NTSB Report on ERA S-76 CFIT
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Airlines and CFIT
Several accidents come to mind:
A B-727 was cleared for approach to Dulles, the crew misread the approach plate and hit the top of a hill. During research of the accident it was determined another airliner did the same thing about a month earlier but barley cleared the hill in IFR conditions.
ATC procedures were soon changed to include an altitude to maintain once cleared for the approach.
The infamous Eastern L1011 crash where the crew were pre-occupied with a burned out landing light indicator. I believe the autopilot became disconnected with three crewmembers on deck and no one caught it. I believe CRM became a big push by the airlines after that but it took years to change institutional mindsets.
A B-727 ended up in the water off of Pensacola during an approach after the FE turned off the GPWS, he thought it was a false message. Anyone want to fly with that crew?
Cali, Columbia, I believe the crew input the wrong fix ID in the system. The wrong fix had an additional letter. It was late at night and at the end of a long flight.
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In those accidents above I don’t think anyone is blaming the hardware
It appears the airlines lowered their accident rates some years after CRM was implemented and followed.
Also, when someone says 10 years of experience do they mean 10 years or 1 year repeated 10 times? As pilots we need to take the responsibility of improving ourselves.
Several accidents come to mind:
A B-727 was cleared for approach to Dulles, the crew misread the approach plate and hit the top of a hill. During research of the accident it was determined another airliner did the same thing about a month earlier but barley cleared the hill in IFR conditions.
ATC procedures were soon changed to include an altitude to maintain once cleared for the approach.
The infamous Eastern L1011 crash where the crew were pre-occupied with a burned out landing light indicator. I believe the autopilot became disconnected with three crewmembers on deck and no one caught it. I believe CRM became a big push by the airlines after that but it took years to change institutional mindsets.
A B-727 ended up in the water off of Pensacola during an approach after the FE turned off the GPWS, he thought it was a false message. Anyone want to fly with that crew?
Cali, Columbia, I believe the crew input the wrong fix ID in the system. The wrong fix had an additional letter. It was late at night and at the end of a long flight.
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In those accidents above I don’t think anyone is blaming the hardware
It appears the airlines lowered their accident rates some years after CRM was implemented and followed.
Also, when someone says 10 years of experience do they mean 10 years or 1 year repeated 10 times? As pilots we need to take the responsibility of improving ourselves.
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SASless,
I am not wrong, those aircraft flew out with a ferry package only, because the customer was going to put his cockpit in. Don't blame the manufacturer when the customer decides to put his own entire cockpit into the aircraft!
I am not wrong, those aircraft flew out with a ferry package only, because the customer was going to put his cockpit in. Don't blame the manufacturer when the customer decides to put his own entire cockpit into the aircraft!
Thread Starter
Nick,
Slow down a mo' ol buddy....aim yer rockets before you pull the trigger....it's a computer keyboard not a full set of 17 pounders you got under your two index fingers.
From my post prior to yours....where is the finger pointing squire?
From my post before that one.....
Slow down a mo' ol buddy....aim yer rockets before you pull the trigger....it's a computer keyboard not a full set of 17 pounders you got under your two index fingers.
From my post prior to yours....where is the finger pointing squire?
The Air Log machines that first got delivered were "green" and had only the basic flight instruments and a standby attitude indicator. The completions were done at Heli-Dyne in Ft. Worth and IFR kit was installed there. Air Log pilots had to fly the aircraft without SAS or a proper set of instruments when the company (Air Log) ran into a backlog at the Heli-Dyne completion center.
This was in the days when Sikorsky was selling the 76 with the organic in-house SAS system and Air Log wanted the Sperry system. You do remember the phase I, II, and III SAS system configurations.
The aircraft were sold that way at the request of the customer (Air Log).
This was in the days when Sikorsky was selling the 76 with the organic in-house SAS system and Air Log wanted the Sperry system. You do remember the phase I, II, and III SAS system configurations.
