AS350 Astar/Squirrel
Buitenzorg,
Well done for chasing this up to find the cause of the noise, but I don't think playing with the pedals during rotor rundown is really a good way of finding any bearing problems. How about checking the bearing on the pre-flight, that way you'll know before you fly if it is OK.
Would be good if you could give us some details as to the calendar time since overhaul, and if all the bulletins had been carried out. When I used to overhaul these things, Eurocopter came out with a number of bulletins to try and improve the reliability. Bearing failure wasn't the problem then, the problem was wear on the bearing housing and wear on the spider because there wasn't enough pinch on the bearing to stop it from rotating in the housing. Your pitch change spider should be at least a -5 or -6, and those dash numbers are from 4 years ago!!!
Well done for chasing this up to find the cause of the noise, but I don't think playing with the pedals during rotor rundown is really a good way of finding any bearing problems. How about checking the bearing on the pre-flight, that way you'll know before you fly if it is OK.
Would be good if you could give us some details as to the calendar time since overhaul, and if all the bulletins had been carried out. When I used to overhaul these things, Eurocopter came out with a number of bulletins to try and improve the reliability. Bearing failure wasn't the problem then, the problem was wear on the bearing housing and wear on the spider because there wasn't enough pinch on the bearing to stop it from rotating in the housing. Your pitch change spider should be at least a -5 or -6, and those dash numbers are from 4 years ago!!!
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Noooby,
The spider was manufactured new in 1988, completely overhauled in 1999, about 2200 hours TSOH. Originally a -5, modified in 2000 to -6. Bearing that failed was 2 years and almost 1100 hours old. Being a driver, I can’t be bothered to check how many SBs apply to this p/n but the log card indicates 3 having been complied with since overhaul.
I’m intrigued about “checking the bearing on preflight”; how would you go about doing this? The bearing is enclosed within the spider so you can’t see it, and the roughness in the bearing would have to be awful to feel it when rotating the tail rotor by hand. Of course I check for play in the complete assembly and blistered paint (from overheating bearing) but none of these were present. Any other hints?
The spider was manufactured new in 1988, completely overhauled in 1999, about 2200 hours TSOH. Originally a -5, modified in 2000 to -6. Bearing that failed was 2 years and almost 1100 hours old. Being a driver, I can’t be bothered to check how many SBs apply to this p/n but the log card indicates 3 having been complied with since overhaul.
I’m intrigued about “checking the bearing on preflight”; how would you go about doing this? The bearing is enclosed within the spider so you can’t see it, and the roughness in the bearing would have to be awful to feel it when rotating the tail rotor by hand. Of course I check for play in the complete assembly and blistered paint (from overheating bearing) but none of these were present. Any other hints?
The main problem with the older bearings was binding. With the newer bearings, axial play seems to be the problem. Grab hold of the stationary star, and see if you can move the bearing housing along the stationary star. Heat, as you mentioned, is another give away. They can also sling grease before they give up the ghost. The bearings are sealed, but are installed with grease across the upper and lower surfaces. This grease can melt and get flung out if the bearing gets hot. On the outboard end of the bearing housing, there should be a line of sealant. Make sure this is in good order, otherwise there is a risk of water getting inside the housing. Can't really think of much else. Bearings were always a throw away item during overhaul, but we did check them for play before biffing. Found a couple that had a wee bit of roughness, but only remember one that was kaput, but we couldn't verify it's total time or TSO.
Sounds like you were unlucky to get a bad bearing, and lucky to hear it
Sounds like you were unlucky to get a bad bearing, and lucky to hear it
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New engine for AS350B2 certificated
Honeywell (Booth No. 1907) and Soloy (Booth No. 2207) have obtained an STC to install Honeywell’s latest version of the LTS101 turboshaft engine on the Eurocopter AS 350B2 AStar, and have delivered the first two converted helicopters.
