Improve Light A/C Separation

[gpn01]

"Forgive me but I sense a reluctance on the part of the glider community to do anything proactive"

That's untrue. The gliding community, thanks to the effective safety management by the BGA (who have had the delegated responsibility from the CAA for gliding) has an excellent safety record. I can't remember the numbers off-hand, but the total number of fatailities annually is fewer than ten p.a. (and that's as a result of all forms of accident, not just people colliding) Anybody know how many fatailities p.a. other sectors of the UK aviation community incur ?

One of the things that the community does proactively is to ensure that changes are proportionate and realistic and of benefit to avaition in general. There's a major issue when trying to reduce risk that what seems obvious and beneficial to one sector can be harmful to others. That's why it's important to ensure that any proposals are workable and don't inadvertantly increase the risk of an accident.

If there was a way in which installing a single, common, alerting device which would be usable and reliable within the confines of all GA operators, then I'm sure we'd all support it. The problem currently appears to be twofold - (1) Different sectors are using different methodologies and (b) the CAA is supporting only one 'solution' as being 'approved'. Until we can have a single approved, workable, method then we're going to have to continue embracing see and be seen, use controlled airspace for those who have the platform to use it and accept an element of risk. We need to strive to continue reducing risk but it's never going to be removed 100% and, as iterated above, you need to be careful of unitended consequences of changing something to be "safer" when it in fact makes it more dangerous.

[Rod1]

So if we assume I am meeting myself coming the other way;

I am flying along and I get an indication that there is an aircraft 5 nm ahead. I have about 70 sec before the bang. What the system is telling me is that an aircraft is in a cone 400 ft by 22 deg p/s by 5nm? Is the 5 nm accurate or +/- something?

I think Height would be important, as ground based radar will not see you much below 2000 ft. However if TCAS is also illuminating the transponder this may not be important?

Pace

I have not been an active glider pilot for many years but your understanding is very poor. To fly in cloud you need to be assessed and signed off by your CFI, this is a very safe system as the club system is much more safety focused than the non club based power environment. You must have a p/s and a radio, and appropriate instrumentation for your training / aircraft. In anything other than an ultra modern machine you will have airbrakes which can stop you exceeding vne, and if your machine is ripped apart by the CB (yes, some glider pilots do fly into CB’s), or you hit something, you can step outside. My experience of glider pilots is that they take safety and airmanship extremely seriously, and the CFI of a gliding club has total control on what happens on and around his airfield. You are not even allowed to rig a glider without his permission.

I apologize if the above is out of date, but I would think very little will have changed.

Rod1

[Pace]

>Until we can have a single approved, workable, method then we're going to have to continue embracing see and be seen, use controlled airspace for those who have the platform to use it and accept an element of risk.<

GPN01

I dont have a problem with see and be seen when we are both in a position to see each other ie reasonable VMC clear and away from cloud.

In 20 years of flying I have seen hundreds of gliders around the base of clouds at 2-3000 feet but only one above 10000 feet and that was over the Alps infact I cannot remember seeing a glider above clouds at all as the Alpine one was near the mountain face and in good VMC.

Eagles and large birds of prey yes but they have excellent eyesight and avoiding techniques :-)

So we are talking about potential risk. While it is great for fast IFR traffic to operate from take off to touchdown in controlled airspace even the airlines are forced to operate out of controlled airspace for portions of their flight at certain airports.

So there is "potential" for a midair with a passenger carrying 737 especially if radar do not pick up a non transponding Glider in a lump of cloud.

The result of such a disaster would be massive and speedy changes in regulations faster than we could write our objections in these forums then there would be no choice.

The potential is there and it is a game of Russian roulette until the unthinkable happens.

Pace

[gpn01]

Pace, there are risks in every aspect of our lives and there's no point hypothesising about what could happen - If we did that we wouldn't get out of bed each morning. Yes, there's a risk (albeit tiny) that an airliner could collide with a microlight, glider, light aircraft, helicopter or whatever. Looking at the CAA's own data though suggests an area of much greater risk:

On 22/08/1985 a Boeing 737 suffered an uncontained engine failure and fire on take-off from Manchester - 55 fatalities
On 08/01/1989 a Boeing 737 crashed on approach to East Midlands after suffering engine problems - 47 fatalities
On 25/02/1994 a Viscount crashed following problems with engine and airframe icing near Uttoxeter - 1 fatality
On 12/01/1999 a Fokker F27 crashed into a house in Guernsey - 2 fatalities
On 14/09/1999 a Boeing 757 departed runway at Geirona, Spain following heavy landing in severe rainstorm and fuselage broke into three pieces - 1 fatality
On 02/05/2000 a Learjet caught fire on landing at Lyon, France after suffering engine problems - 2 fatalities
On 25/05/2000 a Shorts SD330 was struck by the wing of a MD80 that was taking off from Paris, France - 1 fatality
On 27/02/2001 a Shorts SD360 ditched in the Firth of Forth, UK following a double engine flameout - 2 fatalities.

