Sikorsky S-92: From Design to Operations
FH1100,
The RIPS system is a nice extra in the S-92. Atleast here we never lunch into icing conditions without a positive temperature band from SL to 500ft. The advantage of RIPS is that we don't have to descend to a low level to remain clear of icing/shead ice and can remain at standard altitudes.
There has been some issues with RIPS, but it now seems that most of these have been resolved and the system works very well in my opinion.
As mentioned, a good post and some very valid points!
TiP
The RIPS system is a nice extra in the S-92. Atleast here we never lunch into icing conditions without a positive temperature band from SL to 500ft. The advantage of RIPS is that we don't have to descend to a low level to remain clear of icing/shead ice and can remain at standard altitudes.
There has been some issues with RIPS, but it now seems that most of these have been resolved and the system works very well in my opinion.
As mentioned, a good post and some very valid points!
TiP
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Correct Sikorsky has committed to a series of product enhacements. This shows their true commitment to bring everyone home safe every time.
As previously mentioned, the S-92 is victim to some bad press and politically inspired comment in Canada that has resulted in some ill-informed panic amongst the non-aviation literate passengers of certain oil companies
It remains a fine helicopter, certified top the latest requirements, ideal for offshore transport
Nick Lappos - come on and help reassure the doubters
Safe flying
Max
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maxwelg,
If you would like to read up on establishing system reliability effects for a lube filter, here's the US Navy approach (chapter 11):
NSWC-06 Handbook PartB
This approach would be similar to what the FAA would require.
riff_raff
If you would like to read up on establishing system reliability effects for a lube filter, here's the US Navy approach (chapter 11):
NSWC-06 Handbook PartB
This approach would be similar to what the FAA would require.
riff_raff
OK max
Please educate us aviation professionals how that has happened. The FAA wrote the rules and then "policed" them. So how is SAC the great criminal in the process?
and twisting of the FAA.
Those Cougar pilots were between a big rock and a really hard place. How many of us can say with absolute certainty that we would have done any differently?
Great post FH1100 - the SAC sales pitch was a lot of gloss and little substance.
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Variable Load
Even a layman such as myself can see that the FAR29 certification for the S92 MRGB was not in the "spirit" of the clause. Or to put it in more understandable terms that no one can get confused over, don't sell goods with an improper description.
Who polices the policemen? After all, we're all human aren't we, and time in all walks of life have proven that we generally are the source of all errors, be it design, reaction, or implementation of the "rules"
Always happy to add a touch of common sense and thinking outside the box to you aviation professionals...
Safe flying
Max
Even a layman such as myself can see that the FAR29 certification for the S92 MRGB was not in the "spirit" of the clause. Or to put it in more understandable terms that no one can get confused over, don't sell goods with an improper description.
Who polices the policemen? After all, we're all human aren't we, and time in all walks of life have proven that we generally are the source of all errors, be it design, reaction, or implementation of the "rules"
Always happy to add a touch of common sense and thinking outside the box to you aviation professionals...
Safe flying
Max
Re FAA:
The FAA usually acts (and has done so in the past) mainly as supporter of the American Aviation industry.
If this requires improved safety measures by the industry they will act also in the interest of passengers.
If there is a conflict of interests between safety and the interest of the industry, that's when it gets interesting...
In the past not always (to put it veeerrry diplomatically) safety has won in these cases...
The loophole certification of the S-92's MRGB unfortunately fits perfectly into this image.
Someone high up the food-chain in FAA should have lost his job over this. But I'm afraid you won't see this happen.
The FAA usually acts (and has done so in the past) mainly as supporter of the American Aviation industry.
If this requires improved safety measures by the industry they will act also in the interest of passengers.
If there is a conflict of interests between safety and the interest of the industry, that's when it gets interesting...
In the past not always (to put it veeerrry diplomatically) safety has won in these cases...
The loophole certification of the S-92's MRGB unfortunately fits perfectly into this image.
Someone high up the food-chain in FAA should have lost his job over this. But I'm afraid you won't see this happen.
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Perhaps the DoT Inspector General should probe the S-92 - but that really depends on the depth of the TSB report. Its really handy that all of the key US players, current FAA employees and former 'seniors' from FAA and insustry now work in the same city.
riff raff, thats an interesting document but not a NAVAIR document or used on aircraft. I wonder how many filter failure modes are in the S-92 MGB design assessment?
