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Parachute planes?
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Nearly overwhelmingly the ballistic parachutes and recovery parachutes being put on light airplanes are sold to inexperienced pilots, and in most cases, they don't need to be deployed. In the case of Cirrus, who marketed their airplane largely based on the parachute (CAPS) system, many of the deployments have failed, and most of the ones that have been deployed have been pilots who put themselves in increadibly stupid places (thunderstorm over mountains at night in a single engine airplane flown by an inexperienced non-instrument rated private pilot, etc)...pilots who may very well have been led down the prim path by the belief that the parachute was there to save them from their own stupidity.
Parachutes certainly have their place. I've used them many times, own several, and have been strapped to them for several decades. However, in nearly all cases in light airplanes, their use is misplaced, or overemphasised. Personally, if I have an intact airplane around me, I'm certainly more inclined to fly that down than to attempt to deploy a parachute under which a perfectly flyable airplane exists. In the video linked, I didn't see an uncontrollable airplane or a spinning airplane. I saw an evasive maneuver in which he apparently struck the tow rope, and immediately shut off his engine (for what reason?) and deployed the parachute. Why? |
thunderstorm over mountains at night in a single engine airplane flown by an inexperienced non-instrument rated private pilot, etc |
I don't know if he held a flight instructor certificate, but I don't believe so. I believe you're talking about Albert Kolk, who lost control on autopilot at night in severe turbulence over the mountains with three passengers, after he forgot to swap fuel tanks and a fuel imbalance caused a departure from controlled flight.
I found it interesting that in all the testing Cirrus did, leading to certification of the airplane, they never carried a parachute deployment out to it's eventual conclusion; a touchdown. Not once did they deply a parachute and then stay with the airplane under canopy all the way to the ground. The first ones who did were the customers...who then became unwitting test pilots under live, emergency conditions. Up through July 2005, none of them were successful, either. Kolk was only the second to do it, and actually have it work...and he shouldn't have been there in the first place. |
Back to the YouTube video - if the prop stopped because of a snarlup with the rope then why did the pilot need to deploy the parachute ? Am curious because I thought he'd just need to do an emergency engine-off landing (apols if I have this wrong as I'm not a power pilot).
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In the case of Cirrus, who marketed their airplane largely based on the parachute (CAPS) system, many of the deployments have failed |
Back to the YouTube video - if the prop stopped because of a snarlup with the rope then why did the pilot need to deploy the parachute ? Am curious because I thought he'd just need to do an emergency engine-off landing (apols if I have this wrong as I'm not a power pilot). On the other hand, there must have been a glider field nearby, somewhere. But perhaps not within gliding distance. Oh well, we weren't there. Very easy to criticize a life-or-death decision from the comfy chair, with full hindsight. |
I've always thought that
Personally, if I have an intact airplane around me, I'm certainly more inclined to fly that down than to attempt to deploy a parachute under which a perfectly flyable airplane exists. With the donkey out, you have some control over where and when you land. I'd much rather take that option. Although, as has been said, it's easy for me to say that having never experienced an engine failure before.... |
Few if any Cirrus chute deployments have "failed" but one could argue that many, possibly most, of the situations where the chute was pulled would have been better recovered conventionally.
The unquestionable uses of a chute are - over forest - over rough terrain - anywhere, following loss of control due to aircraft-technical failure - pilot incapacitation? - over water But pulling the chute when over a load of green fields, following an engine failure, is nuts. I also don't get why one of the pulls was done due to a missing aileron. You don't need both ailerons, or indeed any at all. |
A highly successful, but questionable deployment (and not so untypical)...
http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/...700361_001.pdf That the occupants survived is largely a matter of luck. A quick review of a few cirrus caps deployments show that numerous listings involving scars earned in battles in which one should never have fought. From several sources... October 2002, Texas: VFR departure after maintenance, aileron unhinged due maintenance error. 1,500 feet VFR after maneuvering, first parachute deployment by pilot in a certified production airplane April 2004, Florida: instrument failure in IFR conditions, confusing instrument behavior, low IMC, departure climb, water in static system; low altitude, 700 feet IMC, prior to disorientation 1 uninjured April 2004, British Colombia, Canada: VFR night cruise, loss of control, possible autopilot-induced stall, night VFR over mountains, high altitude deployment upon loss of control. landed in scree in mountaneous terrain, skidded backwards 1/4-mile, helicopter extraction via parachute risers September 2004, California: VFR climb, autopilot-induced stall, rolled inverted, attempted recovery, activated CAPS in VMC before entering IMC above 10,000 feet 2 uninjured Feb 2005, California, IMC, pilot reported icing at 16,000 over Sierras, high speed descent well above Vne of 204 knots CAPS failed as parachute found separated from airframe, located along track to crash site, high speed impact in mountainous area. 1 fatality June 2005, New York: IFR on approach to KHPN, pilot incapacitated from brain seizure, loss of conciousness, awoke and recovered from Vne dive, determined numbness and loss of function in legs. Last radar report at 1,600 feet and 190 knots (well above Vpd of 133 knots) Compression fractures of vertebrae. January 2006, Alabama: loss of control after pilot flew into severe icing, loss of control after pilot flew into icing, report at 9,000 feet in IMC. 3 uninjured February 2006, South Dakota: pilot reported disorientation shortly after takeoff in instrument conditions, 2 uninjured August 2006, Indiana: Instrument conditions, parachute deployed 2.5 miles from departure airport, aircraft landed in retention pond, parachute was deployed by a passenger--first deployment by non-pilot--because the pilot passed out, pilot fatality, 3 passengers injured. Parachute did not fully deploy. September 2006, Colorado: Plane destroyed with 2 fatalities after reports of icing problems at 14,000 feet. A preliminary report from the NTSB contains the sentence "A witness in the area observed a portion of the fuselage being drug by the deployed aircraft recovery parachute." February 2007, NSW, Australia: Fuel line pressure sensor connection cap separated and loss of pressure stopped the engine. After an approach to a freeway forced landing, CAPS was activated, the rocket fired, but got tangled with the empennage resulting in parachute undeployment. The plane impacted ground in nose down attitude seriously injuring both occupants. April 2007, Luna, New Mexico: The pilot experienced spatial disorientation following loss of the airspeed indicator. After the terrain warning went off, CAPS was activated and the plane came to rest in a forested area. August 2007, Nantucket Island, Mass: Two people aboard, one suffered serious injury after their Cirrus made a parachute landing on Nantucket. FAA spokeswoman Holly Baker said the Cirrus aircraft apparently was trying to land at Nantucket under visual flight rules when the weather deteriorated. She said the pilot used the plane's parachute system and the Cirrus made a hard landing, apparently hitting the guy wires of a LORAN tower in the village of Siasconset, about five miles northeast of the Nantucket airport. What