747-200F down in Bogota ?

[rob rilly]

unprofessional? I'm an old man and forgot one of the names I flew with long ago, so no problem for me as it is you.

Name calling? I never called you any names. So, it seems you are the very immature unprofessional one.

Sure, prove your statement that anyone is upset other than you.

Yes, I was visiting one of the injured crew over the weekend, and what did you do ? Think up names to call the aviation professionals ? An YES , I am PROUD !


You are a true joke, guppy.

[Duck Rogers]

Ok folks, points made.

Back on topic please.


Duck

[Sleeping Freight Dog]

Has there been any more information as to the cause of the 2 engines
failing??? There was an AF A340 that twice had an engine problem out
of Bogota this past weekend. Probably unrelated Guppy, before you start,
but, is there a source for engine contamination down there???

[condorox]

The AF A340 had to dump fuel and return to BOG flight due to a (false) indication that RT was not locked noticed 40 minutes into the flight. On the second departure the same A340 returned to the gate once it was taxing. It seems to me like any relation of these incidents and the Kalitta accident is far fetched.

[pacplyer]

Whale PFE post 20th July 2008 12:37

Aviation Safety
It is cool to be able to BS back and forth on these websites, because nobody knows who you are and you have a fancy screen name and all. It's cool to speculate and get to be an expert on a certain subject, but the problem, like with this accident, is when sensitive information, pictures, etc. gets leaked. It pisses the NTSB off and they don't have to let other intrested parties be a "party" to the investigation. The NTSB are very qualified and have the expertise and resources to do an investigation and then they publish their findings so everyone can learn from it. That is the whole mechanics behind the NTSB. It is unfortunate that we have some among our own ranks that have jeopardized are ability to be a "party" to another investigation. God willing, it won't be an issue. But, maybe some others should take note, if you find yourself in a similar situation. I hope not!

WhalePFE

Whale PFE, one last post,

Strange, I noticed most of your past posts conversing with me have been deleted again for some reason. You make a good point here again imho. The NTSB, if they are invited by the host country, can in turn invite other interested parties into the investigation. But none of the posters here can control leaks which obviously originated in the host country. Who else had access to the cockpit of this aircraft? Was it secured at night? I noticed daylight in the photos so the authorities should have had time to post a guard. Also the shoes are evident in one of the pictures of the person standing on the roof circuit breaker panel.

Blaming the public for commenting on published news reports or pictures put up available to the public is a little far-fetched. Wouldn't you say? I mean, what do you recommend? That we pretend we didn't see those those pictures put up? That we not comment until the investigation is over? Is that what you're suggesting? I do see your point and do not necessarily disagree with you that a hard-working NTSB team might take exception to the photos and info being released before they have even had a chance to chase down all the leads. But how can mere readers prevent this? We can't.

Personally, I think squelching discussion is a futile wish in the internet age. Double engine failures are interesting to many, I think, because they are so rare and unlikely. There have been other boeing aircraft with double engine failures. The "BA038 (777) AAIB Report" thread discussed parallel to this thread comes to mind.

I haven't read all of it, but in that thread an interesting bit of information regarding various Boeing/Pratt engine problems along the line of L-38's "boost pumps off by mistake" hypothetical is in there.

Air Safety Week April 23, 2001:

Yet another pilot recalled his experience in a 747-100 some years ago. Climbing through 20,000 feet, the number 4 engine either flamed out or was shut down after a frighteningly loud compressor stall. In any event, the crew quickly discovered that all the boost pumps were off (the flight engineer had not turned any of them on) and the engine apparently could not suction feed above 20,000 feet.

"Most folks that I've discussed it with have found it hard to believe that the engine would not run on suction feed," this pilot recounted. "I assure you that this was the case..."

This Link starts on page 2 of the article:
Total Loss of Engine Power Mystifies Experts | Air Safety Week | Find Articles at BNET

I (pacplyer) should point out that I'm no expert on anything. I'm just a reader. The above post, just as all my posts are: are strictly my opinion only. I could be wrong about everything and my memory is not very good anymore. This is what happens when you retire. You sit around women and talk about airplanes all the time for some strange reason...

