What's the latest news of the V22 Osprey?
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CV-22 Accident Investigation Results Released
CV-22 accident investigation board results released
12/17/2010 - HURLBURT FIELD, Fla. (AFNS) -- Air Force Special Operations Command officials released the results of their investigation into the CV-22 Osprey accident April 9, near Qalat, Afghanistan, that killed four people and injured 16 of the 20 onboard.
The pilot, flight engineer, an Army Ranger, and a civilian contract employee were killed in the crash.
Under the authority delegated to him by the AFSOC commander, the AFSOC vice-commander convened an Accident Investigation Board to investigate the matter, and designated Brig. Gen. Donald Harvel, the Air National Guard assistant to the commander, AFSOC, Hurlburt Field, Fla., as the board president.
Concluding the investigation, the board president could not determine the cause of the mishap by the standard of "clear and convincing evidence," in part because the flight incident recorder, the Vibration Structural Life and Engine Diagnostics control unit, and the right engine were destroyed and therefore not available for analysis. After an exhaustive investigation of the available evidence, the board president ruled out multiple possible causes. Items ruled out included loss due to enemy action, environmental brownout conditions and vortex ring state. In addition, a design problem that led to the replacement of the Central De-ice Distributor support bracket found in all Marine Corps and Air Force Ospreys, was not a factor.
The board president determined 10 factors substantially contributed to the mishap. These included inadequate weather planning, a poorly executed, low-visibility approach, a tailwind, a challenging visual environment, the mishap crew's task saturation, the mishap copilot's distraction, the mishap copilot's negative transfer of a behavior learned in a previous aircraft, the mishap crew's pressing to accomplish their first combat mission of the deployment, an unanticipated high rate of descent and engine power loss. Substantially contributing factors play an important role in the mishap sequence of events and are supported by the greater weight of credible evidence.
The convening authority approved the board president's report, with comments. While legally sufficient, he assessed the evidence in the AIB report did not support a determination of engine power loss as one of the 10 substantially contributing factors. The convening authority made this decision based upon the evidence in the AIB report and additional analysis of the evidence in the report. The convening authority concluded the preponderance of credible evidence did not indicate engine power loss as a substantially contributing factor of the mishap.
After a review of the original AIB report, the convening authority's statement of opinion and additional material obtained after the completion of the AIB report, the chief of staff of the Air Force reopened the investigation and directed the AIB board president to analyze the additional information.
The board president conducted a follow-on investigation to analyze two Naval Air Systems Command reports and the convening authority's analysis of video data. After consideration of the new material the only fact the AIB president changed from his original report was the ground speed of the aircraft at impact from what was believed to be 75 knots to 80 knots at the time of impact. The remainder of the findings was unchanged.
The primary purpose of the board was to provide a publicly releasable report of the facts and circumstances surrounding the accident. An executive summary of the report is available at http://usaf.aib.law.af.mil/index.html.
The entire report is available at http://www.afsoc.af.mil/accidentinvestigationboard/index.asp or by contacting the AFSOC Public Affairs Office at 850-884-5515.
12/17/2010 - HURLBURT FIELD, Fla. (AFNS) -- Air Force Special Operations Command officials released the results of their investigation into the CV-22 Osprey accident April 9, near Qalat, Afghanistan, that killed four people and injured 16 of the 20 onboard.
The pilot, flight engineer, an Army Ranger, and a civilian contract employee were killed in the crash.
Under the authority delegated to him by the AFSOC commander, the AFSOC vice-commander convened an Accident Investigation Board to investigate the matter, and designated Brig. Gen. Donald Harvel, the Air National Guard assistant to the commander, AFSOC, Hurlburt Field, Fla., as the board president.
Concluding the investigation, the board president could not determine the cause of the mishap by the standard of "clear and convincing evidence," in part because the flight incident recorder, the Vibration Structural Life and Engine Diagnostics control unit, and the right engine were destroyed and therefore not available for analysis. After an exhaustive investigation of the available evidence, the board president ruled out multiple possible causes. Items ruled out included loss due to enemy action, environmental brownout conditions and vortex ring state. In addition, a design problem that led to the replacement of the Central De-ice Distributor support bracket found in all Marine Corps and Air Force Ospreys, was not a factor.
The board president determined 10 factors substantially contributed to the mishap. These included inadequate weather planning, a poorly executed, low-visibility approach, a tailwind, a challenging visual environment, the mishap crew's task saturation, the mishap copilot's distraction, the mishap copilot's negative transfer of a behavior learned in a previous aircraft, the mishap crew's pressing to accomplish their first combat mission of the deployment, an unanticipated high rate of descent and engine power loss. Substantially contributing factors play an important role in the mishap sequence of events and are supported by the greater weight of credible evidence.
The convening authority approved the board president's report, with comments. While legally sufficient, he assessed the evidence in the AIB report did not support a determination of engine power loss as one of the 10 substantially contributing factors. The convening authority made this decision based upon the evidence in the AIB report and additional analysis of the evidence in the report. The convening authority concluded the preponderance of credible evidence did not indicate engine power loss as a substantially contributing factor of the mishap.
After a review of the original AIB report, the convening authority's statement of opinion and additional material obtained after the completion of the AIB report, the chief of staff of the Air Force reopened the investigation and directed the AIB board president to analyze the additional information.
The board president conducted a follow-on investigation to analyze two Naval Air Systems Command reports and the convening authority's analysis of video data. After consideration of the new material the only fact the AIB president changed from his original report was the ground speed of the aircraft at impact from what was believed to be 75 knots to 80 knots at the time of impact. The remainder of the findings was unchanged.