The LTS101-700D2 engine upgrade will give the modified AStar, designated the AS 350SD2, a 14-percent increase in sea-level standard-day takeoff power (18 percent in hot-and-high conditions) compared with the LTS101-600A-3A in a previous Soloy conversion of the AS 350B2.
Doug Kult, Honeywell sales director for light utility helicopters, said the LTS101-700D2 is designed to the same power level as the AStar’s original Turbomeca Arriel 1D1, but with improved specific fuel consumption and reliability numbers. In this application, the -700D is derated to the AStar’s 641-shp maximum transmission power limit.
Honeywell attributes the improvements to a new, cooled gas producer (GP) turbine that ups GP disk life from 6,500 to 15,000 cycles, and an updated, proven reduction gear from other LTS101 models. These changes cumulatively reduce power turbine cycles by 35 percent and increase torque limits by 6 percent, Honeywell stated.
Soloy completed the new engine installation at its Olympia, Wash. facility and accepted 18 orders before Heli-Expo’06. Soloy booked six more on the first day of the show. “We anticipate producing more than 30 conversion kits this year,” predicted Soloy CEO Dave Stauffer.
Before Heli-Expo, Grand Canyon Helicopters chairman Elling Halvorson took delivery of the first AStar converted under the STC, and on Sunday Ross Scott, of Sunshine Helicopters on Maui, Hawaii, became owner of the second.
Soloy and Honeywell are also offering the LTS101-700D-2 upgrade with an option to purchasers for the helicopter service plan (HSP) price-per-flight hour program. Honeywell said it has continuously improved the LTS101 engine family through infusion of technologies and upgrades. This has produced a claimed four-fold improvement in reliability since 1996 while unscheduled removals and warranty claims have fallen to the lowest levels in the engine’s history.
The LTS101-700D2 engine upgrade will give the modified AStar, designated the AS 350SD2, a 14-percent increase in sea-level standard-day takeoff power (18 percent in hot-and-high conditions) compared with the LTS101-600A-3A in a previous Soloy conversion of the AS 350B2.
Doug Kult, Honeywell sales director for light utility helicopters, said the LTS101-700D2 is designed to the same power level as the AStar’s original Turbomeca Arriel 1D1, but with improved specific fuel consumption and reliability numbers. In this application, the -700D is derated to the AStar’s 641-shp maximum transmission power limit.
Honeywell attributes the improvements to a new, cooled gas producer (GP) turbine that ups GP disk life from 6,500 to 15,000 cycles, and an updated, proven reduction gear from other LTS101 models. These changes cumulatively reduce power turbine cycles by 35 percent and increase torque limits by 6 percent, Honeywell stated.
Soloy completed the new engine installation at its Olympia, Wash. facility and accepted 18 orders before Heli-Expo’06. Soloy booked six more on the first day of the show. “We anticipate producing more than 30 conversion kits this year,” predicted Soloy CEO Dave Stauffer.
Before Heli-Expo, Grand Canyon Helicopters chairman Elling Halvorson took delivery of the first AStar converted under the STC, and on Sunday Ross Scott, of Sunshine Helicopters on Maui, Hawaii, became owner of the second.
Soloy and Honeywell are also offering the LTS101-700D-2 upgrade with an option to purchasers for the helicopter service plan (HSP) price-per-flight hour program. Honeywell said it has continuously improved the LTS101 engine family through infusion of technologies and upgrades. This has produced a claimed four-fold improvement in reliability since 1996 while unscheduled removals and warranty claims have fallen to the lowest levels in the engine’s history.
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AS350 float repacking
I would like to have any information on the procedure or an advise, on how to repack a float for the AS350, Can I refill the bottle after it was activated or it has to be sent out. 
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The bottle will have to be sent away to be refilled and your float bags will need to be repacked by your maintainer. The bottle may also need to be hydrostatically tested depending on its age.
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And if you ever have to pressure/leak test the bags make sure the overpressure release valve is working . I needed new underwear after one of the mechs exploded one of the bags on a BK117.
