Parachute planes?
Thread Starter
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: Yorkshire
Age: 41
Posts: 691
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Join Date: Oct 2005
Location: USA
Posts: 3,218
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Nearly overwhelmingly the ballistic parachutes and recovery parachutes being put on light airplanes are sold to inexperienced pilots, and in most cases, they don't need to be deployed. In the case of Cirrus, who marketed their airplane largely based on the parachute (CAPS) system, many of the deployments have failed, and most of the ones that have been deployed have been pilots who put themselves in increadibly stupid places (thunderstorm over mountains at night in a single engine airplane flown by an inexperienced non-instrument rated private pilot, etc)...pilots who may very well have been led down the prim path by the belief that the parachute was there to save them from their own stupidity.
Parachutes certainly have their place. I've used them many times, own several, and have been strapped to them for several decades. However, in nearly all cases in light airplanes, their use is misplaced, or overemphasised. Personally, if I have an intact airplane around me, I'm certainly more inclined to fly that down than to attempt to deploy a parachute under which a perfectly flyable airplane exists.
In the video linked, I didn't see an uncontrollable airplane or a spinning airplane. I saw an evasive maneuver in which he apparently struck the tow rope, and immediately shut off his engine (for what reason?) and deployed the parachute. Why?
Parachutes certainly have their place. I've used them many times, own several, and have been strapped to them for several decades. However, in nearly all cases in light airplanes, their use is misplaced, or overemphasised. Personally, if I have an intact airplane around me, I'm certainly more inclined to fly that down than to attempt to deploy a parachute under which a perfectly flyable airplane exists.
In the video linked, I didn't see an uncontrollable airplane or a spinning airplane. I saw an evasive maneuver in which he apparently struck the tow rope, and immediately shut off his engine (for what reason?) and deployed the parachute. Why?
Join Date: Oct 2005
Location: USA
Posts: 3,218
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I don't know if he held a flight instructor certificate, but I don't believe so. I believe you're talking about Albert Kolk, who lost control on autopilot at night in severe turbulence over the mountains with three passengers, after he forgot to swap fuel tanks and a fuel imbalance caused a departure from controlled flight.
I found it interesting that in all the testing Cirrus did, leading to certification of the airplane, they never carried a parachute deployment out to it's eventual conclusion; a touchdown. Not once did they deply a parachute and then stay with the airplane under canopy all the way to the ground. The first ones who did were the customers...who then became unwitting test pilots under live, emergency conditions. Up through July 2005, none of them were successful, either. Kolk was only the second to do it, and actually have it work...and he shouldn't have been there in the first place.
I found it interesting that in all the testing Cirrus did, leading to certification of the airplane, they never carried a parachute deployment out to it's eventual conclusion; a touchdown. Not once did they deply a parachute and then stay with the airplane under canopy all the way to the ground. The first ones who did were the customers...who then became unwitting test pilots under live, emergency conditions. Up through July 2005, none of them were successful, either. Kolk was only the second to do it, and actually have it work...and he shouldn't have been there in the first place.
Join Date: Aug 2003
Location: UK
Posts: 433
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Back to the YouTube video - if the prop stopped because of a snarlup with the rope then why did the pilot need to deploy the parachute ? Am curious because I thought he'd just need to do an emergency engine-off landing (apols if I have this wrong as I'm not a power pilot).
Join Date: May 2001
Location: UK
Posts: 4,631
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
In the case of Cirrus, who marketed their airplane largely based on the parachute (CAPS) system, many of the deployments have failed
Join Date: Feb 2007
Location: Amsterdam
Posts: 4,598
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Back to the YouTube video - if the prop stopped because of a snarlup with the rope then why did the pilot need to deploy the parachute ? Am curious because I thought he'd just need to do an emergency engine-off landing (apols if I have this wrong as I'm not a power pilot).
On the other hand, there must have been a glider field nearby, somewhere. But perhaps not within gliding distance.
Oh well, we weren't there. Very easy to criticize a life-or-death decision from the comfy chair, with full hindsight.
Pompey till I die
Join Date: Nov 2006
Location: Guildford
Age: 51
Posts: 779
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I've always thought that
Personally, if I have an intact airplane around me, I'm certainly more inclined to fly that down than to attempt to deploy a parachute under which a perfectly flyable airplane exists.
With the donkey out, you have some control over where and when you land. I'd much rather take that option.
Although, as has been said, it's easy for me to say that having never experienced an engine failure before....
Join Date: Jun 2003
Location: EuroGA.org
Posts: 13,787
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Few if any Cirrus chute deployments have "failed" but one could argue that many, possibly most, of the situations where the chute was pulled would have been better recovered conventionally.
The unquestionable uses of a chute are
- over forest
- over rough terrain
- anywhere, following loss of control due to aircraft-technical failure
- pilot incapacitation?
- over water
But pulling the chute when over a load of green fields, following an engine failure, is nuts. I also don't get why one of the pulls was done due to a missing aileron. You don't need both ailerons, or indeed any at all.
The unquestionable uses of a chute are
- over forest
- over rough terrain
- anywhere, following loss of control due to aircraft-technical failure
- pilot incapacitation?
- over water
But pulling the chute when over a load of green fields, following an engine failure, is nuts. I also don't get why one of the pulls was done due to a missing aileron. You don't need both ailerons, or indeed any at all.
Join Date: Oct 2005
Location: USA
Posts: 3,218
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
A highly successful, but questionable deployment (and not so untypical)...
http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/...700361_001.pdf
That the occupants survived is largely a matter of luck.
A quick review of a few cirrus caps deployments show that numerous listings involving scars earned in battles in which one should never have fought. From several sources...
Typical descent rate under a round canopy, and considered to be an acceptable descent rate, is 22 feet per second, or in other words, 1320 feet per minute. That's not a soft landing. The aircraft relies upon a crushable seat and structure to take up the impact. One might require structural deformation during a forced landing, one might not. Under the canopy, it's considered part of the process, no matter what.
What about never being there in the first place. Look some of the few deployments listed above. Cirrus would consider most of them a success, and a few may merit the deployment (pilot dies in flight, etc). However, proper preflight and planning would have prevented most of them, and nearly all have been inexperienced pilots going places they shouldn't.
The common arguement is, of course, "isn't it better that they lived?" While I don't presume to decide that, it's better that they never had to be there in the first place.
From the Cirrus Aircraft Flight Manual:
This isn't the first time you've suggested such a thing. However, aside from the flutter issues of an imbalanced control, have you ever attempted to remove one aileron then return to land with rudders alone? Rather presumptive.
Then there's the favorable characteristics of the airplane...not only was it never tested to a landing with the parachute out, but it wasn't tested through one spin. Thus it requires the parachute for spin recovery, reference the aircraft flight manual...
If one intends to operate the aircraft where one should not, and to place one's self in the position of needing it, then one should perhaps deploy it. This is largely a matter of using a last ditch effort to save one's self from one's own stupidity.
