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Old 3rd Jan 2009, 12:59
  #21 (permalink)  
 
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Human Factors and Single Crew

A lot of work has been undertaken over the years with regard to the Multi-crew environment, leading to courses such as the CRM and MMC. Additionally the Human Factors and limitations knowledge for the same environment has evolved. Within airlines, at least, this knowledge is also being applied to the training undertaken as part of the AOC base check scenarios. The training is given by people who have become experts in their field.

However for the single crew operations, very little has been done but particularly in the case of the private pilot. Much of what is known results from hearsay and what individuals generally have come to believe from personal experiences. I am not aware of any FIC courses including a practical knowledge of Human Factors in the syllabus.

I am in the process of initiating such a Human Factors study for single crew, hopefully in association with a local university who have already completed an enormous amount of work with regard to road drivers but also aircrew. It is planned to complete the study with any recommendations by the end of 2009. The results will then be presented to the GASCo council. The purpose of the study is to discover practical data that could assist the training of Flight Instructors and Private Pilots, most of whom will operate as single crew.

What I have come to believe and understand from 20 years and plus 7000 hours of instructing/examining, is that whatever the intelligence of the individual; multi-tasking is not a natural skill. The brighter and more intelligent pilot may be able process information quickly but may still be limited by the number of tasks to manage. Some extremely intelligent people for instance may tend to focus on minutia at the exclusion of all else. Intelligence doesn’t necessarily match safety in this regard.

Take a flight deck; two pilots, navigator, flight engineer and radio operator (not so often, this many crew, these days I know) and courses are devised to manage and co-ordinate these separate tasks. However the single pilot is all of these and it’s quite easy to see how the single pilot can easily become overloaded. Also when flying with other pilots the single untrained pilot, as some have mentioned, may not know how to divide or retain responsibilities. The strongest personality, although wrong, may simply, by being that, have the last word. In the same way a single thought in a pilots mind may also dominate to the detriment of all else. The single pilot therefore needs training in the mental processes required in some similar way as the multi crew is pieced together. Many wise sayings abound such as; ‘fly the aeroplane first’ and ‘aviate, navigate then communicate’. Proper processes are taught in specific lessons such as the PFL and Stall/Spin awareness training but scenarios perhaps need devising to cover a wider remit.

I’ve read with interest this current thread and would be grateful for personal experiences and beliefs that pilots may have that then can then be tested. Please PM me in confidence. I do not need to have names or any personal details. The contributions will not be used as evidence but it will help me in planning a relevant study.
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Old 3rd Jan 2009, 13:44
  #22 (permalink)  


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I suddenly remembered one of my own "check rides" (as they call them in the USA). I was flying a PA28 for an ATPL test (oxymoron?).

Flew from Naples, Florida to Ft Myers, ILS on the North Easterly runway (I forget the number). Missed approach was straight ahead to 1000', then climbing right turn to 2200' whilst intercepting the 140° radial from the on-field VOR, track the radial out to 10DME then enter the hold at the mythical point in space called Corfu - which, by the way, is directly overhead the two tallest obstructions in the area (two 1000+ feet antennae. ).

Executing the missed approach, the FAA examiner reaches up and tunes Naples VOR into Nav 2.

"What you doing?", says I, "I'm tracking that".

"I want to do a VOR approach into Naples next", he says, "So I thought I'd set it up for you and then tell you to go direct".

"But I'm tracking it NOW", says I, "ILS on Nav 1, missed approach on Nav 2. I *was* tracking that VOR for the missed approach procedure - but you've now detuned it and I've no idea where we are going, we've lost the DME too. Please, just tell me what you want and leave me alone to do it".

I actually found the FAA check rides that I've done relatively difficult - mainly because of interference from well-wishing examiners who start pratting about with stuff during the trip. Blowing my whole perspective on situational awareness.

With two of us in solid VFR, both totally familiar with the airspace and ATC so laid back they are almost horizontal, it didn't cause any real problem or safety issue - but had that been a genuine go-around in the London TMA (or wherever) and a pilot passenger with any level of licence or experience decides to be helpfull and starts to tune navaids.....who would ATC growl at when I start doing funky turns as I try to follow the wrong radial from the wrong VOR?

Who is responsible to the authorities.
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Old 3rd Jan 2009, 13:44
  #23 (permalink)  
 
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CRM has changed abit its the big picture not just the small picture inside the cockpit.

