Never do something stupid fast.

Joined: May 2001
Posts: 440
Likes: 5
From: Hampshire
SNS3,
the pby (well the ones i helped with) had a rotor / stator brake pack rather than a blader brake (ala DC3) - very effective and no chance of a bladder bursting and spraying hydraulic fluid over what maybe a hot assembly.
Chuck, your decision to reject was, in my book, the right one because you were below safe flying speed regardless of the failure.
the pby (well the ones i helped with) had a rotor / stator brake pack rather than a blader brake (ala DC3) - very effective and no chance of a bladder bursting and spraying hydraulic fluid over what maybe a hot assembly.
Chuck, your decision to reject was, in my book, the right one because you were below safe flying speed regardless of the failure.

Joined: Mar 2007
Posts: 74
Likes: 0
From: London
My worst flying experience needing a decision
I thank Chuck for starting an interesting thread. I'm not able to understand and comment on the technicalities of his situation but I like the wider decision making scenario's that he's adressing that we as all pilots are called into making very rarely in critical situations where making the wrong decision can kill us and our passengers.
I'd like to share the worst experience I have had from which I learnt a lot.
A couple of years ago I popped down to Bembridge from Elstree in my shared 172 for a boating festival. Only problem was there was no wind and it was unbearably hot. The following morning we decided to return to Elstree. The outside air temperature at 3000ft was 34 degrees C. My passenger who was a non-pilot said "what a great day for a flight", needless to say we bumped back to Elstree in unpleasant turbulence and haze !
Coming into land I knew she would want to float because of the heat, had 30 degrees of flap and came in (08 runway), a bit of sink near the trees by the lake, needed a bit of power and we floated, and floated, and floated. Half-way down I threw it away and attempted to climb away. Except nothing happened, I even looked at the throttle as I wasn't sure I'd fully advanced it, except I had. I was inching the flaps up as the stall warner was going off 30 feet above the runway and was forced to lower the nose. The trees at the other end were fast approaching. Put too much flap up too quickly we would drop like a stone, not enough and we wouldn't climb. Decision time.
Options a) cut power and hope to keep the wings level when we hit something hopefully slowly, b) keep the nose down while trying to get the flaps carefully up and at the last moment climb above the trees.
I don't know whether I made a deliberate choice but I went for b), we did I think brush the leaves but I'm here to tell the story. Second time round came in much lower to drag myself in, chopped power much earlier and made a good landing.
Sadly another pilot that day damaged their plane while landing, and the airfield was closed for a few hours at the hottest part of the day due to the excessive heat and the relatively short runway for understandable safety reasons.
This shook me up as anyone can imagine and I tried to analyse what went wrong, at an airfield I know like the back of my hand:
1. Flying in unusually very hot conditions.
2. Not making a decision to go round early enough.
3.Totally underestimating the dreadful climb performance of a 172 with 30 degree flaps from a very late go around on such a hot day.
Now as part of my pre-landing checks I always glance at the temp guage, and pay more attention to temperature in weather reports. In the UK, most pilots don't consider the effect of temperature on take off and landing distance as it very rarely causes problems.
I agree totally with Chuck that a moment considering the options when the dice are rolling against you can contribute to a safer outcome rather than an instinctive action.
LF
I'd like to share the worst experience I have had from which I learnt a lot.
A couple of years ago I popped down to Bembridge from Elstree in my shared 172 for a boating festival. Only problem was there was no wind and it was unbearably hot. The following morning we decided to return to Elstree. The outside air temperature at 3000ft was 34 degrees C. My passenger who was a non-pilot said "what a great day for a flight", needless to say we bumped back to Elstree in unpleasant turbulence and haze !
Coming into land I knew she would want to float because of the heat, had 30 degrees of flap and came in (08 runway), a bit of sink near the trees by the lake, needed a bit of power and we floated, and floated, and floated. Half-way down I threw it away and attempted to climb away. Except nothing happened, I even looked at the throttle as I wasn't sure I'd fully advanced it, except I had. I was inching the flaps up as the stall warner was going off 30 feet above the runway and was forced to lower the nose. The trees at the other end were fast approaching. Put too much flap up too quickly we would drop like a stone, not enough and we wouldn't climb. Decision time.
Options a) cut power and hope to keep the wings level when we hit something hopefully slowly, b) keep the nose down while trying to get the flaps carefully up and at the last moment climb above the trees.