I would doubt that most of those using the caps system have ever landed under a round parachute. Having used them myself, including in mountainous areas and in strong winds, I'd have very serious reservations about attempting to deploy one over anything but soft ground (and for those who haven't made a parachute landing into water, think again). Objects suspened under canopies in wind tend to swing, increasing impact forces. As mentioned before, the acceptable descent rate under a military round T-10 type canopy was 22 fps, and the CAPS does around that...about 26 to 27 fps, meaning about 1500 or 1600 feet per minute descent rate. When landing a round canopy on one's feet, it involves rolling and a "parachute landing fall" to prevent injury. I've seen some serious injuries on normal landings, anyway. Without that ability, one needs a structure which can crush around the occupant, which the cirrus does. No wonder Cirrus never tested the deployments right through to a touchdown, with occupants on board...and left that critical function to their customers...who were unable to successfully deploy one until 2002 (even though the CAPS system had been in use since 1998).
I believe I indicated 2005 previously; the first was 2002. Cirrus has continued to have other problems, of course, including control failures, but among other problems have been parachute failures.
Between 2001 and 2006 there were 19 fatal mishaps in cirrus aircraft, with the loss of 39 lives. During the same period, there were 9 CAPS deployments, some of which involved fatalities, some of which resulted in "saves."
Albert Kolk, with a little more research, turns out to be a private pilot, not flight instructor, at the time of his deployment. Cirrus has marketed largely to the non-pilot or inexperienced pilot, trying to create a product with which they can identify. An airplane modeled inside and out like a car, with advanced avionics, and a "safe" parachute. The majority of the mishaps so far haven't been mechanical failure, but pilot error. Not simply a stall-spin on final, but gross judgement errors involving intrument flight, icing, and other conditions in which the aircraft should never have been placed. The parachute has been very successful in selling the aircraft, or helping it sell. It's also very possibly responsible for the decision making process in which pilots go farther into the void than they ought, because they have their golden parachute.
Kolk's mishap report:
http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/reports/air/...p?print_view=1
Interestingly, one of the points noted in that report is that the impact force was light enough to not activate the ELT, which hampered rescue efforts.
http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/...700361_001.pdf
That the occupants survived is largely a matter of luck.
A quick review of a few cirrus caps deployments show that numerous listings involving scars earned in battles in which one should never have fought. From several sources...
October 2002, Texas: VFR departure after maintenance, aileron unhinged due maintenance error. 1,500 feet VFR after maneuvering, first parachute deployment by pilot in a certified production airplane
April 2004, Florida: instrument failure in IFR conditions, confusing instrument behavior, low IMC, departure climb, water in static system; low altitude, 700 feet IMC, prior to disorientation 1 uninjured
April 2004, British Colombia, Canada: VFR night cruise, loss of control, possible autopilot-induced stall, night VFR over mountains, high altitude deployment upon loss of control. landed in scree in mountaneous terrain, skidded backwards 1/4-mile, helicopter extraction via parachute risers
September 2004, California: VFR climb, autopilot-induced stall, rolled inverted, attempted recovery, activated CAPS in VMC before entering IMC above 10,000 feet 2 uninjured
Feb 2005, California, IMC, pilot reported icing at 16,000 over Sierras, high speed descent well above Vne of 204 knots CAPS failed as parachute found separated from airframe, located along track to crash site, high speed impact in mountainous area. 1 fatality
June 2005, New York: IFR on approach to KHPN, pilot incapacitated from brain seizure, loss of conciousness, awoke and recovered from Vne dive, determined numbness and loss of function in legs. Last radar report at 1,600 feet and 190 knots (well above Vpd of 133 knots) Compression fractures of vertebrae.
January 2006, Alabama: loss of control after pilot flew into severe icing, loss of control after pilot flew into icing, report at 9,000 feet in IMC. 3 uninjured
February 2006, South Dakota: pilot reported disorientation shortly after takeoff in instrument conditions, 2 uninjured
August 2006, Indiana: Instrument conditions, parachute deployed 2.5 miles from departure airport, aircraft landed in retention pond, parachute was deployed by a passenger--first deployment by non-pilot--because the pilot passed out, pilot fatality, 3 passengers injured. Parachute did not fully deploy.
September 2006, Colorado: Plane destroyed with 2 fatalities after reports of icing problems at 14,000 feet. A preliminary report from the NTSB contains the sentence "A witness in the area observed a portion of the fuselage being drug by the deployed aircraft recovery parachute."
February 2007, NSW, Australia: Fuel line pressure sensor connection cap separated and loss of pressure stopped the engine. After an approach to a freeway forced landing, CAPS was activated, the rocket fired, but got tangled with the empennage resulting in parachute undeployment. The plane impacted ground in nose down attitude seriously injuring both occupants.
April 2007, Luna, New Mexico: The pilot experienced spatial disorientation following loss of the airspeed indicator. After the terrain warning went off, CAPS was activated and the plane came to rest in a forested area.
August 2007, Nantucket Island, Mass: Two people aboard, one suffered serious injury after their Cirrus made a parachute landing on Nantucket. FAA spokeswoman Holly Baker said the Cirrus aircraft apparently was trying to land at Nantucket under visual flight rules when the weather deteriorated. She said the pilot used the plane's parachute system and the Cirrus made a hard landing, apparently hitting the guy wires of a LORAN tower in the village of Siasconset, about five miles northeast of the Nantucket airport.
April 2004, Florida: instrument failure in IFR conditions, confusing instrument behavior, low IMC, departure climb, water in static system; low altitude, 700 feet IMC, prior to disorientation 1 uninjured
April 2004, British Colombia, Canada: VFR night cruise, loss of control, possible autopilot-induced stall, night VFR over mountains, high altitude deployment upon loss of control. landed in scree in mountaneous terrain, skidded backwards 1/4-mile, helicopter extraction via parachute risers
September 2004, California: VFR climb, autopilot-induced stall, rolled inverted, attempted recovery, activated CAPS in VMC before entering IMC above 10,000 feet 2 uninjured
Feb 2005, California, IMC, pilot reported icing at 16,000 over Sierras, high speed descent well above Vne of 204 knots CAPS failed as parachute found separated from airframe, located along track to crash site, high speed impact in mountainous area. 1 fatality
June 2005, New York: IFR on approach to KHPN, pilot incapacitated from brain seizure, loss of conciousness, awoke and recovered from Vne dive, determined numbness and loss of function in legs. Last radar report at 1,600 feet and 190 knots (well above Vpd of 133 knots) Compression fractures of vertebrae.
January 2006, Alabama: loss of control after pilot flew into severe icing, loss of control after pilot flew into icing, report at 9,000 feet in IMC. 3 uninjured
February 2006, South Dakota: pilot reported disorientation shortly after takeoff in instrument conditions, 2 uninjured
August 2006, Indiana: Instrument conditions, parachute deployed 2.5 miles from departure airport, aircraft landed in retention pond, parachute was deployed by a passenger--first deployment by non-pilot--because the pilot passed out, pilot fatality, 3 passengers injured. Parachute did not fully deploy.