Cheers

[windsock]

robbie, er rob riley, you seem to overreact and badger anyone who corrects you for posting this letter and jeopardizing the security of the investigation and of Kalitta's ability to dispense information to its employees. All comments made to you were made civily and professionally, your responses have been, let's say, childish.

Get a grip, don't brag about who you know, protect them.

Try thinking about the hundreds of people who are still working for Kalitta, maybe they would like to keep their jobs?

If you overreact to this message, again, you've proven my point.

[lomapaseo]

I'll post a temporary comment here (probably will get deleted as being off the original topic).

The only problem that we have here is the possibility that some will take the pictures and the published letter as facts released outside the investigation. Neither are factual. They are only as factual as the person who initially collected them, outside the official invstigation.

Crew interviews are like depositions, multiple parties are present and back and forth questioning considers the amount of recall by survivors.

Photographs are only surface documentation and unless collected against team investigating standards, do not in themselves tell a story.

Let the rumors continue, the facts will be published in an official report.

[WhalePFE]

pacplyer

Interesting. Thanks!

[L-38]

At risk of irritating those free to read this thread, whom simultaneously choose to anger over it's posted hypothesis, my "dime store" supposition continues . . .

With regards to pacplyers relevant article, Total Loss of Engine Power Mystifies Experts | Air Safety Week | Find Articles at BNET, a sentence on page 3 had stated "In this incident and during our flight test, suction feed did not maintain engine performance when the fuel pressure was interrupted during a climb". . . .

This statement of fact had clued me to consider that the act of rotating the airplane from a somewhat level attitude - to that of climb pitch (with it's accompanied forces of inertia and / or gravitational movement of fuel) could also perhaps initiate an engine flameout (if outboard engines already on suction feed).

One may never know, however it may be feasible that under these circumstances, a proper Vr rotation (with suction feed), combined with additional relevant factors such as high field elevation, less dense / warm Summer fuel, and much higher fuel demands than that required for "climb power", may thus starve an engine (especially soon after Vr, as crew rumor had it that "both outboard engines quit just after Vr").

I know, - just my worthless two cent's . . This may be one of the many possible scenarios (but not the only one) . . what would Ernest K.Gann have said?

[pacplyer]

Good question L-38,

Be sure to read page one of that air safety article as well. It discusses a B-767 double engine failure.

Absent pressure from the boost pump in the wing tank, the engine should still be provided an adequate flow of fuel, via a gravity-assisted "suction feed" even if the boost pump is turned off, and even if the crossfeed valve is closed. At least, this is the prevailing conventional wisdom. The big question in this incident is why the engine did not continue to suction feed? The related questions include whether this is a fuel system design problem, and whether it relates to B767/engine combinations other than the Pratt and Whitney [UTX] engines on the United airplane (B767s operated by American Airlines [AMR1] are powered by General Electric [GE] engines).

After rotation, could a high deck angle of up to 18 degrees change gravity feed/suction capability of the fuel tank to the engine? I'll bet it's never been tried intentionally.

The 747-100 in the article doesn't say whether the engineer took off without pumps, only that they discovered it after flameout at FL200. He surely would have had some fuel panel configuration changes before then?

Before taking the runway I'd always make the S/O lean back and let me confirm no ambers on the fuel panel.....

Murphys law and all...

[zerozero]

I'm an FO on the -200 and have personally experienced an engine "surge" due to what I believe was the "uncovering" of the fuel pumps with a light fuel load.

I'm well aware of the 18 degree pitch limitation and in this case I believe it was observed at all times but we were climbing out, light weight, full climb power in a 30 degree left hand turn when the #4 engine experienced a momentary surge.

There was some mild yawing and rolling and as I was finishing the turn we had a discussion about pitch attitude and fuel pump configuration.

Obviously from my standpoint I can't observe the fuel panel but as #4 fully recovered and we continued on our merry way I could only surmise there was a momentary "interruption" of fuel flow.

