State of the Nation - an open letter
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State of the Nation - an open letter
It is time to speak out. I do not relish this task; indeed I am prevented from doing so through normal channels, which is why I must resort to the anonymity of this forum. These are my views, but walk into any crewroom in the RAF and it will be patently clear that the sentiment is widespread. I am a serving member of the Royal Air Force, so I can only speak from that viewpoint, but I believe what follows is indicative of the situation in all three services.
The Armed Forces have undergone massive change in the last decade, as the Cold War ceased to be the threat we faced, and we struggled to find a credible new role for the three services. Whilst we may have gone a long way in the transition to an expeditionary force, we have largely ignored other changes in society. The last decade has seen an overwhelming change in the hopes, aspirations and needs of society as a whole, and of the individuals who make up that society. We need to change not only to reflect our new task, but to look after our personnel properly.
Morale is low throughout the Services. One look at the threads in PPruNe is enough to emphasise that we are facing a very serious situation, whilst those with the power to do something about it continue to bury their heads in the sand. Feedback sent up the chain of command is merely watered down before it reaches Air rank; sadly even when it does get that high, our senior officers are reluctant to bring it to the attention of the politicians.
“If you don’t like it, get out.” There may be some validity in that sentiment, but people are voting with their feet. Our front-line squadrons are under-manned; is there a single squadron which is fully up to strength at the moment? We don’t have enough pilots to fill all the projected Eurofighter cockpits when it comes in; even if the training system worked at maximum capacity from today onwards, there would be a shortfall. But it cannot. Successive cutbacks have ensured that the training system, which was once the envy of the world, is a shadow of its former self. So much has been cut that the front line despairs of the product of our flying training.
The airlines are waking up to the fact that they are going to face a major pilot shortage in the next 5-10 years. Many first-tourist RAF pilots are doing ATPL exams at present (partly to beat the introduction of JAR), but in 5 years’ time they will be prime material for the airlines, just when they are the squadron supervisors, the people we most need to retain. And has the RAF realised this yet?
Pay is one bone of contention. The Services do not pay badly, but they do not compare with the major airlines. The additional pay it would take to make qualified, experienced aircrew remain in the RAF is a pittance when compared to the training costs of replacement aircrew. But instead we introduce enhanced rate flying pay, of a couple of thousand pounds per year, to a very small number of pilots. Never mind the navigators; we have enough navigators. They can sit in the same aircraft, fly the same missions, get shot at by the same enemy, but be paid less. All the hallmarks of a well thought out policy. Oh, and by the way, we will be short of navigators in a couple of years too. It is time the policy-makers grasped the nettle, and confronted the Treasury with the hard facts. We have a crisis, and we need action now to stop it getting worse. If we leave it much longer, the hole will be so deep we will be powerless to dig ourselves out.
Workload has increased markedly since the Gulf War. Fewer people are doing more, with fewer resources, as we become the world’s policemen. All those secondary duties are spread between fewer people, on under-manned squadrons, and left to be done in the precious few months our personnel have back in the UK. And they have to be done, because no-one ever got promoted for being good at their job. No, they got promoted for being good at being Mess Secretary, or running the Christmas Draw. Isn’t it time we employed administrative staff to do the administration of our squadron, to let the pilots do the piloting, the navigators do the navigating, and allow people to be promoted for being good at the job they were trained to do?
At recent “Flight Safety” days we were asked our opinions on a range of matters, and sure enough all the usual gripes came out. But, seeking a more positive response, many ideas were put forward to relieve the pressure on our front-line personnel. The ideas tended to be simple, and fairly cheap to implement, but all were dismissed out of hand; they simply could not be entertained if any cost was involved. Positive ideas were not even given enough credit to go beyond station level. Once again, the goodwill of the workers is lost simply because their positive suggestions are dismissed.
Student pilots going through training at the moment are not issued with their full scale of (two) flying suits. Reason: there is a shortage of flying suits in the RAF.
Front-line Tornado squadrons frequently are unable to get a 4-ship airborne. Reason: lack of spares, and lack of manpower to carry out the repairs when spares are available.
Multi-engine pilots are trained on the Jetstream. Yes, the Jetstream. We routinely have just one serviceable.
We have ceased to be a credible force; we cannot even clothe our aircrew or maintain our aircraft.
In the meantime our senior officers have embraced all the management catch-phrases used in business. We have agencies, chief executives, and top-level budget holders. Long gone are the military terms we are used to. What does all this achieve? The cynics say it sets senior officers up for cosy jobs once they leave the services; the realists spot the alienation it generates between senior and junior ranks.
Once, not so many years ago, our training was second-to-none, and emulated by large companies. Now we have lost our way, and make do with trying to reach civilian standards of practice, rather that setting the standards for others to follow. We now have an organisation of managers, not leaders. We wholeheartedly subscribe to Investors in People, widely discredited by civilian companies as a standard that is largely irrelevant. In the bottom of a drawer I have a personal development folder, issued to everyone in the RAF many months ago, no doubt at great expense to you and I, the taxpayer. It hasn’t been used, nor do I expect it will. I may be busy developing, but no thanks to the RAF.
Since SDR, DCS et al we have become a top-heavy structure; too many chiefs, and far too few indians. Because there are so many chiefs, they all filter out the feedback from the indians in their efforts to look good in front of their superiors. Because there are so many chiefs, change takes too long to implement; by the time everyone has been consulted, years can have elapsed. It is time some of our efficiency savings were made at the top, not at the bottom of the organisation. The workforce cannot cope as it is; unless something is done quickly we will not just lack a credible armed force, we will lack any armed force. Nobody in this “can do” organisation wants to be the first to say “can’t do”, but someone soon must do it, for the sake of the organisation as a whole. Team needs must take priority over task needs for once.
The feeling is growing that we are undervalued: undervalued by the senior officers who manage us, undervalued by the politicians who are our ultimate masters, and undervalued by the British public, whose only view of the Armed Forces is in terms of low-flying aircraft disturbing their peace, and squaddies brawling outside pubs. We may necessarily have been forced to be low-profile when in the public view, but our public relations are appalling. It is time we stood up for ourselves, and banished the apologetic attitude we always seem to take. Whether it is complaints about tanks on Salisbury plain, or low-flying aircraft, we assume we are in the wrong at the outset. Tragic though it may have been, the Jaguar-Cessna mid-air collision at Carno was the fault of the Cessna, who was contravening the Air Navigation Order. But ask any member of the public who was to blame; the vast majority will say the Jaguar. Maybe it is time to start using the press, rather than suffering at their hands. We can start educating the public, who ultimately pay our wages, so they know what we are doing, and why.
