Glen Buckley and Australian small business -V- CASA
Glen, Pip Spence can’t say anything about any of these matters without advice from CASA and the Board because the moment she opens her mouth she is making an admission of one sort or another by CASA.
The current “no comment” response is exactly the same as an individual “no comment” response to a policeman - it does not signify guilt or innocence.
I am afraid you have to wait.
On the matter of ACN’s and corporate name “pass the parcel” rules, in my opinion, CASA is still required to deal with you in good faith and with fairness, equity and natural justice. In other words, if there was some defect then they should have immediately told you and worked with you to correct what might be essentially a minor matter.
The current “no comment” response is exactly the same as an individual “no comment” response to a policeman - it does not signify guilt or innocence.
I am afraid you have to wait.
On the matter of ACN’s and corporate name “pass the parcel” rules, in my opinion, CASA is still required to deal with you in good faith and with fairness, equity and natural justice. In other words, if there was some defect then they should have immediately told you and worked with you to correct what might be essentially a minor matter.
Aah, but Sunny, that is not CAsAs style. “Safety”, that mysterious, mythical thing they espouse..is all.
Any errors, discrepancicies, reg breaches, wording defects all mean that person, persons, business must be obliterated and denied being involved in aviation.
Its zealotry at its most disgusting.
Any errors, discrepancicies, reg breaches, wording defects all mean that person, persons, business must be obliterated and denied being involved in aviation.
Its zealotry at its most disgusting.
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Ms Spence has taken so long to reply to Glen due to her very busy work schedule. There are coffee’s to be consumed, women in leadership forums to promote, diversity policies to write, Ministers Lilly-white asses to kiss, and glossy meaningless statements to author. Trivial matters such as Glen’s are really not high on her priority list. It is very time consuming being a Bureaucrat and tethering yourself to the Ministers desk. But apart from the skinned knees and elbows one gets, the CASA Director gets to mix company with politicians and even ICAO, so she must set her priorities right.
Thread Starter
The issue of the Registered Operator.
Lead Balloon, or indeed anybody who feels they have some input.
I would like to explore your concerns of a flying school maintaining control over a fleet of aircraft with different Registered Operators. I’m assuming you put that forward as a likely CASA approach. My initial thoughts on this matter.
Flying Schools have always operated with a number of aircraft of which they are not the Owners of, or the Registered Operators of. Probably every flying school, with the exception of the large foreign owned businesses, operates in that manner. It allows schools access to aircraft without lease repayments, provides flexibility, maintains customer interest, addresses seasonal demands etc. It really is a very normal way of schools operating and that was very much my experience during 25 years in the industry at a number of schools.
Its standard industry practice for flying schools to operate aircraft that they are not the Registered Operator, or the Owner of. The CASA approach was that the Owner, and the person paying for that aircrafts maintenance should be the Registered Operator.
A typical example would be an aircraft owner who flies 100 hours per annum in his own aircraft. He enters into an agreement with a flying school to utlise his aircraft 400 hours per annum, to offset his costs.
The legislation does permit for that Aircraft Owner/Payer of Maintenance/ Registered Operator to enter into such an agreement with an AOC Holder to utilise that aircraft for flight training.
The legislation permits the Registered Operator to perform the required and specified functions OR contract someone to do so on their behalf, as they did with APTA.
To do this we had an agreement.
Regarding the agreement that we utilised. There was a very significant amount of time spent with CASA personnel on this very topic. Many months in fact, working side by side with CASA personnel to come up with an aircraft agreement that was fit for purpose for exactly what we intended to do. i.e. utilise aircraft with different registered operators. During this process of working with CASA we came up with a number of versions.
One of the major topic of those agreements was trying to bring clarity to the differences between the “Operator” and the “Registered Operator.
I have located an early version of an early document which I have attached below. When a number of the bases joined APTA, they had previously had operated with no agreement at all.
https://www.dropbox.com/s/n82i0sg675...SEP17.pdf?dl=0
So my "position" with CASA would be that there is no legislation that prevents an AOC Holder using aircraft from different Registered Operators, and it is in fact and always has been standard industry practice.
I would also argue that the APTA model provided a greater level of operational control. Because we were not paying the maintenance bills, we had less commercial pressure to influence sub optimal decision making.
All aircraft were fully inducted into the one FSM system, with maintenance more rigidly controlled than had been the Members previous experience.
Thanks for the continuing interest, and look forward to any thoughts. Cheers. Glen
I would like to explore your concerns of a flying school maintaining control over a fleet of aircraft with different Registered Operators. I’m assuming you put that forward as a likely CASA approach. My initial thoughts on this matter.
Flying Schools have always operated with a number of aircraft of which they are not the Owners of, or the Registered Operators of. Probably every flying school, with the exception of the large foreign owned businesses, operates in that manner. It allows schools access to aircraft without lease repayments, provides flexibility, maintains customer interest, addresses seasonal demands etc. It really is a very normal way of schools operating and that was very much my experience during 25 years in the industry at a number of schools.
Its standard industry practice for flying schools to operate aircraft that they are not the Registered Operator, or the Owner of. The CASA approach was that the Owner, and the person paying for that aircrafts maintenance should be the Registered Operator.
A typical example would be an aircraft owner who flies 100 hours per annum in his own aircraft. He enters into an agreement with a flying school to utlise his aircraft 400 hours per annum, to offset his costs.
The legislation does permit for that Aircraft Owner/Payer of Maintenance/ Registered Operator to enter into such an agreement with an AOC Holder to utilise that aircraft for flight training.
The legislation permits the Registered Operator to perform the required and specified functions OR contract someone to do so on their behalf, as they did with APTA.
To do this we had an agreement.
Regarding the agreement that we utilised. There was a very significant amount of time spent with CASA personnel on this very topic. Many months in fact, working side by side with CASA personnel to come up with an aircraft agreement that was fit for purpose for exactly what we intended to do. i.e. utilise aircraft with different registered operators. During this process of working with CASA we came up with a number of versions.
One of the major topic of those agreements was trying to bring clarity to the differences between the “Operator” and the “Registered Operator.
I have located an early version of an early document which I have attached below. When a number of the bases joined APTA, they had previously had operated with no agreement at all.
https://www.dropbox.com/s/n82i0sg675...SEP17.pdf?dl=0
So my "position" with CASA would be that there is no legislation that prevents an AOC Holder using aircraft from different Registered Operators, and it is in fact and always has been standard industry practice.
I would also argue that the APTA model provided a greater level of operational control. Because we were not paying the maintenance bills, we had less commercial pressure to influence sub optimal decision making.
All aircraft were fully inducted into the one FSM system, with maintenance more rigidly controlled than had been the Members previous experience.
Thanks for the continuing interest, and look forward to any thoughts. Cheers. Glen
Para377....No miniscule oversees CAsA. Its "run " sic, very, by a Bored, the 'DAS' and the Iron Ring because it is a free ranging and feral 'corporation' and can behave as it does. Is Oz fcuked ??
Just found out that the corporatised Mareeba Shire Council ie Local Government (sic, very) has a American ABN # and corporatised in the USA. !! WTF. And NO rights under the Oz constitution to levy rates fees and taxes.!
