Cranfield crash, 5 June 2013
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I will do anyway, but we have a half decent tool kit on our works machines.
A couple of screw drivers, long nose pliers, blunt nose pliers, tweezers and a pair of cir-clip pliers. The electrical spares kit even has a 50 amp fuse in it.
I don't have a clue where it goes, but if a 50amper goes I ain't going anywhere near it. I think we counted 220 24V bulbs in all the various indicator status lights in the cockpit. And before you ask I have a P145 sign off to replace them as well.
A couple of screw drivers, long nose pliers, blunt nose pliers, tweezers and a pair of cir-clip pliers. The electrical spares kit even has a 50 amp fuse in it.
I don't have a clue where it goes, but if a 50amper goes I ain't going anywhere near it. I think we counted 220 24V bulbs in all the various indicator status lights in the cockpit. And before you ask I have a P145 sign off to replace them as well.
The two most dangerous things in aviation. A Pilot with a wrench, and an Engineer with a pen 
What you do to your airplane before you get into it and fly it, is of course up to you. I would suggest that if you have to disassemble, reassemble something and/ or use more than a simple screwdriver or adjustable wrench you are firmly in engineer land.
What you do to your airplane before you get into it and fly it, is of course up to you. I would suggest that if you have to disassemble, reassemble something and/ or use more than a simple screwdriver or adjustable wrench you are firmly in engineer land.
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I would add also avionics engineer with anything mildly sharp.
We had one new lad who was trying to get an ADI out but the plug on the back didn't have enough slack. We said to him in jest to just go under the panel and snip the plug off. Which he did. He was thereafter known as 'Slasher'.
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I named one whoops a daisy or just daisy for short.
It was always worth while hanging around if there was any wire locking to do. One day he had to go and sit down because he was feeling dizzy he said it was due to the sun, I reckoned it was more to do with the amount of blood he had lost.
It was always worth while hanging around if there was any wire locking to do. One day he had to go and sit down because he was feeling dizzy he said it was due to the sun, I reckoned it was more to do with the amount of blood he had lost.
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Locking wire is weird stuff, it's just like catching your thumb on the end of a guitar string, how does something of such a small diameter make you bleed like a stuck pig?
Locking wire is weird stuff, it's just like catching your thumb on the end of a guitar string
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You have to match the lock wire to the material you are locking up.
If you use the wrong one you can set up a sacrificial circuit and either the lock wire will corrode or the part your trying to lock up.
I would never use any lock wire that I had acquired from any other source than an A&P said to use. I don't have a clue if they have different types in aviation or if its all the same stuff. But I wouldn't use anything from a DIY outlet just in case the Aviation stuff is some special alloy which is suited for aircraft materials.
It could well be that its not an issue but hey I drive the things and only help out when tolerated.
It always seemed sensible to me to check materials, I used to put buoys and chain lines down for moorings and was very particular what shackles and lock wire I used. Mine used to last 6-7 years. The other bloke in the area who used to do them only lasted 2 years. When you looked at the shackles all the pins had corroded out the hole. But the lock wire was cracking. Mine used to fail due to friction wear.
If you use the wrong one you can set up a sacrificial circuit and either the lock wire will corrode or the part your trying to lock up.
I would never use any lock wire that I had acquired from any other source than an A&P said to use. I don't have a clue if they have different types in aviation or if its all the same stuff. But I wouldn't use anything from a DIY outlet just in case the Aviation stuff is some special alloy which is suited for aircraft materials.
It could well be that its not an issue but hey I drive the things and only help out when tolerated.
It always seemed sensible to me to check materials, I used to put buoys and chain lines down for moorings and was very particular what shackles and lock wire I used. Mine used to last 6-7 years. The other bloke in the area who used to do them only lasted 2 years. When you looked at the shackles all the pins had corroded out the hole. But the lock wire was cracking. Mine used to fail due to friction wear.
Last edited by mad_jock; 18th Mar 2014 at 18:32.
Plugs not an issue.
From GtE's post # 126:
From the AAIB report:
"...the investigation determined that the spark plugs had been correctly fitted ..."
