BRS equipped plane for training

[007helicopter]

And I would not swap my 2002 TB20GT for a brand new SR22, either.

Peter I think you should get some therapy for this thinking

Personally, I would (and do) rather devote that expense to recurrent training, to develop my skills more broadly, and keep me out of trouble to begin with. As I have said, in all these years, I have never wanted to abandon the flight. Is there something different about flying these days, as opposed to the "old days", which makes abandoning the flight by pulling the red handle, more important or necessary now than before? Is training now less appropriate for teaching pilots to stay out of trouble in the first place?

Pilot Dar I could not agree more that recurrent training is essential for safety whatever type is flown it should be factored in to the total cost of ownership. COPA offer possibly the most wide spread and established recurrent training programme's (the CPPP) of any type I know, I have been on 3 in 4 years and they are invaluable in my opinion, last over 3 days and you get to fly and be trained by some of the most experienced Cirrus Instructors in the world who are passionate about safety.

A big problem with the Cirrus is the vast majority of Pilots were trained to land in a field (including me) and not pull the chute, a criticism with hind site of my Cirrus transition training was not enough emphasis was put on the chute as an option.

Initially my thinking was to be fly the plane to ground, stay in control, don't get into trouble in the first place etc etc, over the last years my view point based attending training, observing and studying all Cirrus accident reports, watching other Cirrus Pilots die when they could have used the chute is that now every flight I brief myself on the CAPS option and mentally rehearse using it.

Last year (I stand to be corrected) I think there were around 9 Cirrus fatalities and 1 chute pull, in the heat of the moment my understanding is that pilots simply forget they have a chute, are in denial that it is the best option or just leave it to late.

In the simulator under pressure I certainly forgot it was even there, which was valuable training and a mistake I hope will not happen again if I am faced with that choice in the real world.

[007helicopter]

As to the chute its become a part of the real pilots dont use gps philosophy. Real pilots should be able to perform a forced landing if need arises, and should be able to navigate with pencil and paper. Well maybe they should. Howver i have pulled the lever on enough pilots to know that i wouldnt be assured of their forced landing skills. Dont think you are better than you are, i reckon unless you are practising a forced landing at least once a month you are not as good as you believe.

Fuji I agree with your view and to add I know a PFL and the real deal are 2 completely different things, a straight forward engine failure (which is mostly what we practice) is not generally what kills most Pilots (Cirrus or Otherwise) normally the chain of events building up or poor planning, Pilot error get us into trouble we simply can not cope with and become over whelmed with the speed things then happen and decision making skills deteriorate to often resulting in death.

When flying with my family, non pilot passengers I have categorically decided I would never attempt an off airfield landing, I do not like the unknown factors of the surface, ditches, wire, rocks etc and I would rather not risk there lives.

With 2 pilots or on my own if time permitted I would consider all options but I hope still err for the Chute even if the surface looked tempting.

So yes I admit I have become convinced it is a safer option than a forced landing and one I hope I will have the thinking power to correctly use should the time come to make that decision.

[Genghis the Engineer]

If landing in fields was that likely to damage your aeroplane, we'd have no glider fleet in the UK, it would all have been destroyed or become uninsurable years ago. The fact is that landing in a well judged field is not a drama, and de-rigging it, or even often flying it out (which I've done several times after precautionary microlight landings) once conditions have improved is perfectly feasible.

Equally, there are occasions where a field landing is not going to be enjoyable - much of the Yorkshire Dales, for example, where you have tiny steep fields surrounded by drystone walls.

So, there are five possible outcomes to an engine failure in a Cirrus, I'd venture, these are...

(1) Crash, having f***d the whole thing up
(2) CAPS pull, vertical descent, substantial aircraft damage, hopefully no or minor injuries
(3) Well flown PFL, extract aircraft from a field later
(4) Successfully restart the engine

I'd argue that a sensible Cirrus pilot, just like a sensible (e.g.) Tucano pilot wants to start at the bottom and work up, aiming never to reach (1).

So, let's say that you're at 3,000ft and something goes wrong with the engine. The electronics will presumably give a GPS position and details of the terrain below - so even if night or IMC you have good situational awareness - and odds are you're day VFR anyhow.

At which point surely the drill should be only a variation on conventional light aeroplane teaching, to whit...

(1) Fly the aeroplane
(2) Try and re-start (with appropriate RT / crew brief)
(3) If unable to re-start, aggressively position for the best possible field
(4) When, say, 500ft above minimum safe CAPS operation height make a decision - will this be an acceptable landing or not? If it will be, carry on, if it won't, position clear of stuff you don't want to descend into then pull the CAPS around 200ft above minimum safe operating height.