The primary purpose of the board was to provide a publicly releasable report of the facts and circumstances surrounding the accident. An executive summary of the report is available at http://usaf.aib.law.af.mil/index.html.
The entire report is available at http://www.afsoc.af.mil/accidentinvestigationboard/index.asp or by contacting the AFSOC Public Affairs Office at 850-884-5515.
Excess groundspeed.... exessive tailwind....excessive rate of descent...dark night...no horizion...gee.....only 87 Million Dollars and four people lost! You can do the same thing less the financial costs flying a EMS helicopter.
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So whats about the story that the co-pilot suffered from "amnesia" and the flightrecorder was lost due to a "misunderstanding"?
Missing recorder means CV-22 crash remains a mystery
Missing recorder means CV-22 crash remains a mystery
A paperwork glitch has deprived investigators of the flight incident recorder on board a crashed Bell Boeing CV-22 tiltrotor despite evidence that the critical device survived, according to the president of a US Air Force accident investigation board.
The precise cause of the 9 April crash by a CV-22 attempting to land in wadi at roughly 5,000ft (1,520m) above sea level near Qalat, Afghanistan, remains a mystery because Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) crews were unaware that the CV-22 is equipped with a device that records flight information, says the board's president Brig Gen Donald Harvel (Ret).
AFSOC crews were never told that a flight incident recorder is on board all CV-22s, Harvel says. The instructional manuals for the CV-22s were inherited from the US Marine Corps MV-22B Osprey programme. The manuals needed to be translated from Marine jargon to air force terminology, but the translators made mistakes, Harvel says.
"Somehow in that translation there was nothing in [the AFSOC manual] that showed this aircraft had a [flight incident recorder]," he says. "They had absolutely no idea."
As a result, he adds, the recorder "was never on the list to get that off the airplane" after a crash.
Despite three trips to the crash site by rescue and salvage crews, the recorder was never recovered, fuelling a rare clash in public between safety investigators and AFSOC over opposing theories.
After recovering 16 survivors and four bodies, plus other sensitive equipment, from the crash site, the remains of the CV-22 were destroyed by a bomb, Harvel says. However, the flight incident recorder is designed to survive such an explosion, making it possible the device was still retrievable.
One day after the crash, an army unit arrived at the site to recover what was left of the wreckage, including the left engine nacelle, Harvel says. The army unit also photographed items that would be retrieved the next day. Among the items photographed, there was an object that resembled the structure that contains the flight incident recorder. Several of the items left behind on the first day were missing by the time the army unit returned, Harvel says.
The absence of the recorder means several theories about the cause of the CV-22 crash are possible, he says.
"I could understand how there could be people looking at the same evidence and come to different conclusions," Harvel says.
Harvel, now a Delta Air Lines Boeing 777 captain, believes chances are greater than 50% that the CV-22 crashed because of a mechanical problem.
Specifically, Harvel believes the Rolls-Royce AE1107C engines could have suffered rapidly degraded power - possibly due to compressor stall caused by a 17kt (31km/h), quartering tailwind - in the critical last moments of the flight.
According to Harvel's theory, the CV-22 pilot clearly understood his situation. He attempted to increase power within the final 2s of flight, but realised too late that the CV-22's engines lacked normal power.
AFSOC has dismissed Harvel's theory as unsupported by a "preponderance of credible evidence". The command's internal - and unreleased - investigation report has already blamed the crash on pilot error.
The pilot and flight engineer died in the crash. The co-pilot survived but suffered amnesia. Among the 15 other survivors, nobody knew what was happening in the cockpit in the last moments before the aircraft hit the ground.
The precise cause of the 9 April crash by a CV-22 attempting to land in wadi at roughly 5,000ft (1,520m) above sea level near Qalat, Afghanistan, remains a mystery because Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) crews were unaware that the CV-22 is equipped with a device that records flight information, says the board's president Brig Gen Donald Harvel (Ret).
AFSOC crews were never told that a flight incident recorder is on board all CV-22s, Harvel says. The instructional manuals for the CV-22s were inherited from the US Marine Corps MV-22B Osprey programme. The manuals needed to be translated from Marine jargon to air force terminology, but the translators made mistakes, Harvel says.
"Somehow in that translation there was nothing in [the AFSOC manual] that showed this aircraft had a [flight incident recorder]," he says. "They had absolutely no idea."
As a result, he adds, the recorder "was never on the list to get that off the airplane" after a crash.
Despite three trips to the crash site by rescue and salvage crews, the recorder was never recovered, fuelling a rare clash in public between safety investigators and AFSOC over opposing theories.
After recovering 16 survivors and four bodies, plus other sensitive equipment, from the crash site, the remains of the CV-22 were destroyed by a bomb, Harvel says. However, the flight incident recorder is designed to survive such an explosion, making it possible the device was still retrievable.
One day after the crash, an army unit arrived at the site to recover what was left of the wreckage, including the left engine nacelle, Harvel says. The army unit also photographed items that would be retrieved the next day. Among the items photographed, there was an object that resembled the structure that contains the flight incident recorder. Several of the items left behind on the first day were missing by the time the army unit returned, Harvel says.
The absence of the recorder means several theories about the cause of the CV-22 crash are possible, he says.
"I could understand how there could be people looking at the same evidence and come to different conclusions," Harvel says.
Harvel, now a Delta Air Lines Boeing 777 captain, believes chances are greater than 50% that the CV-22 crashed because of a mechanical problem.
Specifically, Harvel believes the Rolls-Royce AE1107C engines could have suffered rapidly degraded power - possibly due to compressor stall caused by a 17kt (31km/h), quartering tailwind - in the critical last moments of the flight.