(Aviation Safety Statistics | SRG Safety Plan | Safety Regulation)

Looks to me like we need to stop airliners from using engines as they're clearly a major contributor to accidents!

Every time we fly we are taking a risk - engine failure, pilot incapacitation, structural failure, collision, etc. All we can do is to take sensible, considered, precautions.

It's always sobering to read the Airprox reports (latest is at http://www.airproxboard.org.uk/docs/423/ukabbk19.pdf). If I'm reading this correctly, more than 50% of airproxes occurred within controlled airspace, so don't assume that talking to somebody removes all risks!

[Fitter2]

In 48 years of gliding I have seen dozens of gliders above cloud. Maybe I was keeping a good lookout...........

I can't see, however, what that contributes to the discussion.

[tdbristol]

PCAS on Saturday

I have a Zaon PCAS unit which I find works very well . It is the more expensive one which gives approximate heading of the other aircraft, relative altitude and altitude trend, and audible warning in the headset and display flash when there is a 'threat'.
Clearly it only picks up transponder equipped aircraft but does mode C, S and A (no height on A of course). As there is good SSR coverage across the UK I have not found any obvious areas where it does not give a return for transponding aircraft.

Saturday near Norwich the viz was very poor and cloud base lunchtime just below 2,000ft. When about 10 miles from the airfield the PCAS went off. It first indicated an aircraft at 0.5nm distance from me then 0.3nm, 300ft below and climbing, to my rear left quadrant. As I was IFR climbing through 2,500ft and in IMC I could not see the other aircraft. I turned directly away and levelled for a speed increase: the PCAS soon indicated an increasing distance. Shortly afterwards I heard the other pilot give a position report, so I know it was not a spurious alert.
PCAS isn't perfect, and it is unlikely that we would have hit each other, but I never saw him and I doubt that he ever saw me, but having the PCAS allowed me to take easy action to avoid getting closer than I would have liked.
I have had a fair number of other like examples (perhaps a 1/2 dozen) in the past 15 months flying with the unit; so from my experience I am in favour of 'the more transponders the better' and of using PCAS.
Yes, it won't do everything and won't give 100% protection (but nothing would) but it is a useful aid.

[englishal]

If so, is that for economic or convenience?

Yep.....Both.

[RatherBeFlying]

A Modest Proposal

All the heavy iron spends most of its time in Class ABC airspace for which the price of admission is at least a Mode C xpdr which allows the TCAS units to detect the small stuff.

Perhaps a Zaon PCAS would be accepted as an alternate means of compliance so that the small stuff can get out of the way.

Recreational GA and gliders generally operate in Class DEG and Flarm works very well for them at a very reasonable price.

Seeing as how light a/c are required to fit Mode C to operate in Class ABC, it's only fair to require the heavies to fit Flarm if they operate in class DEG

[Fuji Abound]

Seeing as how light a/c are required to fit Mode C to operate in Class ABC, it's only fair to require the heavies to fit Flarm if they operate in class DEG

I accept the smiley but it has already been commented on here that only around 5% of gliders have FLARM - is this really so?

No one is going to take FLARM seriously if this is the real extent of the up take - why would they given this system is totally reliant on both users having FLARM installed?

[englishal]

I wonder how many people have a PCAS type thing? It would certainly increase the uptake if PCAS and FLARM were integrated somehow....

I'm going to get a Zaon box when I'm in the states in a couple of weeks. Seems a reasonable investment and *might* be a lifesaver - though hope it never comes close.

[Rod1]

Having spent some time researching FLARM I would not rule it out yet. The system has only been around for a short time but it has huge take-up in parts of Europe and the BGA has been running tests on it, which appears to have gone very well. It is possible that the take up in the UK will increase dramatically over the next 12 months.

FLARM is available as a very small, light, portable unit with very low power requirements (or an all singing all dancing panel mount). It is the only option for the majority of flying machines in the UK which cannot fit Transponders. If the BGA push this and get the support of the BMAA then it could make a difference. There is also a version specifically for helicopters.