about never being there in the first place. Look some of the few deployments listed above. Cirrus would consider most of them a success, and a few may merit the deployment (pilot dies in flight, etc). However, proper preflight and planning would have prevented most of them, and nearly all have been inexperienced pilots going places they shouldn't. The common arguement is, of course, "isn't it better that they lived?" While I don't presume to decide that, it's better that they never had to be there in the first place. From the Cirrus Aircraft Flight Manual: Warning: CAPS deployment is expected to result in loss of the airframe and, depending upon adverse external factors such as high deployment speed, low altitude, rough terrain or high wind conditions, may result in severe injury or death to the occupants. Because of this, CAPS should only be activated when any other means of handling the emergency would not protect the occupants from serious injury. If an aileron fell off (which happened once, IIRC) I would fly using the rudder, and go to some place with a big runway. One doesn't need ailerons to fly a plane. Then there's the favorable characteristics of the airplane...not only was it never tested to a landing with the parachute out, but it wasn't tested through one spin. Thus it requires the parachute for spin recovery, reference the aircraft flight manual... • Note • Because the SR20 has not been certified for spin recovery, the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) must be deployed if the airplane departs controlled flight. I would doubt that most of those using the caps system have ever landed under a round parachute. Having used them myself, including in mountainous areas and in strong winds, I'd have very serious reservations about attempting to deploy one over anything but soft ground (and for those who haven't made a parachute landing into water, think again). Objects suspened under canopies in wind tend to swing, increasing impact forces. As mentioned before, the acceptable descent rate under a military round T-10 type canopy was 22 fps, and the CAPS does around that...about 26 to 27 fps, meaning about 1500 or 1600 feet per minute descent rate. When landing a round canopy on one's feet, it involves rolling and a "parachute landing fall" to prevent injury. I've seen some serious injuries on normal landings, anyway. Without that ability, one needs a structure which can crush around the occupant, which the cirrus does. No wonder Cirrus never tested the deployments right through to a touchdown, with occupants on board...and left that critical function to their customers...who were unable to successfully deploy one until 2002 (even though the CAPS system had been in use since 1998). I believe I indicated 2005 previously; the first was 2002. Cirrus has continued to have other problems, of course, including control failures, but among other problems have been parachute failures. Between 2001 and 2006 there were 19 fatal mishaps in cirrus aircraft, with the loss of 39 lives. During the same period, there were 9 CAPS deployments, some of which involved fatalities, some of which resulted in "saves." Albert Kolk, with a little more research, turns out to be a private pilot, not flight instructor, at the time of his deployment. Cirrus has marketed largely to the non-pilot or inexperienced pilot, trying to create a product with which they can identify. An airplane modeled inside and out like a car, with advanced avionics, and a "safe" parachute. The majority of the mishaps so far haven't been mechanical failure, but pilot error. Not simply a stall-spin on final, but gross judgement errors involving intrument flight, icing, and other conditions in which the aircraft should never have been placed. The parachute has been very successful in selling the aircraft, or helping it sell. It's also very possibly responsible for the decision making process in which pilots go farther into the void than they ought, because they have their golden parachute. Kolk's mishap report: http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/reports/air/...p?print_view=1 Interestingly, one of the points noted in that report is that the impact force was light enough to not activate the ELT, which hampered rescue efforts. |
"flutter issues of an imbalanced control"
?? One doesn't need the other aileron to suppress flutter; that is done on each aileron separately. It would not work anyway, due to control linkage distance/flexibility. |
Actually, no. While each control should be balanced, you have a high probability of flutter when it's allowed to freefloat, and at lesser speeds than the intact flutter analysis might predict.
Further, the detatching aileron may well destroy the aircraft on it's own. |
SNS3GUPPY
In the case of Cirrus, who marketed their airplane largely based on the parachute (CAPS) system, many of the deployments have failed. At face value it could “imply” the deployment of the parachute had failed. On the basis of your subsequent post there seems to be perhaps two cases out of nine were the deployment was partially successful. I don’t think we have reliable evidence whether the parachute was deployed within the limiting speed. Between 2001 and 2006 there were 19 fatal mishaps in cirrus aircraft, with the loss of 39 lives. During the same period, there were 9 CAPS deployments, some of which involved fatalities, some of which resulted in "saves. So in this period (five years) there was apparently 9 deployments - just under two a year worldwide, involving three fatalities of which in one case there would appear to be evidence that the chute was deployed well above the limiting speed. That would appear to suggest there were 2 fatalities that arose from parachute deployment and a few people who suffered some degree of injury worse that the odd scratch. On the basis of the evidence you have presented I think your first assertion was, to say the least sweeping, since two hardly constitutes “many” and your second statement is at best sensationalist because it implies the loss of 39 lives might be connected with the chute, whereas in fact it would seem at most only 2 lives were lost following chute deployment within the limiting speed. In one of the two cases there is apparently no evidence in either direction on the basis of your post that the chute was correctly deployed. I am not saying your assertions are wrong. I am genuinely interested in the factual evidence surrounding the likelihood of serious injury after chute deployment within the limiting speed. I don’t think conclusions that are not based on the evidence will get us very far. Whether or not the chute should be used is another debate I would agree. |
I actually wonder whether the shute is more of a comfort zone for passengers in the same way as a second engine on a light twin?
Take a typical scenario. A pilot takes his wife and kids for a flight. If anything happens to him unlike in a car where he hits the brakes and 2 seconds later is parked up on the hardshoulder, In a plane he maybe IMC at altitude and 60 miles from the nearest airport. What do his family do? At least with the chute they have an option without they die. Mid air collision the same. At night over mountains the same. Serious icing the same. The chute should be a last resort for a serious situation. The trouble with a Chute is the false sense of security it instills in pilots. False sense of security means that they will fly in conditions which are out of their ability because they think that if it all goes pear shaped all they have to do is pull the chute. Something else I was told is that deploying the chute over water is a killer or paryliser. The undercarriage is an integral part of the vertical speed cushion.ie it takes up a lot of the vertical speed impact as do the seats. Land in water and the the undercarriage impact absorbtion is non existant so you are unlikely to ever walk away again. Pace |
The unquestionable uses of a chute are - over forest - over rough terrain - anywhere, following loss of control due to aircraft-technical failure - pilot incapacitation? - over water Best, Sicknote:ok: |
Yes, it's debatable. However, chute landing on the water is 100% sure to work, whereas ditching is certainly not 100%.