According to Harvel's theory, the CV-22 pilot clearly understood his situation. He attempted to increase power within the final 2s of flight, but realised too late that the CV-22's engines lacked normal power.
AFSOC has dismissed Harvel's theory as unsupported by a "preponderance of credible evidence". The command's internal - and unreleased - investigation report has already blamed the crash on pilot error.
The pilot and flight engineer died in the crash. The co-pilot survived but suffered amnesia. Among the 15 other survivors, nobody knew what was happening in the cockpit in the last moments before the aircraft hit the ground.
It's fishy, is what it is. The copilot went into full CYA mode. According to his testimony, that approach was by-the-book...right up to 4/10's of a mile out...coincidentally where it all went to sh*t. By the book! Right on the altitudes and speeds and gates. Which it...you know...wasn't. They know that. The MP (mishap pilot) was rushing like mad to make his TOT.
General Harvel seemed awfully peeved that the aircraft was destroyed so quickly and that the FIR and VSLED were not recovered.
So many questions remain unanswered.
General Harvel seemed awfully peeved that the aircraft was destroyed so quickly and that the FIR and VSLED were not recovered.
So many questions remain unanswered.
Last edited by FH1100 Pilot; 24th Dec 2010 at 02:20.
BULL****!!!!! There is absolutely NOTHING fishy about it. The copilot was ejected from the aircraft, still strapped in his seat and unconscious when found. Amnesia from this exact type of trauma is common, I know personally of two previous examples. He is not covering his ass and I am irate that you even insinuate this!!! Yes, per his recollection after everything he's been through, he believed in his interviews that the approach was normal but we knew from just days after the accident that this wasn't true.
Second, there is again absolutely nothing fishy about the lack of knowledge regarding the FIR, nor was it a "paperwork glitch". There was zero knowledge of the FIR being installed on the aircraft. Before the decision was made to destroy the aircraft, everything of importance was thought to have been removed from the scene, it wasn't until much later before the existence of the FIR was known. Destroying the aircraft was a shock to a lot of people but it was also a common procedure to do so in both Afghanistan and Iraq depending on the location of the site and the disposition of the aircraft. It was a shame that it happened but the decision was made by the leadership in theater who were more aware of the situation than the armchair detectives here.
I've been through both reports thoroughly and agree with parts from both but honestly don't fully understand what happened in those last precious seconds. With all due respect to BG Harvel, his conclusions are based upon sketchy analysis and highlight a lack of CV-22 technical knowledge. I and others know the facts of what happened that night but the "why" of what happened still has us scratching our heads, which is indeed unfortunate. I will state this unequivocally.....there was absolutely no coverup in either one of these reports!
Lastly, I've put up with the rhetoric on this thread for years now. The men on this crew were my close friends, I trained the pilots, and knew the Flight Engineer and his family for nearly twenty years. This is extremely personal to me, If anyone wants to vomit on their graves or reputations like I'm beginning to hear, I will not stand for it!
Second, there is again absolutely nothing fishy about the lack of knowledge regarding the FIR, nor was it a "paperwork glitch". There was zero knowledge of the FIR being installed on the aircraft. Before the decision was made to destroy the aircraft, everything of importance was thought to have been removed from the scene, it wasn't until much later before the existence of the FIR was known. Destroying the aircraft was a shock to a lot of people but it was also a common procedure to do so in both Afghanistan and Iraq depending on the location of the site and the disposition of the aircraft. It was a shame that it happened but the decision was made by the leadership in theater who were more aware of the situation than the armchair detectives here.
I've been through both reports thoroughly and agree with parts from both but honestly don't fully understand what happened in those last precious seconds. With all due respect to BG Harvel, his conclusions are based upon sketchy analysis and highlight a lack of CV-22 technical knowledge. I and others know the facts of what happened that night but the "why" of what happened still has us scratching our heads, which is indeed unfortunate. I will state this unequivocally.....there was absolutely no coverup in either one of these reports!
Lastly, I've put up with the rhetoric on this thread for years now. The men on this crew were my close friends, I trained the pilots, and knew the Flight Engineer and his family for nearly twenty years. This is extremely personal to me, If anyone wants to vomit on their graves or reputations like I'm beginning to hear, I will not stand for it!
Oh, settle down, Mcpave. Do we have to tell you AGAIN to unbunch those panties? Sheesh. From what we understand the MP (mishap pilot) was a cool-under-fire, highly-respected, highly experienced aviator. All things being equal, I guess this could even have happened to you, right? The MP's copilot was fairly well-experienced, with 2,600 hours. So we can't blame this one on the crew's inexperience, like they did with Majors Brow and Gruber (the Marana pilots).
The copilot seems to have selective amnesia. Instead of saying, "I don't remember anything," he seems to recall the flight in pretty good detail, describing every bit of the approach right up to .4 miles from the LZ, where his "amnesia" starts. I mean, his recall is really pretty good. Only...well...let's face it, some of his description is wrong. Like the last part. No matter what he says, they did *NOT* fly a by-the-book low-visibility approach, not at all. But we'll get to that later.
So…what do we have with this here V-22 accident?
1) A experienced crew.
2) Running late.
3) A way-too-fast approach.
4) A way-too-high rate of descent
5) Task-saturation in the cockpit.
6) A tailwind.
7) Crash!
Shades of Marana!
I thought this scenario wasn’t supposed to happen again? I thought everyone figured out how to keep this from happening? I thought all V-22 ops were supposed to be nice and planned-out and predictable and orderly…and we’d never see in the real battlefield a “Marana”-type situation occur? Landing with a tailwind?? What’s up with that! How come none of the pilots in the other two V-22's said something like, "Hey MP, I've got 17 knots of wind blowing up my butt. How's about we swing around and land these babies...you know... INTO the wind? Like they taught us in flight school, lo those many years ago?"