So as such single crew must also undergo CRM training. IF they are lucky it will be by a CRMI who has operated single crew. If unlucky it will be by a hostie or Multicrew pilot and apart from the error chain and all that good stuff will be of little use
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Old 3rd Jan 2009, 16:37
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In that split second as I was still pearing out on my spoken word of go around he reached over and lifted the gear.

At the same time the aircraft came back out of the scud cloud with the numbers visible. I cancelled and elected to land.
Sounds like you're picking the wrong area for scrutiny. The problem there wasn't the other pilot's decision to retract the gear...you called for that. The problem was your reversal of your decision. Don't do that. Once you elect to go around, whether you've verbalized that, or conceptualized it, you're done decising. Don't go changing your mind.

If you're going to go around, then it's a done deal. Don't suddenly see the runway and elect to abandon or "cancel" your decision. Once you've elected to go missed, that's all she wrote. Go missed.

It's a little like what you were hopefully taught with respect to a forced landing. Don't go changing your choice of landing fields at the last minute. Don't change your decision to go around at the last minute either...you just might land gear up.

Don't try to convert that decision, and the subsequent poor decision to not re-verify the gear down and locked, as a CRM issue involving the other pilot

If any kind of CRM problem existed, it may have been the pilot-flying failing to verbalize...and to obtain a new landing checklist. If you've already elected to go-around and need to change your mind as you did, then at a minimum a new landing checklist must be completed, because in essence, you're starting the landing over again...in a rushed condition and at the worst possible moment. Exactly as you learned.

Let the learning continue and spot the real problem...it doesn't lie with the pilot not flying.
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Old 3rd Jan 2009, 18:02
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I didn't want to be the first to say it, Pace, but have been wondering (without the insight as to exactly what was going on in terms of altitude/distance/waether etc) about having elected to go around and then changing that decision - even as single crew. It does sound a little strange on the surface.
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Old 3rd Jan 2009, 18:29
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KeyGrip and Guppy

I take your points and dont disagree with them. The airfield did not have an instrument approach so the approach was a cobbled together DME/NDB GPS fix thing into terrain I knew well.

A front had just moved in and was still getting worse. The approach was at the base of my limits for the airfield which I had landed at hundreds of times but knew that even with a go around the second time round could be below those limits.

A case of get home itis. Having elected to go around and seeing the runway was too much of a temptation.
Guppy I accept full responsability for all my flights and would never blame the co But a case of I learnt something from that and dont expect there are many pilots around who dont have some flight which was a hard lesson?

Pace

Last edited by Pace; 4th Jan 2009 at 10:03.
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Old 4th Jan 2009, 05:22
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I think that there are two issues being discussed here, one is flying the aircraft safely, and the other is to satisfy The Subsequent Court of Inquiry, and the two are not always compatible. Obviously one must fly safely,and theoretically, if one always follows the rules then safety must follow, but sadly life ain't like that.

As a once Airline instructor, and now a microlight instuctor - but never a G.A. instructor - I once 'hitched' a ride with a G.A. student cleared for a solo cross country back to our home airfield. He correctly pointed out that he wasn't yet cleared to carry pax. and so I had to be the P.1 - I still hold a G.A. CPL and was qualified on the Cherokee in question - but I can fulfil that ' legal P.1' role in the rt. hand set, so let him fly as he had planned.

Not wishing to not only bum a lift, but also deny him P.1 time, after a successful flight that he flew beautifully I quietly went home and he completed the log as P.1. Someone saw him and the Fuzz were alerted.

At The Subsequent Court of Inquiry, I pointed out that he was an unqualified pilot legally cleared to fly that exercise solo, and my presence on board actually made that flight safer. Suppose he had got lost ? End of story - not my best Flying Decision but maybe you get my point.

Whatever you do, one must always think about how you might justify your actions at The Subsequent Court of Inquiry - can you ? In the above example I couldn't, and got caught, but in the end commonsense prevailed.

There is only one P.I/c on any aircraft. End of Story.
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Old 4th Jan 2009, 08:43
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There is only one P.I/c on any aircraft. End of Story.
Not necessarily. Depending on the regulation, while there can only be one acting pilot in command, there may be more than one pilot legal to log PIC. The context of what constitutes the PIC therefore, is subjective, and allows for more than one in documentation...and that has a direct bearing on after-action scrutiny by the legal powers that be.
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Old 4th Jan 2009, 09:56
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Hi

Well I have looked through this thread and this is what I do before I fly with an other Pilot no mater what their experience or ratings

1Run through the planed route / detail

2Discus the weather

3In an emergency decide who is going to fly the aeroplane and who is going to do the radio after that both check to see if we have not done some think silly.

