Helicopter ejection seats
Iconoclast
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From: The home of Dudley Dooright-Where the lead dog is the only one that gets a change of scenery.
I would strongly suggest that Nick redo the math. The FAA design guidelines stipulate that you can not have a failure of a mechanical or electronic component as well as structural elements that can bring down an aircraft no more frequently than one time in a billion hours of operation. They do not reference emplanements or seat miles they reference hours of operation for the fleet. That includes all aircraft of the same type operated by any number of operators.
How many emplanements were there on the 737 models several of which crashed due to a faulty tail power control unit or a damper? How many hours did these aircraft accumulate? I can guarantee that it was well below the 1 billion mark no matter how many people boarded the aircraft type.
How many emplanements were there on the 767 series at the time of the Lauda Air crash? How many hours had been accumulated at the time of the crash? Again well below 1 billion hours.
How many emplanements were there on the 737 series when an engine exploded at the Manchester Airport in the UK? How many hours had accumulated on the 737 series? Again the answer is the same.
I could go on and on but it would always be the same. The commercial aircraft have never met the design goals set up by the FAA and they never will. If there is a crash and the NTSB finds the reason the FAA will perform a cost benefit analysis. They apply a cost of human life of approximately 2.5 million dollars. In the analysis if it is proven that the cost of making the repair fleetwide is in excess of the number of persons killed times 2.5 million dollars in another crash of that aircraft type they will not require the change. This is definitely in favor of the airlines.
Another point, any reference I have made in my post above relative to safety or failure came from the FARs and Advisory Circular 1309 and Advisory Circular 23.1309-1C, which are published by the FAA and not the NTSB.
I think we have deviated from the reason for this thread.
How many emplanements were there on the 737 models several of which crashed due to a faulty tail power control unit or a damper? How many hours did these aircraft accumulate? I can guarantee that it was well below the 1 billion mark no matter how many people boarded the aircraft type.
How many emplanements were there on the 767 series at the time of the Lauda Air crash? How many hours had been accumulated at the time of the crash? Again well below 1 billion hours.
How many emplanements were there on the 737 series when an engine exploded at the Manchester Airport in the UK? How many hours had accumulated on the 737 series? Again the answer is the same.
I could go on and on but it would always be the same. The commercial aircraft have never met the design goals set up by the FAA and they never will. If there is a crash and the NTSB finds the reason the FAA will perform a cost benefit analysis. They apply a cost of human life of approximately 2.5 million dollars. In the analysis if it is proven that the cost of making the repair fleetwide is in excess of the number of persons killed times 2.5 million dollars in another crash of that aircraft type they will not require the change. This is definitely in favor of the airlines.
Another point, any reference I have made in my post above relative to safety or failure came from the FARs and Advisory Circular 1309 and Advisory Circular 23.1309-1C, which are published by the FAA and not the NTSB.
I think we have deviated from the reason for this thread.
Iconoclast
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From: The home of Dudley Dooright-Where the lead dog is the only one that gets a change of scenery.
While working as a techrep on the Atlas missile I had the pleasure of working with an Air Force Captain by the name of Jim Ure. After a while I thought there was enough of a relationship and I asked him about a limp and the fact that his right arm was always in the same position. He told me the following story. He was flying an F-80 over Korea when he had his flight controls seriously damaged making his aircraft roll quite rapidly. He was close to the ground so he elected not to eject because if he were upside down he might be shot into the ground. He popped his canopy and released his restraints. He held onto the inside structure and when he was right side up he let go and the “CENTRIFUGAL FORCE “ * ejected him but not fast enough to clear the vertical fin. On the way down he tried pulling the D ring but nothing happened. His hand was on it but his arm was no longer mechanically connected to his hand. He eventually pulled the D ring with his left hand. He looked down and saw blood running out of his flight suit. He was losing a lot of blood from a seriously damaged leg, which he eventually lost. His comment to himself was ‘Ure you really F****d up this time. He was rescued by friendlies and eventually married his nurse. He is now living in Southern California.. .*You may have noticed CENTRIFUGAL FORCE in caps. Those of you that participated or read the thread on centrifugal Vs centripetal force will understand.
Joined: Feb 2001
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From: London, Ontario, Canada
Nick's post describing the Sikorsky ejection program reminded me...
When I first saw that program on TV, I was working on chasing down an EMI/EMC problem on a certain European helicopter. Seemed every time you switched the defrost onto HIGH, the helicopter entered a slow right turn. The helicopter had been in production for several years before the problem was recognized.
The project pilot and I discussed the show the next day at work, and we both had the same though while watching it. What about EMI/EMC with the blade charges? You would have to be VERY certain everything was worked out before you went flying.
When I first saw that program on TV, I was working on chasing down an EMI/EMC problem on a certain European helicopter. Seemed every time you switched the defrost onto HIGH, the helicopter entered a slow right turn. The helicopter had been in production for several years before the problem was recognized.
The project pilot and I discussed the show the next day at work, and we both had the same though while watching it. What about EMI/EMC with the blade charges? You would have to be VERY certain everything was worked out before you went flying.
Iconoclast
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From: The home of Dudley Dooright-Where the lead dog is the only one that gets a change of scenery.
If a squib firing circuit is properly designed and there are specific guidelines the system is immune to EMI and EMR. One of the biggest contributors to EMI/EMR are solenoids. If a solenoid circuit is properly designed it will incorporate a back EMF suppression diode either on the solenoid or in the circuit.
If the solenoid does not have this installed on itself or in the circuit it can generate up to 1400 volts which will pass through the circuit and arc across the control switch. This arcing can be picked up in the electronics system. Also this high voltage can impress itself onto an adjacent circuit. Critical circuits such as squib firing or autopilot discreet command circuits will be twisted pairs and shielded to ground. When this high voltage reaches ground it can induce a high spike on the ground circuit and effect a completely separate system or black box.