Okay, enough with the sarcasm – I understand it pisses people off. Mcpave and ospreydriver will quickly jump on here telling us that we don't know squat about this accident, but THEY do...but...if they told us they'd have to kill us. Uh-huh. The usual.
I’ve spent literally days poring over the extensive report of this accident by Brig. General Donald Harvel. And I am left somewhat confused. Either the MA (mishap aircraft) flew the LVA profile accurately or it did not. (Well, we know that it did not.) Either it did have a power loss or it did not. Either the first touchdown on the main landing gear was intentional or it was not.
Fact is, they were late for their TOT (Time On Target). Either one minute or five minutes late, depending on which part of the report you believe. Military pilots make a Big Deal about how they can navigate to point on a map in any weather and be there within seconds of the planned time. That's the big difference, they tell us, between manly military pilots and vastly-inferior, effeminate civilian-trained Robbie Rangers. And even though the TOT was not highly-critical in this instance, we must admit that it is a huge matter of pride for military pilots to *not* be late. Add to that the fact that this was one of the MCR’s (mishap crew’s) first combat missions of their deployment. General Harvel made specific note of this pressure, and theorized that it was the reason the MP made such a non-standard, improvised approach. Well duh.
So the V-22 was running late. Apparently, to make up time the MP did a high-speed descent and completely blew the “standard” profile set for such approaches. In fact, at every key point in the approach, he was double (or nearly so) the airspeed he “should” have been at. Complicating this was a 17 knot tailwind. Astonishingly, the MP made up the five-minutes, and managed to be pretty much on-time for the TOT. However, he did it by flying what could be called a “non-standard” approach.
During the last few seconds of flight, the V-22 entered a very high rate-of-descent. Concurrently there reportedly was some unspecified “excited cockpit conversation.” General Harvel presumes that it was between the PIC and Flight Engineer and was with reference to going-around. I'll bet it was! Just about at that point, the main landing gear tires hit the dirt. The accident report is vague on whether this was intentional or unintentional. In either case, the touchdown was downwind at a groundspeed of about 75 knots. The accident report assumes that: a) full power was already applied at that point; and b) there was insufficient power to execute a go-around.
Ultimately, General Harvel goes out on a limb and speculates (based on a number of factors) that *both* engines must have suffered some sort of unexplained simultaneous power loss. You’d have to read the report to understand his logic and how he came to that conclusion. He is being extremely kind to the MP and extremely hard on the V-22, which certainly doesn’t need any more bad publicity when it comes to power/performance issues.
When you read the accident report, you get the impression that General Harvel is simply wrong. The MP was late. He screwed up the approach and crashed. He got the thing slowed down, but let it settle into a horrendous rate-of-descent. When things start going wrong, they go wrong fast! Now, it must be said that the MP almost made it! He almost pulled it off. He was obviously working hard at it. He was probably pulling full power or more. He almost got the rate-of-descent (as high as 1800 fpm) just about arrested when the main landing gear touched. Trouble was, he was still hauling ass at 75 knots when that happened. Even so, everything might’ve been okay except that the nose plowed into a small drainage ditch, causing the V-22 to flip over. Damn. I'll tell you, man, I'm thinking, Settling With Power. Classic case, perhaps.
Unfortunately there are too many unanswered questions. The owner of the “battlespace” quickly called for the V-22 to be destroyed – something that caused General Harvel no small amount of anxiety given that it was a fatal accident. Thus, whatever information could have been gleaned from the wreckage was forever lost. And no matter what Mcpave says, it *is* fishy. It's not like the aircraft was down behind enemy lines in Nazi Germany, or in North Viet Nam where it could have been captured and reverse-engineered by the enemy. It's not like we're at war with all of Afghanistan...just the Taliban...and they're not even an organized Army!
So what was the rush to destruction? They blew it up, then hooked it outta there. Why not just send a '53 in and bring the wreckage pieces back for inspection? It's weird, man. Fishy.
Back to the V-22. When I say something like, "It lands too slowly," the V-22 proponents screech, "Well, it CAN land faster if we need it to." Oh yeah? Well with this accident we see what happens when an experienced V-22 pilot tries to hurry his approach. I suspect that this won't be the last accident of this type. And I wonder: Will they keep blaming them on "engine problems" or "pilot error?" Maybe the real answer is, "This P.O.S. isn't designed and doesn't work well for combat troop insertions into hostile territory."
The copilot seems to have selective amnesia. Instead of saying, "I don't remember anything," he seems to recall the flight in pretty good detail, describing every bit of the approach right up to .4 miles from the LZ, where his "amnesia" starts. I mean, his recall is really pretty good. Only...well...let's face it, some of his description is wrong. Like the last part. No matter what he says, they did *NOT* fly a by-the-book low-visibility approach, not at all. But we'll get to that later.
So…what do we have with this here V-22 accident?
1) A experienced crew.
2) Running late.
3) A way-too-fast approach.
4) A way-too-high rate of descent
5) Task-saturation in the cockpit.
6) A tailwind.
7) Crash!
Shades of Marana!
I thought this scenario wasn’t supposed to happen again? I thought everyone figured out how to keep this from happening? I thought all V-22 ops were supposed to be nice and planned-out and predictable and orderly…and we’d never see in the real battlefield a “Marana”-type situation occur? Landing with a tailwind?? What’s up with that! How come none of the pilots in the other two V-22's said something like, "Hey MP, I've got 17 knots of wind blowing up my butt. How's about we swing around and land these babies...you know... INTO the wind? Like they taught us in flight school, lo those many years ago?"
