'Israelification' of Airports: High Security, Little Bother
Guys, the guy from Amsterdam was profiled in Amsterdam. Israeli style. All passengers flying on American carriers are profiled in Amsterdam.
Profiling is not perfect.
I takes a lot of time.
It takes a lot of manforce.
It is neigh impossible to do on a large scale and still continue to fly like we do now.
Profiling is not perfect.
I takes a lot of time.
It takes a lot of manforce.
It is neigh impossible to do on a large scale and still continue to fly like we do now.
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Guys, the guy from Amsterdam was profiled in Amsterdam. [Israeli] TSA style. All passengers flying on American carriers are profiled in Amsterdam.
I have been through the [profiling] interview several times and it does not have the thoroughness of the profiling El Al performs. It is easy to learn the "correct" answers to the TSA questions.
TSA has nothing to do with profiling in AMS. It is not as over the top as in Israel, but if you talk about peacetime profiling, the Amsterdam style is the closest workeable thing. And even that would mean the end of air travel as we know it.
Of course, the questions you could memorize are the standard questions that everyone gets. But that is not profiling. You were profiled before any questions were asked and deemed safe, hence no further questions. Think about it.
Of course, the questions you could memorize are the standard questions that everyone gets. But that is not profiling. You were profiled before any questions were asked and deemed safe, hence no further questions. Think about it.
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AS I said in my post #39
So, come on. Let's have some ideas.
how about each of the contributors to this thread coming up with their ideas for a beginning to end security process that enables passengers and crew to get from the drop-off point to the aircraft in minimal time and that ensures flight safety WITHOUT the delays, humiliation, degradation and sheer bloody mindedness that they have to suffer at UK airports now.
Well, if you are now already so annoyed by having to remove your shoes or your laptop, how annoyed do you think you will be after you have to explain to a security guard all your private travel details, because that is exactly what profiling leads to. So if you want profiling, make sure you want it for the right reasons.
And also accept that you will need to be at the airport hours before departure for even a domestic flight.
And also accept that you will need to be at the airport hours before departure for even a domestic flight.
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Xeque: "let's have some ideas"
1. Imprison any government official or politician who claims that 100% security can be achieved.
2. Aim for a reasonable level of safety (under 1 plane loss/yr due to terrorist/criminal activity; for comparison, there were a total of 30 fatal airline accidents in 2009).
3. Design the security checkpoint and procedures with a smooth passenger flow in mind.
4. Have enough personnel and equipment available to avoid formation of queues.
5. Be polite, smile and say "please". DON'T SHOUT!
1. Imprison any government official or politician who claims that 100% security can be achieved.
2. Aim for a reasonable level of safety (under 1 plane loss/yr due to terrorist/criminal activity; for comparison, there were a total of 30 fatal airline accidents in 2009).
3. Design the security checkpoint and procedures with a smooth passenger flow in mind.
4. Have enough personnel and equipment available to avoid formation of queues.
5. Be polite, smile and say "please". DON'T SHOUT!
Last edited by MathFox; 4th Jan 2010 at 12:19. Reason: more ideas
Define the problem first Xeque.
The problem we percieve with security in the UK has greatly to do with mentality. Mentality on both sides of the x-ray machine I must say.
Yes, the UK has one of the most ridiculous implementations of security procedures. And some people manning the checkpoints are idiots. But we as UK pilots also have a huge chip on the shoulder and some of us are quite idiotic too. Put those two together et voila. All in all I have not queued longer than 15 minutes at any UK airport, and as a commuter I see a lot of airports, crew and passenger side! So that is not too bad. Come check out how long the passengers queue in Amsterdam before they can be profiled and you will think twice about profiling.
Now as Math says, begin to accept that there is no foolproof solution to the security problem. You can build a brick wall around the airport, you can subject everyone to a cavity search and still clever bad people will find a way around it. You can profile as much as you want, it will only lead to massive costs, delays, hassle, loss of privacy and still some Nigerian bloke will slip through the net, not to speak of all the intelligence networks set up by Bush the maniac. So...
The problem we percieve with security in the UK has greatly to do with mentality. Mentality on both sides of the x-ray machine I must say.