I don't know whether I made a deliberate choice but I went for b), we did I think brush the leaves but I'm here to tell the story. Second time round came in much lower to drag myself in, chopped power much earlier and made a good landing.
Sadly another pilot that day damaged their plane while landing, and the airfield was closed for a few hours at the hottest part of the day due to the excessive heat and the relatively short runway for understandable safety reasons.
This shook me up as anyone can imagine and I tried to analyse what went wrong, at an airfield I know like the back of my hand:
1. Flying in unusually very hot conditions.
2. Not making a decision to go round early enough.
3.Totally underestimating the dreadful climb performance of a 172 with 30 degree flaps from a very late go around on such a hot day.
Now as part of my pre-landing checks I always glance at the temp guage, and pay more attention to temperature in weather reports. In the UK, most pilots don't consider the effect of temperature on take off and landing distance as it very rarely causes problems.
I agree totally with Chuck that a moment considering the options when the dice are rolling against you can contribute to a safer outcome rather than an instinctive action.
LF
Thread Starter
Joined: Oct 2001
Posts: 2,517
Likes: 0
From: Vancouver Island
Good morning fellow aviators I see this thread is progressing as I had hoped it would and we are still focused on the desire to hopefully learn form the experiences of others.
Contrary to what some have been suggesting my use of the private pilot forum to discuss PDM by using real life flying in the professional world has been a winner as evident by the responses of the less experienced here.
Piper.Classique has shown that the message is not really that difficult to grasp...thinking trumps acting without thinking.
Piper. C, just to touch on your post again:
How many people let themselves make stupid decisions because they have been hammered into doing it by the book? And to get back to the poster's original point - how often do you need to do anything in a hurry? If the aeroplane, or glider, or ballon or whatever is ahead of you and you are reacting instantly then you are not far short of panicking, and that is what will kill you. Like he says, slow down! Take a deep breath and THINK before you move.
I was the training pilot for The Flying Fireman in B.C. for 12 years that operated nine PBY water bombers and one of the most important lessons that I taught the crews was your best friend is inertia and you should always strive to have your friend on your side to assist you in an emergency condition. It is simple and free to have inertia helping you, all you have to do is insure you have enough speed avaliable to give you those vital moments to do nothing except think and evaluate.
To reinforce this simple fact I would have them practice engine failures just after liftoff from the water after picking up a full load of water.
I had them accelerate to five knots above the normal climb speed after liftoff and at that point close the throttle on the critical engine and do three things.
(1) Maintain the pitch attitude and keep straight with rudder.
(2) Count to ten before making taking any further actions.
(3) Check the airspeed to determine how much airspeed you have lost during during that count to ten.
The airspeed loss would have been three knots maximum.
Safety wise they were still ahead of the normal climb out airspeed because they still had two more knots than the normal climb out airspeed even though they had lost an engine and did nothing for the count of ten.
Paulc:
you are correct...the brakes on the PBY were built to stop the Titanic and your description of their working parts is correct.
I can't be bothered arguing about these side issues that de rail the intent of what I am attempting to relate....even with people who go into great detail to explain something that has no relevance to the issue being discussed.
Anyhow gang .....if nothing else we seem to be having fun here and hopefully someone will benefit from all this.
Late finals:




Contrary to what some have been suggesting my use of the private pilot forum to discuss PDM by using real life flying in the professional world has been a winner as evident by the responses of the less experienced here.
Piper.Classique has shown that the message is not really that difficult to grasp...thinking trumps acting without thinking.
Piper. C, just to touch on your post again:
How many people let themselves make stupid decisions because they have been hammered into doing it by the book? And to get back to the poster's original point - how often do you need to do anything in a hurry? If the aeroplane, or glider, or ballon or whatever is ahead of you and you are reacting instantly then you are not far short of panicking, and that is what will kill you. Like he says, slow down! Take a deep breath and THINK before you move.
I was the training pilot for The Flying Fireman in B.C. for 12 years that operated nine PBY water bombers and one of the most important lessons that I taught the crews was your best friend is inertia and you should always strive to have your friend on your side to assist you in an emergency condition. It is simple and free to have inertia helping you, all you have to do is insure you have enough speed avaliable to give you those vital moments to do nothing except think and evaluate.
To reinforce this simple fact I would have them practice engine failures just after liftoff from the water after picking up a full load of water.
I had them accelerate to five knots above the normal climb speed after liftoff and at that point close the throttle on the critical engine and do three things.