4Who logs the time / P1

5Who “ fly’s / navigate “

It’s a basic brief but it works

I hope this helps
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Old 4th Jan 2009, 10:28
  #30 (permalink)  
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I think I have a reasonable feel for CRM, having been through CAA training, flight test specialist training, and earned my living on and off over 20ish years in a variety of multi-crew environments. Yet, I really don't recognise some of the descriptions of CRM above.


CRM, to me, is above all about communication. Of-course, everybody knows that the final decision about what is done with an aeroplane is the Captain's but, he/she/it should also be exercising good CRM through their 2-way communication with everybody else on board (whether legally constituted crew or not).


Examples:

I'm flying a single pilot SEP, with a couple of non-flying friends on board. Before flight I brief them on what I'm going to do, what they'll hear, when they can chat to me, when I need them to be quiet. I also make it clear that if they see an aircraft near us they don't think I've seen, or anything that worries them - they should tell me. Before landing, I may ask them to do certain things - such as tidying up anything they've had out in the cabin. None of this degrades my role as Captain, all of it enhances the safety of the flight.

I'm flying as FTE (Flight Test Engineer) on board a 2-seat aeroplane under flight test. Sat in front of / to my left is the Captain, a qualified test pilot. For periods he may require me to provide lookout whilst he is "heads in" doing something with the instrumentation, for other periods I'll be specifically telling him what flight conditions or manoeuvres I want. None of this changes that he's in charge of the safety of the flight.

An airliner has suffered an engine fire in the port engine; the captain, after initially correcting the problem announces that he is shutting down the starboard engine. Several passengers tell the cabin crew that they had seen flames from the port engine. The cabin crew take the view that the captain knows what he's doing, and is clearly too busy to be interrupted, so they leave it. The captain shuts down the wrong engine believing that he was making the right decision. 47 people died at Kegworth.

Pace's was flying a single pilot aircraft with another pilot in the right hand seat when he announced a go-around. The person sat next to him (if I read this correctly) elected to manipulate the controls WITHOUT COMMUNICATING WITH THE CAPTAIN. As a result, a late change in decision, which may or may not have been unwise but was nonetheless the Captain's decision to make, nearly resulted in a gear-up landing. Had either the "passenger" said "Pace, would you like the gear up", to which Pace had replied "yes please, now" - or Pace had afterwards said "Change of plan, we're landing after all", then his pax said (probably rather urgently!) "Pace, the gear is now up" - that wouldn't have happened.

I was flying an SEP south of Prestwick when I suffered an engine vibration followed by a generator failure. I communicated what had occurred to ATC and told them I intended to shut the transponder down to save power then continue to my destination. They acknowledged and agreed with my actions - although we all knew it was my decision.


To me, CRM does not change or influence who ultimately makes decisions in the air, it is all about communication - leading to the decision, and about the decision. Of course, sometimes it all happens very quickly, and very very occasionally a Captain has to make an initial decision without communication - but that is incredibly rare.


I can think of two occasions only in my career where a decision had to be made in a multi-person environment without communicating about it. These were:

(1) In a fast jet which hit compressor stall in a high altitude turn. The pilot recovered the manoeuvre immediately, and THEN we talked about it (I was in the back rather worried for a few seconds).

(2) I was spinning a prototype microlight when the engine failed. I recovered it immediately, entered restart drills then discussed with the other qualified pilot in the right hand seat what had happened and any subsequent actions.



It's all about talking, as Stephen Hawking said in the old BT ad.

G
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Old 4th Jan 2009, 17:43
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A case of get home itis. Having elected to go around and seeing the runway was too much of a temptation.
I experienced something similiar to that recently. During a recurrent checkride, I was acting as the pilot flying, and conducting a coupled approach. We had briefed the approach before the sim session as a coupled approach to a missed, and I was fully prepared to execute the missed. I'd briefed the missed as part of the approach briefing, as always.

100' above minimums the PNF called "approaching minimums." I responded "Continue." At minimums, the runway wasn't in sight, and the PNF called "Minimums, runway not in sight."