If two solenoids are close to each other this back EMF can impress itself on the adjacent solenoid and cause it to operate. Shielding is all-important in the design of electrical systems.
[ 04 February 2002: Message edited by: Lu Zuckerman ]
[ 06 February 2002: Message edited by: Lu Zuckerman ]</p>
If the solenoid does not have this installed on itself or in the circuit it can generate up to 1400 volts which will pass through the circuit and arc across the control switch. This arcing can be picked up in the electronics system. Also this high voltage can impress itself onto an adjacent circuit. Critical circuits such as squib firing or autopilot discreet command circuits will be twisted pairs and shielded to ground. When this high voltage reaches ground it can induce a high spike on the ground circuit and effect a completely separate system or black box.
If two solenoids are close to each other this back EMF can impress itself on the adjacent solenoid and cause it to operate. Shielding is all-important in the design of electrical systems.
[ 04 February 2002: Message edited by: Lu Zuckerman ]
[ 06 February 2002: Message edited by: Lu Zuckerman ]</p>
Joined: Nov 2000
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From: Sunrise, Fl. U.S.A.
Gee, I had to weigh in on the odd thing.
Airlines want you to sit and feel cozy in the tube at altitude and not think about the obvious: if something happens, gravity works.
I look at it this way, there is inherant risk in flying, all pilots accept it, passengers must either accept it, or find another mode of transportation that they will accept for their own risk management. For the airlines to paint a risk free picture is just insane.
We can calculate the odds, (which are high BTW) but that doesn't assist you if you happen to be on THAT flight that has the mishap <img src="smile.gif" border="0"> Which is why I refer back to the above paragraph.
[ 07 February 2002: Message edited by: RW-1 ]</p>
Airlines want you to sit and feel cozy in the tube at altitude and not think about the obvious: if something happens, gravity works.
I look at it this way, there is inherant risk in flying, all pilots accept it, passengers must either accept it, or find another mode of transportation that they will accept for their own risk management. For the airlines to paint a risk free picture is just insane.
We can calculate the odds, (which are high BTW) but that doesn't assist you if you happen to be on THAT flight that has the mishap <img src="smile.gif" border="0"> Which is why I refer back to the above paragraph.
[ 07 February 2002: Message edited by: RW-1 ]</p>
Joined: Nov 2001
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From: Warri, Nigeria
Lu,
If the electrical portion of the ejection seat/blade disposal system is made by Smiths or Lucas....then we know it will have a "failure" rate of 1......not a reliability rate of 1. I have been flying helicopters since 1967 and I snicker when this topic comes up. I am as a result of that helicopter experience a devout pessimist when it comes to things mechanical/electrical/hydraulic/electronic....they will all fail on you at the worst possible moment it seems. The image of hitting the "let's get the heck out of Dodge button". .....and only a partial success occurring just fills me with dread.
If the electrical portion of the ejection seat/blade disposal system is made by Smiths or Lucas....then we know it will have a "failure" rate of 1......not a reliability rate of 1. I have been flying helicopters since 1967 and I snicker when this topic comes up. I am as a result of that helicopter experience a devout pessimist when it comes to things mechanical/electrical/hydraulic/electronic....they will all fail on you at the worst possible moment it seems. The image of hitting the "let's get the heck out of Dodge button". .....and only a partial success occurring just fills me with dread.
Iconoclast
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From: The home of Dudley Dooright-Where the lead dog is the only one that gets a change of scenery.
To: Geronimo 33
I have worked on a consulting basis with two divisions of Lucas and I thought they were pretty good. However there were minimal electrics involved in the two programs. I am not familiar with Smiths equipment so I can’t comment. Now if you want to add Marconi to the mix I can tell you some horror stories regarding the fact they never conform to the design specified by their customers and they do not take constructive criticism. I worked with them on the Tornado Program and the Airbus program and all I can say is that they suck. IMHO.
[ 10 February 2002: Message edited by: Lu Zuckerman ]</p>
I have worked on a consulting basis with two divisions of Lucas and I thought they were pretty good. However there were minimal electrics involved in the two programs. I am not familiar with Smiths equipment so I can’t comment. Now if you want to add Marconi to the mix I can tell you some horror stories regarding the fact they never conform to the design specified by their customers and they do not take constructive criticism. I worked with them on the Tornado Program and the Airbus program and all I can say is that they suck. IMHO.
[ 10 February 2002: Message edited by: Lu Zuckerman ]</p>
Joined: Jul 2001
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From: the cockpit
Lu:
The references I mentioned to you earlier in the thread:
"if you were to board a jet aircraft at random every single day, it would be 26,000 years before you were involved in a major crash (this is less than one fatal accident every millioin flights)"
Faith, N. 1998. Black Box: the final investigations. Boxtree, UK.
and, I was wrong about the nine times safer stat,it appears that it is actually 90 times safer!!:
in comparing air travel by fatalities per billion passenger kms,
"It should be noted that ALL FORMS of paid air travel are safer than travelling by car - varying from about twice as safe if the travelor charters a small plane, to five times as safe in a commuter aircraft, to 90 times safer with the airlines"
Smith, D. 1991. Facts not phobia,: Informing the public on aviation safety levels. The Royal Aeronautical Society's 1991 Sir Charles Kingsford Smith Memorial Lecture delivered in Sydney, Australia, 25 September, 1991.
But then when have you not had a theory that differs from the presented facts?
The references I mentioned to you earlier in the thread:
"if you were to board a jet aircraft at random every single day, it would be 26,000 years before you were involved in a major crash (this is less than one fatal accident every millioin flights)"
Faith, N. 1998. Black Box: the final investigations. Boxtree, UK.
and, I was wrong about the nine times safer stat,it appears that it is actually 90 times safer!!:
in comparing air travel by fatalities per billion passenger kms,
"It should be noted that ALL FORMS of paid air travel are safer than travelling by car - varying from about twice as safe if the travelor charters a small plane, to five times as safe in a commuter aircraft, to 90 times safer with the airlines"
Smith, D. 1991. Facts not phobia,: Informing the public on aviation safety levels. The Royal Aeronautical Society's 1991 Sir Charles Kingsford Smith Memorial Lecture delivered in Sydney, Australia, 25 September, 1991.
