Classification of Operations and ‘Safety’
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Classification of Operations and ‘Safety’
CASA frequently proves the rule that there’s no such thing as unutterable nonsense. The most recent proof is its performance before Senate Estimates on 26 February. (That performance also shows that the current DAS has been drinking - or has perhaps been force-fed - plentiful quantities of the “safety of air navigation” rhetoric Kool-Aide.) (The Hansard should be available here: https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary...onal_estimates. I haven’t worked out how to post the video.)
Apparently an operator was chock full of pilots who were “competent” but not “proficient”. They were not “proficient” because they had not done proficiency checks frequently enough in accordance with that most Orwellian of aviation regulatory tools: the Operations Manual (the content of which is not “approved” by CASA but instead effectively dictated by CASA for hapless small operators).
It appears that the periodicities for recurrent training included in an Operations Manual on the basis of someone’s strong opinion become an objective truth with automatic negative safety consequences if not complied with. Go figure.
This apparently meant the pilots were not sufficiently ‘safe’ to engage complex jets in commercial operations. However, the pilots were apparently sufficiently ‘safe’ to engage the same aircraft in private operations or conduct “mercy flights”. Go figure.
This distinction was justified by CASA on the basis of the usual “knowledge and acceptance of risk” fiction.
Apparently, if a non-proficient pilot has an emergency in a complex jet that s/he can’t handle during a private operation or “mercy flight”, the people killed on the ground know of and accept that risk. Not so if it was a commercial operation. Go figure.
I’m sure all POB the private flights would know the probabilities of the PIC having an emergency that s/he couldn’t handle at the proficiency check due date minus 30 days, and the probabilities of the PIC having an emergency that s/he couldn’t handle at the proficiency due date plus 30 days. The number of zeros after the decimal point in the percentages of each would have been no impediment to a fully-informed and rational assessment and acceptance of the risk. Punters boarding the aircraft on a commercial flight know neither percentage but - apparently through magic or osmosis - accept exposure to the first level of risk but do not accept exposure to the second level of risk. Go figure.
The valid practical point made in the RQAC v CASA Federal Court matter - that a pilot doesn’t become a dangerous Gumby automatically after the due date for some recurrent test/training/check becomes due - was effectively dismissed by CASA. The dismissal was on the basis of the legal difference between a failure to comply with a recurrent requirement imposed as a condition on an ATO delegation on the one hand, and a failure to comply with a recurrent requirement imposed as a consequence of the obligation to comply with an Operations Manual on the other. The latter is a breach of - gasp - the law.
I’m guessing that if the operator had unilaterally amended its Operations Manual, under CAR 215(5), so as to extend the periods between proficiency checks and turn the breach into a non-breach, the pilots wouldn’t have magically become ‘safer’ and, more importantly, CASA would have had a conniption and directed the operator under CAR 215(3) to change it back - thus demonstrating that the content of Operations Manuals is effectively dictated by CASA on the basis of someone’s strong opinion.
Apparently an aircraft ‘knows’ and a pilot’s biology ‘knows’ the difference between the pilot’s failure to comply with a recurrent requirement imposed as a condition on a delegation and the pilot’s failure to comply with a recurrent requirement imposed through an Operations Manual, with the latter producing a ‘less safe’ outcome. Go figure.
Struggling with the evident heavy burden of the safety of air navigation on his shoulders, the current DAS described the risk he took in granting an exemption to enable the least non-proficient pilots to lawfully engage in a commercial operation. I’m sure the DAS had, at his fingertips, the probability figures of the least non-proficient pilots having an emergency s/he couldn’t handle compared with a proficient pilot, as well as the probability at which an operation changes from ‘safe’ to ‘unsafe’.
The scariest thing - the scariest thing - is that they all appear earnestly to believe the nonsense they utter has a rational and causal connection with positive safety outcomes, and that they accordingly make a net positive difference to aviation safety.
Meanwhile, in ATSB land...
CASA’s performance followed the ATSB’s appearance, during the opening statement of which the Chief Commissioner went through the long list of general aviation tragedies in the last 18 or so months. The question whether there might be any causal connection between the spike in general aviation fatalities and the activities of the regulator didn’t arise. Go figure.
Oddly in my view (based on watching many, many Estimates hearings), the ATSB flick-passed questions about the second go at the NGA ditching investigation report to a lawyer. Apparently the responsible technical expert wasn’t available because s/he is based in Brisbane. Even if that’s a legitimate excuse for not fronting the Committee, one wonders why the ‘fallback’ was ATSB’s lawyer.