I stated "Go around. Set go around thrust, Flaps 20." This is a dual command, one to the flight engineer to set the thrust levers to the go around thrust setting, and the other to the pilot not flying to move the flaps to the go around setting of 20. Neither event took place.

As I ordered the go-around the runway popped into view...as one will continue descending below the DH/DA during the missed. Both of my other crewmembers quickly called it out, then sat on their hands, apparently deciding for me that I'd be changing my mind and landing. The flaps didn't get moved, and the thrust levers didn't get pushed up. I repeated again, loudly, "Go around, set go around thrust, flaps 20." Nothing happened. The airspeed got low, the pitch high (because the simultaneous action while calling for thrust and flaps is to rotate to 9 degrees, which I did). I pushed the power up, but at that point we were into low speed warnings, etc. We had to freeze the sim and discuss it. Two crewmembers thought we should have changed game plan in mid stride and landed, and the one crewmember who was still flying the airplane, and giving the commands to go, didn't.

Even with a proper briefing, if the crew doesn't act in accordance with the direction of the pilot flying, and doesn't act cohesively, then the flight may be placed into an unsalvagable situation.

The situation with the light twin and the gear, the Seneca V...the pilot who raised the gear may have thought he was doing the right thing on the go-around...but gear should never be raised until a positive climb has been achieved, and even then it shouldn't have been raised unless the pilot flying (pace) called for it. Pace shouldn't have changed plans...but the other pilot had no business moving the gear without being commanded by Pace. He sabotaged Pace, and in the end two different game plans worked together to result in a gear up landing.

This isn't a one-time, unique event. It happens more frequently than some may realize.

In the case of a landing, there's a lot to be said for the stable approach concept. If the approach is conducted with the airplane configured and checklists completed, then it's probably in good shape to terminate in a good landing. If anything is changed to destablize the approach or alter any part of the checklist items that have been covered and done, then it's far safer to take the airplane around and re-do the whole thing.

A big problem, and one I encountered in that sim session, was a case of pilots who thought they knew best. This may be due to being senior or more experienced. It may be because the pilots each have command experience and aren't very good SIC's (P2's, if you will). For whatever reason, one pilot disregards the wishes or commands of the other...and there's the recipe for disaster.

This speaks highly for standardization. If everybody plays by the same rulebook, the chances of success are substantially improved. When common expectations are known and practiced, and fully supported by all the team, then you can mix and match pilots and crewmembers in the cockpit, and make it happen. If that cohesiveness and standardization doesn't exist, then each operation must begin with a very thorough briefing and clarification as to who will do what, and when...and just as importantly, who won't do what, and when they won't do it.

As for briefing who logs the time...never heard of such a thing in all the flying I've done...there's important stuff to cover during a briefing...but who logs the time isn't part of that.
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Old 4th Jan 2009, 19:08
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The situation with the light twin and the gear, the Seneca V...the pilot who raised the gear may have thought he was doing the right thing on the go-around...but gear should never be raised until a positive climb has been achieved, and even then it shouldn't have been raised unless the pilot flying (pace) called for it. Pace shouldn't have changed plans...but the other pilot had no business moving the gear without being commanded by Pace. He sabotaged Pace, and in the end two different game plans worked together to result in a gear up landing.
Guppy

We did not land Gear up but almost. It was pure chance that I looked down as the gear lights are set low down on the Seneca V twin. I say pure chance but also instincts that something didnt feel quite right.

Both of us had flown and do fly in a multi crew invironment. After the event we discussed it. My co-pilot said he was sure I said going around gear up but I am equally sure I just said going around.

Part of the problem is being trained in CRM and being used to that interaction and then both of you jumping into a single pilot light aircraft. It is very easy for the co-pilot to run to instincts and habit.

I take your point that even in that situation he should have monitored the VSI and altimeter for positive rate and called that. I am 100% sure that all that was called was going around and that was by me.

The other danger to adding to the creation of a situation like that is distraction. In this case the very poor vis and low cloud meaning that your eyes are firmly fixed out of the aircraft.

It was an easy mistake to make and a good learning experience which luckely ended up safely. I had the honesty to post it here while many of us would rather keep things like that secret. I am sure there isnt a pilot alive who doesnt have his own secrets

Pace
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Old 5th Jan 2009, 02:27
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SNS3GUPPY - I had a similar real life experience to your Sim. except that the crew performed as trained.