This is the same council that failed in their use of bs, fraudulent and invalid paperwork for an eviction to make the lease and hangar (mine !) available for someone else.
We definitely need a revolution !
Just found out that the corporatised Mareeba Shire Council ie Local Government (sic, very) has a American ABN # and corporatised in the USA. !! WTF. And NO rights under the Oz constitution to levy rates fees and taxes.!
This is the same council that failed in their use of bs, fraudulent and invalid paperwork for an eviction to make the lease and hangar (mine !) available for someone else.
We definitely need a revolution !
So my "position" with CASA would be that there is no legislation that prevents an AOC Holder using aircraft from different Registered Operators, and it is in fact and always has been standard industry practice.
I would also argue that the APTA model provided a greater level of operational control. Because we were not paying the maintenance bills, we had less commercial pressure to influence sub optimal decision making.
Operational control, in the sense I’m using it in APTA’s context, is about how APTA would be able, legally and practicably, to control access to and the use of aircraft, monitor compliance with the rules around daily inspections, recording of TIS, endorsement of defects and the consequences of endorsed defects etc etc, when APTA is not the registered operator and the aircraft is being flown by people who aren’t APTA employees, and no APTA employee is within cooee of where all the flying activities are happening. (I won’t rehash all the rogue instructor or entire ‘base’ stuff, but that’s the scenario for which APTA had to have a legal and practical answer.)
All aircraft were fully inducted into the one FSM system, with maintenance more rigidly controlled than had been the Members previous experience.
Thread Starter
The registered Operator
The Flight School Manager program that was specifically designed for us, tracked all aircraft hours which needed to be entered in with the Instructors pin number. The hours for each sequence with an appropriate margin was built into the system. An instructor would be unable to log out if.
Flight and duties were potentially going to be breached.
Any qualifications were expired that were relevant to the flight ( VFR v IFR)
The required previous lessons had not been completed.
There were any outstanding maintenance issues etc.
Regarding the commercial pressure that i suggested. As the owner of the aircraft, there could be a tendency to push an aircraft out with a faulty fuel gauges on one tank, knowing that its a local training area flight and that you have visually checked the contents. Most likely safe but most definitely illegal. With the FSM, that flight could not depart.. Without that protection, an operator may be tempted to try and send that aircraft out "under the radar" so to speak. to derive revenue from that aircraft.
As the APTA model did not depend on revenue from the aircraft, there was no pressure on us to compromise safety.
Without any doubt, if you asked any APTA Member what was the biggest change to their operation , it would have been the absolute no compromise to the legislation.regarding maintenance and airworthiness. We were diligent, and without saying too much, we did suspend an operation on one occasion over maintenance concerns.
Flight and duties were potentially going to be breached.
Any qualifications were expired that were relevant to the flight ( VFR v IFR)
The required previous lessons had not been completed.
There were any outstanding maintenance issues etc.
Regarding the commercial pressure that i suggested. As the owner of the aircraft, there could be a tendency to push an aircraft out with a faulty fuel gauges on one tank, knowing that its a local training area flight and that you have visually checked the contents. Most likely safe but most definitely illegal. With the FSM, that flight could not depart.. Without that protection, an operator may be tempted to try and send that aircraft out "under the radar" so to speak. to derive revenue from that aircraft.
As the APTA model did not depend on revenue from the aircraft, there was no pressure on us to compromise safety.
Without any doubt, if you asked any APTA Member what was the biggest change to their operation , it would have been the absolute no compromise to the legislation.regarding maintenance and airworthiness. We were diligent, and without saying too much, we did suspend an operation on one occasion over maintenance concerns.
I’ll preface this with the observation that the whole flying training regulatory structure in Australia, as with so many aviation matters, is complete overreach. But at this point we have to deal with the regulatory quagmire that prevails.
During a training flight at ‘alliance’ ‘base’ X, the aircraft being utilised has nosewheel shimmy during the landing roll. The person running the ‘business’ at ‘alliance’ ‘base’ X tells the instructor and the student that nosewheel shimmy on landing on that aircraft is perfectly normal. What happens next in the APTA FSM? If APTA finds out about the nosewheel shimmy and forms the view that it could be a problem, what actually happens next?
A different aircraft being operated at ‘alliance’ ‘base’ X has no gizmo to record the aircraft’s TIS. What does APTA actually do to make sure that recorded TIS is actual TIS, noting that the instructor’s and student’s ‘flight time’ are not the same as the aircraft’s TIS.
At ‘alliance’ ‘base’ X, the aircraft used for retractible undercarriage training lands and the instructor enters in the MR: “Left Mainwheel undercarriage downlight unserviceable”. Does APTA know about that entry, as soon as it’s entered in the MR and, if yes, what does APTA actually do about it?
During a training flight at ‘alliance’ ‘base’ X, the aircraft being utilised has nosewheel shimmy during the landing roll. The person running the ‘business’ at ‘alliance’ ‘base’ X tells the instructor and the student that nosewheel shimmy on landing on that aircraft is perfectly normal. What happens next in the APTA FSM? If APTA finds out about the nosewheel shimmy and forms the view that it could be a problem, what actually happens next?
A different aircraft being operated at ‘alliance’ ‘base’ X has no gizmo to record the aircraft’s TIS. What does APTA actually do to make sure that recorded TIS is actual TIS, noting that the instructor’s and student’s ‘flight time’ are not the same as the aircraft’s TIS.
At ‘alliance’ ‘base’ X, the aircraft used for retractible undercarriage training lands and the instructor enters in the MR: “Left Mainwheel undercarriage downlight unserviceable”. Does APTA know about that entry, as soon as it’s entered in the MR and, if yes, what does APTA actually do about it?
Thread Starter
Aircraft maintenance oversight
During a training flight at ‘alliance’ ‘base’ X, the aircraft being utilised has nosewheel shimmy during the landing roll. The person running the ‘business’ at ‘alliance’ ‘base’ X tells the instructor and the student that nosewheel shimmy on landing on that aircraft is perfectly normal. What happens next in the APTA FSM? If APTA finds out about the nosewheel shimmy and forms the view that it could be a problem, what actually happens next?
The pilot would enter it onto the maintenance release.
On returning and signing in, he would also enter that detail onto the FSM, which would render the aircraft unavailable for further bookings until assessed.
An email would also be automatically sent to the Maintenance Administration Officer, who would take on the responsibility of managing that situation and ensuring the aircraft was airworthy.
Once satisfied that the problem had been rectified, either the MAO, HAAMC, GSM, GHOO, could reactivate that aircraft into the FSM system, allowing that aircraft to be despatched. Bookings could be made during the unserviceability, although the aircraft could not be despatched.
I assume the “person running the business” would be a Member of the Aero Club Committee.
The Committee had most likely joined APTA because.
· They did not have an AOC
· Were unwilling or unable to obtain an AOC.
If someone held there own AOC, it is unlikely that they would have joined APTA. My experience was that in fact the Committee specifically did not want operational control, had little knowledge of how to run a flight training operation, and I never experienced any of that “interference” that you suggest.
Quite simply, the APTA determination was the only determination, because at any time, any base, any instructor, or any aircraft could be immediately locked out of the system, and completely unable to be despatched.
An option not available to flying schools reliant on a paper based, manual sign out system.
