State of the Nation - an open letter
Guest
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SA
I heard rumours yes. Remember those of us outside the razor wire only hear sanitized press coverage:
"Their may be a slight suggestion through dubious channels, that an unofficial source's great uncle twice removed, had a wee problem with his SA80 falling apart"
'Scuse bad spelling, 'they' can't afford to photocopy the english diagnostic test any more.
Yakkers
I heard rumours yes. Remember those of us outside the razor wire only hear sanitized press coverage:
"Their may be a slight suggestion through dubious channels, that an unofficial source's great uncle twice removed, had a wee problem with his SA80 falling apart"
'Scuse bad spelling, 'they' can't afford to photocopy the english diagnostic test any more.
Yakkers
Guest
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I’ve had an idea that I think might sort out this mess we’ve got ourselves into.
I think that we should accept that we aren’t ever going to fill the number of seats that are currently available on our fixed-wing Squadrons. With in excess of 100 empty spaces and little hope of ever filling that void, we ought to concentrate on what we’ve got.
One of the snags relates to the number of flying hours that our guys get. FJ boys on 150 hours a year are under-utilised, Tristar boys on 700 hours are maxed and therefore the jets are under-utilised.
So, time to get the axe out. Close one of the GR1 Squadrons. Do the same with an F3 Squadron. Close down the entire Jaguar or Harrier Force. Probably has to be Jags I’m afraid. I know that they are cracking machines and that the guys who operate them are highly motivated. The snag is that they cannot be operated off a Boat and they cannot put as many bombs on target as a GR4. 1/3 of the Colt guys to Harrier. 1/3 to CFS. 1/3 to GR4. This ought to generate the equivalent of 100 FJ posts.
Refuse to take any more C-130J from Marshalls. Therefore end up with 24 Sqn as the only operator. Close 30 Sqn. Spread guys around the remaining fleet. Close 10 Sqn at Brize. Close a Nimrod Sqn. Double the Tristar crews. 2.5 crews per C-17.
Make Valley AFT only. All graduates go to Canada for Weapons. Leave JEFTS and Tucano alone. Close METS : send the guys to Prestwick or Oxford.
Pretty radical, but at least it would leave us with a representative number of guys on each Squadron.
How you would retain them is another matter.
I think that we should accept that we aren’t ever going to fill the number of seats that are currently available on our fixed-wing Squadrons. With in excess of 100 empty spaces and little hope of ever filling that void, we ought to concentrate on what we’ve got.
One of the snags relates to the number of flying hours that our guys get. FJ boys on 150 hours a year are under-utilised, Tristar boys on 700 hours are maxed and therefore the jets are under-utilised.
So, time to get the axe out. Close one of the GR1 Squadrons. Do the same with an F3 Squadron. Close down the entire Jaguar or Harrier Force. Probably has to be Jags I’m afraid. I know that they are cracking machines and that the guys who operate them are highly motivated. The snag is that they cannot be operated off a Boat and they cannot put as many bombs on target as a GR4. 1/3 of the Colt guys to Harrier. 1/3 to CFS. 1/3 to GR4. This ought to generate the equivalent of 100 FJ posts.
Refuse to take any more C-130J from Marshalls. Therefore end up with 24 Sqn as the only operator. Close 30 Sqn. Spread guys around the remaining fleet. Close 10 Sqn at Brize. Close a Nimrod Sqn. Double the Tristar crews. 2.5 crews per C-17.
Make Valley AFT only. All graduates go to Canada for Weapons. Leave JEFTS and Tucano alone. Close METS : send the guys to Prestwick or Oxford.
Pretty radical, but at least it would leave us with a representative number of guys on each Squadron.
How you would retain them is another matter.
Guest
Posts: n/a
In defence of the Jaguar.
Plenty of flying hours and fatigue left, without needing major (costly) mods to the back end.
Cheapest of all RAF FJs to operate, per flying hour. (About 4 x cheaper than GR7, 2 x cheaper than GR1/4).
