PHI helicopter down in GoM
Join Date: Oct 2003
Location: Over here
Posts: 1,030
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
S76H, I think the single-engine subject is a red herring. Please show me one accident or incident in the GOM in which injuries or death occurred and in which the number of engines was a factor. I can't find one. Making things safer is going to cost someone money, and I'd much prefer to have it spent on things which can actually save lives, maybe mine. Better weather reporting, better communications (talking to ATC out here is a sometimes thing), terrain proximity warning systems, collision avoidance systems, radar (it can be put in small ships, it just costs lots of money), etc are far more important than having 2 engines.
Like PPF1, I've had the wind change 180 degrees between platforms less than 1/2 mile apart, I've had fog roll in between the time I picked up a slingload and the time I dropped it 1/4 mile away, I've had wind come up on a sunny day from calm to so strong it almost blew my helicopter over the side, it was only saved because the wind blew it toward the center of the platform, and every other phenomenon imaginable. These things can kill you, whether you have 1, 2, or 3 engines. Being able to not fly without being chewed out by management would be far safer than adding another engine.
OK, rant off, I'm done on this one.
Like PPF1, I've had the wind change 180 degrees between platforms less than 1/2 mile apart, I've had fog roll in between the time I picked up a slingload and the time I dropped it 1/4 mile away, I've had wind come up on a sunny day from calm to so strong it almost blew my helicopter over the side, it was only saved because the wind blew it toward the center of the platform, and every other phenomenon imaginable. These things can kill you, whether you have 1, 2, or 3 engines. Being able to not fly without being chewed out by management would be far safer than adding another engine.
OK, rant off, I'm done on this one.
Join Date: Jun 2002
Location: home and abroad
Posts: 582
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Gomer, I was merely pointing out that one global oil company adopts wildly different standards for the aircraft its employees travel on, both sides of the Atlantic. I'm not starting the single vs twin debate, although I think twins will usually have more lifting capacity and therefore carry more goodies to work with. They just happen to be the standard required on the North Sea and I'm quite happy with that.
I agree with your list of items, and we find ourselves improving what we have in that respect out here in Europe as we speak. So again, wildly differing standards between us. Why? The laws of nature are still the same..
As far as wind changes, we have a windsock on every deck, we have fairly accurate weather reporting and are issued warnings by trained radio operators when they observe large changes that might affect our operations, and if the weather closes in, we declare IFR, climb and either fly ARAs or go home.
So why deny yourselves that option list?
I agree with your list of items, and we find ourselves improving what we have in that respect out here in Europe as we speak. So again, wildly differing standards between us. Why? The laws of nature are still the same..
As far as wind changes, we have a windsock on every deck, we have fairly accurate weather reporting and are issued warnings by trained radio operators when they observe large changes that might affect our operations, and if the weather closes in, we declare IFR, climb and either fly ARAs or go home.
So why deny yourselves that option list?
Join Date: May 2002
Location: lake providence, la.
Age: 63
Posts: 111
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
PPF1 says:
People think that the GOM is a place for barely qualified pilots go to build time while waiting for that real job. Not true at all.
You are very right; yet, every day it is happening in the Gulf. Years ago I had heard a story about a pilot that had gotten lost while going from one platform to the next. The story went that, with a load in a 206B, he would fly one way for a few minutes and then turn and go another. He was in the High Island area where there are not many platfroms and although the day was fairly clear the visibility was "not good". For some time he flew in full contact with company flight following at times nearly crying that he was lost and he thought he should just land in the water. Finally, he did spot a platform and landed, nearly out of gas.
Well, a foreman and I were on a long flight into the same area from the East Cameron blocks when this story came up. (When flying the little birds in the GOM the guy with the biggest check gets to sit up front with the pilot.) It seems that this foreman was sitting up front on the day this happened. He said that the pilot paniced and began flying around like he was crazy. The pilot was told several times to just turn toward the beach but could not be convinced that that would help. Eventually they did find a platform, landed, spent the night there, and got out of there the next morning when the company brought more fuel and pilot.