“Their Country Needs You” was a terrible advertisement for the RAF, but its reaction is worth noting. The public see little need for us to police the world, and resent taxpayers money being spent doing so. Sentiment is similar within the forces. It is now time to reassess where we are going, and concentrate on a credible force to defend our own nation. We no longer have the support, of either public opinion, or financially, to be the world power we once used to be.
For too long our senior officers have been afraid to stand up to the politicians, and tell the story as it really is. Maybe our new CAS, Pete Squire, will buck this trend. Maybe, if he does, Geoff Hoon will listen to him. Maybe Gordon Brown will listen too. If not, whoever is last out, please switch off the lights.
[This message has been edited by Strimmer Trimmer (edited 07 June 2000).]
The Armed Forces have undergone massive change in the last decade, as the Cold War ceased to be the threat we faced, and we struggled to find a credible new role for the three services. Whilst we may have gone a long way in the transition to an expeditionary force, we have largely ignored other changes in society. The last decade has seen an overwhelming change in the hopes, aspirations and needs of society as a whole, and of the individuals who make up that society. We need to change not only to reflect our new task, but to look after our personnel properly.
Morale is low throughout the Services. One look at the threads in PPruNe is enough to emphasise that we are facing a very serious situation, whilst those with the power to do something about it continue to bury their heads in the sand. Feedback sent up the chain of command is merely watered down before it reaches Air rank; sadly even when it does get that high, our senior officers are reluctant to bring it to the attention of the politicians.
“If you don’t like it, get out.” There may be some validity in that sentiment, but people are voting with their feet. Our front-line squadrons are under-manned; is there a single squadron which is fully up to strength at the moment? We don’t have enough pilots to fill all the projected Eurofighter cockpits when it comes in; even if the training system worked at maximum capacity from today onwards, there would be a shortfall. But it cannot. Successive cutbacks have ensured that the training system, which was once the envy of the world, is a shadow of its former self. So much has been cut that the front line despairs of the product of our flying training.
The airlines are waking up to the fact that they are going to face a major pilot shortage in the next 5-10 years. Many first-tourist RAF pilots are doing ATPL exams at present (partly to beat the introduction of JAR), but in 5 years’ time they will be prime material for the airlines, just when they are the squadron supervisors, the people we most need to retain. And has the RAF realised this yet?
Pay is one bone of contention. The Services do not pay badly, but they do not compare with the major airlines. The additional pay it would take to make qualified, experienced aircrew remain in the RAF is a pittance when compared to the training costs of replacement aircrew. But instead we introduce enhanced rate flying pay, of a couple of thousand pounds per year, to a very small number of pilots. Never mind the navigators; we have enough navigators. They can sit in the same aircraft, fly the same missions, get shot at by the same enemy, but be paid less. All the hallmarks of a well thought out policy. Oh, and by the way, we will be short of navigators in a couple of years too. It is time the policy-makers grasped the nettle, and confronted the Treasury with the hard facts. We have a crisis, and we need action now to stop it getting worse. If we leave it much longer, the hole will be so deep we will be powerless to dig ourselves out.
Workload has increased markedly since the Gulf War. Fewer people are doing more, with fewer resources, as we become the world’s policemen. All those secondary duties are spread between fewer people, on under-manned squadrons, and left to be done in the precious few months our personnel have back in the UK. And they have to be done, because no-one ever got promoted for being good at their job. No, they got promoted for being good at being Mess Secretary, or running the Christmas Draw. Isn’t it time we employed administrative staff to do the administration of our squadron, to let the pilots do the piloting, the navigators do the navigating, and allow people to be promoted for being good at the job they were trained to do?
At recent “Flight Safety” days we were asked our opinions on a range of matters, and sure enough all the usual gripes came out. But, seeking a more positive response, many ideas were put forward to relieve the pressure on our front-line personnel. The ideas tended to be simple, and fairly cheap to implement, but all were dismissed out of hand; they simply could not be entertained if any cost was involved. Positive ideas were not even given enough credit to go beyond station level. Once again, the goodwill of the workers is lost simply because their positive suggestions are dismissed.
Student pilots going through training at the moment are not issued with their full scale of (two) flying suits. Reason: there is a shortage of flying suits in the RAF.
Front-line Tornado squadrons frequently are unable to get a 4-ship airborne. Reason: lack of spares, and lack of manpower to carry out the repairs when spares are available.
Multi-engine pilots are trained on the Jetstream. Yes, the Jetstream. We routinely have just one serviceable.
We have ceased to be a credible force; we cannot even clothe our aircrew or maintain our aircraft.
In the meantime our senior officers have embraced all the management catch-phrases used in business. We have agencies, chief executives, and top-level budget holders. Long gone are the military terms we are used to. What does all this achieve? The cynics say it sets senior officers up for cosy jobs once they leave the services; the realists spot the alienation it generates between senior and junior ranks.
Once, not so many years ago, our training was second-to-none, and emulated by large companies. Now we have lost our way, and make do with trying to reach civilian standards of practice, rather that setting the standards for others to follow. We now have an organisation of managers, not leaders. We wholeheartedly subscribe to Investors in People, widely discredited by civilian companies as a standard that is largely irrelevant. In the bottom of a drawer I have a personal development folder, issued to everyone in the RAF many months ago, no doubt at great expense to you and I, the taxpayer. It hasn’t been used, nor do I expect it will. I may be busy developing, but no thanks to the RAF.
Since SDR, DCS et al we have become a top-heavy structure; too many chiefs, and far too few indians. Because there are so many chiefs, they all filter out the feedback from the indians in their efforts to look good in front of their superiors. Because there are so many chiefs, change takes too long to implement; by the time everyone has been consulted, years can have elapsed. It is time some of our efficiency savings were made at the top, not at the bottom of the organisation. The workforce cannot cope as it is; unless something is done quickly we will not just lack a credible armed force, we will lack any armed force. Nobody in this “can do” organisation wants to be the first to say “can’t do”, but someone soon must do it, for the sake of the organisation as a whole. Team needs must take priority over task needs for once.
The feeling is growing that we are undervalued: undervalued by the senior officers who manage us, undervalued by the politicians who are our ultimate masters, and undervalued by the British public, whose only view of the Armed Forces is in terms of low-flying aircraft disturbing their peace, and squaddies brawling outside pubs. We may necessarily have been forced to be low-profile when in the public view, but our public relations are appalling. It is time we stood up for ourselves, and banished the apologetic attitude we always seem to take. Whether it is complaints about tanks on Salisbury plain, or low-flying aircraft, we assume we are in the wrong at the outset. Tragic though it may have been, the Jaguar-Cessna mid-air collision at Carno was the fault of the Cessna, who was contravening the Air Navigation Order. But ask any member of the public who was to blame; the vast majority will say the Jaguar. Maybe it is time to start using the press, rather than suffering at their hands. We can start educating the public, who ultimately pay our wages, so they know what we are doing, and why.