Okay, enough with the sarcasm – I understand it pisses people off. Mcpave and ospreydriver will quickly jump on here telling us that we don't know squat about this accident, but THEY do...but...if they told us they'd have to kill us. Uh-huh. The usual.
I’ve spent literally days poring over the extensive report of this accident by Brig. General Donald Harvel. And I am left somewhat confused. Either the MA (mishap aircraft) flew the LVA profile accurately or it did not. (Well, we know that it did not.) Either it did have a power loss or it did not. Either the first touchdown on the main landing gear was intentional or it was not.
Fact is, they were late for their TOT (Time On Target). Either one minute or five minutes late, depending on which part of the report you believe. Military pilots make a Big Deal about how they can navigate to point on a map in any weather and be there within seconds of the planned time. That's the big difference, they tell us, between manly military pilots and vastly-inferior, effeminate civilian-trained Robbie Rangers. And even though the TOT was not highly-critical in this instance, we must admit that it is a huge matter of pride for military pilots to *not* be late. Add to that the fact that this was one of the MCR’s (mishap crew’s) first combat missions of their deployment. General Harvel made specific note of this pressure, and theorized that it was the reason the MP made such a non-standard, improvised approach. Well duh.
So the V-22 was running late. Apparently, to make up time the MP did a high-speed descent and completely blew the “standard” profile set for such approaches. In fact, at every key point in the approach, he was double (or nearly so) the airspeed he “should” have been at. Complicating this was a 17 knot tailwind. Astonishingly, the MP made up the five-minutes, and managed to be pretty much on-time for the TOT. However, he did it by flying what could be called a “non-standard” approach.
During the last few seconds of flight, the V-22 entered a very high rate-of-descent. Concurrently there reportedly was some unspecified “excited cockpit conversation.” General Harvel presumes that it was between the PIC and Flight Engineer and was with reference to going-around. I'll bet it was! Just about at that point, the main landing gear tires hit the dirt. The accident report is vague on whether this was intentional or unintentional. In either case, the touchdown was downwind at a groundspeed of about 75 knots. The accident report assumes that: a) full power was already applied at that point; and b) there was insufficient power to execute a go-around.
Ultimately, General Harvel goes out on a limb and speculates (based on a number of factors) that *both* engines must have suffered some sort of unexplained simultaneous power loss. You’d have to read the report to understand his logic and how he came to that conclusion. He is being extremely kind to the MP and extremely hard on the V-22, which certainly doesn’t need any more bad publicity when it comes to power/performance issues.
When you read the accident report, you get the impression that General Harvel is simply wrong. The MP was late. He screwed up the approach and crashed. He got the thing slowed down, but let it settle into a horrendous rate-of-descent. When things start going wrong, they go wrong fast! Now, it must be said that the MP almost made it! He almost pulled it off. He was obviously working hard at it. He was probably pulling full power or more. He almost got the rate-of-descent (as high as 1800 fpm) just about arrested when the main landing gear touched. Trouble was, he was still hauling ass at 75 knots when that happened. Even so, everything might’ve been okay except that the nose plowed into a small drainage ditch, causing the V-22 to flip over. Damn. I'll tell you, man, I'm thinking, Settling With Power. Classic case, perhaps.
Unfortunately there are too many unanswered questions. The owner of the “battlespace” quickly called for the V-22 to be destroyed – something that caused General Harvel no small amount of anxiety given that it was a fatal accident. Thus, whatever information could have been gleaned from the wreckage was forever lost. And no matter what Mcpave says, it *is* fishy. It's not like the aircraft was down behind enemy lines in Nazi Germany, or in North Viet Nam where it could have been captured and reverse-engineered by the enemy. It's not like we're at war with all of Afghanistan...just the Taliban...and they're not even an organized Army!
So what was the rush to destruction? They blew it up, then hooked it outta there. Why not just send a '53 in and bring the wreckage pieces back for inspection? It's weird, man. Fishy.
Back to the V-22. When I say something like, "It lands too slowly," the V-22 proponents screech, "Well, it CAN land faster if we need it to." Oh yeah? Well with this accident we see what happens when an experienced V-22 pilot tries to hurry his approach. I suspect that this won't be the last accident of this type. And I wonder: Will they keep blaming them on "engine problems" or "pilot error?" Maybe the real answer is, "This P.O.S. isn't designed and doesn't work well for combat troop insertions into hostile territory."
Last edited by FH1100 Pilot; 24th Dec 2010 at 00:30.
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FH1100, what's your experience with combat troop infiltrations? If I remember correctly you're a civilian pilot with experience flying by military standards very light weight helicopters. What makes you think that you can say the the Osprey lands too slow? Do you really think your Jet Ranger can land fast? I'm not saying you're not a very good helo driver, but if my read on your experience is correct, what makes you think you understand modern combat helo tactics?
The questions are about the crash....and what caused it....not one another's parentage.
It appears lots of mistakes were made before, during, and after the crash by an array of folks.
We all know the dangers of an unstablized approach in poor vis and the good probability of hitting the ground out of control when we mix high rates of groundspeed combined with steep approach angles with reduced power while trying to get the aircraft slowed down then adding a huge demand for power to arrest the high rate of descent.
As there is no data available to definitively record the final seconds of the flight....we are left to consider the circumstantial evidence. That leaves some very unpleasant outcomes.
If we accept it was mere pilot error....that is tragic for those involved.
If we accept a single engine loss of power....it makes a bad situation due to pilot technique much worse.