I'll leave aside arguments as to who/what constitutes an 'engineer', but in making my comment on the root cause of the accident not being due to maintenance I took my facts from the AAIB; they were not an assumption, nor based on heresay.
While later comments I read might suggest there's a history to the individual who performed the plug work there's nothing to suggest anywhere that it contributed to the issue. Therefore on that count at least it's a non-starter.
Back to the turn-back methinks...
FP.
Just correcting to a more correct statement:-
Quote:
An unqualified person cleaned the plugs and claimed to have re-fitted them correctly, an engine check was performed, and a flight conducted with no issue prior to the crash flight. He was not authorised to maintain this aircraft he was not an engineer, and nothing I read suggests his work contributed to any issue with the a/c apart from any long term damage potentially caused by unauthorised maintenance and fuel use over a long period of time.
Quote:
An unqualified person cleaned the plugs and claimed to have re-fitted them correctly, an engine check was performed, and a flight conducted with no issue prior to the crash flight. He was not authorised to maintain this aircraft he was not an engineer, and nothing I read suggests his work contributed to any issue with the a/c apart from any long term damage potentially caused by unauthorised maintenance and fuel use over a long period of time.
"...the investigation determined that the spark plugs had been correctly fitted ..."
I'll leave aside arguments as to who/what constitutes an 'engineer', but in making my comment on the root cause of the accident not being due to maintenance I took my facts from the AAIB; they were not an assumption, nor based on heresay.
While later comments I read might suggest there's a history to the individual who performed the plug work there's nothing to suggest anywhere that it contributed to the issue. Therefore on that count at least it's a non-starter.
Back to the turn-back methinks...
FP.
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Its always going to come back to the turn back. And other issues of airmanship and piloting.
And to be honest this is always going to be a problem because of human nature for several reasons.
1. There is a lot of instructors out there that honestly believe that they can do it. How or why they think this I don't know.
2. A lot of instructors have been taught by number 1 and think they can as well.
3. You have to condition a pilot away from there human nature and to go away from perceived safety.
4. Pilots will always go back to their initial training see points 1 and 2.
We don't know what speed they were using for approach but as those of us that use the book speed seem to be in the minority flying tommys lets presume it was 10knts fast which then gives them a lot bigger distance required to land and take off again. A tommy can land and stop in 350m fully loaded when flown correct at the correct speed. Call it with float due excess speed and student landing call it 550m. And drop it back for a TnG to 300meters.
You already have a displaced threshold which is 206m in and the PAPIS 288 m in.
So you have already got 494meters of useless runway behind you of your 1800m. That's over quarter of the runway gone as you touch the wheels down. Then slow down and clean up and apply power again call it 150 meters then another 150 for takeoff run. So we have now used over 50% of the runway, on the day they used 2/3rds of it rotating at Carlie.
Now look at figure 1 in the report and with something take the distance between Carlie and the impact site about 2 thumb lengths for me.
Then go back to just past the PAPI's which are at 288m in and add that distance. Look how much runway you have left in front of you its a good 600 meters. For a lot of us it would be over 700m. The tommy would have zero problem landing in that from 200ft.
So a huge factor which caused the accident was pish pseudo airline ops of touching down next to the PAPI's. I know it didn't cause the engine to fail but it put the aircraft into zero option position of being low and obstacles in the way. If they had used the full runway available y touching down at the threshold they wouldn't have been in the situation of even having to consider a turn back.
And to be honest this is always going to be a problem because of human nature for several reasons.
1. There is a lot of instructors out there that honestly believe that they can do it. How or why they think this I don't know.
2. A lot of instructors have been taught by number 1 and think they can as well.
3. You have to condition a pilot away from there human nature and to go away from perceived safety.
4. Pilots will always go back to their initial training see points 1 and 2.
We don't know what speed they were using for approach but as those of us that use the book speed seem to be in the minority flying tommys lets presume it was 10knts fast which then gives them a lot bigger distance required to land and take off again. A tommy can land and stop in 350m fully loaded when flown correct at the correct speed. Call it with float due excess speed and student landing call it 550m. And drop it back for a TnG to 300meters.