“Their Country Needs You” was a terrible advertisement for the RAF, but its reaction is worth noting. The public see little need for us to police the world, and resent taxpayers money being spent doing so. Sentiment is similar within the forces. It is now time to reassess where we are going, and concentrate on a credible force to defend our own nation. We no longer have the support, of either public opinion, or financially, to be the world power we once used to be.
For too long our senior officers have been afraid to stand up to the politicians, and tell the story as it really is. Maybe our new CAS, Pete Squire, will buck this trend. Maybe, if he does, Geoff Hoon will listen to him. Maybe Gordon Brown will listen too. If not, whoever is last out, please switch off the lights.
[This message has been edited by Strimmer Trimmer (edited 07 June 2000).]
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Well said, and bloody well done for having the guts to say it.
As a member of the public, may I say that I think that you're perhaps a little too pessimistic in your assessment of what we think. Most PPLs (admittedly not the to$$ers who edit Pilot) regarded the Jaguar-Cessna mid-air collision at Carno as being entirely the fault of the Cessna pilot, who was too low, and who could not have been exercising a proper lookout, since he was attempting to fly the aircraft and photograph houses. There's also some doubt as to whether he was properly licensed, whether or not he was strictly contravening the ANO.
As someone who works in the media I've often thought that the RAF should be playing a cleverer game and should be using its many friends and symapthisers within the press, rather than suffering at the hands of the more hostile elements. Unfortunately, too many senior officers, and the PR organisation, see it as their role to 'spin' party policy, rather than further the interests of their service. Only by speaking out on forums like this can you brief your natural allies, let alone start educating the public.
And while anonymity is essential, maybe our profiles could be slightly fuller (type, or community could be given without compromising identities, surely!) and maybe we should all display nice anonymous hotmail addresses. There are some issues which may not be entirely suitable for an open forum. There have been a number of suggestions that there should be some kind of 'Union'/Armed Forces Federation - something which is not possible under the law. But an Air Power Association which RAF officers could be members of (alongside Retired Officers and interested civvies) might work, and might be a useful campaigning body. Perhaps?
I don't recall or remember “Their Country Needs You” , but I don't think you're right in your assessment of the public perception. I think that the post Cold War interventions have generally played very well (Gulf War, Bosnia, maybe Kosovo and Sierra Leone) and that many actually feel that the defence dollar is now being spent wisely and even 'morally'.
But there are problems. The MoD 'charging' the Overseas Development bods for shipping Pumas to Mozambique played badly (the money should have been there in a contingency fund), while revelations about equipment shortcomings coupled with the complete lack of meaningful progress on Smart Procurement lead many to believe that defence spending could be more efficient. Where is the evidence that the RAF has any clue as to what it costs to use its various assets, or makes any effort to use those assets which may be more cost effective?
But discouraging the debate and preventing scrutiny is not the way forward, IMHO.
You say that: "many ideas were put forward to relieve the pressure on our front-line personnel. The ideas tended to be simple, and fairly cheap to implement, but all were dismissed out of hand; they simply could not be entertained if any cost was involved. Positive ideas were not even given enough credit to go beyond station level. Once again, the goodwill of the workers is lost simply because their positive suggestions are dismissed."
So why not post them here! Start a "Good ideas" thread.
As a member of the public, may I say that I think that you're perhaps a little too pessimistic in your assessment of what we think. Most PPLs (admittedly not the to$$ers who edit Pilot) regarded the Jaguar-Cessna mid-air collision at Carno as being entirely the fault of the Cessna pilot, who was too low, and who could not have been exercising a proper lookout, since he was attempting to fly the aircraft and photograph houses. There's also some doubt as to whether he was properly licensed, whether or not he was strictly contravening the ANO.
As someone who works in the media I've often thought that the RAF should be playing a cleverer game and should be using its many friends and symapthisers within the press, rather than suffering at the hands of the more hostile elements. Unfortunately, too many senior officers, and the PR organisation, see it as their role to 'spin' party policy, rather than further the interests of their service. Only by speaking out on forums like this can you brief your natural allies, let alone start educating the public.
And while anonymity is essential, maybe our profiles could be slightly fuller (type, or community could be given without compromising identities, surely!) and maybe we should all display nice anonymous hotmail addresses. There are some issues which may not be entirely suitable for an open forum. There have been a number of suggestions that there should be some kind of 'Union'/Armed Forces Federation - something which is not possible under the law. But an Air Power Association which RAF officers could be members of (alongside Retired Officers and interested civvies) might work, and might be a useful campaigning body. Perhaps?
I don't recall or remember “Their Country Needs You” , but I don't think you're right in your assessment of the public perception. I think that the post Cold War interventions have generally played very well (Gulf War, Bosnia, maybe Kosovo and Sierra Leone) and that many actually feel that the defence dollar is now being spent wisely and even 'morally'.
But there are problems. The MoD 'charging' the Overseas Development bods for shipping Pumas to Mozambique played badly (the money should have been there in a contingency fund), while revelations about equipment shortcomings coupled with the complete lack of meaningful progress on Smart Procurement lead many to believe that defence spending could be more efficient. Where is the evidence that the RAF has any clue as to what it costs to use its various assets, or makes any effort to use those assets which may be more cost effective?
But discouraging the debate and preventing scrutiny is not the way forward, IMHO.
You say that: "many ideas were put forward to relieve the pressure on our front-line personnel. The ideas tended to be simple, and fairly cheap to implement, but all were dismissed out of hand; they simply could not be entertained if any cost was involved. Positive ideas were not even given enough credit to go beyond station level. Once again, the goodwill of the workers is lost simply because their positive suggestions are dismissed."
So why not post them here! Start a "Good ideas" thread.
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It saddens me to read this, not on account of its content, but because largley it is true. I command a TA unit, and I am an ex-regular officer. I joined just after the Options paper was published and watched as morale began to sink, not because of our changing role but because it was felt that the senior officers respnsible for those of us subordinate to them rolled over. In sweeping blows our regiments were taken out of existence and merged. Generations of loyalty gone.
Now I look at our political situation with dispair. Our political leaders are far more arrogant and detached than ever before, democracy is being smashed, and tradition discarded. Our rulers are "in with the in crowd" promoting an image of Cool Britania. What they represent is not what I see as British. They take on the politics of "Islington Liberal Man" worrying about minority issues such as fox hunting,allowing gays into the services, putting women on the front line, the kind of things that most people don't care about. At times of crisis we of the armed forces serve willingly. We risk our lives and our freedom to defend the defenceless. I believe that we do have an international role to play in this respect. In return I ask not for fame or glory, but to be allowed to say who I do or do not think is suited to serve with and alongside me. For this reason I see morale falling when the once proud few are told to obey quotas on ethnic minorities, gays and women in the services. Like flying the people who are there are there on merit and that should be the only quota in operation!