When asked whether NGA would have had enough fuel to make it to an alternate after arrival at YSNF, even if NGA had departed Apia with full fuel, the correct answer - no - was not forthcoming. The extra ‘thinking time’ and increased probabilities of getting a ‘lucky break’ in the weather at YSNF arising from full fuel were irrelevant to the specific question asked. It’s disappointing that the correct answer to the actual question wasn’t provided. But go figure.
Apparently an operator was chock full of pilots who were “competent” but not “proficient”. They were not “proficient” because they had not done proficiency checks frequently enough in accordance with that most Orwellian of aviation regulatory tools: the Operations Manual (the content of which is not “approved” by CASA but instead effectively dictated by CASA for hapless small operators).
It appears that the periodicities for recurrent training included in an Operations Manual on the basis of someone’s strong opinion become an objective truth with automatic negative safety consequences if not complied with. Go figure.
This apparently meant the pilots were not sufficiently ‘safe’ to engage complex jets in commercial operations. However, the pilots were apparently sufficiently ‘safe’ to engage the same aircraft in private operations or conduct “mercy flights”. Go figure.
This distinction was justified by CASA on the basis of the usual “knowledge and acceptance of risk” fiction.
Apparently, if a non-proficient pilot has an emergency in a complex jet that s/he can’t handle during a private operation or “mercy flight”, the people killed on the ground know of and accept that risk. Not so if it was a commercial operation. Go figure.
I’m sure all POB the private flights would know the probabilities of the PIC having an emergency that s/he couldn’t handle at the proficiency check due date minus 30 days, and the probabilities of the PIC having an emergency that s/he couldn’t handle at the proficiency due date plus 30 days. The number of zeros after the decimal point in the percentages of each would have been no impediment to a fully-informed and rational assessment and acceptance of the risk. Punters boarding the aircraft on a commercial flight know neither percentage but - apparently through magic or osmosis - accept exposure to the first level of risk but do not accept exposure to the second level of risk. Go figure.
The valid practical point made in the RQAC v CASA Federal Court matter - that a pilot doesn’t become a dangerous Gumby automatically after the due date for some recurrent test/training/check becomes due - was effectively dismissed by CASA. The dismissal was on the basis of the legal difference between a failure to comply with a recurrent requirement imposed as a condition on an ATO delegation on the one hand, and a failure to comply with a recurrent requirement imposed as a consequence of the obligation to comply with an Operations Manual on the other. The latter is a breach of - gasp - the law.
I’m guessing that if the operator had unilaterally amended its Operations Manual, under CAR 215(5), so as to extend the periods between proficiency checks and turn the breach into a non-breach, the pilots wouldn’t have magically become ‘safer’ and, more importantly, CASA would have had a conniption and directed the operator under CAR 215(3) to change it back - thus demonstrating that the content of Operations Manuals is effectively dictated by CASA on the basis of someone’s strong opinion.
Apparently an aircraft ‘knows’ and a pilot’s biology ‘knows’ the difference between the pilot’s failure to comply with a recurrent requirement imposed as a condition on a delegation and the pilot’s failure to comply with a recurrent requirement imposed through an Operations Manual, with the latter producing a ‘less safe’ outcome. Go figure.
Struggling with the evident heavy burden of the safety of air navigation on his shoulders, the current DAS described the risk he took in granting an exemption to enable the least non-proficient pilots to lawfully engage in a commercial operation. I’m sure the DAS had, at his fingertips, the probability figures of the least non-proficient pilots having an emergency s/he couldn’t handle compared with a proficient pilot, as well as the probability at which an operation changes from ‘safe’ to ‘unsafe’.
The scariest thing - the scariest thing - is that they all appear earnestly to believe the nonsense they utter has a rational and causal connection with positive safety outcomes, and that they accordingly make a net positive difference to aviation safety.
Meanwhile, in ATSB land...
CASA’s performance followed the ATSB’s appearance, during the opening statement of which the Chief Commissioner went through the long list of general aviation tragedies in the last 18 or so months. The question whether there might be any causal connection between the spike in general aviation fatalities and the activities of the regulator didn’t arise. Go figure.
Oddly in my view (based on watching many, many Estimates hearings), the ATSB flick-passed questions about the second go at the NGA ditching investigation report to a lawyer. Apparently the responsible technical expert wasn’t available because s/he is based in Brisbane. Even if that’s a legitimate excuse for not fronting the Committee, one wonders why the ‘fallback’ was ATSB’s lawyer.
When asked whether NGA would have had enough fuel to make it to an alternate after arrival at YSNF, even if NGA had departed Apia with full fuel, the correct answer - no - was not forthcoming. The extra ‘thinking time’ and increased probabilities of getting a ‘lucky break’ in the weather at YSNF arising from full fuel were irrelevant to the specific question asked. It’s disappointing that the correct answer to the actual question wasn’t provided. But go figure.