September 2006, Colorado: Plane destroyed with 2 fatalities after reports of icing problems at 14,000 feet. A preliminary report from the NTSB contains the sentence "A witness in the area observed a portion of the fuselage being drug by the deployed aircraft recovery parachute."
February 2007, NSW, Australia: Fuel line pressure sensor connection cap separated and loss of pressure stopped the engine. After an approach to a freeway forced landing, CAPS was activated, the rocket fired, but got tangled with the empennage resulting in parachute undeployment. The plane impacted ground in nose down attitude seriously injuring both occupants.
April 2007, Luna, New Mexico: The pilot experienced spatial disorientation following loss of the airspeed indicator. After the terrain warning went off, CAPS was activated and the plane came to rest in a forested area.
August 2007, Nantucket Island, Mass: Two people aboard, one suffered serious injury after their Cirrus made a parachute landing on Nantucket. FAA spokeswoman Holly Baker said the Cirrus aircraft apparently was trying to land at Nantucket under visual flight rules when the weather deteriorated. She said the pilot used the plane's parachute system and the Cirrus made a hard landing, apparently hitting the guy wires of a LORAN tower in the village of Siasconset, about five miles northeast of the Nantucket airport.
What about never being there in the first place. Look some of the few deployments listed above. Cirrus would consider most of them a success, and a few may merit the deployment (pilot dies in flight, etc). However, proper preflight and planning would have prevented most of them, and nearly all have been inexperienced pilots going places they shouldn't.
The common arguement is, of course, "isn't it better that they lived?" While I don't presume to decide that, it's better that they never had to be there in the first place.
From the Cirrus Aircraft Flight Manual:
Warning: CAPS deployment is expected to result in loss of the airframe
and, depending upon adverse external factors such as high
deployment speed, low altitude, rough terrain or high wind
conditions, may result in severe injury or death to the
occupants. Because of this, CAPS should only be activated
when any other means of handling the emergency would not
protect the occupants from serious injury.
and, depending upon adverse external factors such as high
deployment speed, low altitude, rough terrain or high wind
conditions, may result in severe injury or death to the
occupants. Because of this, CAPS should only be activated
when any other means of handling the emergency would not
protect the occupants from serious injury.
If an aileron fell off (which happened once, IIRC) I would fly using the rudder, and go to some place with a big runway. One doesn't need ailerons to fly a plane.
Then there's the favorable characteristics of the airplane...not only was it never tested to a landing with the parachute out, but it wasn't tested through one spin. Thus it requires the parachute for spin recovery, reference the aircraft flight manual...
• Note • Because the SR20 has not been certified for spin recovery, the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) must be deployed if the airplane departs controlled flight.
I would doubt that most of those using the caps system have ever landed under a round parachute. Having used them myself, including in mountainous areas and in strong winds, I'd have very serious reservations about attempting to deploy one over anything but soft ground (and for those who haven't made a parachute landing into water, think again). Objects suspened under canopies in wind tend to swing, increasing impact forces. As mentioned before, the acceptable descent rate under a military round T-10 type canopy was 22 fps, and the CAPS does around that...about 26 to 27 fps, meaning about 1500 or 1600 feet per minute descent rate. When landing a round canopy on one's feet, it involves rolling and a "parachute landing fall" to prevent injury. I've seen some serious injuries on normal landings, anyway. Without that ability, one needs a structure which can crush around the occupant, which the cirrus does. No wonder Cirrus never tested the deployments right through to a touchdown, with occupants on board...and left that critical function to their customers...who were unable to successfully deploy one until 2002 (even though the CAPS system had been in use since 1998).
I believe I indicated 2005 previously; the first was 2002. Cirrus has continued to have other problems, of course, including control failures, but among other problems have been parachute failures.
Between 2001 and 2006 there were 19 fatal mishaps in cirrus aircraft, with the loss of 39 lives. During the same period, there were 9 CAPS deployments, some of which involved fatalities, some of which resulted in "saves."
Albert Kolk, with a little more research, turns out to be a private pilot, not flight instructor, at the time of his deployment. Cirrus has marketed largely to the non-pilot or inexperienced pilot, trying to create a product with which they can identify. An airplane modeled inside and out like a car, with advanced avionics, and a "safe" parachute. The majority of the mishaps so far haven't been mechanical failure, but pilot error. Not simply a stall-spin on final, but gross judgement errors involving intrument flight, icing, and other conditions in which the aircraft should never have been placed. The parachute has been very successful in selling the aircraft, or helping it sell. It's also very possibly responsible for the decision making process in which pilots go farther into the void than they ought, because they have their golden parachute.
Kolk's mishap report:
http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/reports/air/...p?print_view=1
Interestingly, one of the points noted in that report is that the impact force was light enough to not activate the ELT, which hampered rescue efforts.
Join Date: Jun 2003
Location: EuroGA.org
Posts: 13,787
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
"flutter issues of an imbalanced control"
??
One doesn't need the other aileron to suppress flutter; that is done on each aileron separately. It would not work anyway, due to control linkage distance/flexibility.
??
One doesn't need the other aileron to suppress flutter; that is done on each aileron separately. It would not work anyway, due to control linkage distance/flexibility.
Join Date: Oct 2005
Location: USA
Posts: 3,218
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Actually, no. While each control should be balanced, you have a high probability of flutter when it's allowed to freefloat, and at lesser speeds than the intact flutter analysis might predict.
Further, the detatching aileron may well destroy the aircraft on it's own.
Further, the detatching aileron may well destroy the aircraft on it's own.
Join Date: May 2001
Location: UK
Posts: 4,631
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
SNS3GUPPY
This was your original assertion.
At face value it could “imply” the deployment of the parachute had failed. On the basis of your subsequent post there seems to be perhaps two cases out of nine were the deployment was partially successful. I don’t think we have reliable evidence whether the parachute was deployed within the limiting speed.
So in this period (five years) there was apparently 9 deployments - just under two a year worldwide, involving three fatalities of which in one case there would appear to be evidence that the chute was deployed well above the limiting speed. That would appear to suggest there were 2 fatalities that arose from parachute deployment and a few people who suffered some degree of injury worse that the odd scratch.
On the basis of the evidence you have presented I think your first assertion was, to say the least sweeping, since two hardly constitutes “many” and your second statement is at best sensationalist because it implies the loss of 39 lives might be connected with the chute, whereas in fact it would seem at most only 2 lives were lost following chute deployment within the limiting speed. In one of the two cases there is apparently no evidence in either direction on the basis of your post that the chute was correctly deployed.
I am not saying your assertions are wrong. I am genuinely interested in the factual evidence surrounding the likelihood of serious injury after chute deployment within the limiting speed.
I don’t think conclusions that are not based on the evidence will get us very far.
Whether or not the chute should be used is another debate I would agree.
In the case of Cirrus, who marketed their airplane largely based on the parachute (CAPS) system, many of the deployments have failed.