Surely only (4) should be any different for a CAPS/BRS/Ejector seat equipped flying machine, such as a Cirrus and pilots of ANYTHING should be following (1)-->(3).


Ditto inadvertent flight into IMC for a VFR pilot. As trained, try to either descend or turn out of it using the best situational awareness achievable with the instrument fit available (which in every SR22 I've ever seen is pretty damned good). If the pilot ceases to be able to control the aeroplane, or appears to be at unavoidable risk of CFIT, position where the moving map suggests there's probably something surviveable underneath, and pull the handle.

Ditto flight into icing - immediately try and climb/descend out of it and clear, again monitor SA, and if the situation seems unrecovereable, try and turn away from above/into-wind from connurbations and pull the handle before either LoC seems inavoidable, or the aeroplane is close to minimum safe chute height.


I've not done a Cirrus conversion course, but one hopes that this is what is being taught on those courses as emergency drills?

But there's much discussion here, and much in the various accident reports,that seems to suggest a mentality prevalent in parts of the Cirrus community that the universal response to most emergencies is:

(1) Something's gone wrong
(2) Pull Handle


Or am I missing something.

That said 007, I'll PM you!

G

[chrisN]

I wonder what training is given to power pilots for selection of fields for a forced landing. I was already an experienced glider pilot when I did my PPL, and had landed in more fields than any of my power instructors. I had almost no instruction at all in the power world, probably because of my gliding experience. I was able to just pick a field and set up a suitable approach without difficulty.

In gliding, the basic instruction given to would-be cross-country pilots is to be within reach of landable fields at 2000 feet, start choosing fields at 1500 feet, and at 1000 feet, forget about trying to stay up and concentrate on assessing the chosen field and setting up a good circuit for a stable approach. With the relatively low sink rate of a glider, compared with a powered aircraft with engine failure, there is ample time to do this. Hence there is rarely any damage to the glider in a field landing.


One reason for not picking the field until down to 1500 feet is that above that height it is difficult if not impossible to see slope, obstructions such as power cables, etc.

In a powered aircraft, with a much higher sink rate, and a considerable level of stress and workload combined after engine failure in cruise, the field choices are very limited, and I would expect a significantly higher proportion of at least some damage to the aircraft.

But you guys (some of you) on here are the experts on powered aircraft forced landings, so I defer to your greater experience of power PFLs.

Chris N

[Genghis the Engineer]

There are several subtle variations on PFL training powered, but they all broadly amount to the same thing. Here's a simplified version of what I practice and teach

- Engine's failed
- Establish best glide speed, point into a sensible area,
- If height permits, attempt a restart
- Pick a good field, well within gliding range, preferably somewhere between 45 degrees to the side of the nose, and behind me, preferably with other good fields around. Points of interest exactly as gliding - crop, slope, wind, obstructions, length
- Establish somewhere between downwind and base, note the vertical angle to an aiming point about 1/3 into the field
- Fly a constant aspect approach, tightening the turn if the aiming point goes up in the field of view, widening it if it goes down.

After that, it's all pretty much aircraft specific - speed, gear, carb heat, flaps, as required. Mayday and pax brief as time permits. Be prepared to switch fields if it's going wrong, if i doubt err on the side of going through the far hedge slow, rather than the near hedge fast.
G

[paulp]

How many gliders land at 60 kts? The Cirrus undercarriage is not very field friendly with its small tires and springy gear. Glide ratio and hence the ability to pick fields once low enough to have a look is much more limited.

With respect to the fuel issue, there is effectively a prop control at full throttle i.e. varying from 2500 to 2700 rpm is strictly prop control with the throttle already wide open. At less throttle it is correct that you have to accept what you get. BTW, this is a Continental design that Cirrus adopted and not really a Cirrus "innovation." For all of this lack of control and gear hanging down I get about the same fuel burn for a given speed as my friend's V-tail Bonanza. In addition I have a wider and more comfortable cockpit and a better ride both in terms of handling turbulence and in terms of Dutch roll.

[Fuji Abound]

If landing in fields was that likely to damage your aeroplane, we'd have no glider fleet in the UK, it would all have been destroyed or become uninsurable years ago. The fact is that landing in a well judged field is not a drama, and de-rigging it, or even often flying it out (which I've done several times after precautionary microlight landings) once conditions have improved is perfectly feasible.

Thats daft.