Our kit is sub-standard. I do not have the kit or vehicles to deploy on camp. I will not get them. In the theatre of operations this equates to lost lives. In aviation terms, one in the air, two in the hangar u/s. This can't be good. I watch as we are committed to bloodless feuds, drop a few missiles and bombs and victory is ours. PR is king, PC it's court jester! It no longer counts that what we do has value, but how it can be spun into public opinion. This is our service, and this is our shame. Perhaps soon it will claim my morale, and when it does it will not be surrendered quietly!
Now I look at our political situation with dispair. Our political leaders are far more arrogant and detached than ever before, democracy is being smashed, and tradition discarded. Our rulers are "in with the in crowd" promoting an image of Cool Britania. What they represent is not what I see as British. They take on the politics of "Islington Liberal Man" worrying about minority issues such as fox hunting,allowing gays into the services, putting women on the front line, the kind of things that most people don't care about. At times of crisis we of the armed forces serve willingly. We risk our lives and our freedom to defend the defenceless. I believe that we do have an international role to play in this respect. In return I ask not for fame or glory, but to be allowed to say who I do or do not think is suited to serve with and alongside me. For this reason I see morale falling when the once proud few are told to obey quotas on ethnic minorities, gays and women in the services. Like flying the people who are there are there on merit and that should be the only quota in operation!
Our kit is sub-standard. I do not have the kit or vehicles to deploy on camp. I will not get them. In the theatre of operations this equates to lost lives. In aviation terms, one in the air, two in the hangar u/s. This can't be good. I watch as we are committed to bloodless feuds, drop a few missiles and bombs and victory is ours. PR is king, PC it's court jester! It no longer counts that what we do has value, but how it can be spun into public opinion. This is our service, and this is our shame. Perhaps soon it will claim my morale, and when it does it will not be surrendered quietly!
Guest
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I suggested a while back (when we were short of cash for airframes) that all those large aluminium door handles should be removed from the "push" side of doors in all station buildings. Enough metal could soon have been found to cast a few new Buccaneers or Phantoms. Did they listen? Seemed perfectly sensible to me...
Seriously though, I voted with my Size 9s six years ago. It seems things haven't improved any.
Seriously though, I voted with my Size 9s six years ago. It seems things haven't improved any.
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Although Strimmer's opening gambit is obviously leaning towards the RAF, his astute view is applicable to all three services, and sadly true.
The politicians and people of this country had better pray that we never go to total war. Our people are up to it, but our yes-man leadership and our equipment is not.
The world is more unstable than ever and the only thing that stands between all we hold dear and the spectres of annihilation or subjugation is our armed services.
We know that money is needed in areas like health etc., but defence is our insurance policy and it has been neglected for too long.
Without our freedom, without the incredible good fortune of living in the world's foremost democracy everything else pales into insignificance. It nearly happened in 1940.
Let's try to ensure we don't have to be that lucky twice.
------------------
Christopher Robin
The politicians and people of this country had better pray that we never go to total war. Our people are up to it, but our yes-man leadership and our equipment is not.
The world is more unstable than ever and the only thing that stands between all we hold dear and the spectres of annihilation or subjugation is our armed services.
We know that money is needed in areas like health etc., but defence is our insurance policy and it has been neglected for too long.
Without our freedom, without the incredible good fortune of living in the world's foremost democracy everything else pales into insignificance. It nearly happened in 1940.
Let's try to ensure we don't have to be that lucky twice.
------------------
Christopher Robin
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The writing has been on the wall since the end of the cold war. The armed forces were the 'quick hit' money-saving option; it seems to me, though, that savings of pennies are being negated by the wasting of pounds - can anyone out there really tell me that Eurofighter is cost effective?
I left the RAF 6 years ago now; my involvement with the RAFVRT has kept me in touch, and it doesn't look pretty. There is an Officers Mess in Northern England with TWO serving RAF Officers in it! I was there for 3 days (including a Friday), and saw one other person outside the group I was with - what has happened to the comradeship (an un-PC word, nowadays) that made up for the crap?
Well done, anyway, for having the courage of your convictions - I hope someone 'up there' is reading this thread and squirming.
A final thought - in 1945 we had 1m people in the RAF, we now have about 60,000 (?). I don't believe we have lost a single 'Air Rank' post in that time ...
I left the RAF 6 years ago now; my involvement with the RAFVRT has kept me in touch, and it doesn't look pretty. There is an Officers Mess in Northern England with TWO serving RAF Officers in it! I was there for 3 days (including a Friday), and saw one other person outside the group I was with - what has happened to the comradeship (an un-PC word, nowadays) that made up for the crap?
Well done, anyway, for having the courage of your convictions - I hope someone 'up there' is reading this thread and squirming.
A final thought - in 1945 we had 1m people in the RAF, we now have about 60,000 (?). I don't believe we have lost a single 'Air Rank' post in that time ...
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Well said, and what a pity it's true. All branches of Military Aviation are approaching the 'beyond saving' point. The sad part is, that although I'm sure some reasonably high ranking individuals will read your post, nothing will come of it. Our best hope is that a journalist from a high quality paper will pick up this thread. I used to be a Lynx Pilot, I say used to be, because I have been grounded through the lack of servicable helicopters. I leave the Army fairly soon, utterly disillusioned with this Government and our hierarchy. I have worked hard, as have many others to make things happen, perhaps this was the mistake. How do you make things happen in a Unit which is scaled for 12 Lynx, but will actually have only 2 per day working? The Forces loss will only be the Airlines gain. Mr Hoon,or anyone else senior enough to make a difference, if you are reading this, wake up. Stop listening to what you want to hear, try to see through the clouds of Bull**** thrown up in front of you by middle ranking clowns over eager for promotion. Rant over.
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It seems that, despite the banter (which is essential!), we all agree that all our services are becoming shadows of their former selves. All you people who are leaving or have left - spare a thought for those of us who have just started our military aviation careers! I have no intention of leaving the forces in the next few years but I fully understand anyone who does - my last glimmer of optimism is that maybe it'll be better a few years down the line. Is this totally misplaced? Over the last few days I've heard a few things that make me believe that maybe the message is getting through to planet DAAvn (and JHC) and even though things won't get better immediately at least steps are being taken.
I think that this website has probably had at least a tiny bit to do with that.
Fly safely boys and girls!!
I think that this website has probably had at least a tiny bit to do with that.
Fly safely boys and girls!!