Our professional FEs are highly experienced and not pilots waiting for the upgrade to the right hand seat so I'm fully confident he wasn't the source of our small problem.

I certainly don't offer this anecdote as a possible scenario for the Bogota accident, just merely wanted to address the issue that, yes, I believe under certain circumstances (high pitch and bank angles, low fuel load) the pumps may be uncovered.

[punkalouver]

The August 2010 Flying magazine has an interesting article on many of the details of the flight although no conclusions. Can't seem to find it on the net. Anyone else.

[411A]

After rotation, could a high deck angle of up to 18 degrees change gravity feed/suction capability of the fuel tank to the engine? I'll bet it's never been tried intentionally.

It most certainly can in some aircraft types, if the fuel quantity in the tanks is too low.
Example,
Years ago, a Bangladesh Biman B707 departed Paya Lebar (Singapore) enroute Kuala Lumpur.
As this was a very short sector, minimal fuel was uplifted SIN with the result that....the airplane rotated, attained a rather nose high attitude, and three engines flamed out due to fuel starvation.
The airplane crashed just off the side of the runway, no fire, minimal injuries to crew and passengers.
I watched it happen, as I was waiting for takeoff in the following SQ 707.
Not a pretty sight.
There was, in the B707-320 AFM, a recommended minimum fuel qualtity in tanks, for takeoff.
As I recall, it was 15,000 pounds.
Biman departed with less, according to reports.

[forget]

Biman. All 4 quit. I was in Dacca expecting a colleague to arrive on the flight. I called the Biman office to enquire on ETA. All I got was ----- ‘The passengers are alive and well’....click.

As 411 says,the crew had taken off with minimum fuel on board planning to re-fuel just up the road in Kualu Lumpur. On rotate the very light aircraft immediately went to a massive rate of climb, uncovered all fuel pumps and -------- deafening silence.

My colleague, also a neighbour and aircraft engineer, told a hilarious story of the next 40 minutes – which is how long it took the crash trucks to find a dead 707 lying on the airport grass! When the engines quit the aircraft was nosed over, gear was up by this time, and down they came. The only indication of terra firma was the grating sounds as the belly contacted the runway. Down the runway they slid and off onto the grass to the right.

The tower then cleared a Qantas 747 for take-off into the crystal clear night -----“Er..... tower, Qantas 01 here. Where’s the Biman ahead of us. We don’t see him’. Another Qantas 74, taxiing on the apron, chipped in. ‘He took-off and came down again. We think he’s still within the airfield.’ Someone in the tower heard this - hit the crash switch and sent the fire trucks to the second 747 where it took ten minutes to convince them they didn’t have a problem. I met the captain of this one in a Hong Kong bar some time later and ‘communications’ with the fire trucks was through the FE opening a door and, eventually, waving them away.

Meanwhile, back on the grass, neighbour had unbuckled himself in a totally silent and dark 707 – walked to the flight deck door and opened it. Empty - with both DV windows open. The flight crew had legged it! Five minutes later and he’s got everyone out of the aircraft and onto the grass, carrying the only casualty - a little old Bengali lady who’d twisted an ankle exiting the aircraft.

Twenty minutes later and still no one had turned up; so neighbour does his Moses trick, noticing that (at least) take-offs were seemingly suspended, and shepherds the passengers across the runway towards the terminal. He made it all the way across followed by 60+ Bengalis of various shapes and sizes, all with lots of cabin baggage, through an open emergency door, up two flights of stairs and into a coffee shop before someone with a uniform said, ‘Er............

There was a dark aspect to this whole thing. The FE 'fell' from a high rise hotel that night.

[Brian Abraham]

I think the following is a wonderful tribute to the crew, though Shell Management is sure to chime in as to how his procedures would have saved the day.

Jumpseat: Before Sully & Skiles | Flying Magazine | The World?s Most Widely Read Aviation Magazine

I reproduce the article in the event "Flying" pull it as old news.