(1) Maintain the pitch attitude and keep straight with rudder.
(2) Count to ten before making taking any further actions.
(3) Check the airspeed to determine how much airspeed you have lost during during that count to ten.
The airspeed loss would have been three knots maximum.
Safety wise they were still ahead of the normal climb out airspeed because they still had two more knots than the normal climb out airspeed even though they had lost an engine and did nothing for the count of ten.
Paulc:
you are correct...the brakes on the PBY were built to stop the Titanic and your description of their working parts is correct.
I can't be bothered arguing about these side issues that de rail the intent of what I am attempting to relate....even with people who go into great detail to explain something that has no relevance to the issue being discussed.
Anyhow gang .....if nothing else we seem to be having fun here and hopefully someone will benefit from all this.
Late finals:


Joined: Jan 2004
Posts: 5,658
Likes: 501
From: Canada
I think it is time to go back to the thread title "fast hands" which is applicable to [U]any [U] size of aircraft and is something that is generally IMO poorly handled at training schools. A lot of PPL training is done in a vary cookbook fashion. The (insert bad thing here) happens and the student leaps into action to carry out what ever the vital action is and then it on to the next exercise. Yes there are a few things that demand instant action like an incipent groundloop or being suddenly subjected to heavy wake turbulance but most emergencies are not like that.
Take an engine failure in a single engine aircraft. Other than setting a slightly nose low pitch attitude there will always be a few seconds to gather your thoughts and.... after vocalizing the mandatory OH SH**.... ask the big questons
1)where should I point the airplane and
2)why did the engine stop ?
PPL's the next time you are practising emergencies make a deliberate effort to put a slow 3 count before doing anything, I think you will be surprised at how much better things go
Take an engine failure in a single engine aircraft. Other than setting a slightly nose low pitch attitude there will always be a few seconds to gather your thoughts and.... after vocalizing the mandatory OH SH**.... ask the big questons
1)where should I point the airplane and
2)why did the engine stop ?
PPL's the next time you are practising emergencies make a deliberate effort to put a slow 3 count before doing anything, I think you will be surprised at how much better things go
Joined: Oct 1999
Posts: 3,325
Likes: 2
From: UK
LF - aeroplanes don't 'float for ever' because it's hot - they do so because the approach was 'too hot'.... too fast, in other words. Nail the speed (A of A) to what it should be for that approach and there'll be minimal float, regardless of air density.
Joined: Jun 2007
Posts: 111
Likes: 0
From: florida
I am a lowely PPL, with MEIR and around 200 hours and have greatly enjoyed reading this post and benefiting from the experience of other peoples' hairy situations described within the thread.
It is interesting always to see certain people trying to snipe down what was a bloody interesting thread opener in true British aviator arrogance.
I have flown in the US and UK and there is a distinct difference in mentality between US pilots/instructors and UK Pilots/instructors. UK there is ingrained arrogance amongst FTOs towards students whereby, we are pretty much lucky to learn and throw good money at schools. US, instructors generally love flying, thats why we all do it and often want to enthuse students with trying manouvers and situations you might otherwise not.
Thankyou chuck for posting and dont feel the need to defend yourself against likes of Airborne Artist, leave him to play with his animals in the cellar.
I often wonder about an engine failiuyr at low level and whether or not to apply flap as a matter of course if landing ahead. Things like those stories above, i can imagine vividly and when/if they happen to me, my reaction will hopefully have benefited from that.
It is interesting always to see certain people trying to snipe down what was a bloody interesting thread opener in true British aviator arrogance.
I have flown in the US and UK and there is a distinct difference in mentality between US pilots/instructors and UK Pilots/instructors. UK there is ingrained arrogance amongst FTOs towards students whereby, we are pretty much lucky to learn and throw good money at schools. US, instructors generally love flying, thats why we all do it and often want to enthuse students with trying manouvers and situations you might otherwise not.
Thankyou chuck for posting and dont feel the need to defend yourself against likes of Airborne Artist, leave him to play with his animals in the cellar.
I often wonder about an engine failiuyr at low level and whether or not to apply flap as a matter of course if landing ahead. Things like those stories above, i can imagine vividly and when/if they happen to me, my reaction will hopefully have benefited from that.
Joined: Sep 2005
Posts: 1,200
Likes: 0
From: Norfolk UK
Dear Cirruscrystal,
I am a low hours UK pilot and have never been treated with contempt or disrespect by any FI, at the three schools I have used.