Guest
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I think we are all a bunch of whingers and quite right too! And nothing ever gets done about it.
We work in an establishment who can spend 1000s on useless Personal development folders (not a modern idea 'cos I seem to remember the black filofax of the early 90s) but if we want our offices cleaned up and given a lick of paint, then there is no-one to do it because its too expensive; But we can do it ourselves, but there is no money for paint. But we can buy that ourselves too!
A minor whinge I know but on the big picture Strimmer Trimmer is spot on.
So c'mon Mr Newspaper man Read this thread and write an article somewhere.
Finally Airships, I know you dont really make the calls, but at least take sides and whinge to the politicians on our behalf.
JG
We work in an establishment who can spend 1000s on useless Personal development folders (not a modern idea 'cos I seem to remember the black filofax of the early 90s) but if we want our offices cleaned up and given a lick of paint, then there is no-one to do it because its too expensive; But we can do it ourselves, but there is no money for paint. But we can buy that ourselves too!
A minor whinge I know but on the big picture Strimmer Trimmer is spot on.
So c'mon Mr Newspaper man Read this thread and write an article somewhere.
Finally Airships, I know you dont really make the calls, but at least take sides and whinge to the politicians on our behalf.
JG
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What has changed in a year?
This article was published in the Sunday Telegraph on 18 Apr 99, three weeks after the start of Operation Allied Farce.
The article was titled: THE FEW ARE NOW TOO FEW
THE past three weeks have undermined many Western military conceits - about the supremacy of air power, the effectiveness of "surgical strikes" and the wisdom of Nato's political leadership. It looked, too, as if another casualty might be the reputation of the Royal Air Force.
In the first 11 days of Operation Allied Force, the RAF managed to attack only three targets. Britain's "devastating blitz smashing key Serb strongholds", as one newspaper put it, turned out to have been largely aborted because it was raining. "This is turning into an attack force straight out of British Rail," said one MP last month, as low cloud stopped bombing for the sixth successive night. Matters have improved, but close scrutiny of MoD statements reveals that RAF jets have successfully attacked targets on only 14 of the past 24 days.
What is more, most of those attacks were only partly successful. American warplanes flew more days and attacked proportionately more targets successfully; even the Dutch were able to claim a Serb MiG kill in the first 24 hours.
The RAF is actually doing quite well by comparison with most coalition partners' air forces. Only the United States, France and Britain have the full capability to drop precision-guided bombs - and France has seemed reluctant to use its weapons. "Of the air forces, the RAF is a respectable second," says Andrew Brooks, an air analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. But it is a very distant second place. By comparison with the United States - and, more pertinently, by comparison with public expectations - the RAF is way behind.
It has nothing to do with the quality of the people involved: the experts agree that, if anything, the aircrew and maintenance staff perform miracles with the resources available. It has little to do with the quality of the aircraft. In temperate climates at least, the Harrier is an extremely agile and capable machine, while the Tornado was specifically designed for the sort of work it is now doing and compares favourably with the Americans' closest equivalent, the F-15E.
The problem is that the RAF has few weapons - and less money. As the frustrated Harrier pilots of Gioia del Colle told The Sunday Telegraph, theirs has become almost a "one-club air force". Unfortunately, RAF chiefs have often chosen the wrong club.
In the early days of the Gulf war, the RAF tried its "Cold War" role of bombing enemy runways - but, though effective against small European airbases, it had little impact on large Iraqi ones. The low-level raids also meant that the British Tornados suffered an unacceptably high casualty rate. Since then, the RAF has switched to becoming a laser-guided bomb force - ideal for the clear skies of Iraq, less suited for rain-swept Europe.
Well before the Balkans crisis blew up, RAF chiefs had started to adopt a more flexible approach, recognising the need to be ready for a range of threats. But for the moment, the RAF has only three main offensive weapons - laser-guided bombs, cluster bombs and straightforward, Second World War-style "free-fall" bombs, lumps of explosive dropped on targets.
Laser-guided weapons are highly accurate - but, as we all now know, the laser beam is diffused by cloud and the bomb cannot be steered to its target. Cluster and free-fall bombs can be used in bad weather, but they are far less precise. In a campaign where avoidance of "collateral damage" sometimes seems to be the main strategic aim, this has put the RAF in serious difficulty.
There are four main ways around the problem. The RAF could wait for the weather to clear - which, as summer approaches, it will - but it risks seeming impotent in the meantime.
Secondly, it could use special forces (or the KLA) on the ground to illuminate the target with lasers below the cloud. The RAF is doing this, but it is necessarily dependent on a rather small supply of special forces men, limiting the number of targets that can be attacked.
The third option is to fly below the cloud. The Tornado, with its advanced terrain-following radar, can do this even when the cloud is almost down to the ground - but then, as was proved in Iraq, there is a much greater risk of the planes being picked off by Serb air defences. So far Nato, with its almost squeamish dread of allied deaths, has largely rejected this option, to the scorn of some RAF aircrew. "Low-level flying is what we do best and have trained for," said one Tornado pilot. "There is plenty of terrain masking [hills to hide behind]. If we don't use our skills, why the hell have we been making Welsh sheep farmers' lives a misery for the past 20 years?"
There is deep concern that political constraints are forcing the RAF - and everyone else - to fight a half-hearted war. "Air power has to be applied massively if it is to work," said one defence insider. "The problem is that we appear to be operating on rules of engagement drawn up by the editorial writers of the Washington Post."
The fourth option is to provide the RAF with weapons that are both precise and all-weather. The US has them - that is one of the main reasons why it is more successful - and there are plenty to choose from, such as Maverick, Hellfire, JDAM . . . These weapons use navigation satellites, infra-red imaging or television guidance to find their targets. They do it on their own: unlike an RAF laser-guided bomb, the pilot does not have to monitor them after they have left the aircraft. Because of their "fire-and-forget" capability, the pilot can lose off two at once: he does not have to wait in the danger zone until he has finished with the one he fired earlier. But these weapons are costly.
After years of argument with the Treasury, Britain has now placed orders for some of these weapons: Brimstone, an anti-tank missile based on the Hellfire, and Storm Shadow, a satellite-guided stealth missile. There are also various programmes to improve existing bombs. But not one will arrive in time to see action in Kosovo.
Not only does the RAF have too few weapons, it may also have too few planes. The tiny force of 20 combat aircraft deployed for the Kosovo operation is a reflection of the cuts which have reduced the RAF's deployable fast jet squadrons by almost half since the end of the Cold War. The RAF is severely limited in what it can do and, because the Harriers usually work in pairs - one "designating" targets while the other strikes - the actual number of "guns" is more like 14. But sending many more jets would put an intolerable strain on an already overstretched and undermanned Service. The neat assumptions in the Government's recent defence review, handing out further cuts to the RAF, may not survive the bombing in Kosovo.
