Volcanic ash cloud and Private / VFR flying (merged)

[robin]

What you have to understand is that in a lot of public sector organisations you will not be blamed for not making a mistake. You will be fired pretty damn quickly if a mistake gets the organisation on to the front page of the Daily Mail.

That is why decision-makers err on the side of safety. You will always hear the phrase "Safety is Paramount".

Well, no it isn't actually. The concept of safety is always bent when it comes up against big bucks.

Remember John Prescott after the train smashes following privatisation of the industry. His promise to do whatever it took to put in automatic braking systems didn't last long

The Environment Agency had to change its mantra to something like
Best Available Solution without incurring additional costs - someone will have the correct phrase.

The Met Office being boffins are generally research scientists and they work in probabilities. They don't take a view as to how the probabilities should be applied. Applied science is 'grease-monkey' stuff and left to the horny-handed sons of toil.

In time we need some honesty from our leaders and the organisations that support them. They need to take some responsibility for their information.

As with last year's BBQ summer and warm winter prediction, it is all very well telling us what their data tells them, but they get into real trouble when the tabloids start using their predictions.

Actually its the same with the issue of aviation forecasts. What we think they are delivering to us is not what they are sending us.

This latest event should now start a debate in the halls of the mighty about changing their attitude to 'acceptable risk'. But I'm not holding my breath

[IO540]

This whole business has been handled stupidly - no matter which way one looks at it.

Given that if one is flying in visibly clear air, there cannot be anything dangerous there (all ash related accidents were caused by somebody flying into the plume, and usually at night) the ultra prudent way forward would have been to ban night flight in the affected areas, and require ash clouds (if any) to be avoided visually.

This would have meant jets doing long haul night stuff having to be in/out of there before/after say sunset +/- 1hr, which would not have affected the overall picture very much...

IMC flight would remain an issue but there hasn't been any IMC around in this near-stationary high pressure area - which is why we have this "problem" in the first place!! Had we been having the usual strong SW airflow, the ash would not have come anywhere near here.

Robin is spot on IMHO. Every job tends to attract applicants who are self-selecting according to personality traits. So a "safety" job is going to attract a finnicky yellow-jacket pompous ISO9000-quality-manager type. You will never see Richard Branson applying for a post entitled "management of documentation for compliance with EU procedures for handling of hazardous chemicals regulations". These yellow-jacket types have been having a field day, and I think they are about to have their noses rubbed in some muck, publicly, and not a day too soon. They acted in a pompous high-handed manner and without any supporting data.

Had this lasted only 24hrs they would have got away with it. But this time they won't. This will be the stuff of business schools for some time... well, competent ones, anyway (if you can find one).

[mm_flynn]

Originally Posted by Droopystop

It all boils down to what you want to pay for risk management: inconvenience and monetry costs or several hundred body bags.

Much as we might not like it, the monetary cost of safety is quite important. The airline industry has lost about £1b (which European Society will pay for in some way - insurance, taxes, lost jobs). If we were going to spend £1bn to sve more lives this year was shutting down the airspace the best way of doing it? Realistically how many lives where saved? Not one life has ever been lost in an ash incident to date, and all of those incidents involved significant dust not a broad probabilistic view of 'maybe dust'.

I would argue a 6 day shutdown was a poor spend of a billion pounds. The first day or two was probably a good spend, giving a time to plan to mitigate the higher risks.

[gasax]

Well anyone who does real risk assessment would quickly work out that several hundred body bags is actually a good return for wasting £1.7B from the airlines and almost certainly that much again from the general population.

Even with the inflated cost of life in my industry that would be a sensible 'justified spend' - the lives not the money!

There is some interesting work published on the effects of 9/11 on air travel. At least 1200 additional road deaths can be attritubed to people declining to fly after the event and instead dying on the roads whilst undertaking travel.

If NATS really has some risk assessment expertise is is hard to find much evidence of it!

[coolbeans]

Just goes to show the professional attitude of UK ATC

Oi!

Thats the attitude of one controller,

Bloody Uk GA and their over generalisations

[pulse1]

If NATS really has some risk assessment expertise is is hard to find much evidence of it!

Risk assessment requires a lot of data. It is not NATS job to find data wrt the survival of jet engines in ash contaminated air. That is the job of the aircraft/airline industry and met office. I am sure that, given sufficient data, NATS are very capable of a professional safety analysis of the data.

[NudgingSteel]

"Just goes to show the professional attitude of UK ATC"

well I had a zone infringement a few weeks back. Just goes to show the professional standard of UK GA.

(Of course it doesn't, that was a one-off, but there's nothing like a good old bit of generalisation, is there!)

[gasax]

I'm sure the could - and to a large extent that is what they have done.

They seem less keen on reaching into their pockets and finding £1.7B to compensate the airlines however.

The ICAO arrangements state 'no ash'. Which is obviously a pretty silly requirement given the number of eruptions taking place every day.