The GOM is unique in many ways as PPF1 has shone. Yet, what is needed is not more regulation but the whole list PPF1 wrote would be just fine.
Barryb
People think that the GOM is a place for barely qualified pilots go to build time while waiting for that real job. Not true at all.
You are very right; yet, every day it is happening in the Gulf. Years ago I had heard a story about a pilot that had gotten lost while going from one platform to the next. The story went that, with a load in a 206B, he would fly one way for a few minutes and then turn and go another. He was in the High Island area where there are not many platfroms and although the day was fairly clear the visibility was "not good". For some time he flew in full contact with company flight following at times nearly crying that he was lost and he thought he should just land in the water. Finally, he did spot a platform and landed, nearly out of gas.
Well, a foreman and I were on a long flight into the same area from the East Cameron blocks when this story came up. (When flying the little birds in the GOM the guy with the biggest check gets to sit up front with the pilot.) It seems that this foreman was sitting up front on the day this happened. He said that the pilot paniced and began flying around like he was crazy. The pilot was told several times to just turn toward the beach but could not be convinced that that would help. Eventually they did find a platform, landed, spent the night there, and got out of there the next morning when the company brought more fuel and pilot.
The GOM is unique in many ways as PPF1 has shone. Yet, what is needed is not more regulation but the whole list PPF1 wrote would be just fine.
Barryb
Join Date: Jun 2003
Location: Off the Planet
Posts: 320
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Gomer Pylot:
How about this one.
S76H, I think the single-engine subject is a red herring. Please show me one accident or incident in the GOM in which injuries or death occurred and in which the number of engines was a factor. I can't find one.
NTSB Identification: FTW03FA097
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Accident occurred Sunday, February 16, 2003 in MI 700, GM
Aircraft: Bell 407, registration: N407HH
Injuries: 2 Fatal, 3 Serious.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On February 16, 2003, approximately 1225 central standard time, a Bell 407 single-engine helicopter, landed offshore in the Gulf of Mexico following a loss of engine power. The helicopter was owned and operated under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135, by Houston Helicopters, Inc., at Pearland, Texas. The pilot and one passenger received fatal injuries, and three passengers received serious injuries. The helicopter has not been recovered and is presumed destroyed. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, and a company visual flight rules (VFR) flight plan was filed for the on-demand air taxi flight. Approximately 1210, the helicopter departed Harbor Island (Tesoro Heliport) at Ingleside, Texas, for the 26.1 nautical mile flight to the Ensco Rig 84 (Matagorda 700 block offshore).
The operator and the dispatcher reported that the pilot transmitted a Mayday call, engine failure, and that he was going to land the helicopter on the water. The Coast Guard at Aransas Pass, Texas, and Corpus Christi, Texas, were notified. Search and rescue was initiated by the operator, Coast Guard, water vessels, and other helicopter operators.
Two of the passengers reported that the helicopter rolled inverted within a few seconds after the landing. The pilot and passengers exited the helicopter, inflated their life vest, and awaited their rescue. Approximately 1425, the pilot and passengers were recovered by the Coast Guard.
The operator, the dispatcher, Coast Guard helicopter pilots, pilot's of other search helicopters, and two of the passengers reported the winds were from the north at 25-40 mph with 5 to 9-foot seas.
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Accident occurred Sunday, February 16, 2003 in MI 700, GM
Aircraft: Bell 407, registration: N407HH
Injuries: 2 Fatal, 3 Serious.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On February 16, 2003, approximately 1225 central standard time, a Bell 407 single-engine helicopter, landed offshore in the Gulf of Mexico following a loss of engine power. The helicopter was owned and operated under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135, by Houston Helicopters, Inc., at Pearland, Texas. The pilot and one passenger received fatal injuries, and three passengers received serious injuries. The helicopter has not been recovered and is presumed destroyed. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, and a company visual flight rules (VFR) flight plan was filed for the on-demand air taxi flight. Approximately 1210, the helicopter departed Harbor Island (Tesoro Heliport) at Ingleside, Texas, for the 26.1 nautical mile flight to the Ensco Rig 84 (Matagorda 700 block offshore).