The aircraft were sold that way at the request of the customer (Air Log).
Why would Sikorsky build a 76 and not make a RadAlt a basic instrument package item?
Immediate answer will be....ah..it is a customer option.
Next question....why would an operator buy a 76 and not install a RadAlt?
Immediate answer will be....ah..it is a customer option.
Next question....why would an operator buy a 76 and not install a RadAlt?
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atpmba
none of those but thanks, it featured on the television black box series pilots were communicating for quite a while with control before they lost it, in the meatime they almost stalled it several times. somewhere off the south americas????
NICK, ah the theatre of it, nick I said I'm with you man! i also say again that we don't neeed to download too much on the drivers. have you never driven a machine with the static vents completely clogged up -- causes all sorts of indicator probs.
there was another recent and not so famous event in oz. a BRAND NEW 407 was found floating upside down the next morning offshore Queensland by the good old television media , seems the hero and crew, who all got out ok, had a known defect radalt, and still continued, planning???? to find by GPS and refuel at night on an offshore reef from jerry cans which he was carrying.
speculate on that one, or i should say speculate on the vacant space between the earlobes.
NICK, ah the theatre of it, nick I said I'm with you man! i also say again that we don't neeed to download too much on the drivers. have you never driven a machine with the static vents completely clogged up -- causes all sorts of indicator probs.
there was another recent and not so famous event in oz. a BRAND NEW 407 was found floating upside down the next morning offshore Queensland by the good old television media , seems the hero and crew, who all got out ok, had a known defect radalt, and still continued, planning???? to find by GPS and refuel at night on an offshore reef from jerry cans which he was carrying.
speculate on that one, or i should say speculate on the vacant space between the earlobes.
Thread Starter
Airport....large well lit, fully instrumented, controlled area with visual approach aids, electronic approach aids, certified weather reporting, runway friction measuring, air traffic control and approach monitoring, used by fully instrumented crew served multi-engined airplanes monitored and assisted by company dispatch personnel, ground handling personnel, baggage and cargo personnel, and service facilities.
Helicopter landing site.....slightly fewer services and facilities than airports.
You wonder why we seem to do goofy things sometimes? You cannot have it both ways and still fly "helicopters". We start flying where the road ends (to quote a dear friend!).
Topend,
Would the crew have noticed something a bit odd on take off if the static ports were blocked? On a nice VFR night in a helicopter....it should have been noticable and easy to cope with as compared to the Boeing Jet that had the problem in South America. The re-enactment of that flight scares the Bejesus out of me just watching it on the TV.
Helicopter landing site.....slightly fewer services and facilities than airports.
You wonder why we seem to do goofy things sometimes? You cannot have it both ways and still fly "helicopters". We start flying where the road ends (to quote a dear friend!).
Topend,
Would the crew have noticed something a bit odd on take off if the static ports were blocked? On a nice VFR night in a helicopter....it should have been noticable and easy to cope with as compared to the Boeing Jet that had the problem in South America. The re-enactment of that flight scares the Bejesus out of me just watching it on the TV.
Having just read the NTSB extract, I note that the initial posting from SASless omits a significant point: the aircraft was equiped with a Honeywell SPZ-7600 autopilot. This would mean it was capable of being full coupled in all 4 axis, and equiped with a rad-alt, although obviously it wasn't equiped with an alerting device.
The recommendations include reference to training in the use of the autopilot, especially the coupling cues and annunciations. One can only wonder what modes were engaged at the time of the accident: none, IAS only, V/S? Not ALT I guess!
I forget the logic of the undercarriage audio warning, but would this not have triggered as the a/c descended through the rad-alt bug setting? Unless the rad-alt bug was set to zero (annoying bright orange lights at night?)
The recommendations include reference to training in the use of the autopilot, especially the coupling cues and annunciations. One can only wonder what modes were engaged at the time of the accident: none, IAS only, V/S? Not ALT I guess!