Possibly NATS risk analysis expertise could have identified the risks of closing huge areas of airspace with little detailed knowledge of ash levels and virtually no technical justification, simply risk aversion?

[G4FKK]

Is there any way I can share the photos of my Stansted and Luton approaches with you? If anyone wants to see them anyway. I think I have to upload them to something like flickr first?

I'd love to see the pics CliffordFW. I'll swap them for some of my Gatwick low approach and go-around at 500' in my Piper Cub (in formation with a PA28 which amused the boys and girls in the tower).

[Please resize the image to no larger than 1024 x 768 - mods]

[IMC1]

Interesting flying during the ASH issue...

Hello,
I have just got back into the UK from an 'interesting' journey back from the US which involved three flights!

While sat in the US, one thing that did occur to me was if I was home and flying in my PA28, would Heathrow let you do a low approach and go around during the airspace closure?

A mate of mine thought Gatwick let some light planes do this.

Any similar stories on some interesting flying I have missed?

Regards,
IMC

[10W]

They seem less keen on reaching into their pockets and finding £1.7B to compensate the airlines however.

So where were all these airlines at the ICAO/industry meeting last month which was looking at volcanic ash issues and trying to come up with safe figures and policies. Oh yeah, that's right, IATA didn't bother to send anyone ...

Airlines want everyone else to make decisions for them and to blame anyone and everyone when it all goes wrong. Instead they should have been pushing the industry for research, for decisions on safe ash levels from engine and airframe manufacturers, and for pragmatic procedures to handle events (such as those used in Alaska, which were driven and formulated in the main by an airline). Sitting on their hands was of course cheaper and meant they didn't need to do any work or help make any decisions. For a while they've even got away with it.

well I had a zone infringement a few weeks back. Just goes to show the professional standard of UK GA.

I don't think you can tar all GA with that brush. It was probably just one of those Cessna 172 drivers


Incidentally, there was no restriction on ATC services in Scottish airspace by NATS units, except to IFR traffic. We even got several large jets from Prestwick to Manchester and Luton by helping them navigate the complex UK airspace system using high level and low level IFR and VFR flight where appropriate. Non NATS unit Liverpool also played their part with VFR clearances not above 3500' to enter their zone and transit across to Manchester, as did London Military and Essex Radar for the Luton arrivals.

Well anyone who does real risk assessment would quickly work out that several hundred body bags is actually a good return for wasting £1.7B from the airlines and almost certainly that much again from the general population.

Now all we have to do is ensure that all the gung ho folks who think nothing should have been done in the first place are the first ones in line. let them have the courage of their convictions. Join the line after Willie Walsh please

[Sir Niall Dementia]

I was flying a helicopter from Geneva to London on Saturday and transitted the LGW over head. Gatwick Director was very busy with most of the PA28's and Cessnas from the south of England wanting to do low approaches. I believe they managed to accomodate everyone and even offered a touch and go to one chap for £980 + VAT.

Normally a LGW overhead transit is a nice peaceful affair, controlled airspace and everyone doing as they are told, Saturday was utter mayhem, my Co and myself laughed all the way to Bovingdon.

SND

Utterly sexist comment: didn't the lady LGW Director have a wonderfully sexy voice?

[Katamarino]

if I was home and flying in my PA28, would Heathrow let you do a low approach and go around during the airspace closure?

I think you are the 271st person to ask this, and if you use the search function, or look in the large and obvious "Volcanic Ash" thread, then you'll find 271 replies saying "no, you can't do this".

[gasax]

I would certainly agree with 10Ws

So where were all these airlines at the ICAO/industry meeting last month which was looking at volcanic ash issues and trying to come up with safe figures and policies. Oh yeah, that's right, IATA didn't bother to send anyone ...

and even

. Instead they should have been pushing the industry for research, for decisions on safe ash levels from engine and airframe manufacturers, and for pragmatic procedures to handle events (such as those used in Alaska, which were driven and formulated in the main by an airline). Sitting on their hands was of course cheaper and meant they didn't need to do any work or help make any decisions. For a while they've even got away with it.

I still think however the questions are for the regulators - any expectation that commerical companies are going to carry out experimental research which the regulators could simply refuse to accept (which is certainly the case which has occured in my own industry) is naive in the extreme.

The 'no ash' requirement was never going to be defensible. Possibily it was just a political stance taken to try and force the industry to think about it, possibly not. Either way it will be interesting to see NATS and the CAA defend the position they took.

[10W]

I still think however the questions are for the regulators - any expectation that commerical companies are going to carry out experimental research which the regulators could simply refuse to accept (which is certainly the case which has occured in my own industry) is naive in the extreme.

Ultimately you are right, the regulators are the ones who have the final say, however there is a lot of precedent for operators liaising with manufacturers to get Flight Manuals tailored for their unique operations or for specific circumstances (operating off ice/snow or take off distances/speeds for challenging short runways). If the industry as a whole had said 'We need guidance in the manufacturers Flight Manual for volcanic ash operations'', then for a price I am sure the work could have been done and we would have developed a better system than the one which caught everyone out last week.