At face value it could “imply” the deployment of the parachute had failed. On the basis of your subsequent post there seems to be perhaps two cases out of nine were the deployment was partially successful. I don’t think we have reliable evidence whether the parachute was deployed within the limiting speed.
Between 2001 and 2006 there were 19 fatal mishaps in cirrus aircraft, with the loss of 39 lives. During the same period, there were 9 CAPS deployments, some of which involved fatalities, some of which resulted in "saves.
So in this period (five years) there was apparently 9 deployments - just under two a year worldwide, involving three fatalities of which in one case there would appear to be evidence that the chute was deployed well above the limiting speed. That would appear to suggest there were 2 fatalities that arose from parachute deployment and a few people who suffered some degree of injury worse that the odd scratch.
On the basis of the evidence you have presented I think your first assertion was, to say the least sweeping, since two hardly constitutes “many” and your second statement is at best sensationalist because it implies the loss of 39 lives might be connected with the chute, whereas in fact it would seem at most only 2 lives were lost following chute deployment within the limiting speed. In one of the two cases there is apparently no evidence in either direction on the basis of your post that the chute was correctly deployed.
I am not saying your assertions are wrong. I am genuinely interested in the factual evidence surrounding the likelihood of serious injury after chute deployment within the limiting speed.
I don’t think conclusions that are not based on the evidence will get us very far.
Whether or not the chute should be used is another debate I would agree.
Join Date: Jan 2001
Location: In the boot of my car!
Posts: 5,982
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I actually wonder whether the shute is more of a comfort zone for passengers in the same way as a second engine on a light twin?
Take a typical scenario. A pilot takes his wife and kids for a flight. If anything happens to him unlike in a car where he hits the brakes and 2 seconds later is parked up on the hardshoulder, In a plane he maybe IMC at altitude and 60 miles from the nearest airport.
What do his family do? At least with the chute they have an option without they die.
Mid air collision the same.
At night over mountains the same.
Serious icing the same.
The chute should be a last resort for a serious situation.
The trouble with a Chute is the false sense of security it instills in pilots. False sense of security means that they will fly in conditions which are out of their ability because they think that if it all goes pear shaped all they have to do is pull the chute.
Something else I was told is that deploying the chute over water is a killer or paryliser. The undercarriage is an integral part of the vertical speed cushion.ie it takes up a lot of the vertical speed impact as do the seats.
Land in water and the the undercarriage impact absorbtion is non existant so you are unlikely to ever walk away again.
Pace
Take a typical scenario. A pilot takes his wife and kids for a flight. If anything happens to him unlike in a car where he hits the brakes and 2 seconds later is parked up on the hardshoulder, In a plane he maybe IMC at altitude and 60 miles from the nearest airport.
What do his family do? At least with the chute they have an option without they die.
Mid air collision the same.
At night over mountains the same.
Serious icing the same.
The chute should be a last resort for a serious situation.
The trouble with a Chute is the false sense of security it instills in pilots. False sense of security means that they will fly in conditions which are out of their ability because they think that if it all goes pear shaped all they have to do is pull the chute.
Something else I was told is that deploying the chute over water is a killer or paryliser. The undercarriage is an integral part of the vertical speed cushion.ie it takes up a lot of the vertical speed impact as do the seats.
Land in water and the the undercarriage impact absorbtion is non existant so you are unlikely to ever walk away again.
Pace
Registered User **
Join Date: Jan 2007
Location: Hong Kong
Age: 52
Posts: 103
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The unquestionable uses of a chute are
- over forest
- over rough terrain
- anywhere, following loss of control due to aircraft-technical failure
- pilot incapacitation?
- over water
- over forest
- over rough terrain
- anywhere, following loss of control due to aircraft-technical failure
- pilot incapacitation?
- over water
Best,
Sicknote
Join Date: Jun 2003
Location: EuroGA.org
Posts: 13,787
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Yes, it's debatable. However, chute landing on the water is 100% sure to work, whereas ditching is certainly not 100%.
We don't have much data on the BRS usage over water e.g. it could be that bloke had a bad back to start with.
One thing I would add to my list is: engine failure at night.
I'd have a BRS chute but the weight penalty is not insignificant - of the order of 50kg I think. Still, as people get more and more obese, it becomes less significant
We don't have much data on the BRS usage over water e.g. it could be that bloke had a bad back to start with.
One thing I would add to my list is: engine failure at night.
I'd have a BRS chute but the weight penalty is not insignificant - of the order of 50kg I think. Still, as people get more and more obese, it becomes less significant
Join Date: Mar 2000
Location: Bath
Posts: 243
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The trouble with a Chute is the false sense of security it instills in pilots. False sense of security means that they will fly in conditions which are out of their ability because they think that if it all goes pear shaped all they have to do is pull the chute.
Ian
Last edited by IanSeager; 1st Jul 2008 at 07:27.
Join Date: May 2001
Location: UK
Posts: 4,631
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I am not yet sure how many "pulls" there have been over water but here is one account.
It is clear the pilot suffered some vertebrae compression, but it would seem he has not lost any function in consequence.
We can only speculate that the pilot would not have survived without a chute because of his physical incapacity before the "pull".
We can also only speculate on the outcome if in spite of his physical incapacity he had remained in control and performed a ditch. Perhaps he might have suffered less injury.
I suspect in any landing on water a factor will be the sea state. Having done some float flying detecting the surface of the water in very carm conditions is difficult even with experience. Flaring too high or low could well result in the same outcome. Equally, in rough conditions landing into the swell (which of course ideally you should avoided) will result in severe deceleration, where as presumably the chute landing might result in less deceleration in these conditions given that the swell may spread the deceleration. We might speculate that a forced landing into a light sea state well handled might result in less physical injury than deploying the chute in the same conditions.
Whether there is any evidence to support any of this I don’t know - it might be pure speculation on my part.
It is clear the pilot suffered some vertebrae compression, but it would seem he has not lost any function in consequence.
We can only speculate that the pilot would not have survived without a chute because of his physical incapacity before the "pull".
We can also only speculate on the outcome if in spite of his physical incapacity he had remained in control and performed a ditch. Perhaps he might have suffered less injury.
I suspect in any landing on water a factor will be the sea state. Having done some float flying detecting the surface of the water in very carm conditions is difficult even with experience. Flaring too high or low could well result in the same outcome. Equally, in rough conditions landing into the swell (which of course ideally you should avoided) will result in severe deceleration, where as presumably the chute landing might result in less deceleration in these conditions given that the swell may spread the deceleration. We might speculate that a forced landing into a light sea state well handled might result in less physical injury than deploying the chute in the same conditions.
Whether there is any evidence to support any of this I don’t know - it might be pure speculation on my part.
Thanks for the huge outpouring of support, good wishes and prayers from my
friends. I was deeply touched by everyone's sentiments, whether from
reading the COPA website, listening to voice mails or reading emails. I
will try to answer each person individually, but please understand if I
don't.