A different aircraft being operated at ‘alliance’ ‘base’ X has no gizmo to record the aircraft’s TIS. What does APTA actually do to make sure that recorded TIS is actual TIS, noting that the instructor’s and student’s ‘flight time’ are not the same as the aircraft’s TIS.
All aircraft were required to have time monitored by either
· VDO
· Tacho
· Flight switch
There was a requirement for any two of these methods to be entered into FSM. Generally, this was the VDO and flight switch.
The flight switch times populated into the maintenance section of the FSM system, whereas the VDO time populated immediately through to the Staff members flight and duty times, and through to the Students Logbook.
On occasions where an aircraft owner did not have a flight switch, we would require the Owner to install one, and that did happen on one occasion. The owner was very much on board, as previously he had been doing his maintenance from the VDO. My recollection was that the cost was approximately $700.
I hope that addresses that query adequately.
At ‘alliance’ ‘base’ X, the aircraft used for retractible undercarriage training lands and the instructor enters in the MR: “Left Mainwheel undercarriage downlight unserviceable”. Does APTA know about that entry, as soon as it’s entered in the MR and, if yes, what does APTA actually do about it?
The response to this would be the same procedure as in Step One.
I would add that we had daily meetings with each base, and fortnightly we would have a Group Safety Meeting and a Group Management meeting. One of the topics was maintenance. These issues would all have been bought up at the meeting, as all maintenance issues were addressed and discussed.
If an opportunity for improvement resulted, a Continuous Improvement Process would be initiated with a notification to CASA via our Continuous improvement process and that may result in a change to procedures which would be communicated through the system requiring a pilot acknowledgement via the FSM system, before being able to sign out.
Cheers. Glen.
About to head into a run of thirteen-hour shifts, so if I don’t respond for a few days, please understand that its not me having a “dummy spit”.
Any available time I have will be focussed on my formal allegation of misfeasance in public office against two senior CASA execs. Another substantial document coming to finalisation. I know all the doomsayers will say it’s a waste of time, and it may well be, but at least I can say that I went down swinging. The same philosophy i use in my day job now.
The Flight School system as mentioned was a very comprehensive system designed by the Developer especially for our system. A link to the product can be found here. CASA personnel attended the training sessions in the Melbourne CBD with the APTA member bases. This occurred approximately 2 years before Mr. Aleck "first became aware of the structure in October 2018 Smart (smartaviation.net)
I would also add that in an industry first, CASA was given full access to the system, and every aspect of the operation two years before CASA "first became aware" of the APTA structure. CASA could at any time and in real time check flight and duty, aircraft maintenance and unserviceability's, safety information, pilot recency, training records, etc etc etc etc
The pilot would enter it onto the maintenance release.
On returning and signing in, he would also enter that detail onto the FSM, which would render the aircraft unavailable for further bookings until assessed.
An email would also be automatically sent to the Maintenance Administration Officer, who would take on the responsibility of managing that situation and ensuring the aircraft was airworthy.
Once satisfied that the problem had been rectified, either the MAO, HAAMC, GSM, GHOO, could reactivate that aircraft into the FSM system, allowing that aircraft to be despatched. Bookings could be made during the unserviceability, although the aircraft could not be despatched.
I assume the “person running the business” would be a Member of the Aero Club Committee.
The Committee had most likely joined APTA because.
· They did not have an AOC
· Were unwilling or unable to obtain an AOC.
If someone held there own AOC, it is unlikely that they would have joined APTA. My experience was that in fact the Committee specifically did not want operational control, had little knowledge of how to run a flight training operation, and I never experienced any of that “interference” that you suggest.
Quite simply, the APTA determination was the only determination, because at any time, any base, any instructor, or any aircraft could be immediately locked out of the system, and completely unable to be despatched.
An option not available to flying schools reliant on a paper based, manual sign out system.
A different aircraft being operated at ‘alliance’ ‘base’ X has no gizmo to record the aircraft’s TIS. What does APTA actually do to make sure that recorded TIS is actual TIS, noting that the instructor’s and student’s ‘flight time’ are not the same as the aircraft’s TIS.
All aircraft were required to have time monitored by either
· VDO
· Tacho
· Flight switch
There was a requirement for any two of these methods to be entered into FSM. Generally, this was the VDO and flight switch.
The flight switch times populated into the maintenance section of the FSM system, whereas the VDO time populated immediately through to the Staff members flight and duty times, and through to the Students Logbook.
On occasions where an aircraft owner did not have a flight switch, we would require the Owner to install one, and that did happen on one occasion. The owner was very much on board, as previously he had been doing his maintenance from the VDO. My recollection was that the cost was approximately $700.
I hope that addresses that query adequately.
At ‘alliance’ ‘base’ X, the aircraft used for retractible undercarriage training lands and the instructor enters in the MR: “Left Mainwheel undercarriage downlight unserviceable”. Does APTA know about that entry, as soon as it’s entered in the MR and, if yes, what does APTA actually do about it?
The response to this would be the same procedure as in Step One.
I would add that we had daily meetings with each base, and fortnightly we would have a Group Safety Meeting and a Group Management meeting. One of the topics was maintenance. These issues would all have been bought up at the meeting, as all maintenance issues were addressed and discussed.
If an opportunity for improvement resulted, a Continuous Improvement Process would be initiated with a notification to CASA via our Continuous improvement process and that may result in a change to procedures which would be communicated through the system requiring a pilot acknowledgement via the FSM system, before being able to sign out.
Cheers. Glen.
About to head into a run of thirteen-hour shifts, so if I don’t respond for a few days, please understand that its not me having a “dummy spit”.
Any available time I have will be focussed on my formal allegation of misfeasance in public office against two senior CASA execs. Another substantial document coming to finalisation. I know all the doomsayers will say it’s a waste of time, and it may well be, but at least I can say that I went down swinging. The same philosophy i use in my day job now.
The Flight School system as mentioned was a very comprehensive system designed by the Developer especially for our system. A link to the product can be found here. CASA personnel attended the training sessions in the Melbourne CBD with the APTA member bases. This occurred approximately 2 years before Mr. Aleck "first became aware of the structure in October 2018 Smart (smartaviation.net)
I would also add that in an industry first, CASA was given full access to the system, and every aspect of the operation two years before CASA "first became aware" of the APTA structure. CASA could at any time and in real time check flight and duty, aircraft maintenance and unserviceability's, safety information, pilot recency, training records, etc etc etc etc
Last edited by glenb; 18th Aug 2022 at 23:17.
Thread Starter
I needed a quick pick me up- Jonathan Aleck outcome based legislation
I have posted this before but it makes me laugh every time. Listen to his words. No wonder I accused him of misfeasnace in public office
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I have posted this before but it makes me laugh every time. Listen to his words. No wonder I accused him of misfeasnace in public office
CASA Safety Video - Outcome based regulation - YouTube
CASA Safety Video - Outcome based regulation - YouTube
I apologise for not explaining the key point in a way that you are comprehending, Glen.
I know the ‘alliance’ ‘members’ didn’t have their own AOC. The fundamental advantage of the APTA structure was of course that the ‘members’ were operating under the authority of APTA’s AOC.
You don’t need to rush or get stressed about the following. But I do urge you to take the time, when you can and your head is in the right place, to get your head around what I’m saying.