The final reason why the RAF has not lived up to public expectations is that those expectations were too high in the first place. "The British still have this idea of themselves as a bit of a superpower, and the politicians encourage it," sighed one senior RAF officer. "It therefore comes as a shock to find that we're actually a medium-sized country, a junior partner to the US, and our air force is tiny."
This article was published in the Sunday Telegraph on 18 Apr 99, three weeks after the start of Operation Allied Farce.
The article was titled: THE FEW ARE NOW TOO FEW
THE past three weeks have undermined many Western military conceits - about the supremacy of air power, the effectiveness of "surgical strikes" and the wisdom of Nato's political leadership. It looked, too, as if another casualty might be the reputation of the Royal Air Force.
In the first 11 days of Operation Allied Force, the RAF managed to attack only three targets. Britain's "devastating blitz smashing key Serb strongholds", as one newspaper put it, turned out to have been largely aborted because it was raining. "This is turning into an attack force straight out of British Rail," said one MP last month, as low cloud stopped bombing for the sixth successive night. Matters have improved, but close scrutiny of MoD statements reveals that RAF jets have successfully attacked targets on only 14 of the past 24 days.
What is more, most of those attacks were only partly successful. American warplanes flew more days and attacked proportionately more targets successfully; even the Dutch were able to claim a Serb MiG kill in the first 24 hours.
The RAF is actually doing quite well by comparison with most coalition partners' air forces. Only the United States, France and Britain have the full capability to drop precision-guided bombs - and France has seemed reluctant to use its weapons. "Of the air forces, the RAF is a respectable second," says Andrew Brooks, an air analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. But it is a very distant second place. By comparison with the United States - and, more pertinently, by comparison with public expectations - the RAF is way behind.
It has nothing to do with the quality of the people involved: the experts agree that, if anything, the aircrew and maintenance staff perform miracles with the resources available. It has little to do with the quality of the aircraft. In temperate climates at least, the Harrier is an extremely agile and capable machine, while the Tornado was specifically designed for the sort of work it is now doing and compares favourably with the Americans' closest equivalent, the F-15E.
The problem is that the RAF has few weapons - and less money. As the frustrated Harrier pilots of Gioia del Colle told The Sunday Telegraph, theirs has become almost a "one-club air force". Unfortunately, RAF chiefs have often chosen the wrong club.
In the early days of the Gulf war, the RAF tried its "Cold War" role of bombing enemy runways - but, though effective against small European airbases, it had little impact on large Iraqi ones. The low-level raids also meant that the British Tornados suffered an unacceptably high casualty rate. Since then, the RAF has switched to becoming a laser-guided bomb force - ideal for the clear skies of Iraq, less suited for rain-swept Europe.
Well before the Balkans crisis blew up, RAF chiefs had started to adopt a more flexible approach, recognising the need to be ready for a range of threats. But for the moment, the RAF has only three main offensive weapons - laser-guided bombs, cluster bombs and straightforward, Second World War-style "free-fall" bombs, lumps of explosive dropped on targets.
Laser-guided weapons are highly accurate - but, as we all now know, the laser beam is diffused by cloud and the bomb cannot be steered to its target. Cluster and free-fall bombs can be used in bad weather, but they are far less precise. In a campaign where avoidance of "collateral damage" sometimes seems to be the main strategic aim, this has put the RAF in serious difficulty.
There are four main ways around the problem. The RAF could wait for the weather to clear - which, as summer approaches, it will - but it risks seeming impotent in the meantime.
Secondly, it could use special forces (or the KLA) on the ground to illuminate the target with lasers below the cloud. The RAF is doing this, but it is necessarily dependent on a rather small supply of special forces men, limiting the number of targets that can be attacked.
The third option is to fly below the cloud. The Tornado, with its advanced terrain-following radar, can do this even when the cloud is almost down to the ground - but then, as was proved in Iraq, there is a much greater risk of the planes being picked off by Serb air defences. So far Nato, with its almost squeamish dread of allied deaths, has largely rejected this option, to the scorn of some RAF aircrew. "Low-level flying is what we do best and have trained for," said one Tornado pilot. "There is plenty of terrain masking [hills to hide behind]. If we don't use our skills, why the hell have we been making Welsh sheep farmers' lives a misery for the past 20 years?"
There is deep concern that political constraints are forcing the RAF - and everyone else - to fight a half-hearted war. "Air power has to be applied massively if it is to work," said one defence insider. "The problem is that we appear to be operating on rules of engagement drawn up by the editorial writers of the Washington Post."
The fourth option is to provide the RAF with weapons that are both precise and all-weather. The US has them - that is one of the main reasons why it is more successful - and there are plenty to choose from, such as Maverick, Hellfire, JDAM . . . These weapons use navigation satellites, infra-red imaging or television guidance to find their targets. They do it on their own: unlike an RAF laser-guided bomb, the pilot does not have to monitor them after they have left the aircraft. Because of their "fire-and-forget" capability, the pilot can lose off two at once: he does not have to wait in the danger zone until he has finished with the one he fired earlier. But these weapons are costly.
After years of argument with the Treasury, Britain has now placed orders for some of these weapons: Brimstone, an anti-tank missile based on the Hellfire, and Storm Shadow, a satellite-guided stealth missile. There are also various programmes to improve existing bombs. But not one will arrive in time to see action in Kosovo.
Not only does the RAF have too few weapons, it may also have too few planes. The tiny force of 20 combat aircraft deployed for the Kosovo operation is a reflection of the cuts which have reduced the RAF's deployable fast jet squadrons by almost half since the end of the Cold War. The RAF is severely limited in what it can do and, because the Harriers usually work in pairs - one "designating" targets while the other strikes - the actual number of "guns" is more like 14. But sending many more jets would put an intolerable strain on an already overstretched and undermanned Service. The neat assumptions in the Government's recent defence review, handing out further cuts to the RAF, may not survive the bombing in Kosovo.
The final reason why the RAF has not lived up to public expectations is that those expectations were too high in the first place. "The British still have this idea of themselves as a bit of a superpower, and the politicians encourage it," sighed one senior RAF officer. "It therefore comes as a shock to find that we're actually a medium-sized country, a junior partner to the US, and our air force is tiny."
Guest
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strimmer trimmer, inspired, truly inspired. A damning indictment which is long overdue, hopefully this will be publicly acknowledged. It is very frustrating for the indians to see experienced chaps walking out the door, and as you so rightly said, even guys undergoing ATTU and OCU's are studying for ATPL's. This experience drain, at both ends, is not being addressed. The fact is that the guys at the coal face are not being shown the loyalty they require by their Airships or politicians. Loyalty has to work both ways. Spot on fella.