I had a trial flight at one school but then decided to use another as it was closer and also had a good reputation.
The CFI who gave me most of my lessons has over 50 years profesional aviation including everything from EE Lightnings to Harriers plus 20 years as an instructor and is a great chap.
The people who carried out my tailwheel training at another club were also excellent.
I've not been flying that long but have not come across people that you describe,maybe you were unlucky!
I am of a certain age and have learned that if you show respect then it is usually returned.
Yours respectfully
Lister
I am a low hours UK pilot and have never been treated with contempt or disrespect by any FI, at the three schools I have used.
I had a trial flight at one school but then decided to use another as it was closer and also had a good reputation.
The CFI who gave me most of my lessons has over 50 years profesional aviation including everything from EE Lightnings to Harriers plus 20 years as an instructor and is a great chap.
The people who carried out my tailwheel training at another club were also excellent.
I've not been flying that long but have not come across people that you describe,maybe you were unlucky!
I am of a certain age and have learned that if you show respect then it is usually returned.
Yours respectfully
Lister
Joined: Dec 2006
Posts: 649
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From: .
cirruscrystal, I think you are being very unfair towards UK FIs.
The 5 FIs at my club (I have flown with all of them, a couple of whom occasionally lurk around here on PPRuNE) are all excellent teachers, experienced pilots and also happen to be good friends. I have never ever experienced anything approaching "arrogance". My instructors also love flying, after all that is why they give up so much of their time to instruct, and from where I'm standing it shows.
I'd agree though that the thread has unfortunately been spoiled by a few individuals with some fairly acerbic comments.
The 5 FIs at my club (I have flown with all of them, a couple of whom occasionally lurk around here on PPRuNE) are all excellent teachers, experienced pilots and also happen to be good friends. I have never ever experienced anything approaching "arrogance". My instructors also love flying, after all that is why they give up so much of their time to instruct, and from where I'm standing it shows.
I'd agree though that the thread has unfortunately been spoiled by a few individuals with some fairly acerbic comments.
Thread Starter
Joined: Oct 2001
Posts: 2,517
Likes: 0
From: Vancouver Island
Please stop this back and forth non constructive sniping at each other.
I did not start this thread to have it disintegrate into arguing over issues that are not relevant to the subject.
So here is more advice, " Never say something stupid fast. "
I did not start this thread to have it disintegrate into arguing over issues that are not relevant to the subject.
So here is more advice, " Never say something stupid fast. "
Joined: Oct 2005
Posts: 3,218
Likes: 2
From: USA
I often wonder about an engine failiuyr at low level and whether or not to apply flap as a matter of course if landing ahead.
I've previously relayed the circumstances of an engine failure I had two years ago at low altitude (150' inside a narrow canyon) in a single engine airplane. I elected to continue my approach to the forced landing site with flaps up to achieve the best glide (I needed all of it), and just prior to touching down on the mountainside, I applied full flaps. I did so to allow surface contact with minimum energy, and also to put more material down to absorb the impact. The Dromader M18T I was flying has large flaps which hang down below the airplane, and I wanted that extra metal out there not just to slow me down in flight with drag, but to absorb energy should surface objects be struck. (Much like putting the fuselage between trees to let the wings absorb the impact energy, when going down in a heavily wooded area).
You need to consider your circumstance. Applying flaps earlier wouldn't have permitted me to clear the powerline I did, just before touchdown. It ran along a fence line that bordered the area in which I touched down. Know your airplane and what it can do. Making a configuration change close to the ground means you're not stabilized; this can be a control issue for you. It may also provided a needed stall margin. It will certainly affect your descent rate and angle, and particularly at low level once you've applied them, you're fairly committed to continuing with flaps...your options have become limited. Nothing is written in stone that says you must have a long stable approach into an emergency landing site...but you also want to make sure you can remain in control. Look at it this way; how often do you practice power off approaches to a forced landing while applying flaps at the last moment?
Not saying you shouldn't do it. I will say that you should practice doing it first until you're comfortable with it and I suggest you do it at first with an instructor.
Joined: Oct 2005
Posts: 3,218
Likes: 2
From: USA
Chuck,
I think that supports your original premise of never acting too quickly. I've always phrased it as "fast hands kill," but it's the same thing.
One of my pet peeves, if you will, is hearing someone say "but that's the way I was taught." It makes one wonder if they were taught to jump off the proverbial bridge, would they do it? My inevitable response is "But, what have you learned?"