The operator and the dispatcher reported that the pilot transmitted a Mayday call, engine failure, and that he was going to land the helicopter on the water. The Coast Guard at Aransas Pass, Texas, and Corpus Christi, Texas, were notified. Search and rescue was initiated by the operator, Coast Guard, water vessels, and other helicopter operators.
Two of the passengers reported that the helicopter rolled inverted within a few seconds after the landing. The pilot and passengers exited the helicopter, inflated their life vest, and awaited their rescue. Approximately 1425, the pilot and passengers were recovered by the Coast Guard.
The operator, the dispatcher, Coast Guard helicopter pilots, pilot's of other search helicopters, and two of the passengers reported the winds were from the north at 25-40 mph with 5 to 9-foot seas.
Join Date: Apr 2002
Location: Hartford, CT USA
Posts: 147
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Just found these articles on another forum. Seems dive teams located the pilot and one of the passengers, last one still missing though.
2theadvocate.com
news24houston.com
2theadvocate.com
news24houston.com
Join Date: Oct 2003
Location: USA
Posts: 2
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
PHPA
Gentlemen,
We are starting to make progress in the GOM. Following is part of an update sent to PHPA members by President Butch Grafton. It shows the progress we have begun throgh the efforts of the newly organized Professional Helicopter Pilots Association, and the roadblocks we face in the effort to make change. We are DONE waiting for HAI (managemnet) and the FAA to make changes for us. We are now going to be the agent of that change.
If you are a US Helicopter Pilot of ANY experience level I strongly ecourage you to join the PHPA. We are the new voice for all US helicopter pilots who care, and want to get rid of the attitude that says "don't tell my mother I'm a helicopter pilot, she thinks I'm a piano player in a New Orleans whore house".
Contact us at www.autorotate.org
2. PHPA Attends HAI/FAA Meeting on Gulf Issues
PHPA was invited to attend the meeting between HAI and the FAA to discuss the safety issues in the Gulf of Mexico. Apparently some at HAI were not very pleased with our presence at this meeting. However, we did have three people there representing our members interests in the safety problems in the Gulf. Kevin Kistler of OPEIU, Al Duquette PHPA's Safety Representative and a legislative representative from the Transportation Trades Department of which PHPA is a member. There is little doubt left among the companies that PHPA is starting to play a part in many, many areas of our profession where we have never been allowed to participate before. The Gulf issues are very serious issues and PHPA is working diligently to get the changes needed to enhance safety, weather, communications and search and rescue capabilities over the entire working area.
We are starting to make progress in the GOM. Following is part of an update sent to PHPA members by President Butch Grafton. It shows the progress we have begun throgh the efforts of the newly organized Professional Helicopter Pilots Association, and the roadblocks we face in the effort to make change. We are DONE waiting for HAI (managemnet) and the FAA to make changes for us. We are now going to be the agent of that change.
If you are a US Helicopter Pilot of ANY experience level I strongly ecourage you to join the PHPA. We are the new voice for all US helicopter pilots who care, and want to get rid of the attitude that says "don't tell my mother I'm a helicopter pilot, she thinks I'm a piano player in a New Orleans whore house".
Contact us at www.autorotate.org
2. PHPA Attends HAI/FAA Meeting on Gulf Issues
PHPA was invited to attend the meeting between HAI and the FAA to discuss the safety issues in the Gulf of Mexico. Apparently some at HAI were not very pleased with our presence at this meeting. However, we did have three people there representing our members interests in the safety problems in the Gulf. Kevin Kistler of OPEIU, Al Duquette PHPA's Safety Representative and a legislative representative from the Transportation Trades Department of which PHPA is a member. There is little doubt left among the companies that PHPA is starting to play a part in many, many areas of our profession where we have never been allowed to participate before. The Gulf issues are very serious issues and PHPA is working diligently to get the changes needed to enhance safety, weather, communications and search and rescue capabilities over the entire working area.
"Just a pilot"
Mars said- "Yes but one of 14 so far this year, five fatal."