Yes, the UK has one of the most ridiculous implementations of security procedures. And some people manning the checkpoints are idiots. But we as UK pilots also have a huge chip on the shoulder and some of us are quite idiotic too. Put those two together et voila. All in all I have not queued longer than 15 minutes at any UK airport, and as a commuter I see a lot of airports, crew and passenger side! So that is not too bad. Come check out how long the passengers queue in Amsterdam before they can be profiled and you will think twice about profiling.
Now as Math says, begin to accept that there is no foolproof solution to the security problem. You can build a brick wall around the airport, you can subject everyone to a cavity search and still clever bad people will find a way around it. You can profile as much as you want, it will only lead to massive costs, delays, hassle, loss of privacy and still some Nigerian bloke will slip through the net, not to speak of all the intelligence networks set up by Bush the maniac. So...
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The article would have earned more respect had the author (writing out of unashamed self-interest) been up-front and admitted how heavily the Israelis rely on RACIAL profiling. How many Arab-Israelis are dealt with in 25 minutes? Or indeed how many white UK citizens? Every colleague who has been there has experienced at least 90 minutes of deeply unpleasant and intrusive interviews which bear little relation to his account.
We could endlessly debate whether or not such profiling is wrong; but to arrogantly and dishonestly claim to have invented some "magic bullet" that the rest of the world must copy doesn't help anyone.
We could endlessly debate whether or not such profiling is wrong; but to arrogantly and dishonestly claim to have invented some "magic bullet" that the rest of the world must copy doesn't help anyone.
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Impact on Airports
I don't understand why the Airport owners are not more vocal in this whole security mess.
I went through LHR a few times shortly after the liquid ban came into effect. The check-in and security lines were horrendous. At T4 the lines snaked their way out of the terminal into a covered tent and out again into the street.
When I eventually made it to airside the shops were deserted - there simply was not time. OK things have got marginally better now but I bet you that added security = loss of takings in the shops - why aren't the Airport owners seeking a better solution on behalf of us all - what will be good for us will be good for them - won't it?
bizdev
I went through LHR a few times shortly after the liquid ban came into effect. The check-in and security lines were horrendous. At T4 the lines snaked their way out of the terminal into a covered tent and out again into the street.
When I eventually made it to airside the shops were deserted - there simply was not time. OK things have got marginally better now but I bet you that added security = loss of takings in the shops - why aren't the Airport owners seeking a better solution on behalf of us all - what will be good for us will be good for them - won't it?
bizdev
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And for all those who repeatedly state that EL Al security is not relevant because either they (A) only look for Moslems, or (B) Moslems and peace loving citizens stay away from El Al, reading about AM Murphy will be enlightening. There have been other cases before and after AM Murphy, all involved passport holders that were "Western, caucasian, non-Moslem" in origin.
Suggesting to "Israelize" the system is not suggesting to fully implement El Al's, but rather to use the latter's expertise to better our/your own.
With experience of multiple trips to Gaza via Tel Aviv and vice versa, may I advise people not to think for one moment that the Israeli process is (a) no bother, or (b) done by intelligent people.
As an elderly Caucasian consultant, I was routinely pulled over on departure for a fatuous interrogation by an idiot, but only if the word Gaza was mentioned. And please, please don't tell me that I just didn't realise that this is part of the process and that the interviewer was not really stupid, but a skilled intelligence officer. I can tell the difference.
The same process happens on arrival at Tel Aviv, if you are travelling in that direction. Immigration gives your passport to a team of teenage cretins, who usher you off to a quiet spot.
TC1; "Why do you want to go to Gaza?" "It's in my contract."
TC2; "Where will you live?" "At the Beach."
TC3; "Who will you meet?" "Ali bin Falaan and his brother Ahmad".
All TCs write down this rubbish carefully in their exercise books.
As an elderly Caucasian consultant, I was routinely pulled over on departure for a fatuous interrogation by an idiot, but only if the word Gaza was mentioned. And please, please don't tell me that I just didn't realise that this is part of the process and that the interviewer was not really stupid, but a skilled intelligence officer. I can tell the difference.
The same process happens on arrival at Tel Aviv, if you are travelling in that direction. Immigration gives your passport to a team of teenage cretins, who usher you off to a quiet spot.