Approaching Zurich, Winter, night, snow, IMC, established ILS then got a GPWS terrain warning. Mountains ! Night ! In Cloud ! "Go around power, 20 flap" etc. No problem, but crew subsequently questioned the action because " We were established on the ILS " Were we ?? Howdya know for sure ? false G/S ?? No contest. Asked ATC if they had been monitoring the app. on surveillance radar, had no need to as cleared for pilot intercept of the ILS, but they might have been. They hadn't but could, and we agreed that if next time I was happy that I was established on the LOC. and G/S and they were also happy that I was OK, then I would ignore the next warning, which didn't happen.

ATC adv. that there is a "pimple" close to the point of intercepting the LOC from the East and I had passed over it turning on to the ILS LOC , and with the the descent rate at the time the GPWS had been frightened - so had I !!

Remember the Captain that said " Shut up - Gringo " and was punching out the GPWS as he hit the hillside ? You canna be too carrrrreful !
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Old 6th Jan 2009, 02:17
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Both of us had flown and do fly in a multi crew invironment. After the event we discussed it. My co-pilot said he was sure I said going around gear up but I am equally sure I just said going around.
I've never seen a crew environment situation in which the gear would be raised without first a statement from the PNF regarding either "Positive Climb," or "Positive Rate."

If you said "Go Around Gear UP," then the gear still shouldn't be raised until a positive climb has been achieved, you've been advised by the PNF that he has a positive indication of a climb, and that following this clarification you again state "Gear Up." Gear should never be commanded up until confirmation by the PNF has been verbally announced regarding the positive rate, and the PNF should never attempt to raise the gear until he's advised regarding the positive climb and then received the order to raise the gear.

No matter what the pilot in the other seat thought he heard, if he didn't advise you that he had a positive climb, then receive a command to raise the gear, he had no business touching the gear handle. Assumption is the mother of screw-ups, and he very nearly gave birth to a mishap by embracing mum.

The other danger to adding to the creation of a situation like that is distraction. In this case the very poor vis and low cloud meaning that your eyes are firmly fixed out of the aircraft.
As PNF, his eyes should have been half-in, half-out, and unless you were in the process of landing, you as PF should be eyes-in. When beginning the missed approach or go-around/balked landing, the immediate transition, especially in low visibility, should be immediately back to instruments...eyes shouldn't be firmly fixed outside the aircraft. I find that the lower the visibility, the more attention I pay inside the aircraft when landing.
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Old 6th Jan 2009, 03:08
  #35 (permalink)  
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What a good thread, it should be required reading for new pilots. Two experiences come to mind:

While flying as an unqualified copilot on a Piper Cheyenne about 25 years ago, an engine began to commit suicide on it's own (FCU failure). We had had a very quick briefing about this, which resulted in my deciding to shut down the offending engine based upon what I saw happening, in order to save it. Happily, the PIC was very pleased at the action I had taken. What happened next was a lesson for me. The PIC tried to do everything, including fly. When he realized that there was a workload issue, he asked of me the tasks I was least able to accomplish (locating and opening bus ties etc.) I suggested to him, that I would be best at the two things common to all aircraft, and for which I was best skilled: Flying it, and talking on the radio, while he used his type specific training to sucure everything as required. This worked out really well, and set the pattern for a very good relationship between he and I. I learned that even the very compotent pilot can become overwhelmed, and the "new guy" might have something very important to offer!

Later in life, my good friend, who owned, and regularly lent to me his very nice C182RG, lost his medical for a period. As I was the only other insured pilot, I happily endulged him, by riding along right seat for an hour a week, while he kept up his proficiancy. Well, Transport Canada found out about this, and tore a strip off me. I must not let him fly, I'm not an instructor! He's a "loss of conciousness risk", he could slump forward on the controls. "Hey" I said, "I could carry him as a passenger right seat, and he could slump forward on the controls on that side?!".... "Yes, but as the pilot in command, you must assess that the passenger does not pose a hazard to the safe flight of the aircraft". I replied: "Well, with a shoulder harness on, it is my assessment that he does not pose a safety of flight hazard in either seat, and I'm happy to have him fly from either seat. He likes the one on the left, he owns the plane, and I'm okay with that!". (I never did figure out how an instructor would be any more qualified than I to handle the imagined risk of the seat occupant slumping on the controls)

Needless to say, the government and I did not come to an agreement on that one, and the operation continued for another year that way, the government powerless to ever prove what they knew was happening up there. After that year, the GROSS ERROR which had caused the original loss of his medical was fianlly recognized, and the privialge returned that same afternoon. We both excercise our respective privilages to fly to this day!