We don't have much data on the BRS usage over water e.g. it could be that bloke had a bad back to start with. One thing I would add to my list is: engine failure at night. I'd have a BRS chute but the weight penalty is not insignificant - of the order of 50kg I think. Still, as people get more and more obese, it becomes less significant :) |
The trouble with a Chute is the false sense of security it instills in pilots. False sense of security means that they will fly in conditions which are out of their ability because they think that if it all goes pear shaped all they have to do is pull the chute. Ian |
I am not yet sure how many "pulls" there have been over water but here is one account.
It is clear the pilot suffered some vertebrae compression, but it would seem he has not lost any function in consequence. We can only speculate that the pilot would not have survived without a chute because of his physical incapacity before the "pull". We can also only speculate on the outcome if in spite of his physical incapacity he had remained in control and performed a ditch. Perhaps he might have suffered less injury. I suspect in any landing on water a factor will be the sea state. Having done some float flying detecting the surface of the water in very carm conditions is difficult even with experience. Flaring too high or low could well result in the same outcome. Equally, in rough conditions landing into the swell (which of course ideally you should avoided) will result in severe deceleration, where as presumably the chute landing might result in less deceleration in these conditions given that the swell may spread the deceleration. We might speculate that a forced landing into a light sea state well handled might result in less physical injury than deploying the chute in the same conditions. Whether there is any evidence to support any of this I don’t know - it might be pure speculation on my part. Thanks for the huge outpouring of support, good wishes and prayers from my friends. I was deeply touched by everyone's sentiments, whether from reading the COPA website, listening to voice mails or reading emails. I will try to answer each person individually, but please understand if I don't. I am writing to answer the common questions on everyone's mind and to attempt to organize my own thoughts and emotions after having gone through a very traumatic ordeal. Many lessons can be learned from my experience of surviving an airplane crash, including: Don't trust anything the news media publishes. Various inaccurate and misleading reports had me: inexplicably parachuting out of a plane that already had its own parachute; losing control in a dive; coming dangerously close to a nuclear reactor; and activating the chute because of mechanical problems. None of these is true. Practice, practice and more practice. Maneuvers like recovery from unusual attitudes, deploying the parachute, shutting down the plane after any emergency, should be instinctive. Quite simply, when things go awry there's no time to consult a checklist or the pilot's operating handbook (POH). While in retrospect I didn't do everything right, I did get all of the important stuff right. Don't fly a single engine plane that isn't equipped with a parachute. Although the chances of actually encountering an emergency situation that is worthy of "pulling the chute" are probably small to infinitesimal over the course of any given pilot's career, the penalty for not having a parachute is almost certain death. Each pilot has to establish and evaluate their own risk assessment criteria, but for me something that has a greater than 50% risk of death, even if only 1% of the time, is an unacceptable risk. That's why I bought a Cirrus in the first place. * * * * * Before I describe in minute detail what happened, here's a brief summary. On the afternoon of Thursday, June 30 I was incapacitated by a short seizure while being vectored for an instrument approach. When I became alert again, the plane was descending at 204 knots, which is faster than redline speed. Following normal procedure I was able to recover from this unusual attitude; an instant later I chose to activate the parachute. On the descent, I steered the plane clear of a fuel tank farm, and crash-landed into the water near Haverstraw, NY. My injuries are more severe than the "cuts on the hand" described in the press. First, my back was broken by the impact of crashing into the water. Thankfully I retain full body function and have every reason to expect a complete recovery after wearing a brace for the next month. Second, I have a benign brain tumor, which has been growing undetected in the middle of my brain for many years and was apparently the cause of the brief seizure in-flight. Thankfully the tumor does not affect my mental facilities in any way, and the risk of future seizures is now being controlled by medication. In the coming weeks I will be discussing treatment options with various specialists: these include surgery or doing nothing. In either event, it is fairly certain that my flying days are over. * * * * * Now for the details.. I departed Lincoln Park, NJ at approximately 4:20 pm. My plane was there for two weeks for its regular 50 hour inspection and an assortment of squawks, including new spark plugs after 400 hours, replacement of the broken shear coupling on Alt 2, cosmetic work on the leading edges and wheel pants, and a new fuel sender unit and gauge. The last item required emptying the tanks and then refilling them so that the new fuel gauge could be properly calibrated. This exercise introduces air into the fuel lines, so we spent a lot of time running the engine on the ground to ensure that all the air was gone. The destination was my home base at Westchester County Airport, NY (HPN): 35 miles and 12 minutes as the SR22 crow flies. Notwithstanding the short distance, I filed an IFR flight plan because the weather was hazy and the weather forecast for HPN was predicting temporary cloud buildups starting at 2,000 feet. As I climbed through 800 feet I contacted NY air traffic control and picked up my clearance: V39 BREZY intersection, Carmel VOR, direct; 3,000 feet. In quick succession I was handed off to the next controller, and coming up at BREZY intersection I was told to expect the ILS 16 approach at HPN. After BREZY intersection I was handed off again, and that controller started to give me vectors for the final approach course: fly a heading of 080 degrees and maintain 3,000 feet. A few moments later I was instructed to turn an additional 20 degrees to the left and maintain 3,000 feet. Incidentally, the visibility in the air was only 2-5 miles, so the decision to file IFR was certainly prudent. As I came out of the turn to 060 degrees, I noted that my altitude had slipped to 2,840 feet while I was busy changing frequencies, turning and loading the approach procedure into the Garmin. Apparently the plane was not trimmed properly, and I concentrated on climbing back up to 3,000 feet, while continuing my scan and noting that everything was running just fine. Indicated airspeed was 160 knots, which is normal for the cruise power setting then in use. Then I blacked out for a period that I now estimate as being 5-10 seconds. When I became alert again, I scanned the instruments and was stunned to see the airspeed indicator showing 204 knots indicated; the attitude indicator showing the nose below the horizon; and the altimeter scrolling down quickly toward 1,900 feet. I also realized that my right leg was weak, and that the controller was calling, asking what happened to my altitude. For non-pilots, the redline threshold is also known as the "never exceed" speed, because the