Simple things...in an engine-out situation, for example, will a student attempt to fly a downwind, base, and final to the forced landing site simply because the student's never done anything else? Or will the student act to do whatever is necessary to put the airplane down safely? I've seen too many who feel that they can only act within the "box" that they were taught, never thinking outside the box.
Over the years I've had to grab pilot's hands when they attempted to shut down the wrong engine, following a failure. Once, in a heavily loaded PB4Y on the way out to a fire...bad time to be shutting down a second engine. Fast hands kill...acting out of instinct rather than thinking...there just aren't that many things that need to be done quickly in an airplane. In the C-130, when we had an engine fire indication (which occasionally happened), we sat on our hands for a ten count, made a 90 degree turn, then waited another ten or so before evaluating. Optical sensors in the nacelles would pick up sun reflections and give false warnings. No sense shutting down something unnecessarily or rushing to create a problem when one didn't exist. And so it goes.
Students are taught after an engine failure to land straight ahead if they haven't reached a target altitude. This is common sense and proper, to a point. Attempting to turn back to the runway too low can result on focusing on the runway and a control loss. However, I've talked to more than a few pilots who felt they couldn't turn a few degrees this way or that, even 90 degrees, to miss a building, tree, or other obstacle, or to reach a nice open field to one side of the departure end of the runway. The student was so focused on doing only what was taught that the student was shackled into thinking only along that track. Anything else would be inconceivable. This isn't right.
During a parachute jump some years ago I had a total malfunction involving the main bridle and pilot chute entangled around my arm. I had few jumps at the time, and training involving a malfunction was straight-forward. Cut away the main and deploy the reserve parachute. However, while my parachute had started to deploy, the actual parachute wasn't off my back yet; it was still in the pack tray. Cutting away would have meant even more material floating around above my back (loose risers) as I attempted to deploy the reserve. I automatically reached for the cutaway handle, but stopped to think, realized it not only wouldn't help but could hurt, and simply deployed the reserve, instead.
On another occasion, I experienced a stuck pilot chute. The pilot chute must be removed from a pouch and hand thrown, and it deploys the main parachute. A new pocket had been sewn for it by a rigger, and the pocket was fine on the ground, but pulled tight and trapped the pilot chute When the rig was worn during the jump. I was unable to remove the pilot chute. I was already low when I discovered this fact, and as I pulled on it, I made one more effort at a good tug on the handle, and tumbled over onto my back. Altimeters don't read correctly on your back, and fall rate changes. I arched and returned face to earth, to find myself very rapidly closing on the ground. I still had the pilot chute handle in one hand, and suddenly had a very clear recollection of the fatality reports I've read over the years...so many cases of witnesses seeing a jumper go all the way to his death desperately tugging on a stuck handle or even part of his jump harness. I realized I was becoming that person, abandoned the handle, and deployed the reserve...and hit the ground shortly thereafter. Taking the time to think, to choose the right decision, may save one's life. Being too quick to make the wrong choice can kill, but the decision as to which path to take always rests with the one in in the hotseat.
I think that supports your original premise of never acting too quickly. I've always phrased it as "fast hands kill," but it's the same thing.
One of my pet peeves, if you will, is hearing someone say "but that's the way I was taught." It makes one wonder if they were taught to jump off the proverbial bridge, would they do it? My inevitable response is "But, what have you learned?"
Simple things...in an engine-out situation, for example, will a student attempt to fly a downwind, base, and final to the forced landing site simply because the student's never done anything else? Or will the student act to do whatever is necessary to put the airplane down safely? I've seen too many who feel that they can only act within the "box" that they were taught, never thinking outside the box.
Over the years I've had to grab pilot's hands when they attempted to shut down the wrong engine, following a failure. Once, in a heavily loaded PB4Y on the way out to a fire...bad time to be shutting down a second engine. Fast hands kill...acting out of instinct rather than thinking...there just aren't that many things that need to be done quickly in an airplane. In the C-130, when we had an engine fire indication (which occasionally happened), we sat on our hands for a ten count, made a 90 degree turn, then waited another ten or so before evaluating. Optical sensors in the nacelles would pick up sun reflections and give false warnings. No sense shutting down something unnecessarily or rushing to create a problem when one didn't exist. And so it goes.