That’s because I’m trying to help you to understand what’s at the heart of the regulatory issue that resulted in CASA doing a complete backflip after encouraging you to believe, through CASA’s approval of variations to cover additional ‘bases’, – and you reasonably believed – that the manuals and procedures and personnel and other arrangements put in place by APTA were sufficient for a structure including the ‘alliance’ ‘member’ concept to comply with the applicable aviation safety regulatory requirements (noting, as I’ve said before, CASA was at least on constructive notice of all the implications of the structure from the point at which CASA considered the application by APTA for a variation to cover the first ‘alliance’ ‘member’ ‘base’).
(And I can only try to imagine how much of your blood, sweat and tears (and treasure) went into building all that. It’s appalling that it ended up where it has.)
APTA didn’t know that the pilot did do what the pilot should have done. APTA didn’t know whether an instructor – who wasn’t an employee of APTA and was operating at a ‘base’ 100nms away where APTA had no continuous employee presence - was complying with his or her obligations to enter defects in an aircraft’s maintenance release (or in APTA’s FSM system).
APTA should patent that system, because it is the first one on the planet which is, apparently, capable of preventing the magnetos in an aircraft’s engine generating a spark, the propellor from generating thrust and the wings from generating lift. (My sincere apologies for the tone of that, but I’ve seen too many garbage in/garbage out aircraft maintenance management software systems in my time. And no piece of software in a computer sitting on someone’s desk has ever rendered a 1975 Cessna 172’s engine incapable of starting and its wings incapable of generating lift.)
APTA did not know whether that requirement was always being complied with by people who weren’t APTA employees and were operating at a ‘base’ 100nms away where APTA had no continuous employee presence.
I chose the examples for a reason. I am aware, from long, first-hand knowledge, of how often defects (like a nosewheel shimmy – “it always does that”) are not entered in GA aircraft maintenance releases; of how often GA aircraft are flown with an open defect in the maintenance release, with which defect the aircraft should not have been flown (like an undercarriage indicator light – “I didn’t check the endorsements section of the MR before I went flying” or “I didn’t know it was unlawful to fly with that undercarriage indicator light blown; it’s just a light bulb” said by 6 different pilots about 6 different flights); and of how often accurate TIS is not recorded in the MR of GA aircraft. All of which happens – sometimes inadvertently through haste or incompetence and sometimes knowingly – quite frequently.
If you have never come across any of those kinds of circumstances in your time in GA, you are – I would suggest – unique. Ditto if you’ve never become aware of circumstances in which the owner of or registered operator of or a business using an aircraft to make money – like an APTA ‘alliance member’ - gives pilots ‘gentle hints’ about the ‘inconvenience’ that would occur if some ‘trivial’ problem was entered in the aircraft’s MR (and the FSM system). Indeed, I’m aware of a pilot who is the subject of an ongoing vendetta as a consequence of pissing off an aircraft operator by entering defects in the aircraft’s maintenance release. (And I have to pull you up on one issue: You put the word “interference” in quotation marks. I didn’t use that word.)
All of the circumstances to which I referred would constitute offences by the individuals involved. But in the APTA structure, they would also constitute offences by APTA. That is because first, it would be happening in the course of training activities being conducted by the individuals under the authority of APTA’s certificate, secondly, APTA’s certificate was (still is) subject to conditions including that “each of the operator’s personnel must comply with each provision of civil aviation legislation that applies to the operator’s authorised Part 141 flight training”, thirdly, the inclusive (not exhaustive) definition of “personnel” extends beyond employees of APTA (which is why the stuff about 141 “contemplating” the use only of “employees who are in all respect agents of the operator” in the CASA email of March 19 is bollocks) and finally, failure to comply with a condition is – of course – a strict liability offence.
This is the key point you have to get your head around: The answer: “It was a requirement of our system” or “it was a requirement of all of the base-specific operations manuals” or “we had a computer program that stops this happening” or whatever is not a sufficient answer to these kinds of questions:
How would APTA know if – let’s take an example – all damage and defects in aircraft utilised for flying training at an ‘alliance’ ‘base’ are always being recorded in the maintenance release?
What would APTA do when it finds out that an instructor at an ‘alliance’ ‘base’ has been failing to enter defects in the maintenance release of an aircraft used at that ‘base’? [Note the question is “when” not “if”. The answer: “It never happens”, is a wrong answer. So is: “Our manuals and computer system don’t allow this, and our key personnel would be pissed off about the situation”.]
What would APTA do if, in response to the action APTA takes, the instructor tells APTA: “Get stuffed. I’m in complete control of this business, and my business has hired and has control of the use of this aircraft”?
How would APTA know that ‘base’ aircraft with open defects in the maintenance release are only ever used in the operations (if any) which may lawfully be conducted with those defects?
What would APTA do if it finds out that an instructor at an ‘alliance’ ‘base’ has been flying an aircraft with an open defect in the maintenance release, with which defect the flights should not have been conducted?
What would APTA do if, in response to the action APTA takes, the instructor tells APTA: “Get stuffed. I’m in complete control of this business and my business has hired and has control of the use of this aircraft”?
The law already requires aircraft damage and defects to be endorsed in the aircraft’s maintenance release. It’s a criminal offence not to. The law already sets out the circumstances in which an aircraft may be flown with open defects, and flights in other circumstances are an offence.
These requirements can be ‘enshrined’ in an operator’s operations manual and there can be detailed procedures about how personnel are to achieve compliance with the requirements. The law already requires personnel to comply with the operations manual. It’s an offence not to.
If being a requirement in the law or some manual or computer system was enough to achieve compliance with the requirement in the real world, there would be no certification system.
The point of the certification system is to ascertain how the certificate holder will legally and effectively get all the wandering cats that are going to be doing stuff, under the authority of the certificate, to comply in fact with requirements in laws which already exist. That’s because, in the real world, simply imposing a requirement is not, of itself, sufficient to achieve compliance. And in the APTA structure, there were many more wandering cats, in the form of ‘alliance’ ‘members’ and their people and premises and aircraft, compared with a ‘traditional’ flying school.
All of the kinds of questions I’ve set out above should have been asked by CASA and – more importantly – the answers should have been analysed by someone with half a clue about their implications, from the start of the regulatory interactions between CASA and APTA during the establishment of the ‘alliance’ structure. CASA didn’t ask those questions until the March 19 email, after the October 2018 letter in which CASA effectively pretended it didn’t know that the structure included people who weren’t APTA employees, utilising premises and aircraft over which APTA had no legal and effective control (which, I reiterate, could have been fixed, which was another of the points of the March 19 email, but by then it was too late for you as a matter of practicality, because CASA had driven you spare and broke).
I know the ‘alliance’ ‘members’ didn’t have their own AOC. The fundamental advantage of the APTA structure was of course that the ‘members’ were operating under the authority of APTA’s AOC.
You don’t need to rush or get stressed about the following. But I do urge you to take the time, when you can and your head is in the right place, to get your head around what I’m saying.