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There are two types used, The orange ones with the 350 part number which can be used on the B and BA are filled with nitrogen and have a steel bottle. The 355 number items are grey in colour, use helium as the gas and have a composite bottle. The 355 floats are a lot bigger for the larger AS350's and are a real pain to repack compared to the orange ones. If you are thinking of repacking the float yourself to get out of trouble ( if that's what you are thinking ) and saying later "how did the bottles loose all pressure so suddenly?", think again as it easy to spot a bag that has been feild packed and both bottles are fired using an explosive squib. So no you won't be able to refill them yourself and either will your local gas guy and Eurocopter won't send DG Squibs out lightly either.
I have seen only one uncommanded float fire, the helicopter was operating low level along the coast and only one went off, all others have been pressing the wrong button cases.
The only checks you do are the continuity checks and bottle pressure checks, it will get pretty expensive if you want to fire them off for a functional check.
I have seen only one uncommanded float fire, the helicopter was operating low level along the coast and only one went off, all others have been pressing the wrong button cases.
The only checks you do are the continuity checks and bottle pressure checks, it will get pretty expensive if you want to fire them off for a functional check.
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Mr Selfish,
This old chestnut.........fixed, heavyweight, pan, lightweight etc etc......
It is confusing with so many variations offered by different, and within, manufacturers.
As usual identifying the system you have fitted and ensuring you have the correct Service Instruction (Bell lingo) is half the battle. Add to that the various PMA kits for firing mechanisms - explosive squib, electrical valve, hypodermic needle etc etc...... (Your kinda getting the drift by now!)
Needless to say, as a general rule, at some time, an installed floatation system does have to be "fired" from the activation method. This of course tests the whole system not just the bags which generally are manually inflated during (typical) 180 day checks.
Some operators are loath to test systems by "firing". This is perhaps understandable when some of the refurbishment kits for explosive squibs are big $$$, however many a defective system has been found out by conducting this mandatory check so go figure the logic of some
Do your research, knowledge is power.
This old chestnut.........fixed, heavyweight, pan, lightweight etc etc......
It is confusing with so many variations offered by different, and within, manufacturers.
As usual identifying the system you have fitted and ensuring you have the correct Service Instruction (Bell lingo) is half the battle. Add to that the various PMA kits for firing mechanisms - explosive squib, electrical valve, hypodermic needle etc etc...... (Your kinda getting the drift by now!)
Needless to say, as a general rule, at some time, an installed floatation system does have to be "fired" from the activation method. This of course tests the whole system not just the bags which generally are manually inflated during (typical) 180 day checks.
Some operators are loath to test systems by "firing". This is perhaps understandable when some of the refurbishment kits for explosive squibs are big $$$, however many a defective system has been found out by conducting this mandatory check so go figure the logic of some
Do your research, knowledge is power.
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Further to TCF's reply bellsux, the squibs (cartridges) have a shelf life and an inservice life. I think the bell kits require the sqibs to be blown at a certain interval after fitting (read the applicable service instruction). The bottle maybe due for hydrostatic at the same time.
This does check the whole system but then a new cartridge is fitted with a refurb kit and costs at least a couple of grand.
This does check the whole system but then a new cartridge is fitted with a refurb kit and costs at least a couple of grand.
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Felipe,
You do not have to fire the bottle to pressure check the float bags, simply use compressed air, AND use the Component Maintenance Manual for the procedure plus the re-packing. For information, the squib is not an explosive device in this kit, but is a frangible disk that is fractured by the heat from an internal resistor. The re-packing is a right sh*t of a job.
Further info. The orange bag float packs are no longer approved for 350BA unless gross mass is limited to 1950 kg
You do not have to fire the bottle to pressure check the float bags, simply use compressed air, AND use the Component Maintenance Manual for the procedure plus the re-packing. For information, the squib is not an explosive device in this kit, but is a frangible disk that is fractured by the heat from an internal resistor. The re-packing is a right sh*t of a job.