If we accept it as being a dual engine loss of power....well we know how the Osprey ends up if that happens below 1600 feet AGL...and that raises concerns about its design.
It appears lots of mistakes were made before, during, and after the crash by an array of folks.
We all know the dangers of an unstablized approach in poor vis and the good probability of hitting the ground out of control when we mix high rates of groundspeed combined with steep approach angles with reduced power while trying to get the aircraft slowed down then adding a huge demand for power to arrest the high rate of descent.
As there is no data available to definitively record the final seconds of the flight....we are left to consider the circumstantial evidence. That leaves some very unpleasant outcomes.
If we accept it was mere pilot error....that is tragic for those involved.
If we accept a single engine loss of power....it makes a bad situation due to pilot technique much worse.
If we accept it as being a dual engine loss of power....well we know how the Osprey ends up if that happens below 1600 feet AGL...and that raises concerns about its design.
FH1100, what's your experience with combat troop infiltrations? If I remember correctly you're a civilian pilot with experience flying by military standards very light weight helicopters. What makes you think that you can say the the Osprey lands too slow? Do you really think your Jet Ranger can land fast? I'm not saying you're not a very good helo driver, but if my read on your experience is correct, what makes you think you understand modern combat helo tactics?
Oh, and let's leave my JetRanger out of this discussion, mm'kay? Nor do I have to be an expert on combat helo tactics. I just read the accident reports, man.
Have you?
*Although I'm sure some little childish smartypants on JH will quickly - if he has not already - claim that I got "my ass handed to me" by busdriver.
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FH1100, my point is that you are of the belief that the Osprey is somehow different than any other helicopter in being vulnerable on approach. Every rotary wing aircraft is slow at that stage of flight.
I may have missed it, but where in the report does it say that the pilot was intentionally fast to make a TOT?
SASless is correct, there just isn't enough in formation in the AIB to really know what happened.
I may have missed it, but where in the report does it say that the pilot was intentionally fast to make a TOT?
SASless is correct, there just isn't enough in formation in the AIB to really know what happened.
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First, The "rate of descent limits in the NATOPS manual" are the same as EVERY OTHER F'G HELO IN THE NAVY AND MARINES! 40/800 is universal!
Second, I do have to pull the, "I could tell you but I'd have to kill you" bit, because I have gotten the privileged mishap brief, and I'm not about to mix up the publicly available info with the PAO press-release-type stuff.
No cover-ups here, just standard-issue government bureaucracy. That's the truth.
BTW, in case anyone thinks weird **** is unusual over there, during the winter of 2001/2002 alone, my composite squadron (46,53,AH/UH) in Aghanistan had 2 class As (one with fatalities), and at least 3 other incidents with signifant damage to aircraft.
I've flown in OEF in the 46 and (briefly) with the 22. I'll take the 22.
Second, I do have to pull the, "I could tell you but I'd have to kill you" bit, because I have gotten the privileged mishap brief, and I'm not about to mix up the publicly available info with the PAO press-release-type stuff.
No cover-ups here, just standard-issue government bureaucracy. That's the truth.
BTW, in case anyone thinks weird **** is unusual over there, during the winter of 2001/2002 alone, my composite squadron (46,53,AH/UH) in Aghanistan had 2 class As (one with fatalities), and at least 3 other incidents with signifant damage to aircraft.
I've flown in OEF in the 46 and (briefly) with the 22. I'll take the 22.
Second, I do have to pull the, "I could tell you but I'd have to kill you" bit, because I have gotten the privileged mishap brief, and I'm not about to mix up the publicly available info with the PAO press-release-type stuff.
So now those of us in mufti....have to assume the uniformed mafia are not hiding an embarrassing truth. Is my perception wrong here?
It would seem there is an unclassified summary that exists whereby the public can be correctly informed of the outcome of the investigation....or am I sipping too much Egg Nog?
Perhaps I shall have to take a wander down the street to the bar with all the Dollar Bills and do a canvas of the short haired gentry to see what I can find out.
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Maybe a little different but not in a conspiracy theory kind of way. Almost every mishap has this happen, but it only becomes contentious in high-visibility investigations.
Privilege is taken very seriously in military mishap investigations. It distinguishes the reports given by Aviation Mishap Boards (AMB) from the punitive investigations given by Judge Advocate General (JAG) investigations and Field Flight Performance Boards (FFPB in the Marines, not sure of the USAF term).
The AMB gets privileged testimony, i.e. what someone tells the AMB cannot be used against him for punitive action. A pilot can say he screwed up the approach, a mechanic can say he smoked pot, whatever. The point is just to find out what happened in order to prevent it from happening again, not to establish blame. Privileged testimony and reports derived from it are briefed within the military aviation community to enhance safety, but are not supposed to be released generally. That would undermine the whole system of free disclosure.
The reports released to the public are generally based on JAG investigations, so they are generally less revealing and open than the ones briefed internally, which are more "warts and all."
The above is written from a USN/USMC perspective, so I'll leave the USAF particulars to others, though the principles are very similar.
Regardless, what I can say is that this mishap is not an Osprey-particular mishap. It could occur to any platform whose job is flying really f'g low in the desert.
Privilege is taken very seriously in military mishap investigations. It distinguishes the reports given by Aviation Mishap Boards (AMB) from the punitive investigations given by Judge Advocate General (JAG) investigations and Field Flight Performance Boards (FFPB in the Marines, not sure of the USAF term).