That’s because I’m trying to help you to understand what’s at the heart of the regulatory issue that resulted in CASA doing a complete backflip after encouraging you to believe, through CASA’s approval of variations to cover additional ‘bases’, – and you reasonably believed – that the manuals and procedures and personnel and other arrangements put in place by APTA were sufficient for a structure including the ‘alliance’ ‘member’ concept to comply with the applicable aviation safety regulatory requirements (noting, as I’ve said before, CASA was at least on constructive notice of all the implications of the structure from the point at which CASA considered the application by APTA for a variation to cover the first ‘alliance’ ‘member’ ‘base’).
(And I can only try to imagine how much of your blood, sweat and tears (and treasure) went into building all that. It’s appalling that it ended up where it has.)
The pilot would enter it onto the maintenance release.
[A]ny aircraft could be immediately locked out of the system, and completely unable to be despatched.
There was a requirement for any two of these methods [VDO; Tacho; Flight switch] to be entered into FSM.
I chose the examples for a reason. I am aware, from long, first-hand knowledge, of how often defects (like a nosewheel shimmy – “it always does that”) are not entered in GA aircraft maintenance releases; of how often GA aircraft are flown with an open defect in the maintenance release, with which defect the aircraft should not have been flown (like an undercarriage indicator light – “I didn’t check the endorsements section of the MR before I went flying” or “I didn’t know it was unlawful to fly with that undercarriage indicator light blown; it’s just a light bulb” said by 6 different pilots about 6 different flights); and of how often accurate TIS is not recorded in the MR of GA aircraft. All of which happens – sometimes inadvertently through haste or incompetence and sometimes knowingly – quite frequently.
If you have never come across any of those kinds of circumstances in your time in GA, you are – I would suggest – unique. Ditto if you’ve never become aware of circumstances in which the owner of or registered operator of or a business using an aircraft to make money – like an APTA ‘alliance member’ - gives pilots ‘gentle hints’ about the ‘inconvenience’ that would occur if some ‘trivial’ problem was entered in the aircraft’s MR (and the FSM system). Indeed, I’m aware of a pilot who is the subject of an ongoing vendetta as a consequence of pissing off an aircraft operator by entering defects in the aircraft’s maintenance release. (And I have to pull you up on one issue: You put the word “interference” in quotation marks. I didn’t use that word.)
All of the circumstances to which I referred would constitute offences by the individuals involved. But in the APTA structure, they would also constitute offences by APTA. That is because first, it would be happening in the course of training activities being conducted by the individuals under the authority of APTA’s certificate, secondly, APTA’s certificate was (still is) subject to conditions including that “each of the operator’s personnel must comply with each provision of civil aviation legislation that applies to the operator’s authorised Part 141 flight training”, thirdly, the inclusive (not exhaustive) definition of “personnel” extends beyond employees of APTA (which is why the stuff about 141 “contemplating” the use only of “employees who are in all respect agents of the operator” in the CASA email of March 19 is bollocks) and finally, failure to comply with a condition is – of course – a strict liability offence.
This is the key point you have to get your head around: The answer: “It was a requirement of our system” or “it was a requirement of all of the base-specific operations manuals” or “we had a computer program that stops this happening” or whatever is not a sufficient answer to these kinds of questions:
How would APTA know if – let’s take an example – all damage and defects in aircraft utilised for flying training at an ‘alliance’ ‘base’ are always being recorded in the maintenance release?
What would APTA do when it finds out that an instructor at an ‘alliance’ ‘base’ has been failing to enter defects in the maintenance release of an aircraft used at that ‘base’? [Note the question is “when” not “if”. The answer: “It never happens”, is a wrong answer. So is: “Our manuals and computer system don’t allow this, and our key personnel would be pissed off about the situation”.]
What would APTA do if, in response to the action APTA takes, the instructor tells APTA: “Get stuffed. I’m in complete control of this business, and my business has hired and has control of the use of this aircraft”?
How would APTA know that ‘base’ aircraft with open defects in the maintenance release are only ever used in the operations (if any) which may lawfully be conducted with those defects?
What would APTA do if it finds out that an instructor at an ‘alliance’ ‘base’ has been flying an aircraft with an open defect in the maintenance release, with which defect the flights should not have been conducted?
What would APTA do if, in response to the action APTA takes, the instructor tells APTA: “Get stuffed. I’m in complete control of this business and my business has hired and has control of the use of this aircraft”?
The law already requires aircraft damage and defects to be endorsed in the aircraft’s maintenance release. It’s a criminal offence not to. The law already sets out the circumstances in which an aircraft may be flown with open defects, and flights in other circumstances are an offence.
These requirements can be ‘enshrined’ in an operator’s operations manual and there can be detailed procedures about how personnel are to achieve compliance with the requirements. The law already requires personnel to comply with the operations manual. It’s an offence not to.
If being a requirement in the law or some manual or computer system was enough to achieve compliance with the requirement in the real world, there would be no certification system.
The point of the certification system is to ascertain how the certificate holder will legally and effectively get all the wandering cats that are going to be doing stuff, under the authority of the certificate, to comply in fact with requirements in laws which already exist. That’s because, in the real world, simply imposing a requirement is not, of itself, sufficient to achieve compliance. And in the APTA structure, there were many more wandering cats, in the form of ‘alliance’ ‘members’ and their people and premises and aircraft, compared with a ‘traditional’ flying school.
All of the kinds of questions I’ve set out above should have been asked by CASA and – more importantly – the answers should have been analysed by someone with half a clue about their implications, from the start of the regulatory interactions between CASA and APTA during the establishment of the ‘alliance’ structure. CASA didn’t ask those questions until the March 19 email, after the October 2018 letter in which CASA effectively pretended it didn’t know that the structure included people who weren’t APTA employees, utilising premises and aircraft over which APTA had no legal and effective control (which, I reiterate, could have been fixed, which was another of the points of the March 19 email, but by then it was too late for you as a matter of practicality, because CASA had driven you spare and broke).
Last edited by Lead Balloon; 19th Aug 2022 at 04:55.
LB, your question is rhetorical. “how would APTA know? the answer is the same as that of the local flying school. APTA relies on trust - exactly the same way as the local school.
Short of a full blown telemetry system (eg ACARS) all operators rely on their staff to tell the truth in a timely manner and follow the procedures. If they can’t be trusted then there is no way in hell that ANY system can generate an accurate outcome.
‘’By definition, APTA surveillance can only ensure by audit that (a) Members know how to use the systems. and (b) Members are trustworthy.
CASA is entitled to ask APTA about matter (a) - which involves training. Item (b) is satisfied by the application of the fit and proper person test.
To put that another way; a mate was until recently a training and checking Captain on a very, very major international airline. The assessment of a pilot by him is still a matter of trustworthiness- and he has at least one story about this subject.
It is not possible to guarantee that humans will always behave and CASA has no business requiring APTA to do the impossible.
Short of a full blown telemetry system (eg ACARS) all operators rely on their staff to tell the truth in a timely manner and follow the procedures. If they can’t be trusted then there is no way in hell that ANY system can generate an accurate outcome.
‘’By definition, APTA surveillance can only ensure by audit that (a) Members know how to use the systems. and (b) Members are trustworthy.
CASA is entitled to ask APTA about matter (a) - which involves training. Item (b) is satisfied by the application of the fit and proper person test.
To put that another way; a mate was until recently a training and checking Captain on a very, very major international airline. The assessment of a pilot by him is still a matter of trustworthiness- and he has at least one story about this subject.