Further info. The orange bag float packs are no longer approved for 350BA unless gross mass is limited to 1950 kg
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AS350 Hydraulic Test Conundrum
Ladies and Gents,
Sorry about the clunky cut and paste work. Just wondering what the industry feeling is re the AS350 accumulator test. There seems to be two schools of thought...
Option 1. Follow the flight manual
Carry out a hydraulic accumulator test:
Check: collective pitch -locked
Cut off hydraulic pressure by actuating the test
push-button on console
Check that the HYD light illuminates and HORN sounds
Move the cyclic stick 2 or 3 times along both axes
separately about 10 % of total travel, check for hydraulic assistance by
absence of control load.
Press the test pushbutton to restore hydraulic
pressure
Check that the HORN is cancelled and HYD light
goes out.
Carry out a hydraulic pressure isolation check:
Isolate hydraulic pressure by actuating the switch on the
collective pitch lever: the HYD light illuminates and
control load is felt immediately.
Restore hydraulic pressure using the switch: the HORN sounds
until the HYD light goes out (2 -3 sec.).
Option 2. Instead of only moving cyclic 2 or 3 times along each axes, continue to move the cyclic until accumulator pressure is depleated. (We'll leave the other topic of excessive stress on the starflex for another day.)
It has been put to me that this is the only way to find out what will happen (hard over of the cyclic if 1 accumlator has a lower pressure than the others)in the event of exhausting accumlator pressure.
Whilst I agree that it may be handy to know that one of your accumulators could do with some extra pressure, in the event of a hydraulic failure the flight manual says to "calmly" reduce collective and adjust airspeed to between 40 & 60kts and isolate, thus it is irrelevant (for want of a better word) what sort of pressure you have available provided you don't "stir" the cyclic excessively during your calm response.
I suppose that if your method for dealing with the failure was to use the accumulator pressure for as long as it lasted (until short finals maybe) then it may be in your best interest to know what was what?
I've flown with a range of check and training pilots in the AS350 all of whom had substantial total and squirrell time...it's a mixed bag of sometimes passionate responces.
For me I'll take the flight manual response...I like to know how deep I'm in it right from the start.
Pro's and con's please.
Cheers FBD
Sorry about the clunky cut and paste work. Just wondering what the industry feeling is re the AS350 accumulator test. There seems to be two schools of thought...
Option 1. Follow the flight manual
Carry out a hydraulic accumulator test:
Check: collective pitch -locked
Cut off hydraulic pressure by actuating the test
push-button on console
Check that the HYD light illuminates and HORN sounds
Move the cyclic stick 2 or 3 times along both axes
separately about 10 % of total travel, check for hydraulic assistance by
absence of control load.
Press the test pushbutton to restore hydraulic
pressure
Check that the HORN is cancelled and HYD light
goes out.
Carry out a hydraulic pressure isolation check:
Isolate hydraulic pressure by actuating the switch on the
collective pitch lever: the HYD light illuminates and
control load is felt immediately.
Restore hydraulic pressure using the switch: the HORN sounds
until the HYD light goes out (2 -3 sec.).
Option 2. Instead of only moving cyclic 2 or 3 times along each axes, continue to move the cyclic until accumulator pressure is depleated. (We'll leave the other topic of excessive stress on the starflex for another day.)
It has been put to me that this is the only way to find out what will happen (hard over of the cyclic if 1 accumlator has a lower pressure than the others)in the event of exhausting accumlator pressure.
Whilst I agree that it may be handy to know that one of your accumulators could do with some extra pressure, in the event of a hydraulic failure the flight manual says to "calmly" reduce collective and adjust airspeed to between 40 & 60kts and isolate, thus it is irrelevant (for want of a better word) what sort of pressure you have available provided you don't "stir" the cyclic excessively during your calm response.
I suppose that if your method for dealing with the failure was to use the accumulator pressure for as long as it lasted (until short finals maybe) then it may be in your best interest to know what was what?
I've flown with a range of check and training pilots in the AS350 all of whom had substantial total and squirrell time...it's a mixed bag of sometimes passionate responces.