airframe was not designed to retain structural integrity above that number. In other words, the wings can break off at any moment. Adrenaline shot through my body as I quickly and methodically executed the procedure for recovering from this unusual attitude: level the wings, decrease power, and carefully lift the nose to avoid any further stresses on the airframe. While accomplishing this I concentrated almost entirely on the attitude indicator, and after a few seconds I was satisfied that the loss of altitude had been reversed at roughly 1,700 feet above the ground. I did not see the airspeed, although I knew instinctively that it was out of the red zone. After a fraction of a second of thought, I then activated the parachute. The factors that led me to this decision included: no desire to proceed any further into marginal weather; concern over the loss of altitude; concern that the plane's structural integrity was compromised by the high speed descent and recovery; and concern that the weakness in my right leg might hinder my ability to control the plane down to the runway. My parachute experience was quite different from what fellow COPA member Bill Graham described last month at M3. I heard the rocket launch and briefly smelled its fumes. A few seconds later I heard a loud, ripping sound as the parachute reached full deployment. I then felt a tremendous jolt*worse than any turbulence that I've experienced*as the parachute billowed open and caused the plane to decelerate. The POH advises 130 knots indicated as the highest deployment speed for the parachute; but I have no idea what the airspeed was in my situation. I suspect it was somewhere above 130 knots based on the very different experiences that Bill and I had. This jolt tilted the airplane downward as the parachute established a level position; it also threw my headphone and glasses in various directions, and caused my head to hit the ceiling near the visor. I have a very small bump to show for it; but that was the only injury from the parachute deployment. In my opinion the seatbelt retraction system and the parachute worked exceptionally well under the circumstances. After finding the headphone and realizing that the plane was now level at roughly 900 feet above the ground and descending straight down under the canopy, the first thing I did was call the controller on the existing frequency: I had no time to switch to 121.5; and saw no point in doing so since the controller was already urgently asking what was going on. I said "Mayday, mayday, 52 Lima here, pulled the parachute near the Hudson River." I believe that the second thing I did was punch in 7700 on the transponder, although I later learned that my plane was already below radar coverage. Inexplicably, I did not pull the mixture back to idle, as advised by the POH, and left the power lever just below the detent (roughly 19 inches MP). In the next minute this would prove to be an invaluable deviation from what the POH requires. I looked out the window and saw that the plane was descending directly over a fuel tank farm for the nearby conventional power station (incidentally, Indian Point, which is a nuclear reactor, is located on the other side of the river, 5.-8 miles upstream, and away from the vectors for the ILS 16 approach course). This was now the scariest part of the flight: worse than emerging from a seizure to find the plane in a high-speed descent, because I already knew from training how to handle that situation. But there is no advice in the POH on how to control the plane once the parachute has been deployed. Now everything happened at warp speed. I called the controller again and said "Mayday, 52 Lima is descending directly over the fuel tanks". No response; and besides, there was nothing the controller could do to help me. I then used "all available resources" to change that outcome: I applied right aileron and rudder, and rocked the power lever to make sure that the engine still had power. These actions caused the plane to gently veer away from the tank farm and over the water: Bowline Creek, a very wide, calm tributary to the Hudson River near the town of Haverstraw, NY, a few miles north of Nyack and the Tappan Zee Bridge. An instant later the plane crashed straight down into the water, which both then and now I consider to be the lesser of two evils. It was like a massive belly flop. This was now the second, scary part of the flight, as water splashed up almost to the top of the windows. Because I landed in water rather than solid ground, the gear did not absorb much of the impact. Instead, the wings and seat did all the work. It was at this point that the fourth lumbar vertebrae in my back cracked and compressed from the impact of the crash. Then came the very worst part: I could not open the door. The wings were now sitting right at water level, which leads me to theorize that the doorframe or pins were deformed by the impact of the crash. And upon impact, water immediately came into the cabin; in the three seconds it took me to realize that the door wasn't going to open, the water level was up to my ankles. More adrenaline shot through my body. I reached for the hammer in the armrest compartment, and with two hands swung at the pilot's window. Two whacks with all my strength and there was an eight inch hole. Steam was now coming out of the engine as the nosecone dipped underwater and the cabin tilted forward, so I now remembered to shut down all the switches and turn the fuel selector to off. I ripped the lap board off my leg, reached behind my seat and grabbed one of the two life jackets that's always there. I then clawed apart most of the rest of the window glass (which gave me some cuts and splinters) until the hole was big enough, and climbed out of the cabin. The wings were now slightly under water; I sat down to put on and inflate the lifejacket. I sat on the wing for a minute to survey the situation and collect my thoughts. The closest point to shore was roughly 300 feet away, near the power plant. Several people were already assembled there at a boat launch, and I spotted a police car already driving in that direction. The parachute was flat on the water, mostly on the other side of the plane. I slipped into the water and began swimming to shore. My leg got caught on something: no doubt a line from the parachute. I kicked it free and swam faster and farther away from the plane. Within four minutes of impact, the plane was nose down in the water and sank in 30 feet of water. No fuel leaked out of the plane. In the next ten minutes I kept swimming slowly, but stopped after roughly 150 feet. There was pain in my back and some blood on my left hand. I was getting cold. A Haverstraw Fire Department launch appeared about half a mile away, where the tributary joins the Hudson River. They came up beside me and sloppily pulled me onboard. The pain in my back was now considerable, so I lay down flat across the deck. A moment later the boat docked near the power plant, where an ambulance was waiting to take me to Nyack Hospital. Enroute to the hospital, a police detective sat next to me and took sparse notes of my story. The EMT folks stuck me full of needles for IV and blood tests; my body temperature was 90 degrees, so they wrapped me in more blankets. I felt a hot spot on my rear end; it turned out to be the battery from my cell phone that was overheating from being underwater. We arrived at the hospital and I was wheeled into the trauma part of the emergency room. They immediately cut off all my clothes (losing my keys in the process), poked more needles into me and did a quick check of my limbs and abdomen. I was then sent for a CT scan of my neck and