It is not possible to guarantee that humans will always behave and CASA has no business requiring APTA to do the impossible.
It is not possible to guarantee that humans will always behave and CASA has no business requiring APTA to do the impossible.
But I’ll guarantee that humans make mistakes and, occasionally, even deliberately break rules. I used the example of GA aircraft defects and GA aircraft maintenance releases for the reasons I explained.
It's not about 'guaranteeing' that each and every contravention will be detected.
The answer “we trust everybody” is not, in itself, enough for any kind of complex system involving humans. I’ve yet to see a fraud control policy in any big organisation that is one sentence: “We just trust everybody.” (One of the ways in which auditors detect fraud in organisations: Their books are perfect and nobody’s ever made a mistake with the organisation’s money.)
I think “trust but verify” is the cliché required approach, with practical actions available when contraventions are inevitably detected.
The question: “What is APTA going to do when it finds out a 'base' instructor has not been recording defects?”, is a perfectly reasonable one and does not set the standard at impossible perfection. The question assumes a contravention has occurred. But there has to be some way of detecting some contraventions, then finding out whether they’re a mistake or deliberate or whatever, then doing something practicable about it.
We’ve been through the comparison with a ‘standard’ local flying school before and you, too, need to get your head around the key difference between a ‘standard’ flying school and the ATPA structure before it collapsed. The AOC holder at the ‘standard’ local flying school has direct legal control over most of the wandering cats that can cause problems. An officer of the AOC holder, or the AOC holder him or herself, are usually physically there during much of the activity. (How many instructors do you reckon instruct at a ‘standard’ local flying school without having any relationship as employee of or contractor to the AOC holder (unless, of course, that instructor is him or herself the AOC holder)? That AOC holder has legal and effective options at his, her or its disposal to detect and deal with detected contraventions in the course of flying training under that AOC. You listed those options earlier in this thread!
But APTA didn’t have those options because APTA didn’t have enforceable agreements between it and most of the wandering cats at the ‘alliance’ ‘member’ ‘bases’. And I’m not talking about an agreement with a single individual or a corporate entity at the ‘base’. There were other cats wandering around at those bases, with no binding legal relationship with ATPA. I’ve said it before: It’s a tragedy that this gap was not picked up and filled early in the development of the APTA structure and CASA should have picked it up during the consideration of the first application for a variation to APTA’s AOC to cover an additional ‘alliance’ ‘member’ ‘base’.
And I’ve also said before: The certification system for flying training in Australia is regulatory overreach. But I can’t change that. While the system is what it is, I’m trying to help Glen understand the arguments he’s up against, because I’ll bet my bottom dollar that CASA will have made and will continue to make this kind of argument (among others). It is what was in and between the lines of CASA's March 19 email, so I'm not revealing anything surprising.
Last edited by Lead Balloon; 21st Aug 2022 at 11:53.
Regardless of the detail and/or legality of what happened, at the very least CASA have demonstrated that they are incapable of administrating civil aviation in Australia. By working with industry (in this case Glen and APTA/MFT, aunt gertrude, george, many other countless aviation organizations shafted by CASA or whoever you want to call them) for an extended period of time (in this case a couple of years) to then pull the pin at the last minute with no previous demonstrated concerns shows incompetence. They either don't have processes in place to know what they are doing, they aren't following their own processes or some combination of that. The slightest measure of management would have had multiple opportunities to alter the process Glenn was following and/or provided the specific guidance/direction necessary to ensure a workable outcome.
Bottom line CASA didn't. They led Glen (and countless others) down the garden path where they proceeded to introduce them to the CASA long pointy object. QED
Bottom line CASA didn't. They led Glen (and countless others) down the garden path where they proceeded to introduce them to the CASA long pointy object. QED
Yep. CASA in effect encouraged APTA down a path that ultimately led to … a CASA trap. The left hand didn’t know what the right hand was doing.
The second sleaziest aspect of the process (so far) is CASA’s current pretence that it did not know the details of the APTA structure and the relationship between APTA and the people, premises and aircraft utilised by ‘alliance’ ‘members’ to deliver flying training. (The sleaziest being Mr Carmody’s allegations against Glen, under parliamentary privilege, of assault and stalking.)
The second sleaziest aspect of the process (so far) is CASA’s current pretence that it did not know the details of the APTA structure and the relationship between APTA and the people, premises and aircraft utilised by ‘alliance’ ‘members’ to deliver flying training. (The sleaziest being Mr Carmody’s allegations against Glen, under parliamentary privilege, of assault and stalking.)
Last edited by Lead Balloon; 22nd Aug 2022 at 00:28.
The legalities and reasons for certification
On the other hand LB’s comprehensive explanations are valuable and do point to CASA’s view of the world. A world of beautiful symmetry of regularity that is, unfortunately, unreal, unworkable in practicality, given the complexities and costly procedures that it imposes. In this case by force on a demoralised and shrinking training environment for the VH registered segment of General Aviation(GA). GA provides the most important training ground for various areas that are directly of value to the community at large. For example the various emergency areas of police work, firefighting, air ambulance. In addition charter for business and government and the crucial work of the aerial application industry. Therefore the Australian community suffers.
Certification, just what value does it confer to the community? It does create a colossal amount of work for the monopoly provider CASA, and generates a considerable amount of fees that it extracts from those flying businesses that cannot operate without certain certifications. In the USA one can teach flying without holding a flying school certification. According to John King of King’s Schools about 70% of USA pilots are taught by independent instructors. John King was contracted for advice by CASA some years ago, a highly regarded GA operator. The fact that the USA trains more GA pilots by far than any other country and has a vigorous GA sector demonstrates that our extreme preoccupation with certification in this area is not justified, a costly aberration against the National interest.
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Certification, just what value does it confer to the community? It does create a colossal amount of work for the monopoly provider CASA, and generates a considerable amount of fees that it extracts from those flying businesses that cannot operate without certain certifications. In the USA one can teach flying without holding a flying school certification. According to John King of King’s Schools about 70% of USA pilots are taught by independent instructors. John King was contracted for advice by CASA some years ago, a highly regarded GA operator. The fact that the USA trains more GA pilots by far than any other country and has a vigorous GA sector demonstrates that our extreme preoccupation with certification in this area is not justified, a costly aberration against the National interest.
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Thread Starter
Clarification of a few matters
I just want to make clear a few points at this stage if I may.
If you refer to the initial notification.
There was, and never has been an allegation by CASA that we did not have full operational control that I am aware of. It was only ever an argument that the structure was unlawful. Once the Ombudsman found that it was not illegal, CASAs stance changed somewhat.
It became "CASA has to satisfy itself that an Operator has operational control". I agree 100%. An AOC Holder must have operational control. Of course they must.
CASA having to satisfy themselves that we have operational control is very different from CASAs determination that we did not have operational control (an allegation never made).
In order to determine that we did not have operational control would require some evidence, anything at all. That could be training records not full up to date, pilot recency not fully up to date, unairworthy aircraft being dispatched on flights, not fully and strictly adhering to our CASA approved procedures specified in the Exposition ( Operations manual). Something, absolutely anything to support the decision to reverse an approval that CASA had previously approved.