For me I'll take the flight manual response...I like to know how deep I'm in it right from the start.
Pro's and con's please.
Cheers FBD
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FDB
I tend for option 2. It will give you an idea of how much (or how little) accumulator pressure you have. Add onto that a check that the pedals have lost pressure immediately (AS350 and BA) once you press the HYD TEST switch. Move the cyclic around but you don't have to be very aggressive with it. Remember that you are just bleeding the accumulators. The Starflex can handle these small ground movements.
The accumulators are there to allow the pilot to bring the aircraft back to a more manageable configuration (airspeed) before complete HYD loss is felt. If you achieve this manageable configuration before the accumulators give out, the HYD isolate switch should be activated to allow a more uniform loss of pressure accross all the accumulators (ie. prevent a hardover in one axis).
My thoughts only.
I tend for option 2. It will give you an idea of how much (or how little) accumulator pressure you have. Add onto that a check that the pedals have lost pressure immediately (AS350 and BA) once you press the HYD TEST switch. Move the cyclic around but you don't have to be very aggressive with it. Remember that you are just bleeding the accumulators. The Starflex can handle these small ground movements.
The accumulators are there to allow the pilot to bring the aircraft back to a more manageable configuration (airspeed) before complete HYD loss is felt. If you achieve this manageable configuration before the accumulators give out, the HYD isolate switch should be activated to allow a more uniform loss of pressure accross all the accumulators (ie. prevent a hardover in one axis).
My thoughts only.
The CAA airtest (flown each year) requires 20 secs of gentle manoeuvering after pressing the test switch before an accu exhausts. 20 secs is a hell of a long time and far more than required to get from whatever you were doing back to 60kts. If the accus are good for 3 fore and aft and lateral movements during the pre-flight check, there will be enough in them to ensure a safe landing if you're in the hover, or achieve 60 kts if in the cruise. Incidentally, the accu pressures are checked during the 100 hr servicing.
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Transport Canada went into this in some detail after the Ontario OMNR accident - I don't have the details to hand, but you might find find details on their web site at www.tc.gc.ca - if I find any info I will post it.
Phil
Phil
I think it much better to flick the switch and plan your approach with constant feed back etc i think that losing that last bit of help on short finals may just ruin your day, you have done loads of approaches with hyd off , this is just another one !
Wonder if Jack Stall played a role in this accident?
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD REPORT: Details of helicopter crash released
Well-respected pilot known for wild rides
By K.C. HOWARD
REVIEW-JOURNAL
Masami Kato, 24, and Makiko Hatano, 23, smiled as they boarded a helicopter on Sept. 20, 2003, for a tour of the Grand Canyon.
The tourists from Japan spoke little English and were excited that their tour pilot, Takashi Mezaki, was from their homeland and spoke their language.
With cameras in hand, they were talking to Mezaki as he took off from Grand Canyon West Airport in Arizona, about 80 miles southeast of Las Vegas, Glenda Christine Springgate-Hill later told investigators.
The tour coordinator for Sundance Helicopters, the company that owned the helicopter, said she then saw the pilot hover oddly over a cliff for about 30 seconds, before descending into a canyon.
Mezaki was to fly the two women and four other passengers through Descent Canyon and land at a beach pad next to the Colorado River. But about two minutes after take-off, part of the helicopter hit the canyon wall. The helicopter crashed and burned on a ledge 1.5 miles from the airport, killing everyone aboard.
The last moments of life for the pilot and his passengers, are detailed in a National Transportation Safety Board report released on Monday. The document, which consists of hundreds of pages of interviews and reports and some pictures of Mezaki's last moments in the air, is a compilation of facts and does not include any analysis of the cause of the crash.
The report mentions that while Mezaki was a well-respected pilot, he also had a penchant for giving passengers a wild ride. Known as "Kamikaze" by some in tour helicopter circles, Mezaki scared numerous passengers by quickly and steeply descending his craft down into the canyon, close to the canyon walls, sometimes passing over other helicopters, according to the NTSB report.