I forget the logic of the undercarriage audio warning, but would this not have triggered as the a/c descended through the rad-alt bug setting? Unless the rad-alt bug was set to zero (annoying bright orange lights at night?)
Thread Starter
212man,
I raised a number of issues....and certainly not all of the possibilities. Any idea why they raised the autopilot training issue?
In the foggy recesses of my alcohol ravaged brain, I seem to recall the 76 uses a combinaton airspeed and RadAlt height to trigger the gear warning.
It seems that if you had a strong headwind and some forward speed the horn would not go off which makes me think it requires both inputs to trigger the warning. Someone more current on the 76 can tell us how that works.
Of course at cruise speed....it would not be the horn that woke you up when you hit the water.
I raised a number of issues....and certainly not all of the possibilities. Any idea why they raised the autopilot training issue?
In the foggy recesses of my alcohol ravaged brain, I seem to recall the 76 uses a combinaton airspeed and RadAlt height to trigger the gear warning.
It seems that if you had a strong headwind and some forward speed the horn would not go off which makes me think it requires both inputs to trigger the warning. Someone more current on the 76 can tell us how that works.
Of course at cruise speed....it would not be the horn that woke you up when you hit the water.
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SASLESS..You should get into Heliergonomics..a developing science......experienced pilots with great sense of humour should apply for position of Test Director of Manufacturer! And you have loads of experience.
SASless,
I thought it was Rad-Alt OR IAS that triggered it, but a lot of water has passed under the bridge since then!
The NTSB's issue of Autopilot training is twofold, I think. a) to highlight differences between the HPZ-7000 and HPZ-7600 (of which I am ignorant, having only seen the 7000!) and b) to ensure adequate training in knowledge of the use of coupled modes: how they function and the indications in the cockpit that show what modes are engaged. I assume the A++ in question had a 'round dial' cockpit so annunciations would be limited to the AP control panel and Flight Director control panel. On EFIS a/c the indications are normally presented on the Flight Mode Annunciator strip at the top of the PFD, and the calling and checking of FMA indications should be part of the SOPs for the a/c.
I cannot help but think that either the radalt was unserviceable (hopefully the final report will tell us), or the bugs were set at zero. If they had been set above zero there would have been sudden bright orange light as they passed the bugged height. It's designed to get your attention!
I thought it was Rad-Alt OR IAS that triggered it, but a lot of water has passed under the bridge since then!
The NTSB's issue of Autopilot training is twofold, I think. a) to highlight differences between the HPZ-7000 and HPZ-7600 (of which I am ignorant, having only seen the 7000!) and b) to ensure adequate training in knowledge of the use of coupled modes: how they function and the indications in the cockpit that show what modes are engaged. I assume the A++ in question had a 'round dial' cockpit so annunciations would be limited to the AP control panel and Flight Director control panel. On EFIS a/c the indications are normally presented on the Flight Mode Annunciator strip at the top of the PFD, and the calling and checking of FMA indications should be part of the SOPs for the a/c.
I cannot help but think that either the radalt was unserviceable (hopefully the final report will tell us), or the bugs were set at zero. If they had been set above zero there would have been sudden bright orange light as they passed the bugged height. It's designed to get your attention!
Thread Starter
How many variations of cockpit configurations exist between all the 76's in a fleet. I know one nay...two Bristow Group companies that has just about every variation there is and over the years has tried to standardize them as much as possible but has not gotten there yet.
That brings up yet another issue to consider....fleet commonality. Had there been a change of aircraft for the crew that day, week, shift, hitch or customer? Are the cockpit procedures different enough or generic enough a mistake could be made due to that?
At one place I worked we thought ourselves as being on top of things only to discover that we as an institution had skipped right over a basic calibration procedure for one of the mission systems that led to some very bright red cheeks when we discovered what had happened. Granted the manufacturers Operator's Manual was written in Swahili and only the technical writer that composed the section dealing with that procedure could have understood it. One of the dangers of out sourcing technical work I guess.