I am writing to answer the common questions on everyone's mind and to
attempt to organize my own thoughts and emotions after having gone through
a very traumatic ordeal.
Many lessons can be learned from my experience of surviving an airplane
crash, including:
Don't trust anything the news media publishes. Various inaccurate and
misleading reports had me: inexplicably parachuting out of a plane that
already had its own parachute; losing control in a dive; coming dangerously
close to a nuclear reactor; and activating the chute because of mechanical
problems. None of these is true.
Practice, practice and more practice. Maneuvers like recovery from unusual
attitudes, deploying the parachute, shutting down the plane after any
emergency, should be instinctive. Quite simply, when things go awry
there's no time to consult a checklist or the pilot's operating handbook
(POH). While in retrospect I didn't do everything right, I did get all of
the important stuff right.
Don't fly a single engine plane that isn't equipped with a
parachute. Although the chances of actually encountering an emergency
situation that is worthy of "pulling the chute" are probably small to
infinitesimal over the course of any given pilot's career, the penalty for
not having a parachute is almost certain death. Each pilot has to
establish and evaluate their own risk assessment criteria, but for me
something that has a greater than 50% risk of death, even if only 1% of the
time, is an unacceptable risk. That's why I bought a Cirrus in the first
place.
* * * * *
Before I describe in minute detail what happened, here's a brief
summary. On the afternoon of Thursday, June 30 I was incapacitated by a
short seizure while being vectored for an instrument approach. When I
became alert again, the plane was descending at 204 knots, which is faster
than redline speed. Following normal procedure I was able to recover from
this unusual attitude; an instant later I chose to activate the
parachute. On the descent, I steered the plane clear of a fuel tank farm,
and crash-landed into the water near Haverstraw, NY.
My injuries are more severe than the "cuts on the hand" described in the
press. First, my back was broken by the impact of crashing into the
water. Thankfully I retain full body function and have every reason to
expect a complete recovery after wearing a brace for the next
month. Second, I have a benign brain tumor, which has been growing
undetected in the middle of my brain for many years and was apparently the
cause of the brief seizure in-flight. Thankfully the tumor does not affect
my mental facilities in any way, and the risk of future seizures is now
being controlled by medication. In the coming weeks I will be discussing
treatment options with various specialists: these include surgery or doing
nothing. In either event, it is fairly certain that my flying days are
over.
* * * * *
Now for the details..
I departed Lincoln Park, NJ at approximately 4:20 pm. My plane was there
for two weeks for its regular 50 hour inspection and an assortment of
squawks, including new spark plugs after 400 hours, replacement of the
broken shear coupling on Alt 2, cosmetic work on the leading edges and
wheel pants, and a new fuel sender unit and gauge. The last item required
emptying the tanks and then refilling them so that the new fuel gauge could
be properly calibrated. This exercise introduces air into the fuel lines,
so we spent a lot of time running the engine on the ground to ensure that
all the air was gone.
The destination was my home base at Westchester County Airport, NY
(HPN): 35 miles and 12 minutes as the SR22 crow flies. Notwithstanding
the short distance, I filed an IFR flight plan because the weather was hazy
and the weather forecast for HPN was predicting temporary cloud buildups
starting at 2,000 feet. As I climbed through 800 feet I contacted NY air
traffic control and picked up my clearance: V39 BREZY intersection, Carmel
VOR, direct; 3,000 feet. In quick succession I was handed off to the next
controller, and coming up at BREZY intersection I was told to expect the
ILS 16 approach at HPN. After BREZY intersection I was handed off again,
and that controller started to give me vectors for the final approach
course: fly a heading of 080 degrees and maintain 3,000 feet. A few
moments later I was instructed to turn an additional 20 degrees to the left
and maintain 3,000 feet. Incidentally, the visibility in the air was only
2-5 miles, so the decision to file IFR was certainly prudent.
As I came out of the turn to 060 degrees, I noted that my altitude had
slipped to 2,840 feet while I was busy changing frequencies, turning and
loading the approach procedure into the Garmin. Apparently the plane was
not trimmed properly, and I concentrated on climbing back up to 3,000 feet,
while continuing my scan and noting that everything was running just
fine. Indicated airspeed was 160 knots, which is normal for the cruise
power setting then in use. Then I blacked out for a period that I now
estimate as being 5-10 seconds.
When I became alert again, I scanned the instruments and was stunned to see
the airspeed indicator showing 204 knots indicated; the attitude indicator
showing the nose below the horizon; and the altimeter scrolling down
quickly toward 1,900 feet. I also realized that my right leg was weak, and
that the controller was calling, asking what happened to my altitude. For
non-pilots, the redline threshold is also known as the "never exceed"
speed, because the airframe was not designed to retain structural integrity
above that number. In other words, the wings can break off at any moment.
Adrenaline shot through my body as I quickly and methodically executed the
procedure for recovering from this unusual attitude: level the wings,
decrease power, and carefully lift the nose to avoid any further stresses
on the airframe. While accomplishing this I concentrated almost entirely
on the attitude indicator, and after a few seconds I was satisfied that the
loss of altitude had been reversed at roughly 1,700 feet above the
ground. I did not see the airspeed, although I knew instinctively that it
was out of the red zone. After a fraction of a second of thought, I then
activated the parachute. The factors that led me to this decision
included: no desire to proceed any further into marginal weather; concern
over the loss of altitude; concern that the plane's structural integrity
was compromised by the high speed descent and recovery; and concern that
the weakness in my right leg might hinder my ability to control the plane
down to the runway.
My parachute experience was quite different from what fellow COPA member
Bill Graham described last month at M3. I heard the rocket launch and
briefly smelled its fumes. A few seconds later I heard a loud, ripping
sound as the parachute reached full deployment. I then felt a tremendous
jolt*worse than any turbulence that I've experienced*as the parachute
billowed open and caused the plane to decelerate. The POH advises 130
knots indicated as the highest deployment speed for the parachute; but I
have no idea what the airspeed was in my situation. I suspect it was
somewhere above 130 knots based on the very different experiences that Bill
and I had.
This jolt tilted the airplane downward as the parachute established a level
position; it also threw my headphone and glasses in various directions, and
caused my head to hit the ceiling near the visor. I have a very small bump
to show for it; but that was the only injury from the parachute
deployment. In my opinion the seatbelt retraction system and the parachute
worked exceptionally well under the circumstances.
After finding the headphone and realizing that the plane was now level at
roughly 900 feet above the ground and descending straight down under the
canopy, the first thing I did was call the controller on the existing
frequency: I had no time to switch to 121.5; and saw no point in doing so
since the controller was already urgently asking what was going on. I said
"Mayday, mayday, 52 Lima here, pulled the parachute near the Hudson
River." I believe that the second thing I did was punch in 7700 on the
transponder, although I later learned that my plane was already below radar
coverage. Inexplicably, I did not pull the mixture back to idle, as
advised by the POH, and left the power lever just below the detent (roughly
19 inches MP). In the next minute this would prove to be an invaluable
deviation from what the POH requires.