Students are taught after an engine failure to land straight ahead if they haven't reached a target altitude. This is common sense and proper, to a point. Attempting to turn back to the runway too low can result on focusing on the runway and a control loss. However, I've talked to more than a few pilots who felt they couldn't turn a few degrees this way or that, even 90 degrees, to miss a building, tree, or other obstacle, or to reach a nice open field to one side of the departure end of the runway. The student was so focused on doing only what was taught that the student was shackled into thinking only along that track. Anything else would be inconceivable. This isn't right.
During a parachute jump some years ago I had a total malfunction involving the main bridle and pilot chute entangled around my arm. I had few jumps at the time, and training involving a malfunction was straight-forward. Cut away the main and deploy the reserve parachute. However, while my parachute had started to deploy, the actual parachute wasn't off my back yet; it was still in the pack tray. Cutting away would have meant even more material floating around above my back (loose risers) as I attempted to deploy the reserve. I automatically reached for the cutaway handle, but stopped to think, realized it not only wouldn't help but could hurt, and simply deployed the reserve, instead.
On another occasion, I experienced a stuck pilot chute. The pilot chute must be removed from a pouch and hand thrown, and it deploys the main parachute. A new pocket had been sewn for it by a rigger, and the pocket was fine on the ground, but pulled tight and trapped the pilot chute When the rig was worn during the jump. I was unable to remove the pilot chute. I was already low when I discovered this fact, and as I pulled on it, I made one more effort at a good tug on the handle, and tumbled over onto my back. Altimeters don't read correctly on your back, and fall rate changes. I arched and returned face to earth, to find myself very rapidly closing on the ground. I still had the pilot chute handle in one hand, and suddenly had a very clear recollection of the fatality reports I've read over the years...so many cases of witnesses seeing a jumper go all the way to his death desperately tugging on a stuck handle or even part of his jump harness. I realized I was becoming that person, abandoned the handle, and deployed the reserve...and hit the ground shortly thereafter. Taking the time to think, to choose the right decision, may save one's life. Being too quick to make the wrong choice can kill, but the decision as to which path to take always rests with the one in in the hotseat.
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SNS
I don't know much about flying (only a few hundred hours in VMC), but I know quite a lot about human behaviour and learning.
I can understand why the ab initio training focuses on operant conditioning (that is teaching a response to an event), since I guess the logic is that people with little experience will likely freeze under stress unless there is a clear, programmed response to the stimulus.
No doubt in the early days, if one takes a hard pragmatic view, fewer people die that way.
I can also completely relate to your view that the same conditioning can kill people.
Perhaps the challenge is how to handle the crossover stage, e.g. the point at which the pilot has enough experience to start to think clearly as you decribe.
My impression is that, post PPL, there is little support to encourage that decision making and the only contact most PPLs have with an instructor is for a biennial, where they are taken back to the PPL 'learning by rote' responses.
Therefore, I think that we owe Chuck a vote of thanks for raising this subject and also to the other contributors who have shared their greater experience to help the many on here expand there horizons
I don't know much about flying (only a few hundred hours in VMC), but I know quite a lot about human behaviour and learning.
I can understand why the ab initio training focuses on operant conditioning (that is teaching a response to an event), since I guess the logic is that people with little experience will likely freeze under stress unless there is a clear, programmed response to the stimulus.
No doubt in the early days, if one takes a hard pragmatic view, fewer people die that way.
I can also completely relate to your view that the same conditioning can kill people.
Perhaps the challenge is how to handle the crossover stage, e.g. the point at which the pilot has enough experience to start to think clearly as you decribe.
My impression is that, post PPL, there is little support to encourage that decision making and the only contact most PPLs have with an instructor is for a biennial, where they are taken back to the PPL 'learning by rote' responses.
Therefore, I think that we owe Chuck a vote of thanks for raising this subject and also to the other contributors who have shared their greater experience to help the many on here expand there horizons
Joined: Oct 2005
Posts: 3,218
Likes: 2
From: USA
I guess the logic is that people with little experience will likely freeze under stress unless there is a clear, programmed response to the stimulus.
I fall back on that in primary instruction when in an airplane such as a Cessna 152, my initial instruction involves one airspeed; climb at one airspeed, approach to land at one airspeed, and use that same airspeed in the event of an engine-out. We later begin to expand on that and explore different ways of configuring, climbing, approaching to land, etc...just as a student expands into learning soft and short field takeoffs and landings, slips to landing, no flap landings, etc...but everyone has to start somewhere, and learning habits that are crucial to survival in an emergency are important.