Glider pilots practise power off landings all the time - they are very good at it! They also have a trick in their wings not found in most light aircraft.

[peterh337]

There has to be a big difference between a forced landing at 30kt and at 60kt - these representing the typical Vs of the two categories discussed here.

Even at the same MTOW that's a 4x difference in energy to be dissipated.

(1) Something's gone wrong
(2) Pull Handle

I think the current Cirrus-focused training is basically that i.e. you have it so use it.

The fact that most chute pulls to date appear to have been in situations which ought to have been recoverable conventionally will keep pilot forums busy for a long time

[007helicopter]

But there's much discussion here, and much in the various accident reports,that seems to suggest a mentality prevalent in parts of the Cirrus community that the universal response to most emergencies is:

(1) Something's gone wrong
(2) Pull Handle


Or am I missing something.

I am not aware of this as a universal response or seen any evidence of that in the Cirrus community, of course I hope most would try and solve the problem and avoid getting in it in the first place.

In fact in total there are very few CAPS pulls relative to the fleet hours, Far to many Cirrus Pilots have died where if only they had used CAPS they would be alive now to tell the tale.

The point is when those options are exhausted and I no longer have control of the aircraft rather than land in uncertain terrain at 60+ knots my preference is to avoid the risk and use CAPS

I would include loss of engine / power as having lost control of the aircraft and I personally do not feel that I am so competent as being able to guarantee with reasonable certainty where I am going to put it down.

In October I spent a week flying a Cirrus in the Rockies and would say most Pilots would agree it could be an advantage in this terrain, but When I look at fields in the UK when I am on the ground that looked viable from 1000 + ft, I often do not like what I see when I look at them on foot.

Also with the recent successful CAPS pull over water this will now be my default position and I will not even consider a conventional ditching.

So trying to relate this to the OP's question if you did could an airplane with BRS make sure your instructor is pro BRS and gives you adequate information and practice what you consider correct form you.

[englishal]

I think there are lots of myths and urban legend regarding the Cirrus....Many microlights have BRS systems and people don't knock these, and microlights are more dangerous than CofA aeroplanes for a start! Again though, in a microlight you can get away with stuff you can't get away in in a heavy aeroplane....like touching down in a field with a 100m landing roll.

When one takes into account that Cirrus's are typically flown by people who do more than just the £200 burger, in different conditions, then it is difficult to compare real accident rates to your average PA28 Warrior with a 160HP engine used by a flying club. I suppose you'd have to compare them to a Twin - and interestingly the Twin suffers a higher fatality rate than a Single, but is less likely to be involved in an accident. You get more CFITs in a twin than a single for example.

As the Cirrus is a desirable aeroplane, then if you can afford one, why not buy one as your first aeroplane?

[007helicopter]

The fact that most chute pulls to date appear to have been in situations which ought to have been recoverable conventionally will keep pilot forums busy for a long time

Peter for sure it gives us something to debate but totally disagree with this opinion, in fact this is an attitude which appears to prevent people pulling the chute, ie I should be good enough to avoid it and heroically put the aircraft and my passengers down in a filed,, I think this is generally a macho type opinion and the Cirrus chute is for wimps and those with more money than sense who can not be bothered to learn to fly the plane properly due to some glossy brochure I saw in a flying magazine.

Even at the same MTOW that's a 4x difference in energy to be dissipated.

totally agree and this is a very good key point

This is also assuming the touch down is somewhere in the region of 60 knots and the Pilot under tremendous pressure and probably mentally over loaded does not stall first, come up short or long of the landing spot, land a LOT faster, cart wheel, hit a tree, fence, wires, ditch, rock etc

[Genghis the Engineer]

There's an interesting analysis of Cirrus accidents here

The author, who seems to have done his homework, thinks that about 30% of Cirrus fatals could have been prevented by CAPS.

Which is interesting, as in my post #16, I said...

... And *maybe* in 30% of fatal accident scenarios, a BRS would have had value. That's 30% of a (statistically) 1 in 70,000 hrs event.

So from two perspectives - my very cynical one, and the CAOPA's very partisan one, you have the same figure.

CAPS, used properly, should prevent about 30% of fatal accidents.

So the choice to fit a BRS, or to rent or buy a BRS equipped aircraft, or not - and the trade off (assuming like most of us your financial resources are limited) should be considered in that light, versus any other safety investment they might be considering.

With a reasonable clear figure there, and a reasonably well established set of figures for fatal accident rates, anybody can then make an informed and sensible decision about whether it's important to them or not.