I looked out the window and saw that the plane was descending directly over
a fuel tank farm for the nearby conventional power station (incidentally,
Indian Point, which is a nuclear reactor, is located on the other side of
the river, 5.-8 miles upstream, and away from the vectors for the ILS 16
approach course). This was now the scariest part of the flight: worse
than emerging from a seizure to find the plane in a high-speed descent,
because I already knew from training how to handle that situation. But
there is no advice in the POH on how to control the plane once the
parachute has been deployed.
Now everything happened at warp speed. I called the controller again and
said "Mayday, 52 Lima is descending directly over the fuel tanks". No
response; and besides, there was nothing the controller could do to help
me. I then used "all available resources" to change that outcome: I
applied right aileron and rudder, and rocked the power lever to make sure
that the engine still had power. These actions caused the plane to gently
veer away from the tank farm and over the water: Bowline Creek, a very
wide, calm tributary to the Hudson River near the town of Haverstraw, NY, a
few miles north of Nyack and the Tappan Zee Bridge.
An instant later the plane crashed straight down into the water, which both
then and now I consider to be the lesser of two evils. It was like a
massive belly flop. This was now the second, scary part of the flight, as
water splashed up almost to the top of the windows. Because I landed in
water rather than solid ground, the gear did not absorb much of the
impact. Instead, the wings and seat did all the work. It was at this
point that the fourth lumbar vertebrae in my back cracked and compressed
from the impact of the crash.
Then came the very worst part: I could not open the door. The wings were
now sitting right at water level, which leads me to theorize that the
doorframe or pins were deformed by the impact of the crash. And upon
impact, water immediately came into the cabin; in the three seconds it took
me to realize that the door wasn't going to open, the water level was up to
my ankles. More adrenaline shot through my body. I reached for the hammer
in the armrest compartment, and with two hands swung at the pilot's
window. Two whacks with all my strength and there was an eight inch
hole. Steam was now coming out of the engine as the nosecone dipped
underwater and the cabin tilted forward, so I now remembered to shut down
all the switches and turn the fuel selector to off. I ripped the lap board
off my leg, reached behind my seat and grabbed one of the two life jackets
that's always there. I then clawed apart most of the rest of the window
glass (which gave me some cuts and splinters) until the hole was big
enough, and climbed out of the cabin. The wings were now slightly under
water; I sat down to put on and inflate the lifejacket.
I sat on the wing for a minute to survey the situation and collect my
thoughts. The closest point to shore was roughly 300 feet away, near the
power plant. Several people were already assembled there at a boat launch,
and I spotted a police car already driving in that direction. The
parachute was flat on the water, mostly on the other side of the plane. I
slipped into the water and began swimming to shore. My leg got caught on
something: no doubt a line from the parachute. I kicked it free and swam
faster and farther away from the plane. Within four minutes of impact, the
plane was nose down in the water and sank in 30 feet of water. No fuel
leaked out of the plane. In the next ten minutes I kept swimming slowly,
but stopped after roughly 150 feet. There was pain in my back and some
blood on my left hand. I was getting cold. A Haverstraw Fire Department
launch appeared about half a mile away, where the tributary joins the
Hudson River. They came up beside me and sloppily pulled me onboard. The
pain in my back was now considerable, so I lay down flat across the
deck. A moment later the boat docked near the power plant, where an
ambulance was waiting to take me to Nyack Hospital.
Enroute to the hospital, a police detective sat next to me and took sparse
notes of my story. The EMT folks stuck me full of needles for IV and blood
tests; my body temperature was 90 degrees, so they wrapped me in more
blankets. I felt a hot spot on my rear end; it turned out to be the
battery from my cell phone that was overheating from being underwater. We
arrived at the hospital and I was wheeled into the trauma part of the
emergency room. They immediately cut off all my clothes (losing my keys in
the process), poked more needles into me and did a quick check of my limbs
and abdomen. I was then sent for a CT scan of my neck and brain; and later
for X-rays of the rest of my body.
When all the test results were in, the ER doctor came in and told me that
my back was broken, and that the orthopedist would be there shortly to
explain further. He then left the room, but came back a moment later and
casually said: "By the way, did you know that you have a brain tumor? The
neurologist will be here soon to explain it some more".
* * * * *
I walked out of the hospital on Friday afternoon. My back still hurts,
mostly from the pressure of the brace that I have to wear for the next four
weeks whenever I'm vertical. I'm taking anti-seizure and pain medications
and next week will consult with neurosurgeons on what (if anything) to do
about the brain tumor.
Last night was the first time I was able to sleep through the night without
waking up several times, sometimes in a sweat; other times just to cry for
ten minutes because I couldn't deal with the emotions of how and why I
nearly died, yet somehow managed to survive.
* * * * *
Unlike other people's descriptions throughout history of near-death
experiences, I did not see my life flash before my eyes; a warm glowing
light; or any symbols of divine presence. What I saw were stark realities
that needed to be dealt with: airspeed, jolts, altitude, fuel farm tanks,
water, pain.
When the plane crashed and the cabin was underwater, and I couldn't open
the door, I sadly thought: "So this is how it ends". But I immediately
determined to reject that outcome, grabbed the hammer and clawed my way out.
friends. I was deeply touched by everyone's sentiments, whether from
reading the COPA website, listening to voice mails or reading emails. I
will try to answer each person individually, but please understand if I
don't.
I am writing to answer the common questions on everyone's mind and to
attempt to organize my own thoughts and emotions after having gone through
a very traumatic ordeal.
Many lessons can be learned from my experience of surviving an airplane
crash, including:
Don't trust anything the news media publishes. Various inaccurate and
misleading reports had me: inexplicably parachuting out of a plane that
already had its own parachute; losing control in a dive; coming dangerously
close to a nuclear reactor; and activating the chute because of mechanical
problems. None of these is true.
Practice, practice and more practice. Maneuvers like recovery from unusual
attitudes, deploying the parachute, shutting down the plane after any
emergency, should be instinctive. Quite simply, when things go awry
there's no time to consult a checklist or the pilot's operating handbook
(POH). While in retrospect I didn't do everything right, I did get all of
the important stuff right.
Don't fly a single engine plane that isn't equipped with a
parachute. Although the chances of actually encountering an emergency
situation that is worthy of "pulling the chute" are probably small to
infinitesimal over the course of any given pilot's career, the penalty for
not having a parachute is almost certain death. Each pilot has to
establish and evaluate their own risk assessment criteria, but for me
something that has a greater than 50% risk of death, even if only 1% of the
time, is an unacceptable risk. That's why I bought a Cirrus in the first
place.
* * * * *
Before I describe in minute detail what happened, here's a brief
summary. On the afternoon of Thursday, June 30 I was incapacitated by a
short seizure while being vectored for an instrument approach. When I
became alert again, the plane was descending at 204 knots, which is faster
than redline speed. Following normal procedure I was able to recover from
this unusual attitude; an instant later I chose to activate the
parachute. On the descent, I steered the plane clear of a fuel tank farm,
and crash-landed into the water near Haverstraw, NY.