That brings up yet another issue to consider....fleet commonality. Had there been a change of aircraft for the crew that day, week, shift, hitch or customer? Are the cockpit procedures different enough or generic enough a mistake could be made due to that?
At one place I worked we thought ourselves as being on top of things only to discover that we as an institution had skipped right over a basic calibration procedure for one of the mission systems that led to some very bright red cheeks when we discovered what had happened. Granted the manufacturers Operator's Manual was written in Swahili and only the technical writer that composed the section dealing with that procedure could have understood it. One of the dangers of out sourcing technical work I guess.
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SASless,
Those air log aircraft were shipped without a cockpit - because the customer was to install his own. The entire cockpit was deleted, not the rad alt. Why not blame me for shipping it without the rest of the cockpit, Kimo Sabe, and stop focussing on the rad alt?
Those air log aircraft were shipped without a cockpit - because the customer was to install his own. The entire cockpit was deleted, not the rad alt. Why not blame me for shipping it without the rest of the cockpit, Kimo Sabe, and stop focussing on the rad alt?
Thread Starter
Ah heck Nick, my cross check was never any good. I seemed to focus on the wrong indicator anyway. Always figgered if you took care of the big ones....the little ones would sort themselves out. Afterall RadAlts are rare items in some places and thus seem like really high tech stuff when you finally get to see one, thus they are fun to watch.
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Give it a rest, the NTSB wrote the report more for the FAA more than any one else. The FAA will file the thing in the Round file cabinet. Well I never flown S-76's only Bell 206's and every single one of those 206 had a different lay out. The Pilots are dead so its easy to blame them, and the rules make the pilots the ones that will be blamed when all else fails. The guys flew into the water, killed themselves and there Passingers. Would a Radar Alt have helped yep it would provide it was turned on and working and the Pilots were paying attention. It all comes back to two pilots for some reason not paying attention and well it hurt them. But it has to be somebodies fault, NSTB has an adjenda, the FAA has theirs, Era well we all know what happend to them because if it, Sikorsky gets tared and feathered for not doing total fitting out there products, never mind that customers like to do their own pannels. All in all that report is just another circle jerk. Take it for what it is, learn from it and move on.
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Seems every time someone hits the water we add another light and gadget to the panel. A rad-alt has been common on everything from Jetrangers to S92 flown offshore, but an ARA approach can still be flown without it. The NTSB recommendation is for EGPWS. So the next time that two pilots ignore the rad-alt, gear warning audio and light, both altimeters unwinding, both VSI negative for a long period, ground prox bar on the EFIS C+, AVAD, we are all confident and satisfied that they will notice the EGPWS. Maybe, maybe not since even those have the Offshore toggle so you don't lose your nav and radar at a bad time on an ARA approach. I don't think there has been a CFIT accident of a EGPWS equipped helicopter in the GOM yet. When there is, the NTSB will add some other warning to the panel for the pilots to not notice.
What about some proper CRM and CFIT training instead that is tailored to the offshore flying and to the aircraft systems and automation? Why do we waste a couple of days a year listening to some retired airline pilot drone on in a classroom about an Airbus hitting a mountain just to get that piece of paper that says "CRM"? What about SOP's that are written with helicopter IFR CRM and the automation in mind instead of treating them as two separate subjects?
What about some proper CRM and CFIT training instead that is tailored to the offshore flying and to the aircraft systems and automation? Why do we waste a couple of days a year listening to some retired airline pilot drone on in a classroom about an Airbus hitting a mountain just to get that piece of paper that says "CRM"? What about SOP's that are written with helicopter IFR CRM and the automation in mind instead of treating them as two separate subjects?
Thread Starter
From early on in this post Nick and I took the position that "Pilot Error" tells only a part of the story in this tragedy. This crew was experienced and was flying a well equipped aircraft in good weather at night over the ocean while in cruise. The report, without any other identifible cause points to the pilots.