At 10 a.m., about two hours before he died, Mezaki flew a group of four people through the canyon. Two of the men in the group heard Mezaki tell the woman in the passenger seat he hadn't slept in 27 hours. The four reported the helicopter approached the canyon, there it hovered for a few seconds, banked right and nose-dived. A woman riding in the front of the helicopter gave a "blood-curdling" scream the entire way down, one passenger said.
The NTSB report doesn't include names of the passengers who were interviewed, but the woman in the front, described as a 41-year-old homemaker, told investigators that she looked back and noticed her husband and the other couple looked "glued" to the rear window.
Her husband, a 42-year-old general contractor with a single-engine, private pilot license said he thought the wild ride from the Sundance pilot was "part of their thing."
He noticed a tip jar and sign in the center of the instrument panel and recalled he told Mezaki on the return trip out of the canyon, "I tip better if I get there alive."
He said the pilot was in control and did not look tired, impaired or drunk. He did not hear any unusual mechanical sounds and was later told by the owner of Sundance that the pilots weren't supposed to fly that way.
Jim Granquist, president of Sundance Helicopters, said pilots often are considered guilty until proven innocent after crashes. But he said Mezaki was "an excellent pilot; he was current on everything."
On Monday, he had not yet reviewed the NTSB report and declined to comment on it. He said the company is still unsure what caused the crash.
Owner of a flight school for 10 years and a former police officer, Mezaki began working for Sundance with more than 5,000 hours in the air. He commuted from his house in California, where he lived with his wife, 11-year-old and 9-year-old daughters and a 10-month-old baby, said Stacy Sheard, another Sundance pilot who was flying Sept. 20.
The morning of the crash he was showing her pictures of his children, before things got hectic. At the time of the accident, both pilots had been "two-hours under turning rotor blades," Sheard recalled.
She quit several days after the crash to work for a different helicopter company. She told NTSB investigators she didn't want to fly Descent Canyon again. She also said the tour coordinator, Springgate-Hill, pushed pilots hard. Mezaki flew with a towel behind his lower back and she had an inflated pillow to cushion her lower back from the constant jolts.
Mezaki and his wife lived a healthy life style according to his coworkers. He was a marathon runner and jogged almost every day for about an hour, according to his Nevada roommate.
Mezaki had been reprimanded in August 2001 after Sundance received a report that he had flown a similar route from Grand Canyon West Airport that included abrupt banks and violated other flight standards.
He was issued a letter that called for a one-week suspension without pay. But Tom Schaus, charter manager of Sundance, said the company was short pilots and opted to delay his suspension, eventually forgetting about it.
Several pilots quoted in the report theorized Mezaki may have encountered the "jack-stall" phenomenon.
In 2000, another pilot dove into the canyon at about 120 knots. He lost control of the helicopter and the rotor nearly hit the side of the canyon. He thought he was going to die and gave up steering, which ironically returned the controls to normal.
Investigators examined the helicopter's parts, including the engine, which was damaged by the impact and fire but otherwise seemed functional.
One of the only pieces unaffected by the crash, investigators noted, was Mezaki's small laminated placard, which was found outside the burned area. It read: "Gratuities are always appreciated."
Well-respected pilot known for wild rides
By K.C. HOWARD
REVIEW-JOURNAL
Masami Kato, 24, and Makiko Hatano, 23, smiled as they boarded a helicopter on Sept. 20, 2003, for a tour of the Grand Canyon.
The tourists from Japan spoke little English and were excited that their tour pilot, Takashi Mezaki, was from their homeland and spoke their language.
With cameras in hand, they were talking to Mezaki as he took off from Grand Canyon West Airport in Arizona, about 80 miles southeast of Las Vegas, Glenda Christine Springgate-Hill later told investigators.
The tour coordinator for Sundance Helicopters, the company that owned the helicopter, said she then saw the pilot hover oddly over a cliff for about 30 seconds, before descending into a canyon.