I'd like to echo my support for FH1100's post. Rotors and transmissions are the most critical systems on a helicopter and needed to be treated as such. The silence (or at very least any reasoned arguement) from the former Sikorsky cheerleaders is noteworthy.
riff raff, thats an interesting document but not a NAVAIR document or used on aircraft. I wonder how many filter failure modes are in the S-92 MGB design assessment?
I'd like to echo my support for FH1100's post. Rotors and transmissions are the most critical systems on a helicopter and needed to be treated as such. The silence (or at very least any reasoned arguement) from the former Sikorsky cheerleaders is noteworthy.
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Does anybody really believe a high-ranking employee of a helicopter company would be permitted to comment (good or bad) on his previous employment at a competing helicopter company?
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FH1100
just to clear up a point or two.
The centre section of the sponson, which is the fuel tank section, is designed to break away in the event of a crash, and in the case of a ditching, sinking. This, given the evidence of the pictures posted on the internet, Did happen. The sponson floats are attached to the rear sponson section which is also attached to the main undercarriage hard points. these stay with the aircraft after ditching along with the front section of the sponson housing the life rafts. Both can clearly be seen in the photographs.
There is more to improving birdstrike protection. Including moving the inclined drive shaft to the rear of the tail pylon, among other improvments.
Plastic winshield was a retrofit made by an affiliate of Bell helicopters. sabotage?
just to clear up a point or two.
It's got emergency floats in the sponsons!
Yes, but in a heavy crash landing on water the sponsons can (and did) rip off, rendering those floats worthless.
Yes, but in a heavy crash landing on water the sponsons can (and did) rip off, rendering those floats worthless.
Better bird-strike protection.
Okay, I'll buy that! But...wait...didn't the S-76 already have that until operators started replacing the glass windscreens with plastic? Damn.
Okay, I'll buy that! But...wait...didn't the S-76 already have that until operators started replacing the glass windscreens with plastic? Damn.
Plastic winshield was a retrofit made by an affiliate of Bell helicopters. sabotage?
Last edited by ironchefflay; 2nd Nov 2010 at 04:36.
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ironchefflay
You pick on two interesting features, however both show how ignorant the S-92 marketing campaign was.
The jury is still out the sponsons and if the front sections, which contain the liferafts actually stayed attached.
Certainly the impact velocity were high.
Here is one photo.
The right hand liferaft section has certainly been placed next to the fuselage but is it attached? Does the rear portion even look attached? Don't forget the TSB have already said the floats didn't activate either.
The survivor certainly talked about the liferafts blowing away on the surface, which suggests they may have been burst out of their container.
In PHI / Shell S-76C++ case Sikorsky were quick to point out that the standard windscreen was certified to the higher BCAR requirements.
What Sikorsky failed to point out when promoting the S-92 was that while they were certifying to the latest FAA/JAA requirements, these wre not as demanding(by a factor of 2) as the ultimate BCAR birdstrike requirements apllied to the first version of the EH101 and the AS332L2 (and by association the EC225)!
It is that fast and loose marketing that seems to becoming back to bite them.
You pick on two interesting features, however both show how ignorant the S-92 marketing campaign was.
just to clear up a point or two.
Quote:
It's got emergency floats in the sponsons!
Yes, but in a heavy crash landing on water the sponsons can (and did) rip off, rendering those floats worthless.
The centre section of the sponson, which is the fuel tank section, is designed to break away in the event of a crash, and in the case of a ditching, sinking. This, given the evidence of the pictures posted on the internet, Did happen. The sponson floats are attached to the rear sponson section which is also attached to the main undercarriage hard points. these stay with the aircraft after ditching along with the front section of the sponson housing the life rafts. Both can clearly be seen in the photographs.
It's got emergency floats in the sponsons!
Yes, but in a heavy crash landing on water the sponsons can (and did) rip off, rendering those floats worthless.
The centre section of the sponson, which is the fuel tank section, is designed to break away in the event of a crash, and in the case of a ditching, sinking. This, given the evidence of the pictures posted on the internet, Did happen. The sponson floats are attached to the rear sponson section which is also attached to the main undercarriage hard points. these stay with the aircraft after ditching along with the front section of the sponson housing the life rafts. Both can clearly be seen in the photographs.
Certainly the impact velocity were high.
Here is one photo.