You will note that CASA has never said that we did not have full operational control, and i challenge them to do so. Remember, this business was fully CASA approved, disregard the name change of the Company only, that same Company had been doing the same thing for a decade. That is delivering multi base, multi entity training. It grew rapidly with the approach of the new legislation, as I knew it would.
In order to prepare for the legislation I invested hundreds of thousands of dollars, and worked with 10 CASA employees developing and massively improving all systems to be ready for the new regulations, as I was.
I appreciate that the recent comments are based very much around operational control.
I had been flying since 1982, and employed in the industry since the mid 90s. I was a Grade One, MEIFR instructor for many years. I operated in that multi base, multi entity structure for many years. Over the years that model improved substantially and the increases in technology made that task far more effective than it had been a decade earlier.
Lets look at one topic only and address "operational control"
Flight and duty Times.
In order to do this I want to make a comparison.
CASA have led the Ombudsman to believe that CASA had never permitted such a structure. There is no doubt that is blatantly false and misleading.
Lets consider Aero Club "A" that wanted to join APTA. Aero Club A had been operating under the AOC of another AOC Holder the day before with full CASA knowledge and approval.
When we considered any new member there was an extensive CASA approved preliminary inspection in our procedures. That procedure highlighted a significant deficiency with flight and duty times. The CASA accepted system to date had been manually entered and written, flight and duty times. They were many weeks behind schedule, and appeared to have some discrepancies. Significantly, there was no way to check the impacts of the past flight and duty times prior to departing on a flight. If there was a breach it would most likely only be picked up well after the breach occurred. As the acceptable method was a written method, and instructor would have little difficulty in adjusting those times, to ensure the breach disappeared. CASA would check those flight and duty times annually during an audit.
Under APTA, those flight and duties were promptly bought up to date and all historical information transferred into the APTA flight and duties, of which every pilot at every base was incorporated into the one system. The system automatically populated the times and would prevent an instructor signing out. The system also had a predictive capability, where all lessons had lesson times with buffers. It would alert the instructor if there was trend towards a breach.. There could be no fudging of flight and duties because the instructor had no control over times, dates, duration etc. In effect, a breach could not happen and in fact i don't believe that we had any breaches in the last 20,000 hours of flying. Consider also that CASA checked Aero Club As flight and duties annually. Under our system, CASA was provided full access, so CASA personnel could simply log in and check all flight and duties in real time, as well as all maintenance issues, training records, overdue flights, pilot qualifications etc etc etc.
The point being, I maintain that i had operational control, and that it is incumbent on CASA to determine that we did not have operational control, and to provide any evidence at all to support such a substantive determination
Cheers. Glen
I am still awaiting CASAS release under FOI of my request for our submitted request for our applications for both AVIA and LTF. Mr Aleck claims that CASA first became aware in October 2018.
If you refer to the initial notification.
There was, and never has been an allegation by CASA that we did not have full operational control that I am aware of. It was only ever an argument that the structure was unlawful. Once the Ombudsman found that it was not illegal, CASAs stance changed somewhat.
It became "CASA has to satisfy itself that an Operator has operational control". I agree 100%. An AOC Holder must have operational control. Of course they must.
CASA having to satisfy themselves that we have operational control is very different from CASAs determination that we did not have operational control (an allegation never made).
In order to determine that we did not have operational control would require some evidence, anything at all. That could be training records not full up to date, pilot recency not fully up to date, unairworthy aircraft being dispatched on flights, not fully and strictly adhering to our CASA approved procedures specified in the Exposition ( Operations manual). Something, absolutely anything to support the decision to reverse an approval that CASA had previously approved.
You will note that CASA has never said that we did not have full operational control, and i challenge them to do so. Remember, this business was fully CASA approved, disregard the name change of the Company only, that same Company had been doing the same thing for a decade. That is delivering multi base, multi entity training. It grew rapidly with the approach of the new legislation, as I knew it would.
In order to prepare for the legislation I invested hundreds of thousands of dollars, and worked with 10 CASA employees developing and massively improving all systems to be ready for the new regulations, as I was.
I appreciate that the recent comments are based very much around operational control.
I had been flying since 1982, and employed in the industry since the mid 90s. I was a Grade One, MEIFR instructor for many years. I operated in that multi base, multi entity structure for many years. Over the years that model improved substantially and the increases in technology made that task far more effective than it had been a decade earlier.
Lets look at one topic only and address "operational control"
Flight and duty Times.
In order to do this I want to make a comparison.
CASA have led the Ombudsman to believe that CASA had never permitted such a structure. There is no doubt that is blatantly false and misleading.
Lets consider Aero Club "A" that wanted to join APTA. Aero Club A had been operating under the AOC of another AOC Holder the day before with full CASA knowledge and approval.
When we considered any new member there was an extensive CASA approved preliminary inspection in our procedures. That procedure highlighted a significant deficiency with flight and duty times. The CASA accepted system to date had been manually entered and written, flight and duty times. They were many weeks behind schedule, and appeared to have some discrepancies. Significantly, there was no way to check the impacts of the past flight and duty times prior to departing on a flight. If there was a breach it would most likely only be picked up well after the breach occurred. As the acceptable method was a written method, and instructor would have little difficulty in adjusting those times, to ensure the breach disappeared. CASA would check those flight and duty times annually during an audit.
Under APTA, those flight and duties were promptly bought up to date and all historical information transferred into the APTA flight and duties, of which every pilot at every base was incorporated into the one system. The system automatically populated the times and would prevent an instructor signing out. The system also had a predictive capability, where all lessons had lesson times with buffers. It would alert the instructor if there was trend towards a breach.. There could be no fudging of flight and duties because the instructor had no control over times, dates, duration etc. In effect, a breach could not happen and in fact i don't believe that we had any breaches in the last 20,000 hours of flying. Consider also that CASA checked Aero Club As flight and duties annually. Under our system, CASA was provided full access, so CASA personnel could simply log in and check all flight and duties in real time, as well as all maintenance issues, training records, overdue flights, pilot qualifications etc etc etc.
The point being, I maintain that i had operational control, and that it is incumbent on CASA to determine that we did not have operational control, and to provide any evidence at all to support such a substantive determination
Cheers. Glen
I am still awaiting CASAS release under FOI of my request for our submitted request for our applications for both AVIA and LTF. Mr Aleck claims that CASA first became aware in October 2018.
Again, Glen, I’ll just predict what I reckon CASA will say, and why.
CASA does not need to make any “allegation” about anything when considering whether or not to grant an authorisation. One of the main points of the 13 March 2019 email was that CASA was not then satisfied that APTA did have operational control over all of the ‘alliance’ ‘members’’ activities. Part of that email said:
It was up to APTA to satisfy CASA that APTA had full operational control, not CASA to show that APTA didn’t. Again from the 13 March 2019 email: “[D]emonstrate to CASA’s satisfaction that a particular shortcoming or deficiency does not exist.”
Having visibility into a computer database does not confer authority to operationally control as a matter of law or practicality. And I reiterate that a computer database depends fundamentally on the stuff manually input to it.