That said, many pilots today aren't properly taught that there are two important glide speeds; one is best glide distance, but the other is minimum sink...many students are never taught about minimum sink, and their instructors probably aren't familiar, either. These in turn are important in understanding the drag and power curves, which help explain performance throughout the flight range. Understanding these and how they apply to your airplane help understand what's going on and maintaining situational awareness in unusual or emergency situations.
Perhaps the challenge is how to handle the crossover stage, e.g. the point at which the pilot has enough experience to start to think clearly as you decribe.
The "crossover stage" is really an on going evolution in which we are all a student. How we understand it changes with time. A wise man once said that the best part of growing older is that we get to experience the same things from a different perspective.
I would submit that while the goal is always mastery, and therefore making the flower just a flower again, one can never let go of the concept that there is more to be learned, and more way to learn it. It's a process that can't be rushed, but should be approached with caution, always remembering that the flower is more complex than one may realize. It's with that in mind that one can really come to appreciate the beauty of what we do, which is to perfect flight. It's a job which is never finished.

The perspective is a little hard to see in this picture, but the bottom of the side canopy door hanging down sits about six feet of the ground. The hilltop behind the airplane is about 9,000', and the elevation of the resting site is about 5,000' above sea level. The aircraft was actually stopped by the wood piling up between the main landing gear, and other than a collapsed tailwheel assembly, no other damage occured (beside the toasted engine, which was done before the aircraft ever reached the ground).
Last edited by SNS3Guppy; 23rd April 2008 at 22:05. Reason: added picture, forced landing
Thread Starter
Joined: Oct 2001
Posts: 2,517
Likes: 0
From: Vancouver Island
Teaching people to be aviators is the highest position in aviation that one can aspire to.
Teaching can not be learned from books.
The best teachers instill confidence in the student by the manner in which the teacher demonstrates, explains and then allows the student to mimic the exercise.
The best teachers endeavor to be certain the student really does understand the exercise before going on to another.
The best teachers endeavour to keep things simple until the student is ready to be taught more advanced exercises.
Confidence is best instilled in the student by speaking in a normal voice and never showing displeasure with the students efforts.
Teaching can not be learned from books.
The best teachers instill confidence in the student by the manner in which the teacher demonstrates, explains and then allows the student to mimic the exercise.
The best teachers endeavor to be certain the student really does understand the exercise before going on to another.
The best teachers endeavour to keep things simple until the student is ready to be taught more advanced exercises.
Confidence is best instilled in the student by speaking in a normal voice and never showing displeasure with the students efforts.
Joined: Apr 2008
Posts: 1,086
Likes: 36
From: France
Chuck said
Thank you Chuck, for a relevant and interesting post (well, you did start the thread, so it would be , wouldn't it?
)
I now want to ask you and other posters what you think of allowing instructing to degenerate into a way of building hours towards a commercial licence. If you feel this is too far from the original thread, why don't we move my question to a new thread? I saw students suffering from hour builders when I was instructing in UK, and hated seeing it. While instructing is a route to the airlines it takes a very strong minded person to focus on the goal of helping a student pilot become an airman. Right now I am learing to instruct on microlights here in France, after not teaching for fifteen years, and one of the joys is that none of my students are learning for any reason other than the pleasure of being in the air. We get to do so much fun stuff, and can take the time to really explore the aeroplane and its capacities.
Teaching people to be aviators is the highest position in aviation that one can aspire to.
)I now want to ask you and other posters what you think of allowing instructing to degenerate into a way of building hours towards a commercial licence. If you feel this is too far from the original thread, why don't we move my question to a new thread? I saw students suffering from hour builders when I was instructing in UK, and hated seeing it. While instructing is a route to the airlines it takes a very strong minded person to focus on the goal of helping a student pilot become an airman. Right now I am learing to instruct on microlights here in France, after not teaching for fifteen years, and one of the joys is that none of my students are learning for any reason other than the pleasure of being in the air. We get to do so much fun stuff, and can take the time to really explore the aeroplane and its capacities.
The Original Whirly

Joined: Feb 1999
Aviation Qualifications: CPL
Posts: 4,327
Likes: 2
From: Belper, Derbyshire, UK
Don't let's discuss something new on this thread! We haven't covered all the important points of the original topic yet!!!!
I know from experience that in an emergency, even a minor one, your brain can freeze. Your mind feels like cotton wool, thinking slows down, and decision-making is incredibly difficult. I haven't got time to give examples; I have to go to work, and anyway I don't want to cloud the issue with details. Trust me, this is true, and it's not just me; it's pretty common. You can also go into denial...this can't be happening!!!