Best TIALD solution of any RAF FJ. 1553B already goes to all six pylons. May not carry many bombs, but may well put more on target, and that's the name of the game!
Deployable, rugged, and reliable.
The aircrew are well-motivated and probably have higher morale than anyone else. Great idea! Do something to really **** 'em off.
The Jaguar is the only example so far of Smart Procurement in action. Binning it would send exactly the wrong signal to those in politics and industry who are at the root of the current problems.
So it can't go on a boat. So what? When was the last time there wasn't an available airfield? What happens when the opposition have a submarine or any form of anti-ship capability.
Jags en route to Maple Flag were held at Lajes (Azores) ready to forward deploy to Dakar (Senegal) for ops over Sierra Leone as the crisis developed. The decision to send a carrier laden with Harriers was political - justifying the existence of the carrier despite costing far more money and resulting in the deployment of a less suitable aircraft for that particular operation, where strafe would have been the weapon of choice. (1,000 lb too big, Paveway too pricey, CBU too indiscriminate). Not sending the Jags in, incidentally, was just as political, as there are those who are embarrassed that this knackered old thing is, so often, the best choice available. Not least BWoS!
So whatever the answer may be, it ain't disbanding the Jag force. It might well be to reduce the number of GR1/GR4 squadrons in order to spread the FH over a larger pool of aircraft, so that they can meet their OSD without lots of expensive structural work, and that might apply to F3 and GR7 too.
But why not just fill the holes. Initially with lots of recent retirees as reservists (damn the cost) and really start training people and treating them properly. It really doesn't have to be that difficult.
PS: Not a Jag Mate. Not married to a Jag Mate. Never been a Jag Mate. Don't even know where Norfolk is, mate!
[This message has been edited by Jackonicko (edited 03 July 2000).]
Plenty of flying hours and fatigue left, without needing major (costly) mods to the back end.
Cheapest of all RAF FJs to operate, per flying hour. (About 4 x cheaper than GR7, 2 x cheaper than GR1/4).
Best TIALD solution of any RAF FJ. 1553B already goes to all six pylons. May not carry many bombs, but may well put more on target, and that's the name of the game!
Deployable, rugged, and reliable.
The aircrew are well-motivated and probably have higher morale than anyone else. Great idea! Do something to really **** 'em off.
The Jaguar is the only example so far of Smart Procurement in action. Binning it would send exactly the wrong signal to those in politics and industry who are at the root of the current problems.
So it can't go on a boat. So what? When was the last time there wasn't an available airfield? What happens when the opposition have a submarine or any form of anti-ship capability.
Jags en route to Maple Flag were held at Lajes (Azores) ready to forward deploy to Dakar (Senegal) for ops over Sierra Leone as the crisis developed. The decision to send a carrier laden with Harriers was political - justifying the existence of the carrier despite costing far more money and resulting in the deployment of a less suitable aircraft for that particular operation, where strafe would have been the weapon of choice. (1,000 lb too big, Paveway too pricey, CBU too indiscriminate). Not sending the Jags in, incidentally, was just as political, as there are those who are embarrassed that this knackered old thing is, so often, the best choice available. Not least BWoS!
So whatever the answer may be, it ain't disbanding the Jag force. It might well be to reduce the number of GR1/GR4 squadrons in order to spread the FH over a larger pool of aircraft, so that they can meet their OSD without lots of expensive structural work, and that might apply to F3 and GR7 too.
But why not just fill the holes. Initially with lots of recent retirees as reservists (damn the cost) and really start training people and treating them properly. It really doesn't have to be that difficult.
PS: Not a Jag Mate. Not married to a Jag Mate. Never been a Jag Mate. Don't even know where Norfolk is, mate!
[This message has been edited by Jackonicko (edited 03 July 2000).]