The AMB gets privileged testimony, i.e. what someone tells the AMB cannot be used against him for punitive action. A pilot can say he screwed up the approach, a mechanic can say he smoked pot, whatever. The point is just to find out what happened in order to prevent it from happening again, not to establish blame. Privileged testimony and reports derived from it are briefed within the military aviation community to enhance safety, but are not supposed to be released generally. That would undermine the whole system of free disclosure.
The reports released to the public are generally based on JAG investigations, so they are generally less revealing and open than the ones briefed internally, which are more "warts and all."
The above is written from a USN/USMC perspective, so I'll leave the USAF particulars to others, though the principles are very similar.
Regardless, what I can say is that this mishap is not an Osprey-particular mishap. It could occur to any platform whose job is flying really f'g low in the desert.
this mishap is not an Osprey-particular mishap. It could occur to any platform whose job is flying really f'g low in the desert.
Low Vis...busy inside the cockpit....very little definition over a very flat area...NVG's at lowest capability....altitude alerts ignored...then "Hello Dolly! Where did the ground come from?".
$87,000,000.00 worth of world's most sophisticated vertical flight machine....with top line crews....and we can still fly them into the ground?
Now what about the FLIR....what mode was it in....who was looking at that?
Three guys up front....all sorts of displays showing height above ground, airspeed, distance and time to go....FLIR, NVG's, IR search light for illum....what more can you ask for to keep your SA accurate?
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As long as planes and helos fly low under demanding conditions, some of them will crash. You alternate between crapping on the plane and crapping on the pilots to get a rise out of others. I'm done with this.
Are you going to give the Alaska F-22 crash the same level of conspiracy-theory nuttiness? Military aircrews fly in conditions and missions that few, if any civilian pilots deal with. You want a national defense, you have to expect this to happen occasionally, in spite of the best training and equipment.
Are you going to give the Alaska F-22 crash the same level of conspiracy-theory nuttiness? Military aircrews fly in conditions and missions that few, if any civilian pilots deal with. You want a national defense, you have to expect this to happen occasionally, in spite of the best training and equipment.
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Good call! I think Sasless just has a stick up his a$$ about the Osprey and when he slates the crew he really shows his true colors.
Never had a human factors moment Sasless?
Get over yourself and just accept that no one cares what you think of the machine or the crews.
Never had a human factors moment Sasless?
Get over yourself and just accept that no one cares what you think of the machine or the crews.
Tuk,
Did you happen to notice the punctuation mark at the end of the first sentence????????????????????????????????????????????
The Air Force called it Pilot Error....I asked where the real cause lay.
Was it bad crew action, poor SOP's that set them up, improper system performance, bad integration of data between systems, or as some folks think an engine(s) malfunction?
Slating a crew as you call it....is simply admitting the truth if it was in fact a guy dropping the ball if...if....if ... that is what actually happened.
The Osprey may be a wonderful aircraft....but as all aircraft it has its limitations and can find itself in circumstances which it is not capable of handling.
If you care not to participate in the discussion....that is your choice but at least have something to add besides your wry wit.
Did you happen to notice the punctuation mark at the end of the first sentence????????????????????????????????????????????
The Air Force called it Pilot Error....I asked where the real cause lay.
Was it bad crew action, poor SOP's that set them up, improper system performance, bad integration of data between systems, or as some folks think an engine(s) malfunction?
Slating a crew as you call it....is simply admitting the truth if it was in fact a guy dropping the ball if...if....if ... that is what actually happened.
The Osprey may be a wonderful aircraft....but as all aircraft it has its limitations and can find itself in circumstances which it is not capable of handling.
If you care not to participate in the discussion....that is your choice but at least have something to add besides your wry wit.
I think it's puzzling and more than a little amusing that those within the V-22 community tell us on one hand that the military would *never* lie about the aircraft, and on the other hand they tell us that *they* know the "truth" behind the crashes...but of course cannot tell us.
Remember back when we were discussing the Marana crash, of which a thorough report was issued. But mcpave contradicted it and stated that he knew the "real" cause of that accident, and alluded to it being nothing like what the report stated. But he couldn't tell us because he'd have to kill us afterward. Hush-hush, super-secret, you know!
Now ospreydriver makes the same statement of this latest Osprey accident.
What they're saying is that the military *WILL* lie about the V-22.
Thank you both for telling us what we already knew.
Remember back when we were discussing the Marana crash, of which a thorough report was issued. But mcpave contradicted it and stated that he knew the "real" cause of that accident, and alluded to it being nothing like what the report stated. But he couldn't tell us because he'd have to kill us afterward. Hush-hush, super-secret, you know!
Now ospreydriver makes the same statement of this latest Osprey accident.
What they're saying is that the military *WILL* lie about the V-22.
Thank you both for telling us what we already knew.
You are completely full of crap!!! I never once lied on this thread, nor did I mislead anyone!!! You continue to accuse me and attack my integrity without basis!!! If you had even one day of experience in the military or any programs with classified information you would understand the limitations of discussing sensitive information on an open forum. Note very carefully that I did not say, "classified" information, but sensitive, a term that is not a categorization of the information but rather a description. There is a distinct difference between information that simply should not be discussed in an open forum and classified information, it's part of the profession of being a professional military aviator. Within every aspect of military operations there is plenty of unclassified information that you do not want to discuss outside of your realm, every single military aviator will attest to this fact, plain and simple.
