'Israelification' of Airports: High Security, Little Bother

[Sallyann1234]

Basic intelligence would dictate, profiling is a must.
The Israelis are pretty good at this, so they could teach us a thing or two.

As the primary target, their security is necessarily very tight and they may well be able to teach something. But the Israelis have very little need for profiling per se because their passengers are effectively self-profiling.

This is very evident if you fly El Al and look around the departure lounge. The types of passenger who would attract special attention by profiling are notable by their absence, since they are generally people who have no need or wish to visit Israel and/or would choose to fly by other airlines.

Other carriers and routes have a greater need for profiling because they carry a much broader cross-section of people.

[Dairyground]

I well remember your type - hostile, sulking individuals, always full of indignant pomposity and sympathy for those who have brought this blight upon the world.

As is almost invariable when a topic touches Israel, two opposing and largely irrelevant viewpoints intrude, with assertions that, to the uninvolved, could come equally well from either side.

But, to get back to the thread. My one experience of flying out of Tel Aviv was after attending a large international conference last Autumn. We were advised to wear our conference badges, as that would ease out passage through the various security checks, but also to arrive three hours before SDT.

It took me only 25 minutes to get from kerbside to shopping, but that was at five in the morning. It had taken about as long, even through the "fast track" at Heathrow T5 on the outward trip. However, a group of Korean delegates from the same conference had been delayed so long in the system the previous afternoon that they missed their flight.

So, with plenty of space and time, provided you don't look too different, the Israeli system can work, but it probably helps if you have a fairly homogeneous set of customers, unlike the heterogeneous lot that pass through many major airports.

And of course, should profiling be put in place as a major part of the flight security system, the terrorists will aim to recruit people unknown to the security services and ensure that visits to their training establishments do not show up in travel documents and other histories. Perhaps the latest incident, using a black African, is the first sign of a move in that direction.

[No_Speed_Restriction]

It's all in the wording. A peaceful approach deserves a generous answer. By the way, I used work for an Israeli carrier and the amount of holes in security you wouldnt believe. I never used to get x-rayed when flying out of TLV on internal flights. All they used to do is check my name on the security register; big deal.

[MathFox]

I like to repeat my opinions:
The Israeli system of airport/airline security requires a significant investment of resources (15 minute or longer interview/embarkation). Is it worth it considering the number of attempted attacks on airlines in general?
It seems effective, but can be gamed by the screeners when they don't like a passenger.
The airport interview is only part of a larger intelligence system; getting US intelligence up to Israel information sharing standards may be a bigger step forward in security than harassing passengers with interviews.

[amos747]

As can be expected, the golden path routes somewhere in between the two extreme approaches to commercial aviation security discussed here. Obviously, "Israelification" across the board is probably not practical in busy international airports; on the other hand, indiscriminating security checks for all, with virtually no profiling, is both frustrating and plain stupid. Subjecting aircrews to the same screening criteria as the general public does not make aviation any safer. I guess the same applies for little old ladies etc.

[Heidhurtin]

It's also worth considering the liability issue. In todays litiginous world in the USA (UK is catching up), can security organisations really afford to allow our safety to rely almost solely on an operatives judgement, as per the Israeli model? (I agree wholeheartedly with previous comments about the intelligence and ability of said operatives in UK and USA!) Even forgetting the possibility of legal action, the propensity for the press to find somebody to blame at all costs means no elected politician is going to trust his position to the judgement of some "oik" on minimum pay!

At least by subjecting everybody to the same mindless routine, said operatives (and their employers et al) have an excuse in the event of a security breach. "Wosn't my fault. I dun my bit like wot it sez in my job description, di'nt I?"

IMHO the ideal solution would involve a combination of the blanket western approach and the Israeli practice. I do not think profiling is a dirty word, it's absolutely necessary. The police have been using it for years before anybody thought to give it a name. A suspect's behaviour will tell you more than the words he uses!

Lastly as frequent SLF through LHR, I am totally amazed that there isn't a separate route through the process for crew. I agree you have to go through the same process, but a streamlined or dedicated crew route would seem so logical. It's a real pain for me once a month or so - it must be hell to do it even more regularly.

[BarbiesBoyfriend]

Has it occurred to those who post on here that those who work in 'Security' in Israel might possibly have a similar outlook to those who work in it elsewhere?

Or be subject to the same, rigorous, selection criteria?

[sTeamTraen]

A couple of random thoughts/questions from someone who considers himself an agnostic on the whole "Israel thing":

- It ought to help with implementing security that Israelis undergo a lot of security checks in their daily lives and take the threat of terrorist attacks seriously because, well, those attacks seem to happen pretty regularly.
- In the same vein, pretty well every adult in Israel has been in the military. This means that not only do they have a pool of people with "serious" experience to hire at security; they also have a travelling public that knows "what to do", in all senses of the term, far better than the average EZY stag weekend pax.
- Losing an El Al plane would be a huge deal for a country of 7 million people. When that ferry went down in the Baltic a few years ago and about 600(?) Swedish people died, half the country knew someone who was on it. A 2000-person total loss would be the proportional equivalent of three 9/11s.