That is improper in my book. If they cannot identify a cause then it remains unsolved in my view. They have not shown what the pilots did...or did not do that allowed the aircraft to impact the water.
The question that remains is simple..."What caused the aircraft to impact the water...what chain of events led to that happening?" Was there some failure of training or procedures that set the crew up for making a mistake that could have caused this?
Due to the lack of an operable CVR and no Data Recorder being installed, we will never know. The Pin the Tail on the Donkey game that gets played in these situations means the Pilots who are not here to defend themselves are going to be the Donkey unfortunately.
I wonder if ERA has had a third party review of its procedures and policies since that accident with a view towards confirming the adequacy of their training , check and procedures.
What makes this accident so strange is that it occurred in cruise over the ocean and not while on an ARA or takeoff. That is why an answer that correctly identifys the cause is so important.
That is improper in my book. If they cannot identify a cause then it remains unsolved in my view. They have not shown what the pilots did...or did not do that allowed the aircraft to impact the water.
The question that remains is simple..."What caused the aircraft to impact the water...what chain of events led to that happening?" Was there some failure of training or procedures that set the crew up for making a mistake that could have caused this?
Due to the lack of an operable CVR and no Data Recorder being installed, we will never know. The Pin the Tail on the Donkey game that gets played in these situations means the Pilots who are not here to defend themselves are going to be the Donkey unfortunately.
I wonder if ERA has had a third party review of its procedures and policies since that accident with a view towards confirming the adequacy of their training , check and procedures.
What makes this accident so strange is that it occurred in cruise over the ocean and not while on an ARA or takeoff. That is why an answer that correctly identifys the cause is so important.
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I agree with Nick on most of this, but just a quick niggle. Spend 9.5 hours in those seats (the S92 is even more uncomfortable than an S76 or even a 412) and see how much trouble you have concentrating on the altitude, airspeed, or indeed anything except the pain in your back and backside. Ergonomics has a large effect on safety.
The A++ can have the gear warning triggered by either the radalt or the airspeed. If this one was triggered by airspeed, and the airspeed never dropped below 60 kts, then there would be no gear warning horn. You can drive it into the water at 70 kts or 130 kts and never, ever get a warning. It isn't both, it's either airspeed or radalt.
Adding more technology is wonderful. But there needs to be training on how to use that technology. A couple of days at FSI is nice, but it won't teach you nearly everything you need to know, and neither will a one or two day class by the local training (checkride) department. Having 10,000 total hours won't help that much, either, if it's all in older models. It takes a lot of training time, which operators aren't willing to do, because that costs lots of money, both in aircraft flight time, unproductive pilot time, and loss of aircraft availability for customer charges. I don't have an answer, but I do think it involves both technology, and proper use of ergonomics for both pilot comfort and especially in making that technology easy to use and understand. Requiring pilots to monitor systems full-time is as dangerous as requiring them to hand-fly full time, perhaps more so. If the pilot is hand-flying, he is likely paying much closer attention to altitude, airspeed, etc. The technology has to be easy to use, and completely transparent. That isn't easy to do, of course.
The A++ can have the gear warning triggered by either the radalt or the airspeed. If this one was triggered by airspeed, and the airspeed never dropped below 60 kts, then there would be no gear warning horn. You can drive it into the water at 70 kts or 130 kts and never, ever get a warning. It isn't both, it's either airspeed or radalt.
Adding more technology is wonderful. But there needs to be training on how to use that technology. A couple of days at FSI is nice, but it won't teach you nearly everything you need to know, and neither will a one or two day class by the local training (checkride) department. Having 10,000 total hours won't help that much, either, if it's all in older models. It takes a lot of training time, which operators aren't willing to do, because that costs lots of money, both in aircraft flight time, unproductive pilot time, and loss of aircraft availability for customer charges. I don't have an answer, but I do think it involves both technology, and proper use of ergonomics for both pilot comfort and especially in making that technology easy to use and understand. Requiring pilots to monitor systems full-time is as dangerous as requiring them to hand-fly full time, perhaps more so. If the pilot is hand-flying, he is likely paying much closer attention to altitude, airspeed, etc. The technology has to be easy to use, and completely transparent. That isn't easy to do, of course.