But then when have you not had a theory that differs from the presented facts?
Iconoclast
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From: The home of Dudley Dooright-Where the lead dog is the only one that gets a change of scenery.
To: helmet fire
You have to understand that there are lies, damned lies and statistics.
Here is another point that must be understood. The certification authorities do not use passenger seat KMs or miles. They use hours of accumulated fleet operations. If you will please refer to my post above you will see an example of passenger seat miles being used in the statistics presented by an airline which advertised that they had only one fatal crash while having accumulated 728,400,000,000 passenger seat miles. According to your statistics this is pretty good. However what the airline neglected to inform the traveling public they had only accumulated 98,550 flight hours on their fleet of aircraft in the accumulation of the stated safety figure.
Using your argument above if a person spent his entire life and then some flying in 737s he should never experience a single point failure that resulted in the loss of the aircraft. The FAA dictates that a single point failure in any system that can cause the loss of an aircraft should not occur more frequently in 1,000,000,000 hours of accumulated fleet operations. Or, one time in 114,155 years of fleet operations. Yet, there have been at least two fatal accidents on 737s involving the rudder actuator or the yaw damper in just the last five or six years.
In the first paragraph of you post you stated, "if you were to board a jet aircraft at random every single day, it would be 26,000 years before you were involved in a major crash (this is less than one fatal accident every million flights)"
Using an average flight time of 4 hours you would have accumulated 4,000,000 flight hours collectively on those million flights and the FAA states that no single point failure can occur no more frequently that 1 10 9 flight hours.
Here is a story that describes the thinking and mindset of individuals that quote statistics as if they were the truth.
During the Saturn Apollo Program there was a statistician that worked for North American Rockwell the builders of the Apollo capsule. This man was deathly afraid to fly because he calculated that the probability of their being a bomb on the aircraft was 1 in a million and a half. One day his boss told him that he would have to fly to the Cape and if he refused he would be fired. His colleagues were at the airport when he appeared. They asked him what had changed his mind about flying. He replied that he had calculated to probability of their being two bombs on board the aircraft were 1 in 10 billion so, he was carrying his own bomb.
To put it in understandable terms Jesus Christ roamed this planet approximately 2001 years ago. In hours it comes to 17,528,760. A billion hours equates to 114,155.25 years.
The FAA requires A billion hours and yet no single aircraft model has ever complied with that safety requirement. And, it never will. Even though the requirement is in hours the FAA and other certification authorities will use passenger seat miles or passenger seat kilometers as their justification for airline safety.
The key word here is OBFUSCATION.
You have to understand that there are lies, damned lies and statistics.
Here is another point that must be understood. The certification authorities do not use passenger seat KMs or miles. They use hours of accumulated fleet operations. If you will please refer to my post above you will see an example of passenger seat miles being used in the statistics presented by an airline which advertised that they had only one fatal crash while having accumulated 728,400,000,000 passenger seat miles. According to your statistics this is pretty good. However what the airline neglected to inform the traveling public they had only accumulated 98,550 flight hours on their fleet of aircraft in the accumulation of the stated safety figure.
Using your argument above if a person spent his entire life and then some flying in 737s he should never experience a single point failure that resulted in the loss of the aircraft. The FAA dictates that a single point failure in any system that can cause the loss of an aircraft should not occur more frequently in 1,000,000,000 hours of accumulated fleet operations. Or, one time in 114,155 years of fleet operations. Yet, there have been at least two fatal accidents on 737s involving the rudder actuator or the yaw damper in just the last five or six years.
In the first paragraph of you post you stated, "if you were to board a jet aircraft at random every single day, it would be 26,000 years before you were involved in a major crash (this is less than one fatal accident every million flights)"
Using an average flight time of 4 hours you would have accumulated 4,000,000 flight hours collectively on those million flights and the FAA states that no single point failure can occur no more frequently that 1 10 9 flight hours.
Here is a story that describes the thinking and mindset of individuals that quote statistics as if they were the truth.
During the Saturn Apollo Program there was a statistician that worked for North American Rockwell the builders of the Apollo capsule. This man was deathly afraid to fly because he calculated that the probability of their being a bomb on the aircraft was 1 in a million and a half. One day his boss told him that he would have to fly to the Cape and if he refused he would be fired. His colleagues were at the airport when he appeared. They asked him what had changed his mind about flying. He replied that he had calculated to probability of their being two bombs on board the aircraft were 1 in 10 billion so, he was carrying his own bomb.
To put it in understandable terms Jesus Christ roamed this planet approximately 2001 years ago. In hours it comes to 17,528,760. A billion hours equates to 114,155.25 years.
The FAA requires A billion hours and yet no single aircraft model has ever complied with that safety requirement. And, it never will. Even though the requirement is in hours the FAA and other certification authorities will use passenger seat miles or passenger seat kilometers as their justification for airline safety.
The key word here is OBFUSCATION.
Joined: Jul 2001
Posts: 1,084
Likes: 1
From: the cockpit
Lu:
As before, no arguement with your point about time between failures, however, the point I was trying to make is that despite all your concerns, AIRLINE TRAVEL IS STILL 90 TIMES SAFER THAN DRIVING!!! Facts, son, just the facts.
And you still didn't address my original question: if it was such a life threatning fault with the Airbus, why on earth would you have gotten on board? <img src="eek.gif" border="0">
As before, no arguement with your point about time between failures, however, the point I was trying to make is that despite all your concerns, AIRLINE TRAVEL IS STILL 90 TIMES SAFER THAN DRIVING!!! Facts, son, just the facts.