The right hand liferaft section has certainly been placed next to the fuselage but is it attached? Does the rear portion even look attached? Don't forget the TSB have already said the floats didn't activate either.
The survivor certainly talked about the liferafts blowing away on the surface, which suggests they may have been burst out of their container.
Better bird-strike protection.
Okay, I'll buy that! But...wait...didn't the S-76 already have that until operators started replacing the glass windscreens with plastic? Damn.
There is more to improving birdstrike protection. Including moving the inclined drive shaft to the rear of the tail pylon, among other improvments.
Plastic winshield was a retrofit made by an affiliate of Bell helicopters. sabotage?
Okay, I'll buy that! But...wait...didn't the S-76 already have that until operators started replacing the glass windscreens with plastic? Damn.
There is more to improving birdstrike protection. Including moving the inclined drive shaft to the rear of the tail pylon, among other improvments.
Plastic winshield was a retrofit made by an affiliate of Bell helicopters. sabotage?
What Sikorsky failed to point out when promoting the S-92 was that while they were certifying to the latest FAA/JAA requirements, these wre not as demanding(by a factor of 2) as the ultimate BCAR birdstrike requirements apllied to the first version of the EH101 and the AS332L2 (and by association the EC225)!
It is that fast and loose marketing that seems to becoming back to bite them.
Shocking though the photos of the wreckage are, I really don't think they can be used as the basis for too much discussion about what did or did not stay attached during the impact. The subsequent freefall to the sea bed, and then the recovery, will certainly have caused much of the damage seen.
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Exactly, wasn't the wreckage cut to retrieve the bodies? And later to be pulled to the surface ?
Anyway what's the point in discussing if the floats stayed on, if the crash was not survivable, those are there to safely abandon the machine in event of emergency landing, not really to have a neatly floating wreckage.
It reminds me of a discussion after a crash that took place in 90's on the Baltic Sea, where W-3RM had CFIT accident, where it hit the water at cruise speed in the night, and the emergency floats were ripped off the fuselage. What would be the point of them being so sturdy to stay on, if the fuselage disintegrated, and the crew bodies were thrown out of it at impact ?
Anyway what's the point in discussing if the floats stayed on, if the crash was not survivable, those are there to safely abandon the machine in event of emergency landing, not really to have a neatly floating wreckage.
It reminds me of a discussion after a crash that took place in 90's on the Baltic Sea, where W-3RM had CFIT accident, where it hit the water at cruise speed in the night, and the emergency floats were ripped off the fuselage. What would be the point of them being so sturdy to stay on, if the fuselage disintegrated, and the crew bodies were thrown out of it at impact ?
ironchefflay:
Oh, please. So...we're thinking that a bird could strike the tail rotor pylon then? I'm curious as to how a bird could bypass the huge, hulking mass of fuselage and rotor system to find its way to a direct hit on the inclined tail rotor driveshaft. From above, perhaps? And again I ask: How many t/r pylon birdstrikes have been recorded over the years? Seems to me that SAC is touting as yet another "SAFETY FEATURE!!!" something that is arguably so. I mean, let's be honest here; just because they say it, does that make it true?
My helicopter (206B) has the WSPS wire-strike protection kit. Does this make my 206 "safer" than any other 206 out there?
I will agree though that reinforcing the *front* of the helicopter (front transmission cover, servo cowlings, etc.) is a valid, worthwhile endeavor.
Lt. Fubar:
Actually, Cougar 91 *was* survivable. At least one guy did.
But Fubar's point is taken. The way most helicopters crash in real life is often *not* survivable.
There is more to improving birdstrike protection. Including moving the inclined drive shaft to the rear of the tail pylon, among other improvments.
My helicopter (206B) has the WSPS wire-strike protection kit. Does this make my 206 "safer" than any other 206 out there?
I will agree though that reinforcing the *front* of the helicopter (front transmission cover, servo cowlings, etc.) is a valid, worthwhile endeavor.
Lt. Fubar:
Anyway what's the point in discussing if the floats stayed on, if the crash was not survivable...
But Fubar's point is taken. The way most helicopters crash in real life is often *not* survivable.
S-92 Ditching
Several posts seem to have missed the fact that the S-92 was designed to meet FAA ditching requirements ( see Advisory Circular 29-2C and the S-92 RFM paragraph entitled "Ditching" ), which are hardly crash landing descriptions.
Secondly, these posts do not address the central question of why the crew did not follow the published emergency procedure, which would have afforded the opportunity to use the floats as designed.