The 'no ash' requirement was never going to be defensible. Possibily it was just a political stance taken to try and force the industry to think about it, possibly not. Either way it will be interesting to see NATS and the CAA defend the position they took.

The defence is easy. ICAO documentation, of which the UK is a signatory, paraphrasing said 'Volcanic ash then no IFR flights'. The UK had not filed a difference with ICAO and therefore was bound by it, regardless of whether it was the best option or not. There are IMHO better options out there (Alaskan procedures look a great starting point), which in slower time could be developed and agreed as international policy. But again it will boil down to someone doing the research and development and putting in the resources to convince the regulatory world that it is safe. I am sure the UK authorities will want to be part of that process, if only to ensure that lessons have been learned and a better set of procedures is available for next time. It may also mean improved infrastructure is required (LIDAR and more readily available sampling aircraft), but then that will be subject to a cost benefit analysis and political will.

Time will tell !

[mm_flynn]

Originally Posted by 10W

The defence is easy. ICAO documentation, of which the UK is a signatory, paraphrasing said 'Volcanic ash then no IFR flights'. The UK had not filed a difference with ICAO and therefore was bound by it, regardless of whether it was the best option or not. There are IMHO better options out there (Alaskan procedures look a great starting point), which in slower time could be developed and agreed as international policy.

I couldn't find anywhere in the ICAO document where is said if there is any volcanic ash then no IFR. If it did there would be no IFR flight ever as there is always at least some background level of ash. Doc 19 just talks about ash clouds but doesn't define what level consitutes a cloud (interestingly, I don't think anyone defines what specific nature of condensing liquid is a weather cloud either - maybe just judgement is used on this ). Doc 9691 also discusses ash clouds and specifically says

The question at issue is — when does the concentration of ash in the contaminated airspace decrease
to a level considered safe for aircraft? Moreover, flying through even very low ash concentrations considered safe from the
standpoint of immediate engine damage may, as indicated in 2.1.4, still cause long-term engine damage, with significant
economic consequences. These questions are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.

Based on the incidents documented in 9691, many other aviation authorities seem to have choosen a much more restricted limitation of flights and to use Cloud to mean something appearing like a cloud (rather than a probabilisitic distribution of where ash might be as used in Europe).

As such, I think the argument 'ICAO said, we signed, therefore we did' is a bit shallow.

The decision may or may not have been the right one, but hopefully it was made on something other than Doc 19 requires no IFR if the metoffice says 'ash may be thar!'

[The Old Fat One]

For those that are interested in the point I (and many more of you) are trying to a make about the nature of risk, this article sums it up quite nicely.

BBC News - Is driving more dangerous than flying through ash?

Note the point about the majority of human beings being unable to make rational decisons about risk. Then apply that to an all powerful civil servant (or even a very frightened one) who knows that nowadays society demands somebodys head every time an accident happens.

As someone once said...

"Ships are safer in harbour, but that's not what ships are for."

[gasax]

And to make an aeroplane truly safe you need to put a very big padlock on the hangar door.....................!

[flyingfemme]

The question, surely, is how the authorities define an "ash cloud"?

Up until now all procedures and rules have been based on the sort of cloud that one can see and avoid. The 100 (or so) airliners that are quoted as having encountered ash clouds since the 70s were flying in a big, black mass of ash and rocks - easy to define and one knows that one flew though it.

How can they tell us that we must avoid invisible clouds on pain of death and destruction without also mandating that we never leave the ground?

More interesting to me (because I didn't stop flying) is the behaviour of those making the rules. Why did they not (quickly) ask people who have done this before? Alaskan Airlines have rules and procedures for volcanic eruptions because they meet them quite often. Iceland has had eruptions before now and managed without bringing the continent to a standstill.

Our European regulators and politicians seem to have sat tight on their overfed backsides until the industry shouted loudly enough to make it very uncomfortable. I'd like to know why they weren't doing the job they are paid to perform on our behalf?

[Genghis the Engineer]

More interesting to me (because I didn't stop flying) is the behaviour of those making the rules. Why did they not (quickly) ask people who have done this before? Alaskan Airlines have rules and procedures for volcanic eruptions because they meet them quite often. Iceland has had eruptions before now and managed without bringing the continent to a standstill.

Our European regulators and politicians seem to have sat tight on their overfed backsides until the industry shouted loudly enough to make it very uncomfortable. I'd like to know why they weren't doing the job they are paid to perform on our behalf?

CAA did talk to those people urgently, and were meeting urgently with overseas authorities, engine and aircraft manufacturers, and a great many scientific specialists to get the fastest possible resolution.

I was in many of those meetings, and was routinely talking to CAA and Met Office people any time between 6am and midnight; this all continues as they review the decisions made.

Just because you weren't there, doesn't mean it didn't happen.

G