TC1; "Why do you want to go to Gaza?" "It's in my contract."
TC2; "Where will you live?" "At the Beach."
TC3; "Who will you meet?" "Ali bin Falaan and his brother Ahmad".
All TCs write down this rubbish carefully in their exercise books.
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Knowing airports, particularly SPL, I wonder sometimes if people do realize what it means to run an airport with 130.000 pax handlings per day - 7647 per hour.
To run a thorough check means a large number of trained staff in an environment that changes continually. El Al started at SPL by separating their pax from the other airlines, checking their luggage by hand, followed by another check on the 'buffer' at that time - mid 70' s the gate was not used. Pax were brought by buses to the platform.
Before entering the a/c all remaning handluggage was checked again and bottles etc. separated and put in rows on the platform. The whole check lasted for some hours, 2 - 3 depending on the flight.
Today, such would be impossible in terms of time and money.
Presently all current checks are done by 'normal' security staff, without any specific training - the papers were very clear when they laid out how strict the security measurements are in real.
Another point is that you might close your front door but do remember that the backdoor is left wide open. The backdoor is everything that moves in the luggage cellars and works in and around the platform.
Israelification? Why not. But it is not sufficient for running the daily SPL show moderately safely.
A total redesign of airport security is necessary. Not favored by politicians, airport authorities and airline operators. Not to speak of the pax.
To run a thorough check means a large number of trained staff in an environment that changes continually. El Al started at SPL by separating their pax from the other airlines, checking their luggage by hand, followed by another check on the 'buffer' at that time - mid 70' s the gate was not used. Pax were brought by buses to the platform.
Before entering the a/c all remaning handluggage was checked again and bottles etc. separated and put in rows on the platform. The whole check lasted for some hours, 2 - 3 depending on the flight.
Today, such would be impossible in terms of time and money.
Presently all current checks are done by 'normal' security staff, without any specific training - the papers were very clear when they laid out how strict the security measurements are in real.
Another point is that you might close your front door but do remember that the backdoor is left wide open. The backdoor is everything that moves in the luggage cellars and works in and around the platform.
Israelification? Why not. But it is not sufficient for running the daily SPL show moderately safely.
A total redesign of airport security is necessary. Not favored by politicians, airport authorities and airline operators. Not to speak of the pax.
Giolla, saying that the security staff at AMS have no specific training is saying that pilots have no training either. The staff ARE trained. They follow a basic course which allows them to man the standard security checks, after which there is on the job training. On top of that, to profile there is an intensive follow up course which is much thougher and longer, followed by more on the job training.
Of course they won't hold a PhD in AVSEC, but neither do pilots know anything really worthwhile about aerodynamics...
Since when do we believe the papers to be correct when they report anything related to aviation? We should know better on PPRuNe! Look, I'm not trying to defend the way things are done in security. I just know it a bit from the inside, and it is not helpful in a discussion like this to say things that are just not true, or worse, quoted from a newspaper.
Of course they won't hold a PhD in AVSEC, but neither do pilots know anything really worthwhile about aerodynamics...
Since when do we believe the papers to be correct when they report anything related to aviation? We should know better on PPRuNe! Look, I'm not trying to defend the way things are done in security. I just know it a bit from the inside, and it is not helpful in a discussion like this to say things that are just not true, or worse, quoted from a newspaper.
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Read the beginning
I would like to be able to see a comparison between the two systems.
Taking into account how many incidents, regardless of what it was. Be it a suicide bomber, attempted bomb planting, hijacking etc..
Looking at their methods, it doesn't seem that bad if this is what they are doing.
Of course one may not be able to use their ideas in the UK to the fullest but perhaps take on board a bit of it?
The examples of bomb proof etc and so on should be taken on board.
Taking into account how many incidents, regardless of what it was. Be it a suicide bomber, attempted bomb planting, hijacking etc..
Looking at their methods, it doesn't seem that bad if this is what they are doing.
Of course one may not be able to use their ideas in the UK to the fullest but perhaps take on board a bit of it?
The examples of bomb proof etc and so on should be taken on board.