G

N.B. If the Cirrus has small wheels and an allegedly flimsy undercarriage, does anybody nonetheless really believe that a conventional landing where the undercarriage *might* fail due to rough ground is going to be most times less pleasant than a vertical descend under a parachute a rate almost certainly to destroy the undercarriage, but substantial loads on the occupants spines. Sorry, no. A CAPS descent will certainly be better than a forwards landing into mature forest or ocean, but where there's something resembling a flattish field, I'd take that every time.

[peterh337]

Peter for sure it gives us something to debate but totally disagree with this opinion,

Glad to give people something to debate

in fact this is an attitude which appears to prevent people pulling the chute

You may well be right but is there evidence for that?

Re flimsy landing gear, I don't think an SR22 landing gear is particularly flimsy. It is fairly tightly cowled and I think an SR22 operated from grass is going to suffer at least as much as a traditional cowled-wheel PA28 with muck getting collected up there. But it should be fine for a forced landing in a field.

IIRC, the original position was that every BRS landing would write off the airframe, but they have salvaged some of them. (I just hope they didn't pass on the avionics to some sucker, after processing them through an avionics bench test ).

That link is interesting.

When you compare the successful CAPS pulls to the 41 fatal accident scenarios, you find remarkable similarities.
My estimation is that 30% of the fatal accidents had a high probability of success if the pilot had pulled the CAPS handle; overall 23 of 41, or 56%, had a high-to-middle level probability of success:
• VFR-into-IMC (7) • High altitude upsets (4)
• Pilot disorientation (5) • Mechanical problems (2)
• Low altitude loss of control (5)


Of those categories listed, #1 and #3 are very similar - unless one is suggesting that a pilot who is "disoriented" in VMC should pull the chute


I bet very few non-IR pilots are going to pull the chute upon simply flying into IMC, when (a) they are supposed to have had training to do something like a 180 and (b) they are likely to be close to uninsurable afterwards. Whatever the best advice is, there is a really powerful human factors issue there.


Mech problems is a genuine reason, though that chute pull where the aileron came off would not be a good reason to pull the chute if the aircraft was controllable (as it should be, one would hope).


Low altitude loss of control is no good for BRS so I don't know why the author suggests these could have been saved. This is possibly of interest.

[sdbeach]

There's an interesting analysis of Cirrus accidents here

Glad to see this come up. Good searching.

BTW, I'm the author of that article, written three years ago.

My updated assessment is now that 105 people have died in 52 fatal Cirrus accidents where the pilots faced a decision similar to a survivable Cirrus parachute save. In other words, the percentage of potentially survivable fatal accidents has gone up from 30% to 60% since 2008. Part of that is that the number of fatal accidents has doubled, part is that more scenarios were survivable with a CAPS pull, but more importantly, more Cirrus pilots are flying without the Cirrus-approved transition training.

Cheers
Rick

[sdbeach]

CAPS, used properly, should prevent about 30% of fatal accidents.

I would not say it that way. I would say that CAPS could prevent fatalities.

And it has done so in rather remarkable fashion.

Cheers
Rick

[sdbeach]

IIRC, the original position was that every BRS landing would write off the airframe, but they have salvaged some of them. (I just hope they didn't pass on the avionics to some sucker, after processing them through an avionics bench test ).

At the outset, Cirrus did not expect to see many aircraft returned to flight status after a parachute pull. So, after the very first parachute deployment, N1223S, they bought the salvage to see what happened. Then they hired a talented mechanic to repair the plane. Cirrus provided the engineering required for structural repairs and the plane flew again and was sold to a new owner.

Just last week, a COPA member posted that they had returned a plane to flight status after a CAPS pull, where the plane was suspended in trees 25 feet above the ground. Interesting extraction challenge, eh? Avionics were undamaged. After structural repairs and repainting the plane, mounting the 4-blade MT prop, the plane is absolutely gorgeous. And it passed all engineering and airworthiness inspections.

I don't have a confirmed list, but it appears that about 12 of 32 airplanes involved with parachute deployments have been repaired and flew again.

Cheers
Rick

[007helicopter]

Rick Beach who is the poster above did a presentation at last years Cirrus Migration, it is an hour long but worth a watch if you want to more about BRS or if you are a Cirrus Pilot I would say essential to watch

CAPS... CONSIDER - M9 Presentation on Vimeo

This hour-long presentation on the use of the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) describes the actual deployment history over the past 10 years and highlights several scenarios where some pilots pulled the red handle and lived while other pilots died in fatal accidents. The latter part of the presentation motivates changes to the way Cirrus pilots consider the use of CAPS in emergency and abnormal situations.