All of those seem to argue in favour of the way Israel does things. I'm not sure if they are scaleable to Western countries, regardless of "political correctness" issues. When I was "sort of profiled" at FRA last year it was a joke, I got referred to the supervisor more or less only because I was a citizen of country A, resident in country B, and flying from country C.

[RoyHudd]

?

Please explain yourself, barbies boyfriend. And explain what you mean by "security" in Israel.

[Carrier]

Quote: "It's also worth considering the liability issue. In todays litiginous world in the USA (UK is catching up), can security organisations really afford to allow our safety to rely almost solely on an operatives judgement, as per the Israeli model?"

Can they afford not to use all proven methods, especially the Israeli approach which has been proven by its track record to be effective? Any litigation lawyer or prosecutor worth his salt and operating in a genuine system of justice would have a field day with responsible security and political persons who were unable to prove that they had effective profiling in place - negligence, dereliction of duty, treason, aiding and abetting the terrorists, being an accessory, etc. They have a duty to use all effective methods and they cannot be excused for failing to use some, especially those proven to be effective, because the use of such methods might upset some group or PC interest.

[Carrier]

Quote: "This would never work in Canada because it requires a minimal level of intelligence.
And as we well know, there is not a single person in the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority (CATSA) or the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) with an IQ greater than that of a turnip."

To see why, take a look at the aptitude level required for a security guard on the Wonderlic test.

Wonderlic Test - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

WonderlicYourself - Bolts From The Blue

The test was given to miscellaneous people of various professions. Examples of scores from everyday professions included:
Chemist - 31
Programmer - 29
Attorney - 29
Journalist - 26
Teacher - 26
Accountant - 26
Sales - 24
Registered nurse - 24
Secretary - 22.5
Bank teller - 22
Clerical worker - 21
Police officer - 21
Gridiron player - 20
Security guard - 17
Warehouse - 15
Janitor - 15

[marchino61]

Here are some facts

There seem to be two opposing and opiniated camps on this thread.

I won't join in this mud-slinging match; instead, I would like to present some facts, namely the latest check-in times for passengers on Swiss at various airports:

AmsterdamSchiphol40 min
Tel AvivBen Gurion International120 min
Heathrow AirportBusiness Class: 30 min
Economy Class: 45 min


New YorkJ.F. KennedyFirst / Business Class: 60 min
Economy Class: 90 min

Latest check-in times

OK, that's my contirbution to this thread - now I will crawl back to my hole and lurk......

[beachfront71]

I dont get it?
The proof is in the pudding. No airplanes blow up = security measures are working ... especially in a high profile area.

For those who apparently have a better idea, let us know your age and occupation.. Not to be a jerk but for all I know we could be arguing with some 15 year olds with no real world experience what so ever...

If you have "better way" to get things done, please do justify it instead of throwing out the idea.

As far as profiling goes, again, if you are a sane person and understand who and what is causing problems, you should be smart enough to expect it, prepare for it, and move on ... it is nothign personal, it is the most logical way to eliminate false positives and an effecient use of the time..

[Xeque]

Beachfront71

OK. Fair enough.
Until last year when I retired (I am British, Caucasian, aged 67) I traveled by air (averagely) 3 times a year on long haul and 6-8 times a year on short haul.
I was born in the UK but have lived most of my life in Germany, Australia, KSA, Abu Dhabi and Bahrain. In the 60's I spent the decade working in the big passenger liners that preceded the B747 and the subsequent rise in popularity of air travel. I now live in Thailand where we have a major Islamic insurgency problem in the south of the country. I am a pilot (PPL) and have been flying for 30 years. Because of the amount of travel I have (until recently) done and my interest in aviation matters generally, I spend a lot of time thinking about the industry and what ails it at present.
Does that establish my credentials?
I know and many other people know (yourself included if you viewed the matter logically) that the current system of bashing passengers and crew in an effort to show that you are 'doing something' about the problem is a total waste of time, effort and expenditure. It is a complete sham and it's only result is to prove that the terrorists have gained the upper hand by inconveniencing and upsetting hundreds of thousands of people. All the terrorists have to do to keep the pot boiling is to throw in the occasional retard (like this latest Nigerian twerp) and the whole world, lead by the Americans, twitches in fear and intimidation. If the twerp actually succeeds it's a bonus.
Greybeard (when he started this post) explained how the Israeli's do it. I thought their system would work if it was expanded to UK airports. Instead of degenerating into an 'us and them' ridiculing exercise how about each of the contributors to this thread coming up with their ideas for a beginning to end security process that enables passengers and crew to get from the drop-off point to the aircraft in minimal time and that ensures flight safety WITHOUT the delays, humiliation, degradation and sheer bloody mindedness that they have to suffer at UK airports now.
Instead of just knocking things, come up with some ideas of your own. Please.

[MG23]

Originally Posted by Xeque

Instead of just knocking things, come up with some ideas of your own. Please.