Now, on to your claims towards me with regard to the Marana crash. Here is my explanation. The Marana accident occured fairly early in the tactical development of the aircraft, since then there has been loads more data gathered on the employment of the Osprey, particularly in formation with another Osprey. This is the key aspect to remember. One particular phenomenon that came to light has been termed, "roll-off", where an aircraft behind another Osprey (Dash Two), experiences a sensation similar to rolling off an imaginary "ball" of air. This phenomenon appears to only occur when in conversion mode, above and directly behind another Osprey. A specific incident several years ago prompted a look into the aerodynamics of what was happening in this regime of flight. What was found was that unlike traditional helicopters, there exists a vortex of air above and behind an Osprey when in conversion mode, a condition that can be visually thought of as "Superman's Cape". This vortex is extremely powerful and can indeed cause a trailing aircaft to continue to roll until the limits of the control stick are reached, and very much capable of rolling the aircraft inverted. Transitioning the nacelles or flying out of the vortex are the conditions to exit the phenomenon. This, in my opinion, is actually what happened to the crew at Marana, a situation that at the time they had no idea to expect. In the helicopter formation business, you usually fear getting below the preceding aircraft, not above it.
I'll state again.....this is MY opinion, not some so-called "secret coverup" as those on here would like to claim. But, it is an professional opinion shared by many others in the program. I base this opinion on over five and a half years of flying the Osprey, thousands of formation approaches in both the Osprey and previous helicopters, no evidence of VRS since Marana, and most importantly, the fact that I personally have experienced "roll-off" several times in the Osprey. Every single incident of roll-off that I've encountered or heard about occurred under nearly indentical conditions that existed at Marana, hence my hypothesis. Luckily for myself and others, our experiences, while unnerving, were not nearly as severe as other stories that I've heard. But, since you said it and now that I've told you, yes I'd still like to kill you, just on general principle.
The results of the research done several years ago have made a previously misunderstood phenomenon now widely understood throughout the community. While it is unique to the Osprey it is in no way a major limitation in the employment of the aircraft.
As far as the Afghanistan accident goes, I personally believe neither the AIB or SIB fully explains what happened that night. Mostly because we don't have the luxury of CVRs and FDRs, a fact that has been brought up in numerous accident investigations. The only "facts" that I completely understand are that they were way too fast for the standard Low Visibility Approach profile but I feel this was only partially due to a late TOT. At sea level, the Osprey will stop on a dime but not at higher elevations and you can find yourself behind the aircraft very quickly if you start your approach hot.
I have "thoughts" and "ideas" of what may have occurred, but I'm not willing to share them because without further data, it would be speculation of the highest degree. Did anyone read anything in those comments that said, "secret", or "hush-hush"??? Unfortunately, I feel that we will never fully glean the truth about that night but I see little evidence pointing at the aircraft itself, and what is there is highly speculative. Lastly, there have been tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of approaches flown in the Osprey community under nearly the identical conditions over the past years without incident. I guess these must have been complete miracles in the critics eyes because each one should have resulted in catastrophe.
Now, on to your claims towards me with regard to the Marana crash. Here is my explanation. The Marana accident occured fairly early in the tactical development of the aircraft, since then there has been loads more data gathered on the employment of the Osprey, particularly in formation with another Osprey. This is the key aspect to remember. One particular phenomenon that came to light has been termed, "roll-off", where an aircraft behind another Osprey (Dash Two), experiences a sensation similar to rolling off an imaginary "ball" of air. This phenomenon appears to only occur when in conversion mode, above and directly behind another Osprey. A specific incident several years ago prompted a look into the aerodynamics of what was happening in this regime of flight. What was found was that unlike traditional helicopters, there exists a vortex of air above and behind an Osprey when in conversion mode, a condition that can be visually thought of as "Superman's Cape". This vortex is extremely powerful and can indeed cause a trailing aircaft to continue to roll until the limits of the control stick are reached, and very much capable of rolling the aircraft inverted. Transitioning the nacelles or flying out of the vortex are the conditions to exit the phenomenon. This, in my opinion, is actually what happened to the crew at Marana, a situation that at the time they had no idea to expect. In the helicopter formation business, you usually fear getting below the preceding aircraft, not above it.
I'll state again.....this is MY opinion, not some so-called "secret coverup" as those on here would like to claim. But, it is an professional opinion shared by many others in the program. I base this opinion on over five and a half years of flying the Osprey, thousands of formation approaches in both the Osprey and previous helicopters, no evidence of VRS since Marana, and most importantly, the fact that I personally have experienced "roll-off" several times in the Osprey. Every single incident of roll-off that I've encountered or heard about occurred under nearly indentical conditions that existed at Marana, hence my hypothesis. Luckily for myself and others, our experiences, while unnerving, were not nearly as severe as other stories that I've heard. But, since you said it and now that I've told you, yes I'd still like to kill you, just on general principle.
The results of the research done several years ago have made a previously misunderstood phenomenon now widely understood throughout the community. While it is unique to the Osprey it is in no way a major limitation in the employment of the aircraft.
As far as the Afghanistan accident goes, I personally believe neither the AIB or SIB fully explains what happened that night. Mostly because we don't have the luxury of CVRs and FDRs, a fact that has been brought up in numerous accident investigations. The only "facts" that I completely understand are that they were way too fast for the standard Low Visibility Approach profile but I feel this was only partially due to a late TOT. At sea level, the Osprey will stop on a dime but not at higher elevations and you can find yourself behind the aircraft very quickly if you start your approach hot.
I have "thoughts" and "ideas" of what may have occurred, but I'm not willing to share them because without further data, it would be speculation of the highest degree. Did anyone read anything in those comments that said, "secret", or "hush-hush"??? Unfortunately, I feel that we will never fully glean the truth about that night but I see little evidence pointing at the aircraft itself, and what is there is highly speculative. Lastly, there have been tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of approaches flown in the Osprey community under nearly the identical conditions over the past years without incident. I guess these must have been complete miracles in the critics eyes because each one should have resulted in catastrophe.