I say (Chronological, latest first)-
1) This one, FATAL, PHI, and the cause is still to be determined
2) Galveston 395, Go-Helitrans, mishap on start
3) Eugene Island 276, FATAL, PHI, LOC engine accelerate/takeoff
4) Ship Shoal 80, Tex Air, rotor strike on landing
5) Ship Shoal 80, Tex Air, tail rotor strike on landing
6) Brazos 532, FATAL,Tarleton Helicopters, dark night
7) "GOM", PHI, forced landing following fadec fault
8) High Island 44, FATAL, PHI, main rotor strike pax
9) Mississippi 700, FATAL, Houston Helicopters, engine failure forced landing.
10) 14 nm. NE of Venice, FATAL, Air Log, hit the platform
11) High Island 471, Air Log, LOC takeoff/landing/repo
I make 11. Can you add to the list?
Yep, 5 fatal.
Pattern? Tex Air seems to be over-represented. PHI's had a bunch of fatals (3 of 5) with WX as a factor. You appear to have a point there. The rest are pretty much all over the map.
Mars said-
Operating Standards and their enforcement!
The statistics were rates not headline figures - the number of helicopters involved in the GOM is not an issue.
Why do pilots constantly defend the indefensible - is it because the common thread running through these accidents is human factors?
My view (having examined all of the accident reports) would be that there is an organisational issue at play here. If here is no predominant common cause then look to a system which does not prevent such accidents
Response-
Operating standards are always a good idea. Suggest some changes that would have made a difference.
The number of helicopters IS an issue. I'll say it again- hundreds of helicopters, thousands of operations. Increased exposure equals increased incidence, all things being equal.
Human factors are always present. No humans, no human factors. So, no humans is the answer?
WX shows up far too often as a contributing factor in almost all these accidents. Weather offshore is especially hazardous, it appears. Fits my recollection.
But, when I was there:
Offshore minimums were 300 and 2 in a VFR twin, 500 and 3 single engine;
40 knots sustained/15 knot gust spread;
Local in the field and on the beach, 300 and 1- which is really, really crappy offshore or cross country on the beach.
Frankly, I always viewed these as permission to operate but not a requirement. And I was faulted only once in 13 years- questioned often- but criticised only once, and that indirectly. I'd say that's the best safety culture possible- allow a well trained professional to evaluate conditions and make a reasoned decision.
I say (Chronological, latest first)-
1) This one, FATAL, PHI, and the cause is still to be determined
2) Galveston 395, Go-Helitrans, mishap on start
3) Eugene Island 276, FATAL, PHI, LOC engine accelerate/takeoff
4) Ship Shoal 80, Tex Air, rotor strike on landing
5) Ship Shoal 80, Tex Air, tail rotor strike on landing
6) Brazos 532, FATAL,Tarleton Helicopters, dark night
7) "GOM", PHI, forced landing following fadec fault
8) High Island 44, FATAL, PHI, main rotor strike pax
9) Mississippi 700, FATAL, Houston Helicopters, engine failure forced landing.
10) 14 nm. NE of Venice, FATAL, Air Log, hit the platform
11) High Island 471, Air Log, LOC takeoff/landing/repo
I make 11. Can you add to the list?
Yep, 5 fatal.
Pattern? Tex Air seems to be over-represented. PHI's had a bunch of fatals (3 of 5) with WX as a factor. You appear to have a point there. The rest are pretty much all over the map.
Mars said-
Operating Standards and their enforcement!
The statistics were rates not headline figures - the number of helicopters involved in the GOM is not an issue.
Why do pilots constantly defend the indefensible - is it because the common thread running through these accidents is human factors?
My view (having examined all of the accident reports) would be that there is an organisational issue at play here. If here is no predominant common cause then look to a system which does not prevent such accidents
Response-
Operating standards are always a good idea. Suggest some changes that would have made a difference.
The number of helicopters IS an issue. I'll say it again- hundreds of helicopters, thousands of operations. Increased exposure equals increased incidence, all things being equal.
Human factors are always present. No humans, no human factors. So, no humans is the answer?
WX shows up far too often as a contributing factor in almost all these accidents. Weather offshore is especially hazardous, it appears. Fits my recollection.