[sdbeach]

Mech problems is a genuine reason, though that chute pull where the aileron came off would not be a good reason to pull the chute if the aircraft was controllable (as it should be, one would hope).

Should be, eh? Got any facts?

Actually, in that CAPS pull, the aileron unhinged and didn't come off completely. So, the intrepid pilot is flying along with a new source of drag that requires almost full deflection to keep wings level. Cause: mechanic had removed the aileron for other work and forgot during reinstallation to safety wire the nuts on the aileron hinges, then one nut worked loose leaving the aileron flapping from the other hinge.

The pilot determined that he could not assure control during maneuvers to land, so he gained some altitude and activated CAPS over a golf course and landed in shrubs. Recently, I met one of the golfers who rushed up, inquired if the pilot was okay, and assured things were under control -- played on! That golfer is now a Cirrus owner!

Cheers
Rick

[sdbeach]

Low altitude loss of control is no good for BRS so I don't know why the author suggests these could have been saved. This is possibly of interest.

As the author, let me suggest why.

One's low altitude is not necessarily the same as someone else's low altitude.

In the analysis of Cirrus accidents that might be candidates for survivable CAPS saves, recall that the design parameters were 133 knots airspeed and 920 feet loss of altitude in a 1-1/2 turn spin and 400 feet in level flight.

So, low altitude loss of control above 400 or 920 feet is a candidate for deploying CAPS. Given that the FAA requirement for flight over congested areas is above 1000 feet, most of these accident flights would be considered low altitude between 1000 and 2000 feet, perhaps even below 3000 feet.

In my analysis, I discount the possibility of a CAPS pull for pilots in CFIT accidents who were likely unaware of the risks.

Nonetheless, several pilots were flying between 1000 and 2000 feet and persisted in maneuvers until they lost control and crashed. Other pilots in similar circumstances pulled handle and survived. It's those low-altitude fatal accidents that I consider had a good, but not great, chance of surviving.

Unfortunately, investigations and discussions about the pilots involved in several Cirrus accidents reveal indications that they were not trained to consider CAPS. In a couple of cases, the pilots were known to hold similar skeptical attitudes found in these discussions. They died. With a perfectly functioning parachute behind them that activated upon ground impact. Only 8 seconds earlier had they pulled the red handle then they might have survived.

That's a tragedy that does not need to happen again. Hence my diligence in refuting the misinformation and outright distortions with facts.

Cheers
Rick

[sdbeach]

in fact this is an attitude which appears to prevent people pulling the chute

You may well be right but is there evidence for that?

Yes.

Three pieces to consider.

1) Palm Bay, FL, a fatal Cirrus accident when the pilot reported loss of engine power and diverted to an open area, one of those undeveloped housing tracts that have roads but no buildings. The pilot stated three times on the radio that he was doing an "off site landing" with apparently increasing stress in his voice. Upon landing in the tall grass, one wing tip hit the ground and caused the plane to cartwheel violently. The pilot and his wife were seriously injured and died overnight in hospital; their neice walked out of the rear seat. This pilot was known to previously own a competitor's plane, whose sales people are on record as claiming that the parachute was a marketing gimmick, and he was heard to disdain the COPA mantra of Pull Early, Pull Often as a way to encourage consideration of using the parachute. Classic off-airport landing scenario that turned fatal, but for the pilot's attitude preventing a survivable CAPS pull.

2) Morton, WA, a fatal Cirrus accident in which a mechanic failed to tighten a cap on the fuel distribution system causing fuel exhaustion. The pilot declared an emergency and diverted to a small mountain airport, couldn't reach it and diverted towards an open field, couldn't reach it and stretched the glide, hit trees and impacted at 60 knots nose first. Pilot died and passenger was hospitalized for several weeks. Scuttlebutt was that the pilot's instructor was not a fan of the parachute and did not encourage its consideration. Classic off-airport landing scenario that turned fatal, but for the pilot's lack of consideration to abandon the power-off glide preventing a survivable CAPS pull.

3) Numerous flight instructors at Cirrus Pilot Proficiency Program report that they encounter Cirrus pilots who repeat the POH guidance that clearly states that using CAPS could cause death or serious injury, consequently they have decided not to rely upon CAPS for emergency procedures. When the instructors recount the numerous survivable scenarios and emphasize the CAPS...CONSIDER step in all emergency procedures, then they see these pilots change their appreciation for the value and utility of CAPS.

Cheers
Rick