Before Sully & Skiles
By Les Abend / Published: Aug 24, 2010

Flying Magazine

En route from Miami to Medellin, Colombia, the cockpit satellite phone rang on board Kalitta Air's 747-200. Dispatch was calling with a request. A competitor's 747 freighter was experiencing mechanical problems in Bogotá. The competitor would be unable to transport a large load of flowers back to the United States. Would the crew divert into Bogotá to rescue the cargo?

Considering the fact that the original schedule was a 36-hour layover in Medellin, the change of plans was not unwelcome. Not that Medellin was necessarily undesirable, but the new itinerary would have the crew home two days earlier. And Capt. Bryant Beebe was fast approaching the FAA rule of 120 flight hours in 30 days.

Both Beebe and the dispatcher agreed that the extra fuel burn would not be an issue. The crew began the process of redirecting the airplane to its new destination.

Hours later, the redirection would forever change the lives of everybody on board the 747. On July 7, 2008, the professionalism of the crew and the raw pilot skills of the captain would be tested to the extreme. They would experience an event that no one believed possible. The event made Chesley Sullenberger and Jeff Skiles' landing on the Hudson River six months later look like it was a scheduled arrival.

With Beebe at the controls, the 747 soon touched down at El Dorado International in Bogotá. Beebe was well aware of the terrain challenges and the surrounding topography. The terrain was never an issue under normal circumstances. An engine failure, however, created the need for a different escape route rather than the standard departure. An engine failure was problematic even for a four-engine 747. These circumstances were the basis for one of Beebe's first important decisions of the event.

The trip had been double-crewed when it left Miami because of the original long flight time schedule. Two flight engineers, a copilot, one mechanic and two loadmasters were on board. Completing the roster of eight was a second captain. The second captain was junior in seniority to Beebe and had less experience. Although the second captain had indicated his desire to fly, Beebe would allow him only the opportunity to participate in and out of Bogotá from the right seat as a copilot. The command decision was received with the characteristic professional pout, but the reasoning was well-understood.

Many of the pilots who have the proud humility to call themselves "freight dogs," or "air cargus caninus," have colorful backgrounds. Beebe is no exception. His goal as a kid was to become an airline pilot and have enough money to buy his own airplane. He learned to fly in Maryland. He soloed after 10 hours of flight time. He obtained his commercial and instrument ratings while still attending high school.

While working as a flight attendant for Pan Am in 1978, Beebe flew canceled checks in a Cherokee Six, a Mooney 210 and a Baron. He was soon hired as a flight engineer on a DC-8 for a company that operated as a freight carrier and a scheduled casino airline. He spent four years as a first officer on a 727 for two different companies — one passenger airline and one freight airline. The now-defunct Midway Airlines employed Beebe for less than a year as a 737 copilot. He spent four years as a copilot on a 707. And then, in 1993, he was hired by Kalitta Air. He became a captain one year later. Beebe has been with Kalitta for 17 years and is seniority No. 12 on its list of approximately 230 pilots.

As ground personnel in Bogotá began preparations to load cargo, takeoff data was calculated and printed via the onboard computer and laptop programs.

Although a walk-around of the exterior had already been performed, Beebe's custom was to perform his own inspection. Part of his reasoning was that he used the opportunity to ensure a pushback and engine start could be accomplished without the risk of rolling a tire in the dirt or blowing equipment at unsuspecting ground personnel. In contrast to scheduled passenger flying, the world of night freight requires more in the way of self-preservation tactics.

After returning to the cockpit, Beebe completed a takeoff briefing that included a contingency to dump fuel immediately if an engine failed. At approximately 0335 local time, the 747 was pushed back. The takeoff roll began on Runway 31 Right shortly thereafter. Because of the heavy weight of 690,000 pounds and the surrounding terrain, maximum power was utilized.

As the airplane rotated, Beebe sensed a heavier than normal pressure required on the yoke. In a brief moment, he would know the reason. As the airspeed indicated V2+10, the No. 4 engine failed. Without hesitation, all three crew members shouted, "Dump!"

