Was going to suggest that NLK needs a GNSS approach apart from the useless SCAT approach but a check of the AIP shows a GNSS approach for runways 04, 11 and 29.

Higher minima than the VOR but at least the runway 11 approach is now runway aligned, with the missed approach the same heading, (107 degrees). Much better than the runway 11 VOR's 15 degree offset

About time!! (Too many pages to read to see if this have been mentioned before).

The plate is anointed NEW PROC and dated 19 NOV 2009.

Has any mention been made of the type of approaches that were attempted?

Theres a TV series in this somewhere you know....:rolleyes:

An episode of "Big Sky" perhaps. :rolleyes:

Martin Henderson could play Dominic ...

It just shows how lazy and uneducated jurnos are when they use Anon web sites to pad out their inability to do their own research in to stories as well!
I could understand using it as a lead to ask questions but it just shows how easy it would be to use a web site to make them look like the easy to manipulate sheep they are, no doubt as the policticians already know .... gives my evil mind ideas!
Keep it in mind the next time you see a story quoting unnamed sources, it is probably hacks like us chatting under false names on a web forum.

Looks like the Pilots and Pel Air will be off to the CASA Office for Orange Frappa Mocha Chinos and bikkies!!

Westwind aircraft have two storage lockers that are only axcessable from outside the aircraft. Rafts are never stored here. The raft would have been placed near the door. But with the main door opening on ditching. Chances are it would have moved .I would expect the nose would have sunk quick also. 3 minutes to sink indicates to me that the foward cabin area would have been under a lot quicker. Add darkness, wave chop.ending up with a lost raft would not be impossible. My guess is they all would have been told to grab there vests. Some may have missed this in the panick.

Just my 2 cents

The Panic?!
 

As a passenger, with ANY advance warning of a planned ditching, my panic would be to GET A BLOODY JACKET ON!!

I would not choose to fly with this pilot. He runs on good luck, good looks, and poor flight planning. The crikey.com.au article by Ben Sandilands covers it all.
I would rather fly with real heroes who never run out of fuel, and who always have carefully-thought-out alternatives in their planning.

I can't believe some of the crap getting posted here. Why would any of you use his past cleo appearences as judjement for his flying. What the !! Hey if I ever stuff up I hope the media don't drag out my 21st photos. You guys will go crazy.childish arguments boys. That said yes he does have a case to answer but how many of you can say you ditched a jet and lived to tell the tale ? Anyone. I thought a pilot group would be more inclined to defend each other until all facts have been aired. Boy was I wrong.

Trial by all the 'experts' on Pprune. Not one of you 'mavericks' were there at the flight planning, takeoff, cruise, descent or approach phases of flight. Furthermore, not one of you were there during the approaches and subsequent missed approaches. And most importantly, not one of you were there when the two pilots discussed their options and decided on a course of action. Instead, you watch the media hype, make character assessments on him using his cleo photo and then beautifully armchair fly the sector to perfection, passing on what you would have done.

I am so disgusted by some of the comments on this thread and I am ashamed some of you are actually in the same profession as me.

You do not need to be an expert to read and apply CAO 82.0.

Sadly I have seen pilots I have flown with, pilots I have worked with and pilots who were friends who disregarded the very basic requirements of flying, whether it was flight planning, weather forecasts, fuel requirements, aircraft weight or their own limitations and are no longer with us.

At some stage the fuel would have burned down to what was required for the flight to the alternate plus reserves. At the flight planning stage this alternate fuel may have allowed for one or two approaches to be conducted. If stronger headwinds were encounter, the alternate time/fuel may have been reached at at TOD or even before TOD. This is the time to divert.

Been there done that.

Harden up Tempo.

I wonder how many times the pilot has had to divert in his career?

Gee a bit rigid there tiger. I can think of several circumstances where I would consider it; Uncontrollable engine fire, catastrophic airframe failure, and certainly fuel exhaustion (whether pilot induced or otherwise:))... One grave risk balanced against another. The pointy end of what we do every day I would have thought...

FWIW I reckon Torres has got the right idea.

