipated his bother a bit earlier. He ran himself out of RRPM in arresting the forward energy of the A/C from the beginning of the quick stop to say minus fifteen (with the tailwind) before the impact, where it is stated that he again had nearly six knots IAS, (that’s 21 knots groundspeed).

The thing is that the massive sinking cue happened so fast (as they do) that I suggest and the numbers confirm it, that within less than a second he, 1 realized, 2 crosschecked, 3 rationalized and 4 reacted – with forward cyclic, (giving him the six knots) all at 3 seconds before impact. Pretty slippery for a bloke first encountering this phenomena. Very good in fact.

As I have said earlier, elsewhere, repeatedly, if you’re gonna stuff it up big time at low level, then be at least above eighty feet – please, perhaps higher for a Blackhawk.

Had he been conditioned to the recovery procedure, he would have been just that much ahead of it, pitched down quicker, missed the ship and not pulled collective, possibly recovering before the water?

THE QUESTION REMAINS, WHY WAS THE APPROACH TERMINATION IN A DEAD DOWNWIND EVEN ON THE BRIEFING BOARD, LET ALONE THE PILOTS FLIGHT PLAN????

If the army big knobs in charge of flying training and SOP’s haven’t worked that out then some elementary training for them might be in order. A Blackhawk and two fine young men wiped out during a safety conscious training mission should be a sobering input to their thinking.

Perhaps also the phraseology, “fifteen knots is well within the a/c capability” will be viewed as pertaining to the engine fire maintenance instead of the egghead idea that it means you can do descending quick stops in a Blackhawk just because it is painted in camouflage.