Guest
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There is a growing image in many of these threads that nobody wants to be in, or stay in the RAF. Well, that isn't true. I know there are many difficult problems, both within and outside service control but all is not lost. Similar problems occured in the shake-ups in the 70s and 80s. But the main point of my post is to say that even with all the problems, it's still a good job. Moreover, it's a unique job that you can't do anywhere else.
Many Airforces around the world are having similar difficulties, and there isn't an unlimited amount of money to spend on defence, so, we will have to accept compromise. I do however agree that many decisions taken in the past have either wasted good money, or had a detrimental effect on morale.
Perhaps the way forward, might be for those of us who really care, to be positive, and offer constructive ideas up through the command chain. I also believe that a good number of aircrew could be given a reason to stay, by an acceptable fiscal reward! Perhaps, being able to take your gratuity and stay in, some form of bonus...not less than the price of the average house, pension whilst still serving, some form of Tax break ie no income tax when serving on opperations. I don't have answers, but somewhere out there in pprune land, someone cleverer than me might have.
If we give up, we have lost. It's never over till it's over. (But I think I can hear a "Fat Lady" clearing her throat!!)
Many Airforces around the world are having similar difficulties, and there isn't an unlimited amount of money to spend on defence, so, we will have to accept compromise. I do however agree that many decisions taken in the past have either wasted good money, or had a detrimental effect on morale.
Perhaps the way forward, might be for those of us who really care, to be positive, and offer constructive ideas up through the command chain. I also believe that a good number of aircrew could be given a reason to stay, by an acceptable fiscal reward! Perhaps, being able to take your gratuity and stay in, some form of bonus...not less than the price of the average house, pension whilst still serving, some form of Tax break ie no income tax when serving on opperations. I don't have answers, but somewhere out there in pprune land, someone cleverer than me might have.
If we give up, we have lost. It's never over till it's over. (But I think I can hear a "Fat Lady" clearing her throat!!)
Guest
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Gentleman Aviator
Closing the Jag force and a GR1/4 Sqn?
One of the biggest problems is retention. Reducing the number of Sqns available to do both Nortern and Southern watch would increase "overstretch". This would lead to more PVR's.....etc. An ever decreasing circle.
Another point to note is that the shortage in the FJ world is not only pilots but navs as well. You try telling a Jag mate that you're binning his aircraft and transferring him to GR1/4; oh and by the way you're sitting in the boot!
Nice to see someone offering a solution (more than I've done!) however IMHO it would cause even more strife further down the line.
Closing the Jag force and a GR1/4 Sqn?
One of the biggest problems is retention. Reducing the number of Sqns available to do both Nortern and Southern watch would increase "overstretch". This would lead to more PVR's.....etc. An ever decreasing circle.
Another point to note is that the shortage in the FJ world is not only pilots but navs as well. You try telling a Jag mate that you're binning his aircraft and transferring him to GR1/4; oh and by the way you're sitting in the boot!
Nice to see someone offering a solution (more than I've done!) however IMHO it would cause even more strife further down the line.
Guest
Posts: n/a
Sorry guys.
I've got mates on the Jag Force and I know what a great job they do. However, I cannot see how the politicians are going to chop Harrier or GR4. As such I think that Jag has to be the loser. Emotionally this idea doesn't make sense, but politically it does.
Having closed 6 FJ Sqns and 3 ME in order to reflect our realistic pilot strength we will have given the politicains an adequate get-out-of-jail-free-card to pull out of Northern Watch (& possibly Southern, although I doubt it). As such our permanent detachments will be appropriate for the force structure and pilot numbers that we have.
I've got mates on the Jag Force and I know what a great job they do. However, I cannot see how the politicians are going to chop Harrier or GR4. As such I think that Jag has to be the loser. Emotionally this idea doesn't make sense, but politically it does.
Having closed 6 FJ Sqns and 3 ME in order to reflect our realistic pilot strength we will have given the politicains an adequate get-out-of-jail-free-card to pull out of Northern Watch (& possibly Southern, although I doubt it). As such our permanent detachments will be appropriate for the force structure and pilot numbers that we have.