And you still didn't address my original question: if it was such a life threatning fault with the Airbus, why on earth would you have gotten on board? <img src="eek.gif" border="0">
Iconoclast
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From: The home of Dudley Dooright-Where the lead dog is the only one that gets a change of scenery.
To: helmet fire
“And you still didn't address my original question: if it was such a life threatening fault with the Airbus, why on earth would you have gotten on board”?
There were two problems that could have caused the loss of the A-310 on which I was riding. One was if a partially extended slat had been struck by lightening and the other was if an internal crack in the flap power control unit developed and migrated inward instead of outward. If it migrated outward we would have lost one hydraulic system and if it migrated inward we would have an uncommanded extension of the flap system. Granted either of these occurrences (lightning strike and internal leak) could have caused the loss of the aircraft but the probability of either occurring was very low. Besides I had the opportunity to go up front and talk to the pilots and telling them how to counter the uncommanded extension of the flaps. So if Mr. Murphy decided that on that flight the flaps would extend without being directed to extend the pilots would save the day. The rest of the flight was mainly my hoping that there was no thunderstorm over London. I have flown on many Airbus Aircraft since that flight and even if it is not on an A-310 I still go up front and talk to the pilots. I do this mainly because of similar system architecture on all Airbus aircraft and the fact that the same companies that supplied the flap and slat system drive on the A-310 are involved in all Airbus Aircraft.
“And you still didn't address my original question: if it was such a life threatening fault with the Airbus, why on earth would you have gotten on board”?
There were two problems that could have caused the loss of the A-310 on which I was riding. One was if a partially extended slat had been struck by lightening and the other was if an internal crack in the flap power control unit developed and migrated inward instead of outward. If it migrated outward we would have lost one hydraulic system and if it migrated inward we would have an uncommanded extension of the flap system. Granted either of these occurrences (lightning strike and internal leak) could have caused the loss of the aircraft but the probability of either occurring was very low. Besides I had the opportunity to go up front and talk to the pilots and telling them how to counter the uncommanded extension of the flaps. So if Mr. Murphy decided that on that flight the flaps would extend without being directed to extend the pilots would save the day. The rest of the flight was mainly my hoping that there was no thunderstorm over London. I have flown on many Airbus Aircraft since that flight and even if it is not on an A-310 I still go up front and talk to the pilots. I do this mainly because of similar system architecture on all Airbus aircraft and the fact that the same companies that supplied the flap and slat system drive on the A-310 are involved in all Airbus Aircraft.
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helmet fire-
Haven't you figured it out by now? Why are you troubled by some need to actually have to stay on the subject? Lu has no such problem.
BTW he never has answered your reasonable question, nor will he, I'll bet! <img src="wink.gif" border="0"> <img src="wink.gif" border="0"> <img src="wink.gif" border="0">
Haven't you figured it out by now? Why are you troubled by some need to actually have to stay on the subject? Lu has no such problem.
BTW he never has answered your reasonable question, nor will he, I'll bet! <img src="wink.gif" border="0"> <img src="wink.gif" border="0"> <img src="wink.gif" border="0">
Joined: Jul 2001
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From: the cockpit
Nick:. .Not so much troubled, as highly amused. I also get to learn lots of cool stuff like how to save the day from uncommanded flap extensions. Tips such as using the glow self generated by my rotors to save me turning on the nitesun, and how to throw out my high school physics book using only centrifugal force. Oh...and I also get to learn about conspiracies such as the FAA continuing to allow the worlds most popular helicopter to fly despite its tendency to have sudden, unexplained mast seperations, and then there is the EH101 coverup that may have averted two fatal accidents. If I didnt ask "Lu, why did you get on the plane?" we may never have encouraged Lu to share these pearls with us, and I would be all the more ignorant of such things as uncommanded flap extension.
Mind you, the actual answer would be fascinating wouldn't it?
So, Lu, if the problem on the Airbus was as life threatening as you claim, why would you even get on board?
And here is a prompt for you Lu:
"Despite the life threatening danger of the Airbus, I flew on it because......(insert answer here).....................
<img src="cool.gif" border="0"> <img src="cool.gif" border="0">
Mind you, the actual answer would be fascinating wouldn't it?
So, Lu, if the problem on the Airbus was as life threatening as you claim, why would you even get on board?
And here is a prompt for you Lu:
"Despite the life threatening danger of the Airbus, I flew on it because......(insert answer here).....................
<img src="cool.gif" border="0"> <img src="cool.gif" border="0">
Iconoclast
Joined: Sep 2000
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From: The home of Dudley Dooright-Where the lead dog is the only one that gets a change of scenery.
To: helmet fire
"Despite the life threatening danger of the Airbus, I flew on it because......(insert answer here)..................... I got on the A-310 for the same reason you get into your helicopter every day. It is a part of our work to do so. I like you realize that there are a lot of things that can go wrong both on your helicopter and on a commercial jetliner but I had to get from Zurich to London. I would mention two city pairs in OZ that you fly from and to but I’m not familiar with the layout of the land. Like you getting into your helicopter and me getting on the A-310 I / you realize that the probability of something bad occurring is very low although it is possible. If I refused to fly I would lose my job and if you refused to fly because you knew that there was a possibility of something going wrong then you would lose your job.
When I flew in the military our planes were for the most part very old and well worn from service in WW2 however I figured that if the pilots had the balls to get in and fly then I could also do the same. What I didn’t know at the time was that the pilots carried a bottle of engine smoothener in their nav cases.
Nick Lappos knows very well what can go wrong on a helicopter but he still gets into them every day. If he dwelled on the potential problems and their ramifications he too would have to carry a bottle of “engine smoothener” in his kit bag that is if he doesn’t do that already.