Pilot DAR
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Old 6th Jan 2009, 04:12
  #36 (permalink)  
 
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Monitored Approach

The situation described in the last 3 or 4 posts is notoriously frequent.
xxx
Prior to about 1998, we had that situation often.
I was frequently spending my life in simulators (747-200) as instructor
Then, got to be training manager, and changed the procedures.
Took a few months to get the chief pilot to approve, but finally was.
I took the PanAm's "monitored approach" procedure, and applied it.
xxx
PNF to fly the approach, coupled autoland (ABC selectors UP on COMMAND).
His SOP is to proceed down to 100 ft DH expecting to miss the approach.
xxx
If PF (looking outside) sees runway, he calls "LANDING" and takes control.
if PF calls "MINIMUMS MISSED APPROACH", gets back on instruments.
PNF applies go around power, pitches up 10º, clicks A/P OFF.
At same time, PNF calls "FLAPS 20 GO AROUND", and initiates MAP profile.
PF selects flaps, calls "POS RATE" when positive "climb" is achieved.
PNF calls for "GEAR UP"...
F/E trims power to go around EPR...
In our SOP "Engliche" - positive "rate" or "climb" means the same thing.
No semantics BS...
xxx
No more confusion, simulator or landings online...

Happy contrails

Last edited by BelArgUSA; 6th Jan 2009 at 08:19. Reason: addition of one line - clarification
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Old 6th Jan 2009, 08:03
  #37 (permalink)  
 
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Remember talking to a grizzly Pan Am captain when BEA were playing with monitored approaches in the '60's as described above. he said " we've always flown monitored approaches - I fly, he monitors " !! Then someone invented CRM.
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Old 6th Jan 2009, 08:06
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No matter what the pilot in the other seat thought he heard, if he didn't advise you that he had a positive climb, then receive a command to raise the gear, he had no business touching the gear handle. Assumption is the mother of screw-ups, and he very nearly gave birth to a mishap by embracing mum.
Guppy this is the very point I am trying to make. Both of us are used to flying in a multi crew situation but this was a single pilot operation.
We did not fly as multi crew doing what most PPls would be doing in a light aircraft.

i did most operations giving him things to do that he wanted to do to keep him from getting bored.

Ie NO SOP but a knocked together system which changed as we saw fit.
When the going got tough in that lack of organisation he selectively picked bits from our multi crew instincts with near disasterous results.

This was an example of why where two pilots share a flight rather than operating in a multi crew invironment there should be some sort of SOP for PPLS in private light aircraft.
At present there is none. PPLs do what we were doing on that flight and making up who does what on the hoof.

Hence the reason for this thread so that a SOP can be worked out for PPLs flying as friends in a single pilot aircraft where they want to share duties.

Pace
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Old 6th Jan 2009, 08:12
  #39 (permalink)  
 
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Location: Arizona USA
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1. Do not touch anything unless you’re invited too.
2. No puking.
3. No screaming.
One more...

NO bit@hing and moaning about, 'aren't we there, yet.'

Remember talking to a grizzly Pan Am captain when BEA were playing with monitored approaches in the '60's as described above. he said " we've always flown monitored approaches - I fly, he monitors " !!

Makes perfect sense to me...and yes, I was originally trained on jets (B707) at PanAmerican.

The reverse is also true.
If the First Officer is flying (at least 50% of the time on my flights), he flies, I monitor.

-OR-

Neither of us manipulate the controls, and let the Lockheed automatics do the deed.

Perfection at its finest.

Last edited by 411A; 6th Jan 2009 at 08:24.
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Old 6th Jan 2009, 08:16
  #40 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: The Smaller Antipode
Age: 89
Posts: 31
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PilotDAR - see my #27, same issue. Unfortunately the Powers don't seem to realise that one doesn't lose ones brain when one loses ones medical category - unless for insanity !

Very experienced airline instructor lost his medical, but argued that he hadn't lost his brain, and could instruct qualified pilots - who would undoubtedly be PiC - in the finer arts of instrument flying towards their I/R flt. test. No way, bureacracy has no sense of humour.
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