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sasless and co
"The Pin the Tail on the Donkey game that gets played in these situations means the Pilots who are not here to defend themselves are going to be the Donkey unfortunately."
This reminded me of one who has been here before and has written about it.
Author Campbell, Steuart
Title: Chinook Crash - the Crash of RAF Chinook Helicopter ZD576 on the Mull of Kintyre
Publisher: Pen & Sword / Leo Cooper
The carrier wave in this book is about a very professional outfit its great camaraderie, extra good training and, the odd dash of luck.
The real story is how the “system” blamed the drivers when there was nothing obvious happened in an accident and how the author is desperately and with great courage trying to clear his former colleagues. A good read and the author needs a big pat on the back.
The ‘system’ he talks about is the military which provided ‘butt cover’ for non decision or inability, which provides the ‘ineffectual system’.
Our ‘system’ is supposed to be different. It is investigation by ATSB or NTSB which is not supposed to be influenced by politicians, manufacturers or big companies looking for ‘butt cover’. They are supposed to be statutory and autonomous. Are they? If so why is this thread plainly unhappy with the finding?
If the finding is libel, then maybe there should be a class action against these sorts of findings when after all nothing has been proven. Why cannot investigation conclude that there was no recoverable evidence, as a finding instead of “pin the tail on the driver?”
It is not really a matter of, quote from another thread:- "I have plenty of operational experience, Civil and Military flying experience and enough hours to know that at some point all of us will experience some sort of accident or incident."
It may well be a matter of providing for a system where when you run into that inextricable problem that your wife, family, friends and colleagues will not be left with a tainted “pilot error” slur against your name.
This reminded me of one who has been here before and has written about it.
Author Campbell, Steuart
Title: Chinook Crash - the Crash of RAF Chinook Helicopter ZD576 on the Mull of Kintyre
Publisher: Pen & Sword / Leo Cooper
The carrier wave in this book is about a very professional outfit its great camaraderie, extra good training and, the odd dash of luck.
The real story is how the “system” blamed the drivers when there was nothing obvious happened in an accident and how the author is desperately and with great courage trying to clear his former colleagues. A good read and the author needs a big pat on the back.
The ‘system’ he talks about is the military which provided ‘butt cover’ for non decision or inability, which provides the ‘ineffectual system’.
Our ‘system’ is supposed to be different. It is investigation by ATSB or NTSB which is not supposed to be influenced by politicians, manufacturers or big companies looking for ‘butt cover’. They are supposed to be statutory and autonomous. Are they? If so why is this thread plainly unhappy with the finding?
If the finding is libel, then maybe there should be a class action against these sorts of findings when after all nothing has been proven. Why cannot investigation conclude that there was no recoverable evidence, as a finding instead of “pin the tail on the driver?”
It is not really a matter of, quote from another thread:- "I have plenty of operational experience, Civil and Military flying experience and enough hours to know that at some point all of us will experience some sort of accident or incident."
It may well be a matter of providing for a system where when you run into that inextricable problem that your wife, family, friends and colleagues will not be left with a tainted “pilot error” slur against your name.
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The important point I am trying to make is that ALL pilots Err, and there is nothing shameful about it. If you think any human system will simply not err, you are mistaken (like that circular logic??)