brain; and later for X-rays of the rest of my body. When all the test results were in, the ER doctor came in and told me that my back was broken, and that the orthopedist would be there shortly to explain further. He then left the room, but came back a moment later and casually said: "By the way, did you know that you have a brain tumor? The neurologist will be here soon to explain it some more". * * * * * I walked out of the hospital on Friday afternoon. My back still hurts, mostly from the pressure of the brace that I have to wear for the next four weeks whenever I'm vertical. I'm taking anti-seizure and pain medications and next week will consult with neurosurgeons on what (if anything) to do about the brain tumor. Last night was the first time I was able to sleep through the night without waking up several times, sometimes in a sweat; other times just to cry for ten minutes because I couldn't deal with the emotions of how and why I nearly died, yet somehow managed to survive. * * * * * Unlike other people's descriptions throughout history of near-death experiences, I did not see my life flash before my eyes; a warm glowing light; or any symbols of divine presence. What I saw were stark realities that needed to be dealt with: airspeed, jolts, altitude, fuel farm tanks, water, pain. When the plane crashed and the cabin was underwater, and I couldn't open the door, I sadly thought: "So this is how it ends". But I immediately determined to reject that outcome, grabbed the hammer and clawed my way out. |
There may be some pilots who take off into nasty conditions saying "Heck, I can pull the 'chute if it all goes wrong" but I haven't met any. Would anyone here seriously use the presence of a BRS to change their personal minima? As regards the Cirrus chute pulls, I think people forget just how many of these planes have been sold. At one stage, Cirrus were outselling Cessna, Piper and probably everybody else. There are thousands of them flying. A few are bound to end up in the hands of pilots who are careless; in a Cessna they would have force landed or got killed but in the Cirrus they pull the chute ..... and make the news! The business about spinning has been done to death everywhere and there is no evidence I know of that a Cirrus will not recover from a spin. Almost any conventional plane will recover from a spin. However, one has to stall first, and the only place that is going to happen is on the base to final turn, and there one is much too low to use the chute. I think the chute was basically a marketing decision, which happened to save Cirrus some testing and perhaps aerodynamic compromises to make it recover in the prescribed N turns (like the strakes on the TB and TBM which are reputed to cost a few kt). There is an article describing the Cirrus certification process which is interesting reading - the FAA concluded exactly what I say above: they did a survey and found that the vast majority of stall/spin incidents would not have been recoverable due to insufficient altitude so the traditionalist "must recover from a spin in X turns or less" attitude is misplaced. Cirrus has been a great success - the only real GA success in the last 30-odd years. Socata did quite well in the 1980s but they dropped out in 2002, and they never had a decent piston presence in the USA. Diamond were doing well but now are stuffed on the engine front. Cirrus marketing (like cars) has upset a load of traditionalists who would like to see GA an anorak-only scene. The reality is that there is no money in the old scene anymore. One has to go after fresh blood to make any headway. Flying schools would be well advised to explore the same methods too. Today, an SR20 or 22 is the only logical purchase for an IFR tourer. Personally I would still prefer my TB20 but they don't make them anymore. |
I can't comment much on Cirrus aircraft as I've never flown one, however, I'd be concerned about flying any aircraft that hasn't been tested in a spin? I may have got it wrong and it has been, and is just "not cleared for spinning" like many others ... Surely as most will recover if needs be, advising the use of a chute in such circumstances seems odd? That said, I accept that the chances of getting into a spin in such an aircraft is the smallest risk of danger over the other possibles such as loss of control in IMC.
The account of the water landing is dramatic and very interesting to read. The ellow is obviously intelligent and full of survival spirit. Having a brain seizure must be very scary (even more so in flight) so I'm sure he did what his confused brain told him was correct at the time. If it hadn't been for that though, I'd say to pull a chute having successfully recovered to controlled flight was crazy! the aeroplane may very well have been structurally compromised, but if the wings were still attached and everything worked, a landing would be the only sensible option IMHO. SS |
I'd say to pull a chute having successfully recovered to controlled flight was crazy! I'd be concerned about flying any aircraft that hasn't been tested in a spin? |
The European authorities (initially JAA, later EASA) when first evaluating the Cirrus SR20 agreed with the principles of the FAA/ELOS approach but had some further questions. A series of spins was performed on their initiative. While not a complete formal program they reported no unusual characteristics. Spinning was dropped from the PPL syllabus many years ago - some agree, some dont. The fact is how many pilots would successfully recover from an unintentional spin? Possibly not that many, and that is assuming they have the height in which to do so. I am happy to admit that the first time I went "spinning" I found the experience quite disorientating and I had already done some basic aerobatic training before. Of course with a little time you are aware of what the aircraft is doing and what you need to do - but that is true of many things. d. Following an abused control entry stall controllability demonstration, the aircraft must respond immediately and normally without unreversed use of the controls and without exceeding the temporary control forces specified in § 23.143(c) to regain coordinated unstalled flight. The FAA also determined, as stated in the ELOS, that the probability of high altitude loss of control is very low. In the event that control is lost, the CAPS system provides an effective means to protect the occupants. The departure resistance aspects of the ELOS are primary, but the presence of the CAPS system is an additional risk mitigating feature due to its ability to recover the aircraft in less than 1000 feet. In its presentation to the JAA Sectorial Team on February 26, 2003, the FAA re-stated its philosophy. The primary focus is to prevent departure from controlled flight / spin entry, through three aspects. • First, the FAA found that the enhanced stall handling characteristics are based on the intent of the spin resistance requirements. • Second, the FAA found that the improved departure resistance addresses the real issue driving the accident rate – inadvertent departure from controlled flight – and that this supports the US Department Of Transportation’s safety mandate. • Third, the FAA concluded that the Cirrus wing treatment and handling characteristics are parallel to NASA research. The FAA’s secondary focus of addressing these accidents is the low altitude departure recovery being possible using the CAPS system, The FAA noted that the CAPS system recovers the airplane in the same or less altitude than airplanes in the same class take to recover from the one-turn spin requirement of sec. 23.221. The FAA saw the stall handling characteristics providing the