This study has been around since 1999 and is a properly researched paper rather than opinions.
StallSpinEvaluation.PDF (richstowell.com)

One fact that emerges clearly in this study is this: “One feature that stands out in all except one of the 39 stall/spin accidents examined is that knowing how to recover from the stall or spin was of no benefit to the pilots in these circumstances. They stalled at altitudes so low that once the stall developed, a serious accident was in progress. Safety will be advanced therefore by preventing stalls and spins.”

It is well worth a read.

We’ll, if you asked CASA or the ATSB they would say it isn’t a real VH registered aeroplane so therefore doesn’t count.

There are sadly quite a few second hand comments being thrown around online that haven’t made their way here on that one that said witnesses saw the aircraft on fire before it crashed/landed. Completely unconfirmed and hearsay until it comes from a reliable source.

Unusual post, when most posts are "Don't speculate! Wait for the report! Of course YOU'VE got the answers, we don't need an investigation now ..."

Thanks for posting this!
Whilst I don't disagree with the stats in this post (and, in fact, find it a really interesting read), I can't help but think experiencing a spin and recovery is still a great experience to have in your bank of aviation know-how. Perhaps it'll make you even better at spin-avoidance.
I'm of the opinion that some aerobatic/spin exposure is important to lessen the "startle effect" of even relatively benign Unusual Attitudes/Aircraft Upsets. The more training and experience, the better.

Exactly the point I was trying to make joseph, I've butt clenched a few times when riding along and seen what I considered largish angle of bank at lowish speeds, and I knew the pilots didn't have spin training, perhaps it's just my old age and spending a life time flying things you couldn't spin if you tried.

I did spins when I did my tailwheel endorsement, because the aircraft was coincidentally a Decathlon and the instructor had an aerobtics rating.

I immediately learned that there was no way I would have recovered from a spin merely through the explanation given during my PPL. Very glad I did the real thing.

Spin recovery training by its very nature must demonstrate the lead in circumstances that are to be avoided.

Not all spins are base to final. If you're in a spin at 5000 agl despite having taken spin avoidance training,who you gonna call if you didn't have to take spin recovery training to get the license.

My point was not that spin recovery was not useful, in fact I'd recommend it for instructors, however like any advanced training the more it happens the more likely crashes occur from miss handling. As the data suggests actual spin training has negligible effect on spin related accidents as they tend to occur too low to recover from and spin entry at altitude which results in ground impact is very rare. So you then have to think of the crossover in that if you mandate spin training for all candidates you will have less competent providers forced to do it, and training accidents will occur.

"...spin entry at altitude which results in ground impact is very rare." There are two ways to read this. The first is spin entry at altitude is very rare. That of course is accurate. The second read is that a spin has happened, rare as it is, and yet ground impact did not occur. Although it is said that some aircraft will recover from a spin if you just let go of the yoke, I don't think most will. If they didn't go to ground, then some spin recovery technique must have been applied, which means it must have been learned at some point.

"...if you mandate spin training for all candidates you will have less competent providers forced to do it, and training accidents will occur." Absolutely correct. I would suggest that can be remedied by a requirement of more competent instructors. And perhaps a recurring requirement for demonstrated spin recovery, although that may be an administrative goat shag. I've probably done about 300 spin recoveries, or supervised someone else both entering the incipient stage and recovering on command. I can't say I enjoyed any of them. At some point, I did become fairly competent in the process. But, no denying things can go south.

Until I saw this thread, I hadn't known that spin recovery was no longer required.
. . .

Just read this thread, it applies to the Jabiru and every other GA accident in Australia.

Stall and Spin Evaluation by Rich Stowell, great books, great vids, go to OSH and to his presentations, even better when it's a Q&A and discussion.

Interesting!

I've spun Aerobats many times, including multi-rotation spins, and don't recall any reluctance to recover from them!
When undertaking basic IR training in NZ I had an instructor who thought it was funny to have me under the hood on partial panel and then spin the Traumahawk and say, "You have control"!

Back onto this sad accident.

Any further information as to what actually happened?

I have no doubt that spinning in approved, well maintained, appropriately loaded aircraft, by competent experienced pilots is as safe as it can be. But that would not be the case if you mandate a blanket spinning requirement for licences. I can think off hand a few accidents already where stall/spin was part of the sequence and the pilots were ex airforce or instructors who had spinning experience. The situation presented just was not a straight forward 'stall/spin' rather more insidious, like icing related or in types that would be almost impossible to recover. If you get into a spin in a light single under 2000kg it might loose a few thousand feet, in anything bigger you are starting to talk about massive height loss once you enter a spin. So even a departure close to cruise altitude in a chieftain is going to get close to the ground, that's if you can even recover. Most times we hear about a 'scary' airliner incident where it's stalled is not a 'full' stall but some sort of roll/incipient mechanism as it approached the stall, even then the loss of height is always significant. Most times a full stall developes or a spin even then it turns into an accident report. I'm very interested to see what caused the recent Seminole Spin accident in the US, although the Radar plot leading up to it had some very interesting looking tracks.

Preliminary report:

https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/news-i...iminary-report

As the first demonstrator pilot of the first Cessna 150( not C152) Aerobatic aircraft introduced in Australia, I can assure you it recovered totally conventionally from a fully developed spin. I did dozens of them in Aerobatic demonstrations at air shows in South East Queensland. Control column fully forward and opposite rudder and that was it. Of course one had to be trained in these manoeuvres, and I was a recipient of this training from an expert in his field from the RAAF.
Even in the PPL syllabus of the day, incipient spin recovery training was mandatory.

As you say, training is required. Just saying column fully forward and opposite rudder, is very generalised. It doesn’t include the checklist items of throttle to idle, ailerons neutral, rudder full opposite and then forward elevator (as per the manual). Training with a competent instructor will explain exactly why all those four steps are needed and the difference between an incipient, fully developed spin, and a spiral dive ( and discuss inverted spins).

it’s a bit like saying Instrument Flying is just staring at the Artificial Horizon most of the time….

At least two questions arise from reading the preliminary ATSB report:
(1) Ground witnesses reported hearing rough running or surging of the engine earlier in its flight and one of the witnesses of the descent heard engine running rough then 'stop' prior to the accident. So was there already an engine problem unrelated to icing or are such reports consistent with an engine affected by, and injesting, ice?
(2) Report notes the parachute system needs to be deployed before aircraft departs controlled flight. This seems to be a catch 22. Most pilots would presumably be reluctant to deploy a chute in the early stages of control problems developing as they would be conscious it means the aircraft will likely be damaged beyond economic repair when it hits the ground, even at the reduced rate of decent under a parachute. They would be attempting to recover control. So what is the window of opportunity to properly deploy the chute?

I also thought the rough running was interesting.

I found when flying the Cirrus that backfiring is difficult to hear, especially with noise cancelling headsets. How do I know this? If you reduce the throttle too quickly, for example on final, the continental will tend to backfire… perhaps not on all of them, however it was an observation of mine.

Makes me wonder if the pilot understandably didn’t hear the backfiring, power was reducing, along with speed and it all came unstuck.

I’m also surprised that a witness kept listening to an aircraft approaching 10,000ft to the point that they noticed that the engine stopped.

History shows that eyewitnesses can be very unreliable. Especially if they have watched Aircrash Investigators!