You already have a displaced threshold which is 206m in and the PAPIS 288 m in.
So you have already got 494meters of useless runway behind you of your 1800m. That's over quarter of the runway gone as you touch the wheels down. Then slow down and clean up and apply power again call it 150 meters then another 150 for takeoff run. So we have now used over 50% of the runway, on the day they used 2/3rds of it rotating at Carlie.
Now look at figure 1 in the report and with something take the distance between Carlie and the impact site about 2 thumb lengths for me.
Then go back to just past the PAPI's which are at 288m in and add that distance. Look how much runway you have left in front of you its a good 600 meters. For a lot of us it would be over 700m. The tommy would have zero problem landing in that from 200ft.
So a huge factor which caused the accident was pish pseudo airline ops of touching down next to the PAPI's. I know it didn't cause the engine to fail but it put the aircraft into zero option position of being low and obstacles in the way. If they had used the full runway available y touching down at the threshold they wouldn't have been in the situation of even having to consider a turn back.
Last edited by mad_jock; 19th Mar 2014 at 19:38.
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Entering a turn with the intent of returning to the airfield at something between 75-200ft agl with a rough running engine when there are numerous options ahead is just suicidal.
MJ - agreed. Poor speed control, PAPIs, big runways, ATPL manuals before knowing how to trim etc etc dumb-down the art of flying.
MJ - agreed. Poor speed control, PAPIs, big runways, ATPL manuals before knowing how to trim etc etc dumb-down the art of flying.
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But why is the AIBB not picking up on this.
Why isn't the CAA's making sure all training establishments including the airline schools have the proper methods defined in their training manuals for flying SEP's?
We have two people now disabled for life now because of pseudo airline pish. What will happen absolutely nothing.
Why isn't the CAA's making sure all training establishments including the airline schools have the proper methods defined in their training manuals for flying SEP's?
We have two people now disabled for life now because of pseudo airline pish. What will happen absolutely nothing.
I think it's probably in part an indictment on today's society where procedure is put ahead of ability; I don't see it getting any better for some time unfortunately.
In my training there we certainly expected (psuedo) EFATO's, but that is also part of the problem - it's when we don't expect it that things start to unravel; we need to suppress the natural urge to turn-back and/or keep things within the airfield.
It might be that more emphasis on EFATO needs to be included in the training syllabus - as much as instrument training perhaps? Conducting some 'real' EFATO's out in the field, and/or in a simulator might be a benefit.
I know I tried it out - at height - just to see how much height it took to do a turn-back after engine failure. It was significant and again may be something that needs to be demonstrated and tried out several times during a pilot's initial training, and later flight reviews...
Incidentaly MJ, that was a useful assessment I thought.
FP.
In my training there we certainly expected (psuedo) EFATO's, but that is also part of the problem - it's when we don't expect it that things start to unravel; we need to suppress the natural urge to turn-back and/or keep things within the airfield.
It might be that more emphasis on EFATO needs to be included in the training syllabus - as much as instrument training perhaps? Conducting some 'real' EFATO's out in the field, and/or in a simulator might be a benefit.
I know I tried it out - at height - just to see how much height it took to do a turn-back after engine failure. It was significant and again may be something that needs to be demonstrated and tried out several times during a pilot's initial training, and later flight reviews...
Incidentaly MJ, that was a useful assessment I thought.
FP.
Last edited by First_Principal; 19th Mar 2014 at 18:36. Reason: Forgot to add comment on MJ's post.
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First principal good post but this goes far deeper than EFATOs. An analogy is driving a car through town without instinctively using the steering wheel to control direction. A professional pilot ( ie instructor) should be able to 'feel' the aircraft and react accordingly. This chap, for whatever reason, handled the aircraft like a computer game and it is purely luck that the stall/spin didn't kill him. I don't point a finger at the pilot, I point it at a training system which does not spend nearly enough time on the basics (ie before cct work). The whole slow speed regime needs to be instinctive.
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And also does the correct technique for individual aircraft types/classes.
I don't do SEP approaches in the works machine I do turboprop ones.