Mezaki was to fly the two women and four other passengers through Descent Canyon and land at a beach pad next to the Colorado River. But about two minutes after take-off, part of the helicopter hit the canyon wall. The helicopter crashed and burned on a ledge 1.5 miles from the airport, killing everyone aboard.
The last moments of life for the pilot and his passengers, are detailed in a National Transportation Safety Board report released on Monday. The document, which consists of hundreds of pages of interviews and reports and some pictures of Mezaki's last moments in the air, is a compilation of facts and does not include any analysis of the cause of the crash.
The report mentions that while Mezaki was a well-respected pilot, he also had a penchant for giving passengers a wild ride. Known as "Kamikaze" by some in tour helicopter circles, Mezaki scared numerous passengers by quickly and steeply descending his craft down into the canyon, close to the canyon walls, sometimes passing over other helicopters, according to the NTSB report.
At 10 a.m., about two hours before he died, Mezaki flew a group of four people through the canyon. Two of the men in the group heard Mezaki tell the woman in the passenger seat he hadn't slept in 27 hours. The four reported the helicopter approached the canyon, there it hovered for a few seconds, banked right and nose-dived. A woman riding in the front of the helicopter gave a "blood-curdling" scream the entire way down, one passenger said.
The NTSB report doesn't include names of the passengers who were interviewed, but the woman in the front, described as a 41-year-old homemaker, told investigators that she looked back and noticed her husband and the other couple looked "glued" to the rear window.
Her husband, a 42-year-old general contractor with a single-engine, private pilot license said he thought the wild ride from the Sundance pilot was "part of their thing."
He noticed a tip jar and sign in the center of the instrument panel and recalled he told Mezaki on the return trip out of the canyon, "I tip better if I get there alive."
He said the pilot was in control and did not look tired, impaired or drunk. He did not hear any unusual mechanical sounds and was later told by the owner of Sundance that the pilots weren't supposed to fly that way.
Jim Granquist, president of Sundance Helicopters, said pilots often are considered guilty until proven innocent after crashes. But he said Mezaki was "an excellent pilot; he was current on everything."
On Monday, he had not yet reviewed the NTSB report and declined to comment on it. He said the company is still unsure what caused the crash.
Owner of a flight school for 10 years and a former police officer, Mezaki began working for Sundance with more than 5,000 hours in the air. He commuted from his house in California, where he lived with his wife, 11-year-old and 9-year-old daughters and a 10-month-old baby, said Stacy Sheard, another Sundance pilot who was flying Sept. 20.
The morning of the crash he was showing her pictures of his children, before things got hectic. At the time of the accident, both pilots had been "two-hours under turning rotor blades," Sheard recalled.
She quit several days after the crash to work for a different helicopter company. She told NTSB investigators she didn't want to fly Descent Canyon again. She also said the tour coordinator, Springgate-Hill, pushed pilots hard. Mezaki flew with a towel behind his lower back and she had an inflated pillow to cushion her lower back from the constant jolts.
Mezaki and his wife lived a healthy life style according to his coworkers. He was a marathon runner and jogged almost every day for about an hour, according to his Nevada roommate.
Mezaki had been reprimanded in August 2001 after Sundance received a report that he had flown a similar route from Grand Canyon West Airport that included abrupt banks and violated other flight standards.
He was issued a letter that called for a one-week suspension without pay. But Tom Schaus, charter manager of Sundance, said the company was short pilots and opted to delay his suspension, eventually forgetting about it.
Several pilots quoted in the report theorized Mezaki may have encountered the "jack-stall" phenomenon.
In 2000, another pilot dove into the canyon at about 120 knots. He lost control of the helicopter and the rotor nearly hit the side of the canyon. He thought he was going to die and gave up steering, which ironically returned the controls to normal.
Investigators examined the helicopter's parts, including the engine, which was damaged by the impact and fire but otherwise seemed functional.
One of the only pieces unaffected by the crash, investigators noted, was Mezaki's small laminated placard, which was found outside the burned area. It read: "Gratuities are always appreciated."