ability to recover from a stall without losing control or entering a spin, and the CAPS system as a second line of defense. (John Colomy, FAA, address to the Sectorial Team on 26 February 2003) JAA Requested Items 1. Provide additional information on SR20 Stall characteristics and Spin behavior. Cirrus engaged in an extensive flight test program to investigate the stall characteristics and spin behavior of the Cirrus SR 20, with over 60 spin entries, and the stall and departure preceding the spin entries. a. Stall Behavior i. Requirements. See above ELOS text for requirements. After this flight test program, Cirrus continues to believe that the standards set in the ELOS are correct. The stall departure standards set for the SR20 simulate realistic inadvertent stall situations. ii. Results. The SR20 meets or exceeds the ELOS requirements in all required configurations. See SR20 TIR for detail on stall results in Appendix 2. The Airplane retains roll control throughout the stall. The airplane can be rolled from 15 degrees of bank in one direction to 15 degrees of bank in the other direction with the stick full back with typical pilot skill. iii. Comments. FAA and JAA test pilots have formally and informally flown the SR20 and agree that the aircraft meets or exceeds the ELOS requirements, is tolerant of slow speed uncoordinated control movements, and provides the pilot with significant time and indications to apply corrections. CRI B-2 Page 4 of 21 b. Spin Behavior i. Test Matrix. A limited investigation of the SR20 spin behavior has been completed and results are contained in Cirrus Design reports 12419, title, and 15568, title. The incipient spin and recovery characteristics were examined during more than 60 total spin entries covering the following configurations. Configuration1 Normal Spins Level Entry C.G. Clean-Power Off Takeoff-Power Off Landing-Power Off Clean-Power On 1 Left & 1 Right 1 Left & 1 Right 1 Left & 1 Right 1 Left & 1 Right Fwd2, Mid, Aft Fwd Fwd Fwd2 1. All spins conducted at gross weight. 2. Also evaluated accelerated entries, 30 degree banked turn entries, and effects of ailerons against the spin direction. ii. Results. The aircraft recovered within one turn in all cases examined. Recovery controls were to reduce power, neutralize ailerons, apply full rudder opposite to spin, and to apply immediate full forward (nose down) pitch control. Altitude loss from spin entry to recovery ranged from 1,200 – 1,800 feet. Detail results can be found in the above referenced reports. iii. Comments. No spin matrix less than that prescribed in AC23-8A or AC23-15, can determine that all configurations are recoverable. It must be assumed that the SR20 has some unrecoverable characteristics. In the SR20 proper execution of recovery control movements is necessary to affect recovery, and aircraft may become unrecoverable with incorrect control inputs. These spins enabled Cirrus to gain additional understanding of both the stall departure characteristics of the airplane and the necessary spin recovery techniques. EASA "recommended" that in the event of an inadvertent spin with sufficient height to recover "normal" spin recovery should be applied for 5 seconds and only IF this is unsuccessful should the chute be deployed. It would appear EASA at least considers that assuming you know what you are doing you have a reasonable chance of a Cirrus recovering from a spin. |
Good discussion...
I still cannot see how one is going to get into a spin - base to final turn excepted - without doing something really careless. Actually there is another way and that is probing the operating ceiling, and as your IAS falls (due to lack of power etc) towards Vs, then you have a stall condition. That would be around FL220 for the SR22. The focus on spins (now removed from the PPL) would have been better spent teaching pilots to fly in a more deliberate fashion... always trim for a specific speed especially when flying below cruise speed (i.e. in the circuit) and be very careful. I was never taught to trim during my PPL training; only afterwards I discovered that the trim really controls the aircraft speed, and how doing it right reduces pilot workload. Also an understanding of how Vs varies with wing loading would help - you can do really steep turns at low speeds if you couple that with unloading the wings during the turn (this means losing height). |
The business about spinning has been done to death everywhere and there is no evidence I know of that a Cirrus will not recover from a spin. Whereas it wasn't demonstrated for certification, you get to be an ad hoc tester if you elect to find out. You might end up actually doing to to death, in that event. Almost any conventional plane will recover from a spin. However, one has to stall first, and the only place that is going to happen is on the base to final turn, and there one is much too low to use the chute. |
What evidence do you know of that the airplane will recover from a spin? I am beginning to wonder if you just have something against Cirrus? From my point of view, I am not suggesting I have the answers to some interesting questions on this thread. However I would far rather consider the evidence than jump to irrational conclusions. I am flying a SR22 but dont have much time on type yet - so I have a vested interest. I am certainly not defending Cirrus because I think they are the best thing out of the box, and I am keeping an open mind. |
I'd say to pull a chute having successfully recovered to controlled flight was crazy! Maybe not if you have just recovered from an unexplained black out and are not feeling 100% - what if it happened again on short final?....I see what you are saying though and had it been an inadvertent unusual attitude I'd have landed it. Having a brain seizure must be very scary (even more so in flight) so I'm sure he did what his confused brain told him was correct at the time. If it hadn't been for that though, I'd say to pull a chute having successfully recovered to controlled flight was crazy! SS |
A 747SP experienced a departure and incipient spin I would in any case be suprised if one could enter a spin prior to departure. Normally one needs to be airborne for a spin to occur (unless it is extremely windy). |
Is it one of the old Cessna twins? ME planes don't have any spin recovery requirements. .......... :):):):) |
Common on, if you are going to take part in the discussion you have to READ the posts before. I have set out what spin testing the JAA / EASA / FAA have done. The testing clearly was not as comprehensive as for an aircraft cleared for intentional spinning but it would seem it was no less comprehensive that many aircraft that are not approved for spinning and dont have a chute. From your post: Test Matrix. A limited investigation of the SR20 spin behavior has been completed and results are contained in Cirrus Design reports 12419, title, and 15568, title. The incipient spin and recovery characteristics were examined during more than 60 total spin entries covering the following configurations. Not recently parked next to one of those, that I recall. Is it one of the old Cessna twins? ME planes don't have any spin recovery requirements. We see that several of the deployments by owners of the Cirrus have occured when they placed themselves in positions to experience upsets in flight, leading to departing controlled flight...one of the reasons that Cirrus advertises their system for use. It seems that a stall and even a spin might also be entered by a light airplane pilot in a CAPS equipped cirrus while in cruise flight...imagine that. The example is relevant after all. |
Oh dear Mr SNS3 I better never fly a 747 ever again.