In regards to only 3 people wearing life jackets and not the pilots I believe.

I know procedures for some companies are to don the life jacket after the aircraft has come to a complete stop. In this case, if the aircraft sunk straight away, then I believe the pilots would be more worried in getting everyone out including themselves, rather then trying to get lifejackets on and risk sinking with the aircraft. This may explain why only 3 people had life jackets on.

Does the organisation have a systemic problem ?
 

How many operators have had 3 crashes with the same type of aircraft in Australia ... (Pel-Air have crashed 3 Westwinds, all at night)

Does the organisation have a systemic problem ?

Crews are generally in part at least a reflection of the organisation.

My comments are from knowing the aircraft, and what its like to fly one around the pacific.

at full fuel he should have had enough fuel for an approach and diversion to NWWW, and this should have been part of his planning and descent briefing. ie, if we are not visual at the minima, we will comence the missed approach and set course of ??? for our alternate NWWW. I have said exactly that in a briefing there myself.

I know when we use to do trips to AGGH we had a PNR figured out which we updated continuously on the way, I would always brief my FO that if we didnt have an actual weather, that was better than the allternate minima we would divert,(I know someone will comment on why use the alternate minima blah blah blah...... because at this stage we are still planning to go there we aren't there yet, and airports in the pacific especially AGGH always forecast weather to be better than it is. I have got visual well below what was forecast to be there a number of times)

My PNRs were not flexible I would always have stuck to it (PNR usually worked out to be at TOD or just prior), I did have one flight that we didnt get contact with the tower until just prior to our PNR (about 3 mins before) and I had started getting ready for the diversion, and about to action it when we finally got contact. I know fuel isn't something you can play around with!

I have made some decision that pelair didnt like here and there but as soon as you pointed out you weren't comfortable using a certain airfield due to weather or distance of alternates and wouldn't use it for that flight they soon backed down. I diverted after a missed approach from one point to an alternate I chose, had the CP ring me and say why the bloody hell have you gone there, my answer was because I was PIC and thats were I decided to go! the answer from WM was oh ok fair enough.

I would just not be surprised if he didnt get weather up dates or monitor how much fuel he was burning on his way there or recalculating his min safe diversion fuel, which is something I and all the guys I flew with did, if he had been running an as you go graph, that was the norm in pelair when I was there he would have had a better awareness of the situation and doubt he would have screwed around doing approaches rather than diverting after the first one or even diverting before top of descent if he didnt have enough fuel to divert after an approach, especially when the last metar had OVC002.

I know everyone comments on how its easy to look back from the comfort of your armchair, but I have worked in the company in the same aircraft into the pacific many many times, and been in similar situations, but its not rocket science, you monitor your fuel on the way, everywhere in the pacific, you get updated weather every 30mins if it looked at all marginal, which it was. and if you were burning more fuel than planned (due to extra wind, lower level, fuel leak or any other unexplained reason) you would know about it and be able to make the decision as to what you would do i.e get onto HF tell them you were diverting and have them contact the company to get everything set up in your alternate........ the reason I know this is because I have done it when winds were stronger than forecast.... its part of your job, there is no excuse for getting to YSNF with no options left, anyone that says there is shouldn't be a captain on anything let alone an aircraft operating into remote areas of the pacific.

if people are going to use things I have said in previous posts thats fine but please dont take what I have said out of context!

and as for the training on sea survival being done before line training, when did they start doing that??? we did wet drills when I was there which was the standard go for a swim with a jacket. then have a BBQ.

The best thing out of all of this is we now know that you can successfully ditch a westwind.

let the games begin!

I have never heard of anything so ridiculous.:confused:

You put a life jacket on during the preparation for ditching but do not inflate it.

Looking/feeling around for a life jacket would be the last thing I would want to be doing after ditching. You would need both hands free to go hand over hand to the nearest exit, not one hand holding on the a life jacket and trying to find the exit with the other free hand - especially at night.

Totally agree 601. But also the company I work for says in black and white. Once the aircraft has come to a complete stop, don life jacket but do not inflate.

There are enough experts here we don't need the ATSB.