I don't do turboprop ones in SEP's.
I can't remember any issue at all after doing 1100 hours in SEP doing SEP approaches going to 3 deg TP ones at 3 times the speed 7 times the weight and 2300SHP on the wings instead of 120 HP.
So quite why people need trained in this pseudo airline pish from the word go I don't really know.
I don't really hold with that bose you can do it but only if you are teaching the correct thing. The problem which is developing ever since JAR came in is that the two different methods of training are stepping on each others toes.
When I was full time there was one integrated trained instructor in the whole of Scotland and he had a PPL before he started the course. Now over 50% of the CV's coming into flying schools are Integrated trained FI's who think pseudo airline pish is the way to fly SEP's which they have been taught on the premise that they are going straight into a fully automated pref A airliner.
I don't do SEP approaches in the works machine I do turboprop ones.
I don't do turboprop ones in SEP's.
I can't remember any issue at all after doing 1100 hours in SEP doing SEP approaches going to 3 deg TP ones at 3 times the speed 7 times the weight and 2300SHP on the wings instead of 120 HP.
So quite why people need trained in this pseudo airline pish from the word go I don't really know.
I don't really hold with that bose you can do it but only if you are teaching the correct thing. The problem which is developing ever since JAR came in is that the two different methods of training are stepping on each others toes.
When I was full time there was one integrated trained instructor in the whole of Scotland and he had a PPL before he started the course. Now over 50% of the CV's coming into flying schools are Integrated trained FI's who think pseudo airline pish is the way to fly SEP's which they have been taught on the premise that they are going straight into a fully automated pref A airliner.
However MJ - none of us would have particular reservations teaching circuits in a PA38 on half that runway length, and there were still plenty of options ahead.
I had a lowish hour PPL come to me for a currency/conversion into a syndicate a year or so ago and, as is my wont, I had him brief me before take-off on his emergency actions in the event of an EFATO. He told me, clearly using words he got from somewhere else, that he'd attempt a turnback if it seemed viable.
I asked him if he'd ever been briefed on how to fly a turnback? No, nor practiced it, nor had one demoed to him.
But he got those words from somewhere.
So, somewhere out there, there are idiots who should know better teaching a turnback as a viable option - but only apparently verbally, without any actual practice of this rather difficult and marginal manoeuvre. And worse still, there are examiners passing PPL/CPL/FI skill tests on people who are preaching this dangerous gospel.
I have flown two successful turnbacks from partial EFATOs - but both times I was actually flying field to field, and not what my student described or this young FI tried to fly. And can think of no good reason I'd ever attempt one at 200ft from EGTC - an airport I know very well, or to be honest from anywhere else at that height. Including a touch and go from halfway down the runway. That hedge at 20 knots would be perfectly survivable!
Somebody taught this man, and somebody examined him. Those people, if the organisation has any backbone, should by now be having meetings: firmly without tea and biscuits, at the Belgrano. If !
G
I had a lowish hour PPL come to me for a currency/conversion into a syndicate a year or so ago and, as is my wont, I had him brief me before take-off on his emergency actions in the event of an EFATO. He told me, clearly using words he got from somewhere else, that he'd attempt a turnback if it seemed viable.
I asked him if he'd ever been briefed on how to fly a turnback? No, nor practiced it, nor had one demoed to him.
But he got those words from somewhere.
So, somewhere out there, there are idiots who should know better teaching a turnback as a viable option - but only apparently verbally, without any actual practice of this rather difficult and marginal manoeuvre. And worse still, there are examiners passing PPL/CPL/FI skill tests on people who are preaching this dangerous gospel.
I have flown two successful turnbacks from partial EFATOs - but both times I was actually flying field to field, and not what my student described or this young FI tried to fly. And can think of no good reason I'd ever attempt one at 200ft from EGTC - an airport I know very well, or to be honest from anywhere else at that height. Including a touch and go from halfway down the runway. That hedge at 20 knots would be perfectly survivable!
Somebody taught this man, and somebody examined him. Those people, if the organisation has any backbone, should by now be having meetings: firmly without tea and biscuits, at the Belgrano. If !
G