You make light of my comments about what could possibly go wrong and that’s OK but it would surprise you how many times I told my clients what could go wrong and for whatever reason they ignored it. That too is OK but you and the other guys on this forum are flying in those aircraft where problems were ignored for whatever reason.
"Despite the life threatening danger of the Airbus, I flew on it because......(insert answer here)..................... I got on the A-310 for the same reason you get into your helicopter every day. It is a part of our work to do so. I like you realize that there are a lot of things that can go wrong both on your helicopter and on a commercial jetliner but I had to get from Zurich to London. I would mention two city pairs in OZ that you fly from and to but I’m not familiar with the layout of the land. Like you getting into your helicopter and me getting on the A-310 I / you realize that the probability of something bad occurring is very low although it is possible. If I refused to fly I would lose my job and if you refused to fly because you knew that there was a possibility of something going wrong then you would lose your job.
When I flew in the military our planes were for the most part very old and well worn from service in WW2 however I figured that if the pilots had the balls to get in and fly then I could also do the same. What I didn’t know at the time was that the pilots carried a bottle of engine smoothener in their nav cases.
Nick Lappos knows very well what can go wrong on a helicopter but he still gets into them every day. If he dwelled on the potential problems and their ramifications he too would have to carry a bottle of “engine smoothener” in his kit bag that is if he doesn’t do that already.
You make light of my comments about what could possibly go wrong and that’s OK but it would surprise you how many times I told my clients what could go wrong and for whatever reason they ignored it. That too is OK but you and the other guys on this forum are flying in those aircraft where problems were ignored for whatever reason.
Joined: Jul 2001
Posts: 1,084
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From: the cockpit
Lu,. . thanks for the answer. Lets see, here it is: To: helmet fire. ."Despite the life threatening danger of the Airbus, I flew on it because I got on the A-310 for the same reason you get into your helicopter every day. It is a part of our work to do so.". . <img src="eek.gif" border="0"> . .Actually Lu, you are wrong. I am NEVER paid to fly non airworthy or life threatening aircraft, in fact I am paid NOT to risk my client, myself, nor the machine by doing so.
Your reason that you "had to get from Zurich to London" is hardly a reason I would risk my life for, but there you go, the world takes all types. Or, are your claims of life threatening failures a bit overstated after all?
I only make light of your huge calls Lu, not the intent and aim of your discussions.
BTW an equivalent of Zurich to London might be Tamworth to Bendigo in Oz!
<img src="cool.gif" border="0"> <img src="cool.gif" border="0">
Your reason that you "had to get from Zurich to London" is hardly a reason I would risk my life for, but there you go, the world takes all types. Or, are your claims of life threatening failures a bit overstated after all?
I only make light of your huge calls Lu, not the intent and aim of your discussions.
BTW an equivalent of Zurich to London might be Tamworth to Bendigo in Oz!
<img src="cool.gif" border="0"> <img src="cool.gif" border="0">
Iconoclast
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From: The home of Dudley Dooright-Where the lead dog is the only one that gets a change of scenery.
To: helmet fire
“Actually Lu, you are wrong. I am NEVER paid to fly non airworthy or life threatening aircraft, in fact I am paid NOT to risk my client, myself, nor the machine by doing so”.
The potential for failure is always there and under those conditions the helicopter becomes un-airworthy when a rotor blade comes off or you have a transmission failure that locks up the gear train. The other way you have to know your aircraft is un-airworthy is when your mechanic discovers a defect or you note a problem during a flight and the mechanic investigates the problem and grounds the helicopter. Then there is another way of finding out that your aircraft is un-airworthy and that is when an AD is issued grounding your helicopter and all other models of the same helicopter. In order for that AD to be issued a pilot and his passengers had to die.
Every time you fly you have the potential of discovering that your helicopter is un-airworthy yet you get in and start it up and flyaway. The reasons you do this on a daily basis are because of faith in yourself as a pilot. The faith you have in your machine and hopefully the faith that you have in the people that maintain you machine the faith in the design of the helicopter and the faith in the engineers having gotten it right. You should also have faith that the manufacturer had someone like myself to identify potential problems and most of all you have the faith that the manufacturer listened to the criticism.
Regarding my flying on the A-310 what would you have me do? I brought the problems to the attention of the top management of the company I worked for and they refused to do anything because they would have to pay for any redesign. Their theory was that if someone above our company or even Airbus discovered the problems they would issue a change in scope and our company would get paid for the change. I took the problem to the wing integration contractor in Northern Germany and they told me the same thing and for the same reasons. I then took it to the wing designer in the UK and they told me they were sympathetic to my problem but they could offer no help. Now consider the following. The contract required that Airbus and the certification authorities be notified in the event of the discovery of Reliability, Maintainability or Safety problem and none of the three levels of contractors told them. Here is another point. Airbus prepared a specification that outlined a series of tests to be performed on every plane prior to roll out. These tests were to prove the bonding integrity and ability to resist damage due to lightning strike. Well since it was proven that the flaps and slats were not grounded it only indicates that Airbus never performed the tests outlined in their own specification.
With all of that, what excuse would you suggest I have used to take another flight on a Boeing or Lockheed or McDouglas aircraft?
“Actually Lu, you are wrong. I am NEVER paid to fly non airworthy or life threatening aircraft, in fact I am paid NOT to risk my client, myself, nor the machine by doing so”.
The potential for failure is always there and under those conditions the helicopter becomes un-airworthy when a rotor blade comes off or you have a transmission failure that locks up the gear train. The other way you have to know your aircraft is un-airworthy is when your mechanic discovers a defect or you note a problem during a flight and the mechanic investigates the problem and grounds the helicopter. Then there is another way of finding out that your aircraft is un-airworthy and that is when an AD is issued grounding your helicopter and all other models of the same helicopter. In order for that AD to be issued a pilot and his passengers had to die.