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ST
A brilliant open letter.
I just wish that Hoon and his 'PC' cronies could seee that we care about our respective services, but we are sick of overwork & underfunding.
Just give us the right investment for personal and equipment, then let us get on with the job knowing that we have the backing/infrastructure to do it!
A brilliant open letter.
I just wish that Hoon and his 'PC' cronies could seee that we care about our respective services, but we are sick of overwork & underfunding.
Just give us the right investment for personal and equipment, then let us get on with the job knowing that we have the backing/infrastructure to do it!
Guest
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Strimmer:
Great work. Hopefully, one of the Airships will use your words to "strim" the trees so they can see the woods.
Another point, specifically to all the senior officers reading this that were junior-ish in my day of the mid-eighties:
remember all the guys leaving in the 80's hiring boom; remember the Robson Report? Remember what it felt like to be stuck-in, with some years to go and all the guys around you were pi$$ing off to sunnier climes
and your wife was asking why don't you go,dear? Mrs X is now soooo happy.....and she doesn't have to put up with purple carpets anymore.....
If you do remember....THEN STOP PRETENDING YOU HAVE NO CLUE WHAT'S WRONG NOW.
Nothing has been fixed in a decade. Fix it. If you don't, well, my hiring dept. here at Sunnier Climes Airways is ready to shut you down. You have been warned....
Great work. Hopefully, one of the Airships will use your words to "strim" the trees so they can see the woods.
Another point, specifically to all the senior officers reading this that were junior-ish in my day of the mid-eighties:
remember all the guys leaving in the 80's hiring boom; remember the Robson Report? Remember what it felt like to be stuck-in, with some years to go and all the guys around you were pi$$ing off to sunnier climes
and your wife was asking why don't you go,dear? Mrs X is now soooo happy.....and she doesn't have to put up with purple carpets anymore.....
If you do remember....THEN STOP PRETENDING YOU HAVE NO CLUE WHAT'S WRONG NOW.
Nothing has been fixed in a decade. Fix it. If you don't, well, my hiring dept. here at Sunnier Climes Airways is ready to shut you down. You have been warned....
Guest
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Strimmer,
Good words, well said. As another serving officer, I would like to echo your sentiments and reinforce their validity to any third parties reading this thread. Isn't it sad that(excellent)forums like this give us our only chance to speak out with any hope of being heard. It seems that most servicemen have given up on our so-called leadership and think it better to throw our voices into the void and hope for an echo.
Our flight safety seminar was very similar to yours. Our main comments was, "Why does the Air Force Board keep asking questions of its servicemen without listening to the replies?"
Given the size of our Air Force, we have far too many senior officers who do far too little. By that, I'm not arguing that they are idle. Rather that they busy themselves with trivia and personal career development rather than grasping the nettle with big issues and difficult decisions. It is they who should be addressing the fundamental lack of funding which undermines our current system.
Major changes are required in the higher structure of both the RAF and MOD. Given the number of tactical assets within the RAF, why do we still have Group HQ's within Command HQ's under the Air Force Board which drowns in a myriad of MOD agencies and committees run by a veritable army of civil servants. (Is it true that civil servants outnumber servicemen in the MOD, I'm pretty sure that they outnumber our Army, desertions not included!)
There are plenty of BIG cuts which can be made to funnel money back to where it's needed most. Remember Front Line First! Call me a cynic but perhaps self-interest has prevented senior officers from axing senior officer positions. Speak to any of them and they will passionately defend the staffing structure of the RAF which produces such high caliber senior officers. Such a shame then that most of them couldn't make a decision if their ar$e was on fire! Interestingly, it is hard to generate the same level of enthusiasm from a senior officer on the subject of current Ops.
I seem to have typed myself into a frenzy. I must lie down.
To any senior officers reading this:
1. Cut down on the number of HQ's, bite the bullet and accept fewer Air Rank officers. (Can we really justify CAS being a 4-star?)
2. Radically simplify our procurement structure and procedures. This will save Billions.
3. For God's sake do something about AFTS and our ageing Hawk fleet. (If Canada is it, then it's not enough!)
4. Yes, I know that not all senior officers are bad leaders.
5. To the good ones, we desperately need strong leadership now before it's too late.
6. You are going to get a good pension whether you get that promotion or not.
To any journalists reading this:
1. Please publicise our plight.
2. Put pressure on the politicians. They want blood from a stone. A shoddy military will mean that it's real blood. Ours.
Thank you for your patience.
(All the good guys leave - but isn't it a shame.)
Good words, well said. As another serving officer, I would like to echo your sentiments and reinforce their validity to any third parties reading this thread. Isn't it sad that(excellent)forums like this give us our only chance to speak out with any hope of being heard. It seems that most servicemen have given up on our so-called leadership and think it better to throw our voices into the void and hope for an echo.
Our flight safety seminar was very similar to yours. Our main comments was, "Why does the Air Force Board keep asking questions of its servicemen without listening to the replies?"
Given the size of our Air Force, we have far too many senior officers who do far too little. By that, I'm not arguing that they are idle. Rather that they busy themselves with trivia and personal career development rather than grasping the nettle with big issues and difficult decisions. It is they who should be addressing the fundamental lack of funding which undermines our current system.
Major changes are required in the higher structure of both the RAF and MOD. Given the number of tactical assets within the RAF, why do we still have Group HQ's within Command HQ's under the Air Force Board which drowns in a myriad of MOD agencies and committees run by a veritable army of civil servants. (Is it true that civil servants outnumber servicemen in the MOD, I'm pretty sure that they outnumber our Army, desertions not included!)
There are plenty of BIG cuts which can be made to funnel money back to where it's needed most. Remember Front Line First! Call me a cynic but perhaps self-interest has prevented senior officers from axing senior officer positions. Speak to any of them and they will passionately defend the staffing structure of the RAF which produces such high caliber senior officers. Such a shame then that most of them couldn't make a decision if their ar$e was on fire! Interestingly, it is hard to generate the same level of enthusiasm from a senior officer on the subject of current Ops.
I seem to have typed myself into a frenzy. I must lie down.
To any senior officers reading this:
1. Cut down on the number of HQ's, bite the bullet and accept fewer Air Rank officers. (Can we really justify CAS being a 4-star?)
2. Radically simplify our procurement structure and procedures. This will save Billions.
3. For God's sake do something about AFTS and our ageing Hawk fleet. (If Canada is it, then it's not enough!)
4. Yes, I know that not all senior officers are bad leaders.
5. To the good ones, we desperately need strong leadership now before it's too late.
6. You are going to get a good pension whether you get that promotion or not.
To any journalists reading this:
1. Please publicise our plight.
2. Put pressure on the politicians. They want blood from a stone. A shoddy military will mean that it's real blood. Ours.