The junior captain acting as copilot immediately selected the engine-out escape route on the FMC (flight management computer). As Beebe began a turn to follow the FMC guidance, the stick shaker activated indicating an impending stall. He commanded, "Emergency thrust!" Why was this happening? Beebe soon had his answer. The No. 1 engine had now failed.

Strangely relieved that he did not have to compensate for asymmetric thrust, Beebe realized that following the escape route would not be possible on only two engines. He always had a Plan B. The Plan B was to attempt a landing at the Air Force base just to the north. Beebe turned the lumbering 747 back to the left away from the closest terrain. And then the nightmare went from bad to worse.

The No. 2 engine quit. Nobody on board had to verbalize that flying a 747 on one engine was unsustainable. Because of the approaching ridge line, the Air Force base was no longer an option. Plan C.

Beebe glanced toward El Dorado Airport. The PAPI lights on Runway 13 Right were visible. But the lights were all red. They were far below the three-degree glideslope. The airplane would never clear the terrain prior to the runway. Plan D.

Having familiarized himself with the area over the years, Beebe knew that a flat field existed just to the north of the airport. Using scattered streetlights and two opposing cell towers as runway edge markers, Beebe wrestled the airplane to line up for a controlled approach into the field.

With the gear up and the flaps still in the takeoff position of 10 degrees, the touchdown was surprisingly soft. And then all hell broke loose. Tremendous G-forces were experienced as the airplane slid across the ground, breaking itself into pieces behind the cockpit and the upper deck. Even though it wasn't quite true, the crew would joke later that Beebe had to be told to stop flying the airplane. Sliding across the field was both surreal and quiet. At no time during the entire event did Beebe consider the fact that they wouldn't survive, and at no time did he see his life flash before his eyes.

Once the remains of the cockpit came to a stop almost inverted on its side, nobody panicked. An unofficial roll call began. All eight crew members had survived. One of the loadmasters in the upper deck attempted a cell-phone call to Dispatch. Initially, the call was considered a prank. Unfortunately, it wasn't until 45 minutes later that Colombian emergency medical personnel reached the scene.

Beebe's seat was the only one that remained attached. In a moment of dark humor he found the crash ax after slithering toward the floor. He had shattered his L4 disc. After returning to the States, Beebe was told that he might never walk again unless additional surgery was performed. He still has serious pain as of this date, but he is using his cane less.

The other captain broke his nose sliding forward underneath the bottom of the instrument panel. His crotch strap was not fastened at the time of the crash. He suffered miscellaneous bumps and bruises but returned to work two months later.

The flight engineer sustained the worst injuries. He was in and out of consciousness at the crash site, losing a tremendous amount of blood. His spleen and part of his skull were removed. Various bones were broken, and he is now confined to a wheelchair. Because of his active role in manipulating switches, he had not restrained himself prior to impact nor was his seat facing directly forward.

The mechanic seated on the jumpseat in the cockpit received virtually the same injuries as Beebe did. Unstrapped from his shoulder harnesses, he fell to the floor with an audible snap. He is in a wheelchair, paralyzed from the waist down.

The crew members in the upper deck received mostly minor injuries involving cuts and bruises. The extra copilot walked away with barely a scratch.

Two civilians on the ground were killed. Beebe's face contorts and his eyes water every time his thoughts turn to the Colombians who perished. Despite the tragedy, the neighboring town of Madrid sent Beebe the equivalent of a medal of valor in gratitude for avoiding the population.

What happened for a 747 to lose three engines? As of this writing, the Colombian government, with the assistance of the National Transportation Safety Board, is still investigating. Speculation of fuel contamination and mechanical failure is being considered. By certification, an engine at max power should last at least five minutes.

Regardless of the conclusion, no doubt exists as to the professionalism of all of the cockpit crew members involved. In an impossible situation, the abilities of the humble man in the left seat are unsurpassed. His contribution to the outcome remains unspoken. I am honored to know a man who ranks on the same level as Chesley Sullenberger and Jeff Skiles.

It is even more of an honor to know that my profession has many more.