Guest
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Gentleman Aviator,
I'll type this slowly, so that you can understand!
1) You are dangerous as well as barking mad!
2) Reducing over-stretch is a key issue, but reducing commitments is simply not an option.
3) Reducing commitments to meet the force structure is b0ll0cks! One day there will be commitments which aren't just 'nice to do' for the politicians and the current level of commitments is not unrealistic, even if the commitments themselves could be viewed as non-essential or optional.
4) If the Forces can't do the job the politicians and tax-payers want them to do, the obvious question will be:
"What's the point of having them at all."
5) The only answer is to solve the real problem, and far from reducing frontline FJ strength, that probably needs the really radical strength of actually increasing it - maybe at the expense of massive armoured Divisions, nuclear submarines, the Household Division, the Red Arrows, the BoBMF, the Royal Tournament, a national ASW aircraft (let's go to a NATO force, like with the E-3). You know it makes sense!
I'll type this slowly, so that you can understand!
1) You are dangerous as well as barking mad!
2) Reducing over-stretch is a key issue, but reducing commitments is simply not an option.
3) Reducing commitments to meet the force structure is b0ll0cks! One day there will be commitments which aren't just 'nice to do' for the politicians and the current level of commitments is not unrealistic, even if the commitments themselves could be viewed as non-essential or optional.
4) If the Forces can't do the job the politicians and tax-payers want them to do, the obvious question will be:
"What's the point of having them at all."
5) The only answer is to solve the real problem, and far from reducing frontline FJ strength, that probably needs the really radical strength of actually increasing it - maybe at the expense of massive armoured Divisions, nuclear submarines, the Household Division, the Red Arrows, the BoBMF, the Royal Tournament, a national ASW aircraft (let's go to a NATO force, like with the E-3). You know it makes sense!
Guest
Posts: n/a
Here's something radical GA, instead of closing operational sqns (let's be honest, what would that achieve?) offer good pay and conditions to all, and have an active floating reserve of RAFVR who hold ATPLs on multis. Type rate the RAFVRs to fly C130/J/VC10/Tri-Star and give them an incentive to put in so many hours a month to relieve the pressure on the regs operating these cabs? There are probably quite a few airline pilots out there who would quite like to do a different type of flying than LGW-JFK or multiple short sectors each day. The only problem that I can see with this suggestion is that it is a bit sensible!
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Remember: all landings are controlled crashes!
[This message has been edited by kbf1 (edited 04 July 2000).]
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Remember: all landings are controlled crashes!
[This message has been edited by kbf1 (edited 04 July 2000).]
Guest
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Or how about recognising that the standards required for streaming someone FJ vary enormously according to the availability of slots. Why not look for those keen young chaps who found themselves streamed rotary or multi who could (perhaps with a longer, differently structured TWU and OCU) be developed into fast jet aircrew. There could even be an emphasis on getting people through the course, rather than chopping them at FHT, or whatever. They might never become even pairs leaders, but they'd fill cockpits, and get a crack at doing what many of them joined to do. And I'd venture to suggest that recruiting a generation of multi-engined co-pilots would not need to be that difficult, though they wouldn't be the same as today's arguably over-qualified and 'over-calibre' right-hand seaters.
Guest
Posts: n/a
Right then, one at a time.
Jackonicko,
1. Possibly on both points.
2. See 2.
3. You are not making a great deal of sense. We do not have the assets to meet the commitment. They have all been issued a Green Book by the CAA and have left, or are leaving. You cannot simply generate experienced pilots from nothing.
4. An analogy:
If you require 4 painters to do a job but only have 3 available what would you do?
Under your plan you would throw a tizzy and have none at all.
Under the MOD/RAF plan we would have 3 doing the work of 4 to simulate a ‘phantom’ painter. The 3 remaining would become disillusioned with the job due to the unrealistic demands placed upon them and leave.
