A highly successful, but questionable deployment (and not so untypical)...
http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/...700361_001.pdf
That the occupants survived is largely a matter of luck.
A quick review of a few cirrus caps deployments show that numerous listings involving scars earned in battles in which one should never have fought. From several sources...
October 2002, Texas: VFR departure after maintenance, aileron unhinged due maintenance error. 1,500 feet VFR after maneuvering, first parachute deployment by pilot in a certified production airplane
April 2004, Florida: instrument failure in IFR conditions, confusing instrument behavior, low IMC, departure climb, water in static system; low altitude, 700 feet IMC, prior to disorientation 1 uninjured
April 2004, British Colombia, Canada: VFR night cruise, loss of control, possible autopilot-induced stall, night VFR over mountains, high altitude deployment upon loss of control. landed in scree in mountaneous terrain, skidded backwards 1/4-mile, helicopter extraction via parachute risers
September 2004, California: VFR climb, autopilot-induced stall, rolled inverted, attempted recovery, activated CAPS in VMC before entering IMC above 10,000 feet 2 uninjured
Feb 2005, California, IMC, pilot reported icing at 16,000 over Sierras, high speed descent well above Vne of 204 knots CAPS failed as parachute found separated from airframe, located along track to crash site, high speed impact in mountainous area. 1 fatality
June 2005, New York: IFR on approach to KHPN, pilot incapacitated from brain seizure, loss of conciousness, awoke and recovered from Vne dive, determined numbness and loss of function in legs. Last radar report at 1,600 feet and 190 knots (well above Vpd of 133 knots) Compression fractures of vertebrae.
January 2006, Alabama: loss of control after pilot flew into severe icing, loss of control after pilot flew into icing, report at 9,000 feet in IMC. 3 uninjured
February 2006, South Dakota: pilot reported disorientation shortly after takeoff in instrument conditions, 2 uninjured
August 2006, Indiana: Instrument conditions, parachute deployed 2.5 miles from departure airport, aircraft landed in retention pond, parachute was deployed by a passenger--first deployment by non-pilot--because the pilot passed out, pilot fatality, 3 passengers injured. Parachute did not fully deploy.
September 2006, Colorado: Plane destroyed with 2 fatalities after reports of icing problems at 14,000 feet. A preliminary report from the NTSB contains the sentence "A witness in the area observed a portion of the fuselage being drug by the deployed aircraft recovery parachute."
February 2007, NSW, Australia: Fuel line pressure sensor connection cap separated and loss of pressure stopped the engine. After an approach to a freeway forced landing, CAPS was activated, the rocket fired, but got tangled with the empennage resulting in parachute undeployment. The plane impacted ground in nose down attitude seriously injuring both occupants.
April 2007, Luna, New Mexico: The pilot experienced spatial disorientation following loss of the airspeed indicator. After the terrain warning went off, CAPS was activated and the plane came to rest in a forested area.
August 2007, Nantucket Island, Mass: Two people aboard, one suffered serious injury after their Cirrus made a parachute landing on Nantucket. FAA spokeswoman Holly Baker said the Cirrus aircraft apparently was trying to land at Nantucket under visual flight rules when the weather deteriorated. She said the pilot used the plane's parachute system and the Cirrus made a hard landing, apparently hitting the guy wires of a LORAN tower in the village of Siasconset, about five miles northeast of the Nantucket airport.
Typical descent rate under a round canopy, and considered to be an acceptable descent rate, is 22 feet per second, or in other words, 1320 feet per minute. That's not a soft landing. The aircraft relies upon a crushable seat and structure to take up the impact. One might require structural deformation during a forced landing, one might not. Under the canopy, it's considered part of the process, no matter what.
What about never being there in the first place. Look some of the few deployments listed above. Cirrus would consider most of them a success, and a few may merit the deployment (pilot dies in flight, etc). However, proper preflight and planning would have prevented most of them, and nearly all have been inexperienced pilots going places they shouldn't.
The common arguement is, of course, "isn't it better that they lived?" While I don't presume to decide that, it's better that they never had to be there in the first place.
From the Cirrus Aircraft Flight Manual:
Warning: CAPS deployment is expected to result in loss of the airframe
and, depending upon adverse external factors such as high
deployment speed, low altitude, rough terrain or high wind
conditions, may result in severe injury or death to the
occupants. Because of this, CAPS should only be activated
when any other means of handling the emergency would not
protect the occupants from serious injury.
If an aileron fell off (which happened once, IIRC) I would fly using the rudder, and go to some place with a big runway. One doesn't need ailerons to fly a plane.
This isn't the first time you've suggested such a thing. However, aside from the flutter issues of an imbalanced control, have you ever attempted to remove one aileron then return to land with rudders alone? Rather presumptive.
Then there's the favorable characteristics of the airplane...not only was it never tested to a landing with the parachute out, but it wasn't tested through one spin. Thus it requires the parachute for spin recovery, reference the aircraft flight manual...
• Note • Because the SR20 has not been certified for spin recovery, the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) must be deployed if the airplane departs controlled flight.
If one intends to operate the aircraft where one should not, and to place one's self in the position of needing it, then one should perhaps deploy it. This is largely a matter of using a last ditch effort to save one's self from one's own stupidity.
I would doubt that most of those using the caps system have ever landed under a round parachute. Having used them myself, including in mountainous areas and in strong winds, I'd have very serious reservations about attempting to deploy one over anything but soft ground (and for those who haven't made a parachute landing into water, think again). Objects suspened under canopies in wind tend to swing, increasing impact forces. As mentioned before, the acceptable descent rate under a military round T-10 type canopy was 22 fps, and the CAPS does around that...about 26 to 27 fps, meaning about 1500 or 1600 feet per minute descent rate. When landing a round canopy on one's feet, it involves rolling and a "parachute landing fall" to prevent injury. I've seen some serious injuries on normal landings, anyway. Without that ability, one needs a structure which can crush around the occupant, which the cirrus does. No wonder Cirrus never tested the deployments right through to a touchdown, with occupants on board...and left that critical function to their customers...who were unable to successfully deploy one until 2002 (even though the CAPS system had been in use since 1998).
I believe I indicated 2005 previously; the first was 2002. Cirrus has continued to have other problems, of course, including control failures, but among other problems have been parachute failures.
Between 2001 and 2006 there were 19 fatal mishaps in cirrus aircraft, with the loss of 39 lives. During the same period, there were 9 CAPS deployments, some of which involved fatalities, some of which resulted in "saves."
Albert Kolk, with a little more research, turns out to be a private pilot, not flight instructor, at the time of his deployment. Cirrus has marketed largely to the non-pilot or inexperienced pilot, trying to create a product with which they can identify. An airplane modeled inside and out like a car, with advanced avionics, and a "safe" parachute. The majority of the mishaps so far haven't been mechanical failure, but pilot error. Not simply a stall-spin on final, but gross judgement errors involving intrument flight, icing, and other conditions in which the aircraft should never have been placed. The parachute has been very successful in selling the aircraft, or helping it sell. It's also very possibly responsible for the decision making process in which pilots go farther into the void than they ought, because they have their golden parachute.
Kolk's mishap report:
http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/reports/air/...p?print_view=1
Interestingly, one of the points noted in that report is that the impact force was light enough to not activate the ELT, which hampered rescue efforts.