But, when I was there:
Offshore minimums were 300 and 2 in a VFR twin, 500 and 3 single engine;
40 knots sustained/15 knot gust spread;
Local in the field and on the beach, 300 and 1- which is really, really crappy offshore or cross country on the beach.
Frankly, I always viewed these as permission to operate but not a requirement. And I was faulted only once in 13 years- questioned often- but criticised only once, and that indirectly. I'd say that's the best safety culture possible- allow a well trained professional to evaluate conditions and make a reasoned decision.
Join Date: Mar 2002
Location: Canada
Posts: 690
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Mars' total match Bob Williams of ExxonMobile's tally (he is the OGP's accident stats guru).
For the missing events how about:
24 March PHI 407 near Houma (dep EI 132) LOC
21 March AirLog 206L (dep EC 89) damaged in hard (precautionary) landing
6 March Taylor Energy AS350B2 near Venice, LA (for MC 20) LA hit water while turning
The past OGP GoM stats:
1995 3 fatal / 5 total
1996 4 / 7
1997 1/ 6
1998 1 / 3
1999 1 / 9
2000 3 / 9
2001 1 / 8 with a rate of 0.22 fatal accidents per 100K hrs or 1.77 accidents per 100K hrs.
2002 due out soon
2003 YTD 5 / 14 and 2003 extrapolated: 6 / 17 with a estimated rate of 1.33 fatal accidents per 100K hrs (6 times worse than 2001) or 3.77 accidents per 100K hrs (or twice 2001).
EDITED UPDATE:
15th GoM accident this year & PHI's 6th was Bell 407 N405PH which ditched just after take off from a rig nine miles south of Marsh Island 16 Nov 2003. http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthr...t=Marsh+Island
For the missing events how about:
24 March PHI 407 near Houma (dep EI 132) LOC
21 March AirLog 206L (dep EC 89) damaged in hard (precautionary) landing
6 March Taylor Energy AS350B2 near Venice, LA (for MC 20) LA hit water while turning
The past OGP GoM stats:
1995 3 fatal / 5 total
1996 4 / 7
1997 1/ 6
1998 1 / 3
1999 1 / 9
2000 3 / 9
2001 1 / 8 with a rate of 0.22 fatal accidents per 100K hrs or 1.77 accidents per 100K hrs.
2002 due out soon
2003 YTD 5 / 14 and 2003 extrapolated: 6 / 17 with a estimated rate of 1.33 fatal accidents per 100K hrs (6 times worse than 2001) or 3.77 accidents per 100K hrs (or twice 2001).
EDITED UPDATE:
15th GoM accident this year & PHI's 6th was Bell 407 N405PH which ditched just after take off from a rig nine miles south of Marsh Island 16 Nov 2003. http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthr...t=Marsh+Island
Last edited by zalt; 19th Dec 2003 at 01:35.
Join Date: Mar 2002
Location: Canada
Posts: 690
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
To put my 2003 estimate of 1.33 fatal accidents per 100K hours in GoM in context:
Its is 4 times the 1998-2002 fatal accident rate in GoM according to HASC data.
It is roughly twice the fatal+non-fatal rate PHI achieved between 1992 and 2000 (I note they have changed their web site recently to remome this sort of data). The extrapolated total accident rate is almost 6 times higher.
A certain 'major oil company' (if you are in the industry: you know who) has a 2000 target of less than 0.5 fatal accidents per 100k hours, and aim to reduce that target to 0.2 in 2005 (which they had been able to achieved last year), and 0.1 by the end of the decade.
Comparing with US military Class A accidents (ie fatal and high value damage accidents):
US Navy (FW & RW) Class A mishap rate in FY02 was 1.746 (FY02 slightly above the USN 5 year average)
US Army (FW & RW) Class A mishap rate in FY03 was 1.645 per 100K hours (FY03 slightly below the Army's 3 year average)
Both these are less than half the extrapolated 2003 GoM total accident rate (ie assuming things get no better by the end of the year).
Summary: A really bad year.
PS I am aware that relying to my own posts is a sign of insanity!!
Its is 4 times the 1998-2002 fatal accident rate in GoM according to HASC data.