Every time you fly you have the potential of discovering that your helicopter is un-airworthy yet you get in and start it up and flyaway. The reasons you do this on a daily basis are because of faith in yourself as a pilot. The faith you have in your machine and hopefully the faith that you have in the people that maintain you machine the faith in the design of the helicopter and the faith in the engineers having gotten it right. You should also have faith that the manufacturer had someone like myself to identify potential problems and most of all you have the faith that the manufacturer listened to the criticism.
Regarding my flying on the A-310 what would you have me do? I brought the problems to the attention of the top management of the company I worked for and they refused to do anything because they would have to pay for any redesign. Their theory was that if someone above our company or even Airbus discovered the problems they would issue a change in scope and our company would get paid for the change. I took the problem to the wing integration contractor in Northern Germany and they told me the same thing and for the same reasons. I then took it to the wing designer in the UK and they told me they were sympathetic to my problem but they could offer no help. Now consider the following. The contract required that Airbus and the certification authorities be notified in the event of the discovery of Reliability, Maintainability or Safety problem and none of the three levels of contractors told them. Here is another point. Airbus prepared a specification that outlined a series of tests to be performed on every plane prior to roll out. These tests were to prove the bonding integrity and ability to resist damage due to lightning strike. Well since it was proven that the flaps and slats were not grounded it only indicates that Airbus never performed the tests outlined in their own specification.
With all of that, what excuse would you suggest I have used to take another flight on a Boeing or Lockheed or McDouglas aircraft?
Joined: Jul 2001
Posts: 1,084
Likes: 1
From: the cockpit
Nick: Do you see my point now? <img src="wink.gif" border="0">
Lu: . .You said: >>"the helicopter becomes un-airworthy when a rotor blade comes off or you have a transmission failure that locks up the gear train".<< I strongly agree with this astute oberservation, Professor. Lets hope I never attempt to fly without first checking the aircraft has all of its rotor blades on and its' drive train working (though I suspect I might notice shortly after start).
But, methinks, here is the crux of our differences: . .You said: >>"Every time you fly you have the potential of discovering that your helicopter is un-airworthy yet you get in and start it up and flyaway"<
This is true Lu, but unfortunatley irrelevant to my question to you. Irrelevant because you are going on about "potential" of losing airworthiness aonce airborne, whilst I am posing the question about an aircraft that, according to your previous statements, is not airworthy to begin with. I say again, I do not fly in aircraft that I believe to be unairworthy, yet you claim the Airbus is such an aircraft and then you jump on board "hoping" that your brief to the pilots and the total absence of thunderstorms will allow you to arrive safely. Thus your answer to my question (that you would fly for the same reasons I would fly) is not correct, because I WOULD NOT and yet YOU WOULD.
Lu, you went on to ask: >>Regarding my flying on the A-310 what would you have me do?<<
Answer: I dont care what you do Lu. If you want to get on an aircraft you believe is unsafe, then do it. I dont.
In regard to you statements about the A-310, I hope you collected all of your supporting evidence to clear you as you state: >>The contract required that Airbus and the certification authorities be notified in the event of the discovery of Reliability, Maintainability or Safety problem and NONE of the three levels of contractors told them.<<
Some questions immediately spring to mind.... .1. Were you not a contractor? . .2. Did you inform the Certification Authorities AND Airbus? . .3. Just like the EH-101 and R22, do you do the right thing by families of the victims, and contact them to offer expert witness support in their time of need?
I suspect the first line of questions from any examining lawyer might be:
Lawyer: "Mr Zuckerman, do you wish to commit suicide?". .Lu: (insert answer here - I'll assume the answer is negative). .Lawyer: "If you REALLY believe that the aircraft was bound to crash due to these design faults you discovered, and claim to have been ignored/covered up by the manufacturer, why on earth would you risk YOUR life by regularly flying on them?"
Fairly close to my original question, n'est pas? . . <img src="rolleyes.gif" border="0">
Lu: . .You said: >>"the helicopter becomes un-airworthy when a rotor blade comes off or you have a transmission failure that locks up the gear train".<< I strongly agree with this astute oberservation, Professor. Lets hope I never attempt to fly without first checking the aircraft has all of its rotor blades on and its' drive train working (though I suspect I might notice shortly after start).
But, methinks, here is the crux of our differences: . .You said: >>"Every time you fly you have the potential of discovering that your helicopter is un-airworthy yet you get in and start it up and flyaway"<
This is true Lu, but unfortunatley irrelevant to my question to you. Irrelevant because you are going on about "potential" of losing airworthiness aonce airborne, whilst I am posing the question about an aircraft that, according to your previous statements, is not airworthy to begin with. I say again, I do not fly in aircraft that I believe to be unairworthy, yet you claim the Airbus is such an aircraft and then you jump on board "hoping" that your brief to the pilots and the total absence of thunderstorms will allow you to arrive safely. Thus your answer to my question (that you would fly for the same reasons I would fly) is not correct, because I WOULD NOT and yet YOU WOULD.
Lu, you went on to ask: >>Regarding my flying on the A-310 what would you have me do?<<
Answer: I dont care what you do Lu. If you want to get on an aircraft you believe is unsafe, then do it. I dont.
In regard to you statements about the A-310, I hope you collected all of your supporting evidence to clear you as you state: >>The contract required that Airbus and the certification authorities be notified in the event of the discovery of Reliability, Maintainability or Safety problem and NONE of the three levels of contractors told them.<<
Some questions immediately spring to mind.... .1. Were you not a contractor? . .2. Did you inform the Certification Authorities AND Airbus? . .3. Just like the EH-101 and R22, do you do the right thing by families of the victims, and contact them to offer expert witness support in their time of need?
I suspect the first line of questions from any examining lawyer might be:
Lawyer: "Mr Zuckerman, do you wish to commit suicide?". .Lu: (insert answer here - I'll assume the answer is negative). .Lawyer: "If you REALLY believe that the aircraft was bound to crash due to these design faults you discovered, and claim to have been ignored/covered up by the manufacturer, why on earth would you risk YOUR life by regularly flying on them?"