Rod1

[Robin400]

The latest info I have, sales of the Flarm unit are now over 11,000 units.

We are all looking to improve safety for all, my vote goes to the Flarm system, capable of being fitted into flying machines with limited power supplies and payload.

Using a barometric and GPS based altitude processor, the error will be much less than a transponder based sytems with the possible errors on the static pressure line. Mode C is +/- 200ft.

I am sure Flarm design teams are working hard on certification so our colleagues with more sopisticated aircraft can install such a system at a low cost.

[NigelOnDraft]

Pace...

Why the rules should be determined by the BGA an organisation that has its own interests at heart and not all of us puzzles me.

Ask the CAA or EASA or whoever However, the CAA (EASA?) still have oversight, so if the BGA do somehting barking mad, I am sure they will be overruled

The CAA should be the regulatory authority which should lay out regulations to protect us all in an even handed way.

They do... they just delegate some/all to the BGA, LAA, BMAA or whatever...

Realistically if you are flying solid IMC and ask for radar and when asked to squak say you do not have a transponder you will get raised eyebrows.
There can be very few aircraft who fly solid IMC and are irresponsable enough to do so without a transponder.

You are now moving from the "rules" to what is typical / sensible in your opinion Please can you confirm (I may be wrong?) that:

1. Under the BGA rules, which upset you so much, a glider can fly IMC without a Xpdr and without talking to a radar service.
2. Under the CAA/EASA rules, a powered aircraft can fly IMC without a Xpdr and without talking to a radar service.

This whole thread started because of a tragic collision between two aircraft one a complex twin and the other a light aircraft.
The question was where are the risks and how can those risks be minimised.

Disagree... This thread was started to deliberately move away from Coventry, which is under AAIB investigation, and there should be no speculation / conclusions until the AAIB report or AAIB issue earlier recommendaitons. IMHO

But IMC is a different matter because the idea of keeping a good lookout becomes irrelevant and hence I personally would have regulations which stipulate a transponder for all IMC flight and basic IMC flight training for those who enter IMC conditions.

OK - and I trust you expressed in detail those opinions to the CAA consulation which finished in May? But please bear in mind you are criticising the glider community for something which solely contradicts your opinions, and which I believe is actually allowable by powered aircraft. What part of IMC training is relevant to collision avoidance? And would be applicable to the glider pilot over and above whatever training the BGA enforce?

I have learnt a lot from this thread, and it's predecessor But knee jerk reactions and finger pointing do not work IMHO. "We", parts of the GA community have fought off compulsory Xpdrs for some time, using risk v cost arguments, and who pays v who benefits. It will take some convincing evidence to reverse all that

NoD

[BackPacker]

Under the CAA/EASA rules, a powered aircraft can fly IMC without a Xpdr and without talking to a radar service.

Don't be so sure. I have not read the 600+ page document describing the EASA proposal for FCL but from the summary I understand that both the IMC rating (for power) and the Cloud Flying rating (for gliders) will go away.

And I would not be surprised if further European harmonization will eventually mean that flight in IMC requires an IFR flight plan, an IR rating, controlled airspace and an IFR capable aircraft. Including a transponder. This is already the case (or, as far as mode S is concerned, happening soon) on mainland Europe. Why would the UK not follow suit under EASA, which is after all a European organization?

[NigelOnDraft]

BackPacker... All might be true, and welcome to some. However, my post(s) concerned today's situation for all...

From my pov,

flight in IMC requires an IFR flight plan, an IR rating, controlled airspace and an IFR capable aircraft. Including a transponder

has some logic to it, and would not affect me. However, I am sure others will have their own opinions as can be seen by the IMC Rating campaign... and the previous Mode S / Xpdr battle

NoD

[BackPacker]

Nigel, you asked about EASA rules. They don't come into force yet.

AFAIK, under current legislation (ANO), you are right.

[David Roberts]

I'll chip in again with a few facts.