My injuries are more severe than the "cuts on the hand" described in the
press. First, my back was broken by the impact of crashing into the
water. Thankfully I retain full body function and have every reason to
expect a complete recovery after wearing a brace for the next
month. Second, I have a benign brain tumor, which has been growing
undetected in the middle of my brain for many years and was apparently the
cause of the brief seizure in-flight. Thankfully the tumor does not affect
my mental facilities in any way, and the risk of future seizures is now
being controlled by medication. In the coming weeks I will be discussing
treatment options with various specialists: these include surgery or doing
nothing. In either event, it is fairly certain that my flying days are
over.
* * * * *
Now for the details..
I departed Lincoln Park, NJ at approximately 4:20 pm. My plane was there
for two weeks for its regular 50 hour inspection and an assortment of
squawks, including new spark plugs after 400 hours, replacement of the
broken shear coupling on Alt 2, cosmetic work on the leading edges and
wheel pants, and a new fuel sender unit and gauge. The last item required
emptying the tanks and then refilling them so that the new fuel gauge could
be properly calibrated. This exercise introduces air into the fuel lines,
so we spent a lot of time running the engine on the ground to ensure that
all the air was gone.
The destination was my home base at Westchester County Airport, NY
(HPN): 35 miles and 12 minutes as the SR22 crow flies. Notwithstanding
the short distance, I filed an IFR flight plan because the weather was hazy
and the weather forecast for HPN was predicting temporary cloud buildups
starting at 2,000 feet. As I climbed through 800 feet I contacted NY air
traffic control and picked up my clearance: V39 BREZY intersection, Carmel
VOR, direct; 3,000 feet. In quick succession I was handed off to the next
controller, and coming up at BREZY intersection I was told to expect the
ILS 16 approach at HPN. After BREZY intersection I was handed off again,
and that controller started to give me vectors for the final approach
course: fly a heading of 080 degrees and maintain 3,000 feet. A few
moments later I was instructed to turn an additional 20 degrees to the left
and maintain 3,000 feet. Incidentally, the visibility in the air was only
2-5 miles, so the decision to file IFR was certainly prudent.
As I came out of the turn to 060 degrees, I noted that my altitude had
slipped to 2,840 feet while I was busy changing frequencies, turning and
loading the approach procedure into the Garmin. Apparently the plane was
not trimmed properly, and I concentrated on climbing back up to 3,000 feet,
while continuing my scan and noting that everything was running just
fine. Indicated airspeed was 160 knots, which is normal for the cruise
power setting then in use. Then I blacked out for a period that I now
estimate as being 5-10 seconds.
When I became alert again, I scanned the instruments and was stunned to see
the airspeed indicator showing 204 knots indicated; the attitude indicator
showing the nose below the horizon; and the altimeter scrolling down
quickly toward 1,900 feet. I also realized that my right leg was weak, and
that the controller was calling, asking what happened to my altitude. For
non-pilots, the redline threshold is also known as the "never exceed"
speed, because the airframe was not designed to retain structural integrity
above that number. In other words, the wings can break off at any moment.
Adrenaline shot through my body as I quickly and methodically executed the
procedure for recovering from this unusual attitude: level the wings,
decrease power, and carefully lift the nose to avoid any further stresses
on the airframe. While accomplishing this I concentrated almost entirely
on the attitude indicator, and after a few seconds I was satisfied that the
loss of altitude had been reversed at roughly 1,700 feet above the
ground. I did not see the airspeed, although I knew instinctively that it
was out of the red zone. After a fraction of a second of thought, I then
activated the parachute. The factors that led me to this decision
included: no desire to proceed any further into marginal weather; concern
over the loss of altitude; concern that the plane's structural integrity
was compromised by the high speed descent and recovery; and concern that
the weakness in my right leg might hinder my ability to control the plane
down to the runway.
My parachute experience was quite different from what fellow COPA member
Bill Graham described last month at M3. I heard the rocket launch and
briefly smelled its fumes. A few seconds later I heard a loud, ripping
sound as the parachute reached full deployment. I then felt a tremendous
jolt*worse than any turbulence that I've experienced*as the parachute
billowed open and caused the plane to decelerate. The POH advises 130
knots indicated as the highest deployment speed for the parachute; but I
have no idea what the airspeed was in my situation. I suspect it was
somewhere above 130 knots based on the very different experiences that Bill
and I had.
This jolt tilted the airplane downward as the parachute established a level
position; it also threw my headphone and glasses in various directions, and
caused my head to hit the ceiling near the visor. I have a very small bump
to show for it; but that was the only injury from the parachute
deployment. In my opinion the seatbelt retraction system and the parachute
worked exceptionally well under the circumstances.
After finding the headphone and realizing that the plane was now level at
roughly 900 feet above the ground and descending straight down under the
canopy, the first thing I did was call the controller on the existing
frequency: I had no time to switch to 121.5; and saw no point in doing so
since the controller was already urgently asking what was going on. I said
"Mayday, mayday, 52 Lima here, pulled the parachute near the Hudson
River." I believe that the second thing I did was punch in 7700 on the
transponder, although I later learned that my plane was already below radar
coverage. Inexplicably, I did not pull the mixture back to idle, as
advised by the POH, and left the power lever just below the detent (roughly
19 inches MP). In the next minute this would prove to be an invaluable
deviation from what the POH requires.
I looked out the window and saw that the plane was descending directly over
a fuel tank farm for the nearby conventional power station (incidentally,
Indian Point, which is a nuclear reactor, is located on the other side of
the river, 5.-8 miles upstream, and away from the vectors for the ILS 16
approach course). This was now the scariest part of the flight: worse
than emerging from a seizure to find the plane in a high-speed descent,
because I already knew from training how to handle that situation. But
there is no advice in the POH on how to control the plane once the
parachute has been deployed.
Now everything happened at warp speed. I called the controller again and
said "Mayday, 52 Lima is descending directly over the fuel tanks". No
response; and besides, there was nothing the controller could do to help
me. I then used "all available resources" to change that outcome: I
applied right aileron and rudder, and rocked the power lever to make sure
that the engine still had power. These actions caused the plane to gently
veer away from the tank farm and over the water: Bowline Creek, a very
wide, calm tributary to the Hudson River near the town of Haverstraw, NY, a
few miles north of Nyack and the Tappan Zee Bridge.
An instant later the plane crashed straight down into the water, which both
then and now I consider to be the lesser of two evils. It was like a
massive belly flop. This was now the second, scary part of the flight, as
water splashed up almost to the top of the windows. Because I landed in
water rather than solid ground, the gear did not absorb much of the
impact. Instead, the wings and seat did all the work. It was at this
point that the fourth lumbar vertebrae in my back cracked and compressed
from the impact of the crash.