Fairly close to my original question, n'est pas? . . <img src="rolleyes.gif" border="0">
Iconoclast
Joined: Sep 2000
Posts: 2,132
Likes: 0
From: The home of Dudley Dooright-Where the lead dog is the only one that gets a change of scenery.
To: helmet fire
“Some questions immediately spring to mind”.... .“1. Were you not a contractor? . . 2. Did you inform the Certification Authorities AND Airbus? . . 3. Just like the EH-101 and R22, do you do the right thing by families of the victims, and contact them to offer expert witness support in their time of need”?
. .Response:. .1) Yes. .2) While I was still actively involved in the program and when I went to work for Agusta I decided that I had done every thing within my power to present the problem to the major contractors for the A-310 wing but to no avail. I decided that I would not take it any further unless and until the A-310 was certificated in the United States. While at Agusta I found that this certification was granted and at that time I contacted the FAA. It took two very detailed letters to convince them to take action. However the kicker in my second letter was that I was absolving myself of any responsibility and if an aircraft were lost due to the described defects it would be their fault. They finally took action and the Vice President and chief program manager were fired. Both of these gentlemen went on to better jobs in the German aircraft industry and even though the FAA took action the design was never changed so the same problems exist. Upon my return to the States I contacted every American operator of the A-310 and spoke to the respective safety pilots advising them of the problems and how to counter a runaway flap system. I don’t believe I could have done any more than I had done.. .3) Two lawyers to support their investigations into two R-22 crashes have placed me on retainer and as I had previously stated in another post the Royal Navy regarding the EH-101 crash contacted me. I also belong to an organization made up of mainly Aviation Accident Lawyers and they all know my technical background so if any lawsuits are brought forward relative to the three EH-101 crashes I will most likely be contacted.
. .I suspect the first line of questions from any examining lawyer might be:
Lawyer: "Mr. Zuckerman, do you wish to commit suicide?". .Lu: (insert answer here - I'll assume the answer is negative) . .Lawyer: "If you REALLY believe that the aircraft was bound to crash due to these design faults you discovered, and claim to have been ignored/covered up by the manufacturer, why on earth would you risk YOUR life by regularly flying on them?" . . . .Response to first question:
No sir I do wish to commit suicide.
Response to the second question:
But sir, I did not believe that the aircraft was bound to crash but that the potential for the aircraft to crash was there but the probability of occurrence was minimal and dependent upon two very different circumstances. The first was the aircraft being struck by lightning during let down with the slats partially extended. Then there were two other subsets to this which were the probability of the lightning hitting the nose which is the primary attach point and second being struck on the edge of the partially extended slat. The presence of an electrical storm in the vicinity of LHR was minimal and the possibility of being struck on the slat was a 50-50 possibility. The use of the term regularly is an over statement as I only flew on an A-310 only one time. Regarding the potential for an uncommanded flap extension the probability was minimal and in this case if a crack were generated the possibility of the crack migrating inward or outward was also 50-50.
Now,let's explore what I would do as opposed to what you would do:
Would you fly on a 747-200 with TWA 800 in mind? Would you fly in a MD-10 with the vision of the crash in Sioux City? Would you fly in a MD-11 with the thought of the crash in Peggys’ Cove? Would you fly in a 737 with the vision of the possibility of extreme rudder excursions? Would you fly in a 737 with the vision of the roof blowing off or the vision of an uncontained engine explosion resulting in the deaths of many passengers in Manchester, England? How about flying in a 767 with the vision of an uncommanded thrust reverser causing the loss of the aircraft. I could go on for a long time but I hope by now you can understand where I am coming from. Each of these aircraft were deemed airworthy when they left the ground but each had a potential flaw that was either overlooked, disregarded or totally unknown and in each case this flaw manifested itself much to the detriment of the passengers and crew.
Even though you were fully knowledgeable of these crashes and the reasons for them you would still get on any one of them and fly from point A to point B and possibly on to point C. Why, because the certification authorities told you the aircraft were safe to fly on and the airlines offered statistics showing how safe they were based on passenger seat miles or, passenger seat kilometers flown.
Now if you would not fly on these aircraft within Australia you could take a train assuming it was going in the right direction or you could ride on a sheep truck or if you were going long distances you could take a ship.
Now, let’s address accident rates on trains, sheep trucks and ships…
“Some questions immediately spring to mind”.... .“1. Were you not a contractor? . . 2. Did you inform the Certification Authorities AND Airbus? . . 3. Just like the EH-101 and R22, do you do the right thing by families of the victims, and contact them to offer expert witness support in their time of need”?
. .Response:. .1) Yes. .2) While I was still actively involved in the program and when I went to work for Agusta I decided that I had done every thing within my power to present the problem to the major contractors for the A-310 wing but to no avail. I decided that I would not take it any further unless and until the A-310 was certificated in the United States. While at Agusta I found that this certification was granted and at that time I contacted the FAA. It took two very detailed letters to convince them to take action. However the kicker in my second letter was that I was absolving myself of any responsibility and if an aircraft were lost due to the described defects it would be their fault. They finally took action and the Vice President and chief program manager were fired. Both of these gentlemen went on to better jobs in the German aircraft industry and even though the FAA took action the design was never changed so the same problems exist. Upon my return to the States I contacted every American operator of the A-310 and spoke to the respective safety pilots advising them of the problems and how to counter a runaway flap system. I don’t believe I could have done any more than I had done.. .3) Two lawyers to support their investigations into two R-22 crashes have placed me on retainer and as I had previously stated in another post the Royal Navy regarding the EH-101 crash contacted me. I also belong to an organization made up of mainly Aviation Accident Lawyers and they all know my technical background so if any lawsuits are brought forward relative to the three EH-101 crashes I will most likely be contacted.