1. The BGA has self regulated UK gliding - very successfully I might add - since 1948 (or so). It has not operated under delegation from the CAA or it predecessor the MAT. Technically UK gliding has been 'outside regulation' except for compliance with the ANO, radio regulations and airspace regulations. Hang gliding and para gliding - a different governing body - is also unregulated but subject to the same compliance framework, ANO etc.
2. That is now changing (for gliding) with the advent of EASA, without any safety case put forward by the European 'system' to justify regulatory capture in 2002
3. Class G airspace is 'uncontrolled'. That's where glider pilots fly in cloud, sometimes. Not in controlled airspace.
4. The long term fatal accident rate in UK gliding is c.3 p.a. Of course, when comparing accident rates it is statistically sensible to measure the rate by reference to activity levels. Which for UK gliding is relatively easy because it is a club-based activity with recording of launches and hours. Not so easy with power flying to collect the activity stats. That's why making comparisons is difficult. I spent some time last year (with others from the UK, including the DfT) on an ECAC committee looking at the question of compiling GA stats on a consistent basis across the EU, and not just accident stats.
5. As I quoted in an earlier posting, I can recall only 4 power / glider mid-airs over something like 30+ years. All were in VFR conditions. I cannot recall any power / glider collisions in cloud over this period, though of course I may be wrong. And maybe one or two glider / glider mid-airs in non VMC in that time -one a few years ago involving one of the sport's most experienced cross country pilots, near his base club.
6. The EASA Licensing NPA does not include an IMC power-flying rating or glider cloud flying qualification in the sub ICAO LPL, though there is the inherited JAA IFR in the ICAO compliant licence proposals. The lack of IMC rating because there is no equivalent in the rest of Europe. But EASA is establishing a working group this autumn to consider this and is reportedly keen to have such a rating. The cloud flying qualification was recommended by the EASA sub group under the chairmanship of a senior Belgrano official, endorsed by the group I sit on, but the higher level FCL working group, with a majority of 'JAR thinkers' on it, took it out because they thought it was a back door route to an IFR for touring motor gliders (the proposed glider pilot licences would include a TMG rating but it was never suggested or intended that the cloud flying qualification was designed to be available for the TMG rating). The FCL group did not even consider the case of 'pure glider' pilots. I can tell you, that has to be reinstated because otherwise gliding will be taking a huge backward step. I am confident it will be resolved.

[NigelOnDraft]

Nigel, you asked about EASA rules. They don't come into force yet.

Thanks for that... my

Under the CAA/EASA rules,

references were in response to

You are way out of date.

EASA are the authority - the CAA act as their local agents.

I don't have a clue about "who" makes the rules right now... just have a rough idea of the rules

NoD

[Single Spey]

How to minimise risk in Class G airspace? Fundamentally, I think that it is up to each individual pilot to decide what level of risk his flight entails and whether he accepts that risk based on the equippage of his aircraft/glider/microlight and if he decides to make use of RIS/RAS/FIS, whetehr operating IFR or VFR, IMC or VMC. If a pilot believes that see and be seen is sufficient for him as anindividual then OK. However, I also consider that we all have some responsibility to other airspace users that expensive technology is not going to resolve. Systems such as FLARM, TCAS etc may be useful to a community that decides to voluntarily adopt them, but do not meet the responsibility we should all have to the total airspace user community. The user community most at risk who have no individual responsibility would seem to be the fare paying passengers flying into places like Humberside, Inverness etc which are outside the normal controlled airspace structure. More CAS should not be the answer.
My proposal would be that all airports involved in commercial operations that are outside CAS would be required as part of their licence to have primary radar and NATS en-route would be mandated to provide primary coverage linking the airport cover to the controlled airspace system. Then instead of mandatory transponder equippage the CAA should mandate that all air vehicles should have a minimum radar cross section such that they can be seen on primary radar. This may require the fitting of reflectors etc onto gliders, microlights but in my opinion ought to be a low-cost, low-technology, no-power solution. This will provide a guaranteed surveillance environment such that ATC can provide active separation to those aircraft that require it, whilst other users are free to operate as they wish. Who pays? Equipping aircraft etc the owner, operator. For the ATC services - the commercial operators who gain the benefit from reduced risk. As a result we can all operate exactly as we do now, accepting wahtever level of risk we wish, but have the knowledge that we have allowed other airspace users to reduce their risk by use of a third party - ATC - where they feel it is appropriate.

[Fuji Abound]

Single Spey

Some very good points.

Sadly NATS dont give away anything.

I recall an airfield in exactly the situation you outline where I chatted to the guys in AT. Although they had a radar head of their own for various reasons it made sense to have a NATS feed. NATS agreed - £100K per annumn plus installation.

If you go to Calais you will find a radar feed in the tower. It is provided free. It "protects" the IA at an airfield where there is almost no commercial traffic and certainly no scheduled traffic.

IMO the CAA should require NATS to provide a radar feed to any airport with an instrument approach.

Yachts have for years fitted radar reflectors. They are cheap and easy to fit. I guess the cost would be equally small for gliders and micro lights. I agree this would greatly enhance there transparency to ground based radar.