Then came the very worst part: I could not open the door. The wings were
now sitting right at water level, which leads me to theorize that the
doorframe or pins were deformed by the impact of the crash. And upon
impact, water immediately came into the cabin; in the three seconds it took
me to realize that the door wasn't going to open, the water level was up to
my ankles. More adrenaline shot through my body. I reached for the hammer
in the armrest compartment, and with two hands swung at the pilot's
window. Two whacks with all my strength and there was an eight inch
hole. Steam was now coming out of the engine as the nosecone dipped
underwater and the cabin tilted forward, so I now remembered to shut down
all the switches and turn the fuel selector to off. I ripped the lap board
off my leg, reached behind my seat and grabbed one of the two life jackets
that's always there. I then clawed apart most of the rest of the window
glass (which gave me some cuts and splinters) until the hole was big
enough, and climbed out of the cabin. The wings were now slightly under
water; I sat down to put on and inflate the lifejacket.
I sat on the wing for a minute to survey the situation and collect my
thoughts. The closest point to shore was roughly 300 feet away, near the
power plant. Several people were already assembled there at a boat launch,
and I spotted a police car already driving in that direction. The
parachute was flat on the water, mostly on the other side of the plane. I
slipped into the water and began swimming to shore. My leg got caught on
something: no doubt a line from the parachute. I kicked it free and swam
faster and farther away from the plane. Within four minutes of impact, the
plane was nose down in the water and sank in 30 feet of water. No fuel
leaked out of the plane. In the next ten minutes I kept swimming slowly,
but stopped after roughly 150 feet. There was pain in my back and some
blood on my left hand. I was getting cold. A Haverstraw Fire Department
launch appeared about half a mile away, where the tributary joins the
Hudson River. They came up beside me and sloppily pulled me onboard. The
pain in my back was now considerable, so I lay down flat across the
deck. A moment later the boat docked near the power plant, where an
ambulance was waiting to take me to Nyack Hospital.
Enroute to the hospital, a police detective sat next to me and took sparse
notes of my story. The EMT folks stuck me full of needles for IV and blood
tests; my body temperature was 90 degrees, so they wrapped me in more
blankets. I felt a hot spot on my rear end; it turned out to be the
battery from my cell phone that was overheating from being underwater. We
arrived at the hospital and I was wheeled into the trauma part of the
emergency room. They immediately cut off all my clothes (losing my keys in
the process), poked more needles into me and did a quick check of my limbs
and abdomen. I was then sent for a CT scan of my neck and brain; and later
for X-rays of the rest of my body.
When all the test results were in, the ER doctor came in and told me that
my back was broken, and that the orthopedist would be there shortly to
explain further. He then left the room, but came back a moment later and
casually said: "By the way, did you know that you have a brain tumor? The
neurologist will be here soon to explain it some more".
* * * * *
I walked out of the hospital on Friday afternoon. My back still hurts,
mostly from the pressure of the brace that I have to wear for the next four
weeks whenever I'm vertical. I'm taking anti-seizure and pain medications
and next week will consult with neurosurgeons on what (if anything) to do
about the brain tumor.
Last night was the first time I was able to sleep through the night without
waking up several times, sometimes in a sweat; other times just to cry for
ten minutes because I couldn't deal with the emotions of how and why I
nearly died, yet somehow managed to survive.
* * * * *
Unlike other people's descriptions throughout history of near-death
experiences, I did not see my life flash before my eyes; a warm glowing
light; or any symbols of divine presence. What I saw were stark realities
that needed to be dealt with: airspeed, jolts, altitude, fuel farm tanks,
water, pain.
When the plane crashed and the cabin was underwater, and I couldn't open
the door, I sadly thought: "So this is how it ends". But I immediately
determined to reject that outcome, grabbed the hammer and clawed my way out.
Join Date: Jun 2003
Location: EuroGA.org
Posts: 13,787
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
There may be some pilots who take off into nasty conditions saying "Heck, I can pull the 'chute if it all goes wrong" but I haven't met any.
Would anyone here seriously use the presence of a BRS to change their personal minima?
As regards the Cirrus chute pulls, I think people forget just how many of these planes have been sold. At one stage, Cirrus were outselling Cessna, Piper and probably everybody else. There are thousands of them flying. A few are bound to end up in the hands of pilots who are careless; in a Cessna they would have force landed or got killed but in the Cirrus they pull the chute ..... and make the news!
The business about spinning has been done to death everywhere and there is no evidence I know of that a Cirrus will not recover from a spin. Almost any conventional plane will recover from a spin. However, one has to stall first, and the only place that is going to happen is on the base to final turn, and there one is much too low to use the chute. I think the chute was basically a marketing decision, which happened to save Cirrus some testing and perhaps aerodynamic compromises to make it recover in the prescribed N turns (like the strakes on the TB and TBM which are reputed to cost a few kt).
There is an article describing the Cirrus certification process which is interesting reading - the FAA concluded exactly what I say above: they did a survey and found that the vast majority of stall/spin incidents would not have been recoverable due to insufficient altitude so the traditionalist "must recover from a spin in X turns or less" attitude is misplaced.
Cirrus has been a great success - the only real GA success in the last 30-odd years. Socata did quite well in the 1980s but they dropped out in 2002, and they never had a decent piston presence in the USA. Diamond were doing well but now are stuffed on the engine front.
Cirrus marketing (like cars) has upset a load of traditionalists who would like to see GA an anorak-only scene. The reality is that there is no money in the old scene anymore. One has to go after fresh blood to make any headway. Flying schools would be well advised to explore the same methods too.
Today, an SR20 or 22 is the only logical purchase for an IFR tourer. Personally I would still prefer my TB20 but they don't make them anymore.
Last edited by IO540; 1st Jul 2008 at 08:42.
Join Date: Sep 2003
Location: South Norfolk, England
Age: 58
Posts: 1,195
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I can't comment much on Cirrus aircraft as I've never flown one, however, I'd be concerned about flying any aircraft that hasn't been tested in a spin? I may have got it wrong and it has been, and is just "not cleared for spinning" like many others ... Surely as most will recover if needs be, advising the use of a chute in such circumstances seems odd? That said, I accept that the chances of getting into a spin in such an aircraft is the smallest risk of danger over the other possibles such as loss of control in IMC.
The account of the water landing is dramatic and very interesting to read. The ellow is obviously intelligent and full of survival spirit. Having a brain seizure must be very scary (even more so in flight) so I'm sure he did what his confused brain told him was correct at the time. If it hadn't been for that though, I'd say to pull a chute having successfully recovered to controlled flight was crazy! the aeroplane may very well have been structurally compromised, but if the wings were still attached and everything worked, a landing would be the only sensible option IMHO.
SS
The account of the water landing is dramatic and very interesting to read. The ellow is obviously intelligent and full of survival spirit. Having a brain seizure must be very scary (even more so in flight) so I'm sure he did what his confused brain told him was correct at the time. If it hadn't been for that though, I'd say to pull a chute having successfully recovered to controlled flight was crazy! the aeroplane may very well have been structurally compromised, but if the wings were still attached and everything worked, a landing would be the only sensible option IMHO.
SS