It is no slur to have had a human error accident, any more than a baseball hero must make 100% hits while at bat. It is impossible for a human system to be infallible. To get the errors down in percentage, we must make the job easier and more predictable, and less reliant on extra-human capabilities. For that Chinook crew's family to hang their heads because an expert group had decided that they erred is not a shame on them, it is simply a fact that they undertook an enterprise that had slim margins, and that less than perfect behavior could cause a mishap. Since none of us can behave that way, a certain number of mishaps will occur. Remember, the military are those among us who decide how many lives a hill is worth.
It is clear from the posts on this thread that this concept is not understood, perhaps because I cannot adequately explain it.
It is no slur to have had a human error accident, any more than a baseball hero must make 100% hits while at bat. It is impossible for a human system to be infallible. To get the errors down in percentage, we must make the job easier and more predictable, and less reliant on extra-human capabilities. For that Chinook crew's family to hang their heads because an expert group had decided that they erred is not a shame on them, it is simply a fact that they undertook an enterprise that had slim margins, and that less than perfect behavior could cause a mishap. Since none of us can behave that way, a certain number of mishaps will occur. Remember, the military are those among us who decide how many lives a hill is worth.
It is clear from the posts on this thread that this concept is not understood, perhaps because I cannot adequately explain it.
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Nick,
If I remember correctly in the case of the UK military Chinook there was a slur. The families hung their heads not because the report found that there was a human factor involved when there was no particular evidence one way or the other, but because the pilots were found guilty of Gross Negligence without any particular evidence of human factors one way or the other. I note that, long after many horses have bolted, CVRs are now being fitted in UK military aircraft
The fact remains, on the UK side of the pond (in the 80s I think) an S61 crashed in fog but with bright sunlight which may have masked the little orange light on the radalt. As a result, all those years ago, an audio warning (AVAD) was mandated by the UKCAA. This goes off when the bugged height is reached and at 100ft, so even if the crew fail to set the bug they still get a 100ft warning in their headsets. It is not a full blown EGPWS, but it has the effect of advising the crew that something is amiss when flying offshore. Why did this not get adopted on the other side of the pond? Maybe no one took the time to take an interest in accidents outside the USA, or maybe it was a criminal attempt to save money. If the FAA had made AVAD compulsory on all offshore helicopters I am sure several lives would have been saved over the years and this accident may have been avoided.
Has this lesson now been learned?
If I remember correctly in the case of the UK military Chinook there was a slur. The families hung their heads not because the report found that there was a human factor involved when there was no particular evidence one way or the other, but because the pilots were found guilty of Gross Negligence without any particular evidence of human factors one way or the other. I note that, long after many horses have bolted, CVRs are now being fitted in UK military aircraft
The fact remains, on the UK side of the pond (in the 80s I think) an S61 crashed in fog but with bright sunlight which may have masked the little orange light on the radalt. As a result, all those years ago, an audio warning (AVAD) was mandated by the UKCAA. This goes off when the bugged height is reached and at 100ft, so even if the crew fail to set the bug they still get a 100ft warning in their headsets. It is not a full blown EGPWS, but it has the effect of advising the crew that something is amiss when flying offshore. Why did this not get adopted on the other side of the pond? Maybe no one took the time to take an interest in accidents outside the USA, or maybe it was a criminal attempt to save money. If the FAA had made AVAD compulsory on all offshore helicopters I am sure several lives would have been saved over the years and this accident may have been avoided.
Has this lesson now been learned?
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To err is human, and I've certainly proved my humanity many times. So far I've been lucky, and my errors have had no significant effects. It could have easily been otherwise, though, and I certainly welcome any technology which can help save my rear. EGPWS is a huge step forward, and IMO it should be required on any commercial aircraft. FMS and full flight directors take over the drudgery of flying, and keep the aircraft on course, on altitude, and allow the pilots to keep the big picture in sight. Reliance on technology without insuring it's doing what we want, not what we told it to do, can be dangerous, however. To coin an acronym, TAANSTAFL, and there are downsides to everything, of course. In the long term though, the upsides outweigh the downsides. I'll take all the technology I can get, and happily learn to cope with it.