It is roughly twice the fatal+non-fatal rate PHI achieved between 1992 and 2000 (I note they have changed their web site recently to remome this sort of data). The extrapolated total accident rate is almost 6 times higher.
A certain 'major oil company' (if you are in the industry: you know who) has a 2000 target of less than 0.5 fatal accidents per 100k hours, and aim to reduce that target to 0.2 in 2005 (which they had been able to achieved last year), and 0.1 by the end of the decade.
Comparing with US military Class A accidents (ie fatal and high value damage accidents):
US Navy (FW & RW) Class A mishap rate in FY02 was 1.746 (FY02 slightly above the USN 5 year average)
US Army (FW & RW) Class A mishap rate in FY03 was 1.645 per 100K hours (FY03 slightly below the Army's 3 year average)
Both these are less than half the extrapolated 2003 GoM total accident rate (ie assuming things get no better by the end of the year).
Summary: A really bad year.
PS I am aware that relying to my own posts is a sign of insanity!!
Join Date: Nov 2000
Location: Canada/around
Posts: 148
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
From Prune Fan #1:
"I've seen little (what I call) "front-lets" in which there is scant direct evidence other than a sudden, 180 degree shift in wind direction and temperature. If you didn't catch the little burble of turbulence when you flew through it, you might not even notice. In fact, one morning, an Air Log pilot heading to a platform nearby to mine flew through one, missed the change of wind, and crashed as he tried to land in the direction he thought the wind was coming from. The wind on the beach was out of the north; the wind offshore was out of the south. That was an interesting day..."
I hope there was more to it than that. Not confirming wind at the platform by looking at the water, combined with no windsock on the platform, would be the height foolishness. So I assume the entire wasn't told?
---------------------------
This is one example from this post of many weather phenomenon that should be part of every pilot's basic weather education. This includes the over-water losses of visibility from smoke and haze. The same things happen over land too. The difference is the lack of places to land, just like there is in many other undeveloped parts of the world.
In so many other parts of the world the combined needs of the oil companies to respond imediately to operational requirements and the lack of options for aircraft in offshore flying have resulted in mandatory IFR capabilities for all operations, even if the primary role is day-VFR. Why is such a basic safety concept so foreign to the Gulf of Mexico?
Too often on here I have seen pilots state that the Gulf of Mexico is unique as an explanation of why things are the way they are. Bull, it is not unique. The mentailty in viewing it is the only unique thing I see...
"I've seen little (what I call) "front-lets" in which there is scant direct evidence other than a sudden, 180 degree shift in wind direction and temperature. If you didn't catch the little burble of turbulence when you flew through it, you might not even notice. In fact, one morning, an Air Log pilot heading to a platform nearby to mine flew through one, missed the change of wind, and crashed as he tried to land in the direction he thought the wind was coming from. The wind on the beach was out of the north; the wind offshore was out of the south. That was an interesting day..."
I hope there was more to it than that. Not confirming wind at the platform by looking at the water, combined with no windsock on the platform, would be the height foolishness. So I assume the entire wasn't told?
---------------------------
This is one example from this post of many weather phenomenon that should be part of every pilot's basic weather education. This includes the over-water losses of visibility from smoke and haze. The same things happen over land too. The difference is the lack of places to land, just like there is in many other undeveloped parts of the world.
In so many other parts of the world the combined needs of the oil companies to respond imediately to operational requirements and the lack of options for aircraft in offshore flying have resulted in mandatory IFR capabilities for all operations, even if the primary role is day-VFR. Why is such a basic safety concept so foreign to the Gulf of Mexico?
Too often on here I have seen pilots state that the Gulf of Mexico is unique as an explanation of why things are the way they are. Bull, it is not unique. The mentailty in viewing it is the only unique thing I see...
Join Date: Jun 2002
Location: home and abroad
Posts: 582
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I agree, the GoM debate bears much resemblance to the Aussie HEMS debate when it comes to VFR flight over water in conditions that can only be described as actual IMC.
Why do we as a profession and community continue to sell ourselves so cheap?
Why do we as a profession and community continue to sell ourselves so cheap?