Where is "DFC" when we need him most? I am sure he would set the record straight in no time at all. We are such a bunch of UN-professionals here. I am sure we need at least TWO professionals to keep us lot in line. |
you'll find that the post upon which you're commenting wasn't made in reply to your statement, but that of IO540. Again, contrary to his assertion that as there is no evidence the aircraft will not recover from a spin, I again offer that there is no evidence that it will. Where do you consider the certification process for the Cirrus departs from other light aircraft NOT certified for spinning? Are you asserting that the work done on the Cirrus falls short of other GA aircraft NOT certified for spinning? I am seeking to establish whether it is your contention that there is clear evidence a Cirrus is any more or less proven in its ability to recover from a spin than any other NON spin certified light aircraft, so we are clear on what it is we are discussing. |
Oh dear Mr SNS3 I better never fly a 747 ever again. And yes, doubtless you'll not find yourself flying for a living. Your attitude would certainly seem to preclude it. Fujiabound, clearly the SR20 didn't exhibit favorable characteristics for spin recovery. Emphasis was placed on stall avoidance and spin prevention, with the use of the parachute as a secondary method to back up a pilot who didn't manage to keep the airplane shiny side up in the first place. In the SR20 proper execution of recovery control movements is necessary to affect recovery, and aircraft may become unrecoverable with incorrect control inputs. Truth is that Cirrus is in the middle of a series of lawsuits right now regarding fatalities which have occured following fatal crashes (and yes, some involved parachute failures). The details of those cases will not be made available until the matters are concluded. Unfortunately a personal friend is embroiled in the matter. That has no bearing on my view on the aircraft or the company. While I was a supporter of Cirrus before they became public, and have always wished Klappmeier and company well, I have also never been silent regarding my distain for their marketing of the parachute system and the effect it has had on an inepxerienced and unwitting market. Nearly overwhelmingly, the attraction to the BRS installation appeals to those with the least experience, and that is telling. |
Fujiabound, clearly the SR20 didn't exhibit favorable characteristics for spin recovery. Emphasis was placed on stall avoidance and spin prevention, with the use of the parachute as a secondary method to back up a pilot who didn't manage to keep the airplane shiny side up in the first place. As I indicated earlier JAA required the POH to be amended such that the pilot should apply standard spin recovery inputs and only in the event recovery was not effected within 60 seconds, or there was insufficient height in the first place, should the chute be deployed. Presumably based on the evidence the JAA felt there was a reasonable probability of the aircraft recovering. You may well be correct that the Cirrus does not exhibit favourable spin recovery characteristics but you still have not explained how you reach this conclusion on the basis of the evidence so far discussed. Truth is that Cirrus is in the middle of a series of lawsuits right now regarding fatalities which have occured following fatal crashes (and yes, some involved parachute failures). The details of those cases will not be made available until the matters are concluded. Unfortunately a personal friend is embroiled in the matter. Nearly overwhelmingly, the attraction to the BRS installation appeals to those with the least experience, and that is telling. I can however think of an analogy. Twins are frequently promoted as being "safer" because of the extra engine. The evidence however is that you are more likely to kill yourself in a twin following an engine failure so it is popular to conclude they are not safer. Of course what everyone forgets is if you give a pilot a tool with the intention of reducing fatalaties but the training is inadequate for him to use that tool correctly then dont be surprised when he kills himself. The corrrect conclusion is that a twin is more dangerous than a single unless the pilot receives adequate and recurrent training in which event a twin is "safer" Another is the MU-2. Its accident record is so poor the FAA has mandated additional training. It would be easy to conclude the aircraft is "unsafe". However the FAA after careful analysis of the evidence has had the sense to avoid this conclusion. Rather they have concluded that the aircraft has some characteristics which requires additional training. Since these requirments were introduced there have been no accidents involving the MU-2. I cant help feel that you are not distinguishing between cause and effect in some of your posts. I would like to be wrong, but unless you can set out the evidence on which you rely more clearly I dont know what else to conclude. |
I dont know what else to conclude. 60 spins were conducted including complete rotations. The spin may not have been fully established but never the less in every case the aircraft recovered using conventional spin recovery. You may well be correct that the Cirrus does not exhibit favourable spin recovery characteristics but you still have not explained how you reach this conclusion on the basis of the evidence so far discussed. You wonder how I came to the conclusion that there is no evidence that the Cirrus will recover from a spin? I responded to the statement "The business about spinning has been done to death everywhere and there is no evidence I know of that a Cirrus will not recover from a spin." The truth is that there is no evidence that it will recover. Cirrus didn't demonstrate it, certify the aircraft for it, and prohibits it. Therefore, there is no basis to believe that it will. In fact, Cirrus left it for the customer to find out, much like it left the first manned parachute deployment to a landing to an inexperienced customer in the field...because it was never done at the factory or by the test program. Go figure. In America there is an expression - if you have had a bad day, poor yourself a good glass of wine and mull over who you can sue. That is not to say there may not be merit in the case(s) but it is not relevant to this discussion other than as a distraction unless you care to share the details of the case. I can however think of an analogy. Twins are frequently promoted as being "safer" because of the extra engine. The evidence however is that you are more likely to kill yourself in a twin following an engine failure so it is popular to conclude they are not safer. Of course what everyone forgets is if you give a pilot a tool with the intention of reducing fatalaties but the training is inadequate for him to use that tool correctly then dont be surprised when he kills himself. The corrrect conclusion is that a twin is more dangerous than a single unless the pilot receives adequate and recurrent training in which event a twin is "safer" The extra engine, if managed correctly, does exist to provide redundant systems support, from additional hydraulic to additional pneumatic, vacum, and electrical power...and the twin can do something else that the single can't...continue flying for an extended distance after an engine failure. An extra engine often enables a light airplane to carry more, usually a little faster, and to climb higher faster. Like any increase in performance and capability, it also requires additional training and preparation...and recurrent, regular training. Another is the MU-2. Its accident record is so poor the FAA has mandated additional training. It would be easy to conclude the aircraft is "unsafe". However the FAA after careful analysis of the evidence has had the sense to avoid this conclusion. Rather they have concluded that the aircraft has some characteristics which requires additional training. Since these requirments were introduced there have been no accidents involving the MU-2. |
I really get conflicted emotions reading this stuff...for fifty five years I had deluded myself in the belief that having more than one engine on an airplane somehow gave me a better safety margin......