. .I suspect the first line of questions from any examining lawyer might be:
Lawyer: "Mr. Zuckerman, do you wish to commit suicide?". .Lu: (insert answer here - I'll assume the answer is negative) . .Lawyer: "If you REALLY believe that the aircraft was bound to crash due to these design faults you discovered, and claim to have been ignored/covered up by the manufacturer, why on earth would you risk YOUR life by regularly flying on them?" . . . .Response to first question:
No sir I do wish to commit suicide.
Response to the second question:
But sir, I did not believe that the aircraft was bound to crash but that the potential for the aircraft to crash was there but the probability of occurrence was minimal and dependent upon two very different circumstances. The first was the aircraft being struck by lightning during let down with the slats partially extended. Then there were two other subsets to this which were the probability of the lightning hitting the nose which is the primary attach point and second being struck on the edge of the partially extended slat. The presence of an electrical storm in the vicinity of LHR was minimal and the possibility of being struck on the slat was a 50-50 possibility. The use of the term regularly is an over statement as I only flew on an A-310 only one time. Regarding the potential for an uncommanded flap extension the probability was minimal and in this case if a crack were generated the possibility of the crack migrating inward or outward was also 50-50.
Now,let's explore what I would do as opposed to what you would do:
Would you fly on a 747-200 with TWA 800 in mind? Would you fly in a MD-10 with the vision of the crash in Sioux City? Would you fly in a MD-11 with the thought of the crash in Peggys’ Cove? Would you fly in a 737 with the vision of the possibility of extreme rudder excursions? Would you fly in a 737 with the vision of the roof blowing off or the vision of an uncontained engine explosion resulting in the deaths of many passengers in Manchester, England? How about flying in a 767 with the vision of an uncommanded thrust reverser causing the loss of the aircraft. I could go on for a long time but I hope by now you can understand where I am coming from. Each of these aircraft were deemed airworthy when they left the ground but each had a potential flaw that was either overlooked, disregarded or totally unknown and in each case this flaw manifested itself much to the detriment of the passengers and crew.
Even though you were fully knowledgeable of these crashes and the reasons for them you would still get on any one of them and fly from point A to point B and possibly on to point C. Why, because the certification authorities told you the aircraft were safe to fly on and the airlines offered statistics showing how safe they were based on passenger seat miles or, passenger seat kilometers flown.
Now if you would not fly on these aircraft within Australia you could take a train assuming it was going in the right direction or you could ride on a sheep truck or if you were going long distances you could take a ship.
Now, let’s address accident rates on trains, sheep trucks and ships…
Iconoclast
Joined: Sep 2000
Posts: 2,132
Likes: 0
From: The home of Dudley Dooright-Where the lead dog is the only one that gets a change of scenery.
To: Nick Lappos
I am very sorry that you feel the way you do but let me ask you a question.
Were you involved in the certification testing of the S-76? Were you in constant contact with the various design groups? Did you and the designers investigate every possible safety feature of the design? Did you get involved in the verification testing of all of the major dynamic systems or, did Sikorsky elect to demonstrate the relative safety of the design by computer analysis just like Boeing did on the 767 thrust reversers. If you were not directly involved in the certification process then did the certification test pilot that was involved perform all of the above activities?
Now, assuming that you or another colleague did all of the above then please explain to the readers of this post how the blades failed on I believe two S-76s with the loss of crew and passengers. From what I understand the blades had redundant load paths and the secondary load path failed placing the entire load on the primary load path with the end result, for whatever reason, the primary load path failed and the blades came off due to Centrifugal force.
I have been in the aerospace industry since 1955 and have been exposed to the genius and arrogance of the various design departments in the companies I worked in. I have been involved in RMS since 1968 and I have been exposed to those firms that really promoted the concepts of RMS. And I have also been in companies where the engineers had a not invented here attitude and ignored the RMS personnel or, they swept the problems under the carpet hoping that the systems would not fail during the guarantee period.
Where do you feel that Sikorsky fits into these extremes relative to the promotion and acceptance of RMS? If you rate them very high then again I ask you to explain the problems of the S-76 and other Sikorsky products.
Let’s face the truth. The engineering and test departments at all of the aerospace companies never get it 100% right and the operational pilots are really test pilots until all of the bugs are removed and or corrected and in the process some of them get killed along with their passengers.
The same for the automobile companies.
I am very sorry that you feel the way you do but let me ask you a question.
Were you involved in the certification testing of the S-76? Were you in constant contact with the various design groups? Did you and the designers investigate every possible safety feature of the design? Did you get involved in the verification testing of all of the major dynamic systems or, did Sikorsky elect to demonstrate the relative safety of the design by computer analysis just like Boeing did on the 767 thrust reversers. If you were not directly involved in the certification process then did the certification test pilot that was involved perform all of the above activities?
Now, assuming that you or another colleague did all of the above then please explain to the readers of this post how the blades failed on I believe two S-76s with the loss of crew and passengers. From what I understand the blades had redundant load paths and the secondary load path failed placing the entire load on the primary load path with the end result, for whatever reason, the primary load path failed and the blades came off due to Centrifugal force.
I have been in the aerospace industry since 1955 and have been exposed to the genius and arrogance of the various design departments in the companies I worked in. I have been involved in RMS since 1968 and I have been exposed to those firms that really promoted the concepts of RMS. And I have also been in companies where the engineers had a not invented here attitude and ignored the RMS personnel or, they swept the problems under the carpet hoping that the systems would not fail during the guarantee period.
Where do you feel that Sikorsky fits into these extremes relative to the promotion and acceptance of RMS? If you rate them very high then again I ask you to explain the problems of the S-76 and other Sikorsky products.
Let’s face the truth. The engineering and test departments at all of the aerospace companies never get it 100% right and the operational pilots are really test pilots until all of the bugs are removed and or corrected and in the process some of them get killed along with their passengers.
The same for the automobile companies.