In this sort of situation a conditioned response is incredibly useful, simply because it doesn't require thought; you do what you've practised. But as discussed above, conditioned responses can get in the way too. So what do we do, and how should we teach? Chuck???? Anyone????
I know from experience that in an emergency, even a minor one, your brain can freeze. Your mind feels like cotton wool, thinking slows down, and decision-making is incredibly difficult. I haven't got time to give examples; I have to go to work, and anyway I don't want to cloud the issue with details. Trust me, this is true, and it's not just me; it's pretty common. You can also go into denial...this can't be happening!!!
In this sort of situation a conditioned response is incredibly useful, simply because it doesn't require thought; you do what you've practised. But as discussed above, conditioned responses can get in the way too. So what do we do, and how should we teach? Chuck???? Anyone????
Joined: Oct 2005
Posts: 3,218
Likes: 2
From: USA
Sensory overload is a common reaction to a situation in which disbelief supplants the ability to think. It's a sign of unpreparedness. That is, one who encounters a situation in which one is either too frightened to act or unable to do so for reasons of disbelief, should never have gone there. One who flies and airplane and is unprepared to handle an engine failure, fire, loss of directional control, communications loss, etc, shouldn't be flying that airplane.
An instructor who lets a student out on their own who hasn't prepared a student has failed the student. A student who encounters an emergency for the first time on their own has been failed by the instructor. The student should have already been there with the instructor, and the student shouldn't see it as an emergency, but an abnormal situation which has been made routine. Expect the engine to fail. Expect a fire. Expect an electrical failure. Never assume these things are a matter of if, but when. Not if they will happen, but merely a matter of when. Be prepared for the when.
You should never be aloft without having a place picked out, moment by moment, where you'll go in an emergency. A place to divert, a place to make a forced landing, a decision made. We refer to this as being ahead of the airplane. Sometimes pilots fly so far behind their airplane that they'll never be hurt by a crash...they'll arrive 30 minutes later. It's said that one the airplane should never go where your mind hasn't been 30 seconds earlier.
Dealing with the unexpected events which arise is largely a matter of letting go. Don't be tied to what was, several second ago. That's ancient history. Own what is now. Abandon the past, abandon your need for security by asking how this can be happening or why, and simply deal with the airplane in the moment. Work with what you've got. How you've been trained is how you'll fly; train often, review often, and be prepared.
During an emergency is not the time to figure things out...that should have been done before you ever left the ground.
An instructor who lets a student out on their own who hasn't prepared a student has failed the student. A student who encounters an emergency for the first time on their own has been failed by the instructor. The student should have already been there with the instructor, and the student shouldn't see it as an emergency, but an abnormal situation which has been made routine. Expect the engine to fail. Expect a fire. Expect an electrical failure. Never assume these things are a matter of if, but when. Not if they will happen, but merely a matter of when. Be prepared for the when.
You should never be aloft without having a place picked out, moment by moment, where you'll go in an emergency. A place to divert, a place to make a forced landing, a decision made. We refer to this as being ahead of the airplane. Sometimes pilots fly so far behind their airplane that they'll never be hurt by a crash...they'll arrive 30 minutes later. It's said that one the airplane should never go where your mind hasn't been 30 seconds earlier.
Dealing with the unexpected events which arise is largely a matter of letting go. Don't be tied to what was, several second ago. That's ancient history. Own what is now. Abandon the past, abandon your need for security by asking how this can be happening or why, and simply deal with the airplane in the moment. Work with what you've got. How you've been trained is how you'll fly; train often, review often, and be prepared.
During an emergency is not the time to figure things out...that should have been done before you ever left the ground.
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Whirly
IMO, not "what", but "when" and "how."
The PPL syllabus pretty much ends at PPL - where is the follow on syllabus for more experienced PPLs?
Airline pilots have recurrent training in a sim environment, lots of learning there (I'm lucky I had 15 hours with a TRE in a sim and learned a huge amount about flying, even though I will never be competent to fly the arcraft type the sim was simming)
IMO, not "what", but "when" and "how."
The PPL syllabus pretty much ends at PPL - where is the follow on syllabus for more experienced PPLs?
Airline pilots have recurrent training in a sim environment, lots of learning there (I'm lucky I had 15 hours with a TRE in a sim and learned a huge amount about flying, even though I will never be competent to fly the arcraft type the sim was simming)