Thanks,
John Dixson
Secondly, these posts do not address the central question of why the crew did not follow the published emergency procedure, which would have afforded the opportunity to use the floats as designed.
Thanks,
John Dixson
JohnDixson
John, the matter of the crew's reaction to the emergency is discussed ad infinitum in the other thread about the accident. Here, we are talking about the S-92 from design to operations.
The fact is, helicopters sometimes crash. From the very beginning, Sikorsky touted the S-92 as the (if you'll permit a little sarcasm on my part) safest helicopter designed and built, past, present or future. The reality is that while it has some nifty technological advances that SAC is calling "safety features," those items may or may not make the aircraft actually safer.
Regardless of the particulars of the Cougar crash, Sikorsky is going to have a hard time justifying to a jury how their transmission actually meets the requirements of 29.297(c)(1). Some (like me) would say that it does not. But who knows? The court (or NTSB, or whomever) may find that Sikorsky's assumptions about the trans were perfectly logical and reasonable. That would shut me up right quick.
It's ironic...tragically so...that if Sikorsky had only installed a transmission oil quantity gauge from the get-go, the Cougar accident may have been avoided. If a crew sees the pressure at zero and the quantity at zero, they know they're in deep sh*t. There would be no question but to put the dang thing down.
But the Cougar pilots didn't have full information. All they had was a zero pressure reading, and the knowledge that other S-92's had suffered some kinds of oil pump failures. As we all know and admit, the zero pressure reading should have been enough for them to decide to put 'er down. But they did not. Being humans and not robots, the two of them came to a decision and made a mistake. We can be sure they knew what the RFM called for. We cannot be sure exactly why they disregarded it.
As a pilot, I'm certain that they did not think for one second that all of their transmission oil had departed the aircraft. Heck, wasn't that what the EBS was for?
Finally, it seems astonishing to me that SAC has not yet retrofitted a transmission oil quantity gauge to the S-92. How hard could it be? That's all it would take to eliminate another accident of this type. Put a quantity gauge in, and then in the RFM put in big letters: ZERO PRESSURE AND ZERO QUANTITY, LAND NOW OR DIE!!!!!! (The number of exclamation points they actually use is optional.) Then again, there are probably combinations of pilots and circumstance that would result in even that warning being disregarded.
Secondly, these posts do not address the central question of why the crew did not follow the published emergency procedure, which would have afforded the opportunity to use the floats as designed.
The fact is, helicopters sometimes crash. From the very beginning, Sikorsky touted the S-92 as the (if you'll permit a little sarcasm on my part) safest helicopter designed and built, past, present or future. The reality is that while it has some nifty technological advances that SAC is calling "safety features," those items may or may not make the aircraft actually safer.
Regardless of the particulars of the Cougar crash, Sikorsky is going to have a hard time justifying to a jury how their transmission actually meets the requirements of 29.297(c)(1). Some (like me) would say that it does not. But who knows? The court (or NTSB, or whomever) may find that Sikorsky's assumptions about the trans were perfectly logical and reasonable. That would shut me up right quick.
It's ironic...tragically so...that if Sikorsky had only installed a transmission oil quantity gauge from the get-go, the Cougar accident may have been avoided. If a crew sees the pressure at zero and the quantity at zero, they know they're in deep sh*t. There would be no question but to put the dang thing down.
But the Cougar pilots didn't have full information. All they had was a zero pressure reading, and the knowledge that other S-92's had suffered some kinds of oil pump failures. As we all know and admit, the zero pressure reading should have been enough for them to decide to put 'er down. But they did not. Being humans and not robots, the two of them came to a decision and made a mistake. We can be sure they knew what the RFM called for. We cannot be sure exactly why they disregarded it.
As a pilot, I'm certain that they did not think for one second that all of their transmission oil had departed the aircraft. Heck, wasn't that what the EBS was for?
Finally, it seems astonishing to me that SAC has not yet retrofitted a transmission oil quantity gauge to the S-92. How hard could it be? That's all it would take to eliminate another accident of this type. Put a quantity gauge in, and then in the RFM put in big letters: ZERO PRESSURE AND ZERO QUANTITY, LAND NOW OR DIE!!!!!! (The number of exclamation points they actually use is optional.) Then again, there are probably combinations of pilots and circumstance that would result in even that warning being disregarded.