I think a number of things mentioned are good ideas: for example, the purpose-built screening rooms for baggage so that if something bad is found then you can simply clear that room and don't need to worry about the rest of the airport.

However, I think that profiling is vastly more complex than people seem to believe it to be. For example, they imagine that they can detect a crazed Islamic suicide bomber by looking for someone who's 'nervous'.

Why would a crazed Islamic suicide bomber be nervous? He's about to become a martyr and be flown off to Paradise with 72 virgins to keep him company... surely he'd be extremely happy about that? And even if he was 'nervous', I'm sure there are at least a million times as many people who are simply nervous about flying as there are crazed suicide bombers, so how are you going to pick one bomber out of a million ordinary everyday flyers?

[mr Q]

The harsh reality is that there can never be 100% security any more than there is 100% safety...
It is a cat and mouse game and good intellegence appears to dictate who wins any particular bout but the bombers only have to be successful only once by breaching the security and getting on board an aircraft and the western world panics and reacts while the terrorists wait and watch .....
I am sure terror groups give Israeli airlines a wide berth because they are not easy targets.
Vigilence is the watchword but that alone is never enough

[Bergerie1]

Many years ago before I retired I was involved in an examination of Israeli security methods. It was shortly after the Lockerbie accident and we were investigating how to improve security screening at UK airports.
Without going into details here of how the Israeli process works a number of facts rapidly became obvious:-

1. At that time there were only two international airports, Tel Aviv and Eilat.

2. The passenger numbers requiring screening at these airports were low in comparison to those in the UK (see Bob Head’s post for current numbers, I quote:-
Heathrow 478.000 a/c movements 67,000,000 paxs + Transfers airside
O'Hare 881.000 a/c movements 69.000.000 paxs
Ben Gurion 94.000 a/c movements 11.500.000 paxs
Birmingham 112.000 a/c movements 10,000,000 paxs.

3. The Israelis, at that time, had a very specific profile to look for whereas at Heathrow they were multiple (remember we are not just looking for a Muslim man wearing a beard or a Muslim woman wearing a niqab or other concealing clothing) the possibilities are endless, and are even more difficult now given the number of radicalised UK nationals, some of British ethnic origins.

4. With the very large numbers of passengers being processed through large international airports, profiling on the Israeli model would require (a) a very large number of well trained and intelligent profilers (where would you get them from?) and (b) a very significant increase in processing time (and what would that do to the throughput and consequent queues?).

Clearly, the current methods are flawed, witness the failures that have occurred and the types of experiences posted by aircrew elsewhere on PPRuNe posts. But I am convinced that a certain amount of profiling would help, however to introduce the Israeli model at Heathrow would bring the airport to a near halt.

Croqueteer mentions Belfast Aldergrove. Yes, they did it there very efficiently but, again, at a small airport with low throughput and with very specific targets to profile for.

I fear we must accept that security will never be watertight, it is just not possible in a public transport system on the scale of current international air transport. Therefore you have to make a difficult decision. Do you have 100% security and virtually no air transport or do you have air transport on the current scale and accept a certain level of risk?

Don’t get me wrong, I am not advocating inadequate security but we do have to be realistic as to what exactly is possible.

[BobHead]

Wilod Goose

Yesterday you said' "It is of the person who desires to bring harm to passengers and the flight, or is being unknowingly used to do so - such as Anne Mary Murphy (Anne Mary Murphy - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
This is not an easy task and requires highly trained personnel, and a system that evolves with the terrorist methods.

Remember - the Israeli system has never been beaten by terrorists since 1968. Contrary to what has been suggested here, this is not through lack of motivation of the Palestinians or Hizbollah and their agents. They have tried and tried again, but were beaten each time.

The West are incapable of overcoming their PC paralysis.
Many, as can be gathered from these pages as well, are even more incapable of recognizing the advantages of an Israeli method."

Examination of history, including Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, which incidently can be altered and edited by any interested party up until very recently, shows that no A/C that departed from a UK airport has ever been hijacked and Only Pan Am 101 has been blown up and that by a bag loaded onto the aircraft in Fankfurt origin from Malta. So it appears the UK Security sytems works so why would we need the Israeli sytem?

I only ask

BobH

[Golf Charlie Charlie]

Just briefly, there was a hijacking from a UK airport in the 1970s - a British Airways One-Eleven on a domestic flight.

[MathFox]

BobH:

So it appears the UK Security sytems works so why would we need the Israeli sytem?

The Dutch admitted that their system was broken (vented anger at the EU that regulated the full body scanners to the storage closet) and made some tweaks to the system. Yes, the body scanners are allowed out of the closet again.

As a passenger I see value in a security check, I also realise there is a cost both in time and "security tax". I realise that 100% security guarantees are impossible, even with "El Al style" security checks. Planes also crash due to mechanical failure (or pilot error).
A sane goal for airport security checks would be to keep "terrorist incidents" significantly lower than other plane accidents. The "broken", "old" (2009) system worked in that respect.
Off course, regular reviews of how checking can be improved should be done. A reduction of cost (or smoother experience for the passenger) counts as improvement in my book too.