I’m sure that you and I and a bunch of like-minded people could set up a flying school tomorrow and, as a matter of objective fact, the flying training activities would be conducted safely and the pilots trained to the requisite level of competence. But herein lies the rub: It would all be in breach of regulatory requirements. And I say again: I’m not defending those requirements; I can’t change them. I’m just trying to prepare you for what I reckon will be the arguments made and the flaws in them.
If I had to bet my bottom dollar, I’d say that this is just the usual right hand not knowing what the left was doing in CASA. One part of CASA was busily authorising the variation of AOCs - not just APTA's - to cover flying training at different locations, without having a proper understanding of the implications for legal and effective control when some of the people, premises and aircraft involved were not the AOC holder’s. Another part of CASA had a holy sh*t moment. That other part contained the bulk of adults actually in charge.
CASA’s ‘Plan A’ was to claim that the APTA structure is simply impermissible under the civil aviation legislation. That plan crashed and burned when someone competent and with integrity apparently read what the legislation actually says. The civil aviation legislation does not prohibit an AOC holder from utilising personnel who are not employees of the AOC holder, or premises of which the AOC holder is not owner or lessee, or aircraft of which the AOC holder is not the owner or registered operator, in the conduct of operations under the AOC. (But those arrangements raise the legal and effective control issue…)
So CASA’s ‘Plan B’ was effectively as described in CASA’s 13 March 2019 email. That email imposed a task that could have gone on forever with unlimited costs. That drove you to despair and broke.
But the elephant in the room remained (and remains) that variations to APTA’s AOC had previously been granted to authorise these kinds of arrangements, without CASA having made ATPA go through the process imposed by the 13 March 2019 email. Thus CASA wants to keep up the pretence that it did not become aware of the details of the APTA structure until late 2018 and that the structure was novel. (The 13 March 2019 email uses the language: “the novelty of the approach APTA proposes”.) The truth is in my view that CASA was at least on constructive notice of the details, from – at the latest – the point at which CASA considered the first variation application to cover an additional ‘base’. That’s the process during which the gist of the 13 March 2019 email should have been explained to APTA. And it should have been explained to any other AOC holder who ever wanted to conduct activities utilising personnel who are not employees of the AOC holder, or premises of which the AOC holder is not owner or lessee, or aircraft of which the AOC holder is not the owner or registered operator – all which activities occur, frequently. But CASA doesn’t have the corporate integrity to admit the earlier mistakes.
CASA does not need to make any “allegation” about anything when considering whether or not to grant an authorisation. One of the main points of the 13 March 2019 email was that CASA was not then satisfied that APTA did have operational control over all of the ‘alliance’ ‘members’’ activities. Part of that email said:
As a matter of operational control, and integral to the very object of the authorisation[s] involved, CASA must be satisfied that all these considerations have been, and will continue to be, satisfied by the authorisation holder.
To the extent aspects of an authorisation holder’s [read APTA] safety-related functions under the civil aviation legislation might be conducted, for and on behalf of the authorisation holder, by and through separate and independent legal entities [read ‘alliance’ ‘members’], contractually engaged by the authorisation holder for those purposes, CASA would need to be fully satisfied that:
[…blah blah blah…]
In assessing this contract [these contracts], CASA will have regard to the way in which the specific operational activities for which APTA will be accountable, as the authorisation holder, can and will be carried out by the contracted entity, and the bases on which full operational control can and will be maintained by APTA under those arrangements.
…
To the extent aspects of an authorisation holder’s [read APTA] safety-related functions under the civil aviation legislation might be conducted, for and on behalf of the authorisation holder, by and through separate and independent legal entities [read ‘alliance’ ‘members’], contractually engaged by the authorisation holder for those purposes, CASA would need to be fully satisfied that:
[…blah blah blah…]
In assessing this contract [these contracts], CASA will have regard to the way in which the specific operational activities for which APTA will be accountable, as the authorisation holder, can and will be carried out by the contracted entity, and the bases on which full operational control can and will be maintained by APTA under those arrangements.
…
Having visibility into a computer database does not confer authority to operationally control as a matter of law or practicality. And I reiterate that a computer database depends fundamentally on the stuff manually input to it.
I’m sure that you and I and a bunch of like-minded people could set up a flying school tomorrow and, as a matter of objective fact, the flying training activities would be conducted safely and the pilots trained to the requisite level of competence. But herein lies the rub: It would all be in breach of regulatory requirements. And I say again: I’m not defending those requirements; I can’t change them. I’m just trying to prepare you for what I reckon will be the arguments made and the flaws in them.
If I had to bet my bottom dollar, I’d say that this is just the usual right hand not knowing what the left was doing in CASA. One part of CASA was busily authorising the variation of AOCs - not just APTA's - to cover flying training at different locations, without having a proper understanding of the implications for legal and effective control when some of the people, premises and aircraft involved were not the AOC holder’s. Another part of CASA had a holy sh*t moment. That other part contained the bulk of adults actually in charge.
CASA’s ‘Plan A’ was to claim that the APTA structure is simply impermissible under the civil aviation legislation. That plan crashed and burned when someone competent and with integrity apparently read what the legislation actually says. The civil aviation legislation does not prohibit an AOC holder from utilising personnel who are not employees of the AOC holder, or premises of which the AOC holder is not owner or lessee, or aircraft of which the AOC holder is not the owner or registered operator, in the conduct of operations under the AOC. (But those arrangements raise the legal and effective control issue…)
So CASA’s ‘Plan B’ was effectively as described in CASA’s 13 March 2019 email. That email imposed a task that could have gone on forever with unlimited costs. That drove you to despair and broke.
But the elephant in the room remained (and remains) that variations to APTA’s AOC had previously been granted to authorise these kinds of arrangements, without CASA having made ATPA go through the process imposed by the 13 March 2019 email. Thus CASA wants to keep up the pretence that it did not become aware of the details of the APTA structure until late 2018 and that the structure was novel. (The 13 March 2019 email uses the language: “the novelty of the approach APTA proposes”.) The truth is in my view that CASA was at least on constructive notice of the details, from – at the latest – the point at which CASA considered the first variation application to cover an additional ‘base’. That’s the process during which the gist of the 13 March 2019 email should have been explained to APTA. And it should have been explained to any other AOC holder who ever wanted to conduct activities utilising personnel who are not employees of the AOC holder, or premises of which the AOC holder is not owner or lessee, or aircraft of which the AOC holder is not the owner or registered operator – all which activities occur, frequently. But CASA doesn’t have the corporate integrity to admit the earlier mistakes.
The Loyola bull**** artist J.A. Glen, what you created within your business was a good example of outcome based regulation, a way to safely operate and manage a business without abiding by prescriptive methodology. However the loopy lawyer didn’t subscribe to your methodology did he? Anyway, he is a wordsmith and full of ****, and this softly softly nice guy video is not a true picture of what the bearded weasel is really like. He has thrown a number of CASA DAS’s under the bus, and the way he did it so publicly to Spence in the Senate is a prime example of how this two-faced maggot operates.
To me, this just feeds into this BS in management-speak these days that twists the buggery out of the language and invents versions of words that don't exist so they can be used as adjectives or verbs, etc. when they're not.
If I hear one more MORON state that "there are learnings from this" I'll vomit. WTF was wrong with 'lessons'??
Like business, CASA too is, as my 80+ year old airline veteran father would say "is, like society, drowning in a sea of bullsh*t".