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@ Perko
I know the coy that carries out the checks. On top of that, to prove the present insufficient security, a UK photographer managed to get a syringe through the gate that escaped the security staff.
A shiftleader of this coy explained explicitly how she had a few hours basic training followed by many complaints of workload and working conditions fromother staffmembers.
You cannot improve technical matters only, you should improve the whole system, reducing chances, and that is what counts. Again, the system must be redesigned as a whole rather than shifting all responsibility to humans who are obliged to do their work on a commercial basis instead of achievement.
I know the coy that carries out the checks. On top of that, to prove the present insufficient security, a UK photographer managed to get a syringe through the gate that escaped the security staff.
A shiftleader of this coy explained explicitly how she had a few hours basic training followed by many complaints of workload and working conditions fromother staffmembers.
You cannot improve technical matters only, you should improve the whole system, reducing chances, and that is what counts. Again, the system must be redesigned as a whole rather than shifting all responsibility to humans who are obliged to do their work on a commercial basis instead of achievement.
Giolla, you quote directly from the Telegraaf, not Holland's most respected newspaper. The story from that shiftleader is BS. Anyone who has or had anything to do professionally with security at AMS will confirm that.
Managing to get a seringe through is, well, not the most difficult thing to do, neither the most worrysome. Again, not that security is perfect, checks get missed, and as you said earlier, I agree that the backdoor is quite open. But then again, how do you secure an airport properly whilst maintaining reasonable efficiency? If you have the answer to that...
Managing to get a seringe through is, well, not the most difficult thing to do, neither the most worrysome. Again, not that security is perfect, checks get missed, and as you said earlier, I agree that the backdoor is quite open. But then again, how do you secure an airport properly whilst maintaining reasonable efficiency? If you have the answer to that...
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From what I read here, it seems that profiling at Ben Gurion results in 3% being subjected to more stringent searches. I suspect that the same profiling at a major international hub would result in a much higher percentage, since the people who travel through Ben Gurion are a more biased sample of the world's population. The advantage gained would then be limited.
In essence, you are looking for people very different from "the average passenger" at your airport or for your airline. That's much easier for a specialist airport/carrier like Ben Gurion or El Al than it is for an international hub or carrier like BA, where the range of passengers is much more diverse.
In essence, you are looking for people very different from "the average passenger" at your airport or for your airline. That's much easier for a specialist airport/carrier like Ben Gurion or El Al than it is for an international hub or carrier like BA, where the range of passengers is much more diverse.
I imagine quite a number who are writing here have never transited an Israeli airport, and are working on hearsay.
My most recent experience, at Ovda, was that the Israeli "security" staff there appeared to be trained-last-week recent school leavers. Not one appeared to be over the age of 25. They didn't appear to have much of a clue about their substance testing technology, where they spent most of the the time looking puzzled, resetting, opening up the covers, and going for assistance.
As far as giving confidence in procedures was concerned, we got the exact opposite impression.
One thing among all this novice approach, they were never rude to the passengers. Their sentences may have been parroted without sincerity from their training manual, but there was none of the shouting and going red in the face that you get at Gatwick or LAX.
My most recent experience, at Ovda, was that the Israeli "security" staff there appeared to be trained-last-week recent school leavers. Not one appeared to be over the age of 25. They didn't appear to have much of a clue about their substance testing technology, where they spent most of the the time looking puzzled, resetting, opening up the covers, and going for assistance.
As far as giving confidence in procedures was concerned, we got the exact opposite impression.
One thing among all this novice approach, they were never rude to the passengers. Their sentences may have been parroted without sincerity from their training manual, but there was none of the shouting and going red in the face that you get at Gatwick or LAX.
"First, the screening area is surrounded by contoured, blast-proof glass that can contain the detonation of up to 100 kilos of plastic explosive"
How thick does glass have to be protect against 100kg plastic Explosive? I'd hazard at few meters...
How thick does glass have to be protect against 100kg plastic Explosive? I'd hazard at few meters...
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From what I read here, it seems that profiling at Ben Gurion results in 3% being subjected to more stringent searches. I suspect that the same profiling at a major international hub would result in a much higher percentage, since the people who travel through Ben Gurion are a more biased sample of the world's population.