Under my plan we would accept that we only had 3. We would therefore expect less work within the available timescale or the same work over a longer period.
5. There are insufficient serviceable aeroplanes for your expansionist plan. There is no more money in the pot. Our current ever-decreasing circle involves taking experienced front-line pilots away to train inexperienced students within a training system at max capacity. Those that graduate will arrive on the Sqn with little experience. Those that would have helped with the burden of convex have already been posted to CFS. Those that are left have an unrealistic training burden. They leave. IPS of 45 that is now at 60 goes to 75. More experienced guys posted away to CFS to achieve this new goal.
Meltdown!
kbf1
Cool plan.
It already works at Lyneham. However the Part Time Reservists are there for a surge capability. Most of the guys get a sim, a GH and a short route per month. That is the max that they can offer. As such, although they are a trained asset, they are not very cost effective. They get as much continuation training as a regular but only provide a fraction of the route hours.
They are an effective way to have lots of trained crews ‘just in case’.
Jackonicko
1. Excellent idea!
Remembering that the ME Sqns are 20-30% undermanned you want to take the boys through a quick Tucano refresher, a full Hawk course, a full OCU and a full Sqn work-up. Those that survive will have only lost 2 years in the retraining process.
Jackonicko,
1. Possibly on both points.
2. See 2.
3. You are not making a great deal of sense. We do not have the assets to meet the commitment. They have all been issued a Green Book by the CAA and have left, or are leaving. You cannot simply generate experienced pilots from nothing.
4. An analogy:
If you require 4 painters to do a job but only have 3 available what would you do?
Under your plan you would throw a tizzy and have none at all.
Under the MOD/RAF plan we would have 3 doing the work of 4 to simulate a ‘phantom’ painter. The 3 remaining would become disillusioned with the job due to the unrealistic demands placed upon them and leave.
Under my plan we would accept that we only had 3. We would therefore expect less work within the available timescale or the same work over a longer period.
5. There are insufficient serviceable aeroplanes for your expansionist plan. There is no more money in the pot. Our current ever-decreasing circle involves taking experienced front-line pilots away to train inexperienced students within a training system at max capacity. Those that graduate will arrive on the Sqn with little experience. Those that would have helped with the burden of convex have already been posted to CFS. Those that are left have an unrealistic training burden. They leave. IPS of 45 that is now at 60 goes to 75. More experienced guys posted away to CFS to achieve this new goal.
Meltdown!
kbf1
Cool plan.
It already works at Lyneham. However the Part Time Reservists are there for a surge capability. Most of the guys get a sim, a GH and a short route per month. That is the max that they can offer. As such, although they are a trained asset, they are not very cost effective. They get as much continuation training as a regular but only provide a fraction of the route hours.
They are an effective way to have lots of trained crews ‘just in case’.
Jackonicko
1. Excellent idea!
Remembering that the ME Sqns are 20-30% undermanned you want to take the boys through a quick Tucano refresher, a full Hawk course, a full OCU and a full Sqn work-up. Those that survive will have only lost 2 years in the retraining process.
Guest
Posts: n/a
GA, correct me if I am wrong, but aren't these guys ex-C130 guys who stay on in a reserve capacity, just like the pilots in 7Regt AAC? What I am advocating is pilots who have not done OCU on the C130 et al be given the opportunity to take RAFVR commissions and fly alongside the reg's, just like as a TA officer I deploy alongside the regulars for a few days at a time, a few weeks, or even a few months.Anyone who had an ATPLA with a multi-engine ticket could apply to join.
On the issue of low return on investement at Lyneham, isn't it really more a case of the RAF under-utilising this asset rather than the system not working?
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Remember: all landings are controlled crashes!
On the issue of low return on investement at Lyneham, isn't it really more a case of the RAF under-utilising this asset rather than the system not working?
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Remember: all landings are controlled crashes!