Thank you for your patience.
(All the good guys leave - but isn't it a shame.)
Guest
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I had the pleasure of speaking to a variety of military aircrew whilst on a course in a secret location in southern England last week. ( Caveat : I'm neither a military pilot, nor a journalist, but someone with whom the comments struck home. Also some of the comments are as I interpreted them, perhaps not as the originator intended, and any errors / misconceptions are down to me ). Anyway, once they stopped talking shop amongst themselves ( takes tongue out of cheek ) I noted the following :
1. Most appeared to be PVR'ing / planning their ATPLs because, amongst lots of other things, they're pissed off with either not flying enough ( a Lynx man getting 6 hours a month, Tornado people getting 10 - 12 a month ? ) or the fact that their lifestyle isn't conducive to a good home life ( 7 moves in 7 years - wasn't that a film ? - or crap housing / loss of family medical cover and so on ).
2. Some are studying for the ATPLs because they're coming to the end of their time and good luck to them, they've repaid the commitment given to them by virtue of their training.
Either way, if things don't change, then I would suspect the increase in leaving rates won't match the intake rates, and when there's no money to keep Lynx serviceable ( is 34 good ones in a total of over 200 acceptable ? ) or they have to buy their own kit to ensure they are comfortable when flying, or other pissy little and not so pissy little reasons which all add up, who can blame them ?
If you are asked by the politicians I helped elect to fight on my behalf, the least I as a taxpayer can expect is that you're trained / equipped / looked after properly. And that doesn't seem to be happening.
1. Most appeared to be PVR'ing / planning their ATPLs because, amongst lots of other things, they're pissed off with either not flying enough ( a Lynx man getting 6 hours a month, Tornado people getting 10 - 12 a month ? ) or the fact that their lifestyle isn't conducive to a good home life ( 7 moves in 7 years - wasn't that a film ? - or crap housing / loss of family medical cover and so on ).
2. Some are studying for the ATPLs because they're coming to the end of their time and good luck to them, they've repaid the commitment given to them by virtue of their training.
Either way, if things don't change, then I would suspect the increase in leaving rates won't match the intake rates, and when there's no money to keep Lynx serviceable ( is 34 good ones in a total of over 200 acceptable ? ) or they have to buy their own kit to ensure they are comfortable when flying, or other pissy little and not so pissy little reasons which all add up, who can blame them ?
If you are asked by the politicians I helped elect to fight on my behalf, the least I as a taxpayer can expect is that you're trained / equipped / looked after properly. And that doesn't seem to be happening.
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Couldn't agree more.
What is needed now is real radical change. Not just changes to the current practice but wholescale revision of the entire system.
Less senior officers. More preparedness to publicise our concerns. Remember moral courage? Its at the heart of leadership, I seem to recall. It's not that I don't believe that many of our senior officers are good guys. The vast majority are. But it is getting to be time for people to stand up and be counted.
The bottom line is that you only get what you pay for and if the government (and the public at large who elect them) only want a third rate defensive militia incapable of engaging in meaningful conflict or influencing events across the globe then this must be spelt out and clearly stated. If that is the will of the electorate then so be it. But what is not on is to only pay for that third rate level of service and then expect, at a moments notice, our brave boys to pitch up and save the day. There is a serious disconnect between the resources being provided and the output desired. That gap is currently being filled by the goodwill and professionalism of the individual servicepeople and their families who endure the low standards of pay, lifestyle and operational effectiveness yet continue to do their best. And the bad news is... that the light is beginning to dawn and the people are beginning to go.
I leave you with a quote from Winston Churchill. It dates from 1904 and is specific to the Army but I think that the meaning is tri-service nowadays.
'The Army is not like a limited liability company, to be reconstructed, remodelled, liquidated and refloated from week to week as the money market fluctuates.
It is not an inanimate thing, like a house, to be pulled down or structurally altered at the caprice of the tenant or owner.
It is a living thing.
If it is bullied, it sulks;
If it is unhappy, it pines;
If it is harried, it gets feverish;
If it is sufficiently disturbed, it will whither and dwindle and almost die;
And when it comes to this last serious condition
It is only to be revived by lots of time and lots of money.'
Take a lesson or two from history...
[This message has been edited by Poor Pongo (edited 08 June 2000).]
What is needed now is real radical change. Not just changes to the current practice but wholescale revision of the entire system.
Less senior officers. More preparedness to publicise our concerns. Remember moral courage? Its at the heart of leadership, I seem to recall. It's not that I don't believe that many of our senior officers are good guys. The vast majority are. But it is getting to be time for people to stand up and be counted.
The bottom line is that you only get what you pay for and if the government (and the public at large who elect them) only want a third rate defensive militia incapable of engaging in meaningful conflict or influencing events across the globe then this must be spelt out and clearly stated. If that is the will of the electorate then so be it. But what is not on is to only pay for that third rate level of service and then expect, at a moments notice, our brave boys to pitch up and save the day. There is a serious disconnect between the resources being provided and the output desired. That gap is currently being filled by the goodwill and professionalism of the individual servicepeople and their families who endure the low standards of pay, lifestyle and operational effectiveness yet continue to do their best. And the bad news is... that the light is beginning to dawn and the people are beginning to go.
I leave you with a quote from Winston Churchill. It dates from 1904 and is specific to the Army but I think that the meaning is tri-service nowadays.
'The Army is not like a limited liability company, to be reconstructed, remodelled, liquidated and refloated from week to week as the money market fluctuates.
It is not an inanimate thing, like a house, to be pulled down or structurally altered at the caprice of the tenant or owner.
It is a living thing.
If it is bullied, it sulks;
If it is unhappy, it pines;
If it is harried, it gets feverish;
If it is sufficiently disturbed, it will whither and dwindle and almost die;
And when it comes to this last serious condition
It is only to be revived by lots of time and lots of money.'
Take a lesson or two from history...
[This message has been edited by Poor Pongo (edited 08 June 2000).]
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Funny how history has a habit of repeating itself and how a political quote from 100yrs ago can be as apt today as it was then.
I spent most of the morning watching the Discovery Channel today (waiting for u/s aircraft to come up - never did). Interesting documentary about the military during the inter-war years. Apparently the navy at times didn't have enough fuel to put to sea. Can you imagine something like that happening today.......?
I spent most of the morning watching the Discovery Channel today (waiting for u/s aircraft to come up - never did). Interesting documentary about the military during the inter-war years. Apparently the navy at times didn't have enough fuel to put to sea. Can you imagine something like that happening today.......?