......now I read this and my emotions are difficult to describe thinking I had been wrong for all those years. Twins were never intended to be "safer." The concept of the extra engine is an increase in climb performance, as extra thrust equates to climb performance. Richard Collins spearheaded efforts to convince the flying public of any concept that the extra engine represents "safety" beginning back in the 70's, so that's no new concept, and it's been heavily taught as a potential pilot trap for several decades. The extra engine was never there to "reduce fatalities." It's there to boost performance. Then my heart slowed down and I have recovered from some of the shock when I read this. The extra engine, if managed correctly, does exist to provide redundant systems support, from additional hydraulic to additional pneumatic, vacum, and electrical power...and the twin can do something else that the single can't...continue flying for an extended distance after an engine failure. An extra engine often enables a light airplane to carry more, usually a little faster, and to climb higher faster. Like any increase in performance and capability, it also requires additional training and preparation...and recurrent, regular training. For a brief moment I feared I had been living in a time warp and the several times I spent hours flying to an airport on one engine having feathered and shut down an engine were just my imagination and those flights never happened. :E The most rewarding thing about this is the boost to my self confidence I feel knowing that somehow I managed to " manage it correctly " words can not describe my feelings of accomplishment. ;) |
Cor! talk about pick the bits out to make me look like a lummox I don't know what all the fuss about the Cirrus is.....Anyone would think we were discussing the Titanic and not enough life boats. The BRS is just one other option , it could save your life, who knows? I'd like one especially if the wing fell off. The BRS has never killed anyone - bad decisions kill people- but it has saved lives and that is a fact. There are MANY planes out there not certified for spinning (the 747SP for one - which incidentally hit severe turbulence while the crew were not paying attention if I recall corectly), yet I'd still fly one. Aren't most PA28's, the most common training plane "not certified for spins"? What is the reason for this? It is clearly because someone thinks that if you spin one, you may die. In 8 years of flying I have yet to a) unintentionally stall and b) inadvertently enter a spin. Even doing some messed up "aerobatics gone wrong" we still didn't spin. I do my best to avoid any unintential "outside of the flight regime" flight, which is what my training was all about. I'm pretty confident that should I be lucky enough to ever own a Cirrus, that I won't enter an unintenional spin. Unfortunately the USA does have a culture of suing if something happens, mostly because the people who sue know that 9 times out of 10 the company being sued will settle out of court because if they don't they *could* stand to lose 10x that amount and it is not worth the risk or expense of going to court - hot coffee from MacDonalds springs to mind - incidentally at the same time as the "hot coffee" incident (7 mill?) a british chap sued Kellogs over a napalm-hot pop tart which burned him after it came out of the toaster. He won and was awarded £500. Unfortunately this compensation culture is spreading to the UK fast. When selling shares one of the prospective buyers asked the question "who is responsible if I injure myself in the hangar".....We determined that he was not suitable for the group (in answer: you are). |
Chuck
I really get conflicted emotions reading this stuff...for fifty five years I had deluded myself in the belief that having more than one engine on an airplane somehow gave me a better safety margin...... ......now I read this and my emotions are difficult to describe thinking I had been wrong for all those years. Unfortunately the USA does have a culture of suing if something happens Anyways, back to the issue .. .. .. I guess we have stablished that there is no evidence a Cirrus will recover from a fully established spin, but there is no evidence it will not. In short we dont know either way. There is however evidence that it will almost certainly always recover form an incipient spin using standard recovery techniques. Nearly all low level spins are fatal. The ability of the aircraft to recover or the deployment of a chute will not help you. Nearly all spins occur at low level. Recovery from high level spins depend on the ability of the pilot and the aircraft to recover. I have suggested that many pilots would handle a first time spin badly, even if the aircraft was capable of recovering. One could conclude that if the average pilot has not recovered at the incipient stage his chances of survival in any aircraft are already compromised. Cirrus give another option IF conventional and demonstrated recoverability at the incipient stage has failed. In so far as the chute is concerned there is limited evidence that the chute can result in severe injury due to a failure in deployment or due to the trauma on landing. However, the evidence is that these occurences have been extremelly rare. We could conclude that the only relevant debate therefore is whether the chute is on balance an enhancement to safety or not. To make that asessment we have to determine whether the chute has a record of saving more lives than would have been lost. There is one further aspect. Whether the chute encourages pilots to put themselves in situations they would not otherwise do were it not for the chute. For example, if you depart at night in a twin, even if you suffer an engine failure it is very unlikely you are going to meet with the ground again until you elect to do so. With a single, chute or not, if the engine fails you will meet the ground earlier than expected. That meeting does not carry with it a guarantee that you will escape uninjured - although the evidence would suggest your chances are reasonable. Pilots are on the whole not fools. Life is about assessing risk. I know some pilots who would not fly a single over water in the winter without an immersion suit. They realise if they ditch their chances of survival are poor. They equally understand the risk of an engine failure is tiny. One pilot might consider a chute provides sufficient supplementary cover over the risk of an engine failure at night that whilst he wouldnt go without the chute, he would with it. Personally, that would be my assessment. I think when that choice is taken away from us we should give up. I also think we need to go on examining and questioning the evidence always. No one has yet come up with an aircraft that is completley safe - I think Cirrus may have a high performance single that is a little safer than most high performance singles in the hands of a well trained pilot. I would be interested to know if your assessment is different. |
I guess we have stablished that there is no evidence a Cirrus will recover from a fully established spin, but there is no evidence it will not. In short we dont know either way. There is however evidence that it will almost certainly always recover form an incipient spin using standard recovery techniques. Comments. No spin matrix less than that prescribed in AC23-8A or AC23-15, can determine that all configurations are recoverable. It must be assumed that the SR20 has some unrecoverable characteristics. In the SR20 proper execution of recovery control movements is necessary to affect recovery, and aircraft may become unrecoverable with incorrect control inputs. Nearly all spins occur at low level. Pilots are on the whole not fools. Life is about assessing risk. I know some pilots who would not fly a single over water in the winter without an immersion suit. They realise if they ditch their chances of survival are poor. One pilot might consider a chute provides sufficient supplementary cover over the risk of an engine failure at night that whilst he wouldnt go without the chute, he would with it. Personally, that would be my assessment. Some years ago I attended a tanker conference in Reno, Nevada. At that meeting, a representative of the California Department of Forestry stood to give a report on receipt of the new turbine-engine conversions to the CDF S-2 Trackers. Rather than address the added safety provided by the more powerful, more reliable engines, he instead went on about how the airplanes could now fly into deeper holes more impossible places and fly back out. A standard axiom in that business is that one never begins a drop run unless one can complete it without getting rid of the load. One plans to be able to have a safe exit with an engine failure, with a tank that won't drop, etc. The idea that one has more power and therefore places one's self into more precarious positions flies in the face of safety. What he was describing was the ability to increase risk, rather than have a higher safety margin, and he was in error. Much like electing to make a single engine flight at night because one has a panic button parachute on board. If one wouldn't make the flight without it, one shouldn't be enticed into doing so with such a carrot dangling ahead. We have reverse thrust. It can provide shorter stopping distances. However, we don't calculate a rejected takeoff based on it's availablility, nor our stopping distances. It's an added safety tool, but we don't take it for granted, and any use thereof is considered a bonus. If we can't do what we need to do without it, we don't do it. The recovery parachute should be the same way; it should NOT factor into your decision to undertake a given flight or operation. |
Much like electing to make a single engine flight at night because one has a panic button parachute on board. Why not ban seat belts in cars and have an 8" steel spike in the middle of the steering wheel. It would improve the general standard of driving dramatically. |
It would?
Really? |
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