Last edited by Lead Balloon; 27th Feb 2018 at 09:00.
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I believe you would be referring to the requirements of CAR217, for certain operators to have a CASA approved check and training organisation, which must-as a minimum- provide 2 checks of competency in a 12 month period? That requirement is not someone’s opinion, it is law, the ops manual must have procedures that- if followed- will ensure compliance. If an operator can’t comply with this basic requirement and lets not one, but every single one of its pilots checks lapse, why should CASA let them continue to operate, and take the work away from everyone else who do spend the money on the checks and monitoring programs, sometimes sending their pilots overseas to jump in the sim? One pilot falling out of currency is one thing, every pilot being uncurrent is completely different
Thread Starter
Good legal points, vref. I was trying to make points about the substance of the circumstances and the safety fictions on the basis of which the classification of operations scheme and other aspects of the regulatory regime are justified.
I’d merely note on your legal points that:
(1) The ‘basic’ competency check periodicities in 217(3) were not etched in the stone tablets brought down by Moses from Mount Sinai. They are the manifestation of a human being’s strong opinion.
(2) 217 contains discretions and powers that result in CASA being able to dictate, on the basis of a human being’s strong opinion, the operators who must have a C&T system and the system’s content. “any other operator CASA specifies”. “The training and checking organisation and the tests and checks provided for therein shall be subject to the approval of CASA.”
Interestingly, CASA did not stop the operator in question from operating. CASA did not suspend the operator’s AOC or any of the pilots’ licences or ratings. CASA took the view that the operator was ‘safe enough’ to carry out private operations and “mercy flights”. So far as I can tell, the operator was in breach of CARs 215 and 217. What regulatory action should flow from that should depend on the substance of the safety risk. I imagine that the operator was so sh*t scared of the ‘nuclear option’ that it ‘grounded’ itself.
Unfortunately, the elephant in the Committee room was never spotted by the Committee: The vast difference between the regulator’s efforts to assist Pel Air to address the deficiencies discovered in Pel Air after the NGA ditching, on the one hand, and the regulator’s efforts to assist this operator to address the deficiencies discovered in this operator. Go figure. (Dominic James and others would no doubt be struck with the irony of the fact that the deficiencies were discovered in this operator during an attempt to conduct a flight so as to bring an end to the administrative torture being committed on Dom as a consequence of the NGA ditching.)
And the number of fatal accidents in GA over the last 18 or so months? Move on, nothing to see here.
I’d merely note on your legal points that:
(1) The ‘basic’ competency check periodicities in 217(3) were not etched in the stone tablets brought down by Moses from Mount Sinai. They are the manifestation of a human being’s strong opinion.
(2) 217 contains discretions and powers that result in CASA being able to dictate, on the basis of a human being’s strong opinion, the operators who must have a C&T system and the system’s content. “any other operator CASA specifies”. “The training and checking organisation and the tests and checks provided for therein shall be subject to the approval of CASA.”
Interestingly, CASA did not stop the operator in question from operating. CASA did not suspend the operator’s AOC or any of the pilots’ licences or ratings. CASA took the view that the operator was ‘safe enough’ to carry out private operations and “mercy flights”. So far as I can tell, the operator was in breach of CARs 215 and 217. What regulatory action should flow from that should depend on the substance of the safety risk. I imagine that the operator was so sh*t scared of the ‘nuclear option’ that it ‘grounded’ itself.
Unfortunately, the elephant in the Committee room was never spotted by the Committee: The vast difference between the regulator’s efforts to assist Pel Air to address the deficiencies discovered in Pel Air after the NGA ditching, on the one hand, and the regulator’s efforts to assist this operator to address the deficiencies discovered in this operator. Go figure. (Dominic James and others would no doubt be struck with the irony of the fact that the deficiencies were discovered in this operator during an attempt to conduct a flight so as to bring an end to the administrative torture being committed on Dom as a consequence of the NGA ditching.)
And the number of fatal accidents in GA over the last 18 or so months? Move on, nothing to see here.
Last edited by Lead Balloon; 27th Feb 2018 at 20:04.
The law and regulations appear to be the proverbial self licking ice cream cone for CASA - ( self-perpetuating system that has no purpose other than to sustain itself).
- "safety" is what we say it is.
- The law and regulations exist to ensure "safety".
- Therefore the law and regulations are what we say they are.
The net result is to maximise career outcomes for CASA staff and politicians at the expense of the industry and general public.
Yet despite all the money and mountains of unreadable law and regulation produced by CASA, we still have GA accidents that result in serious injury and death...
-An aircraft is overloaded and stalls.
- Another lands downwind and overruns.
How is it that such apparently relatively simple errors are not avoided (knocks on wood)? While CASA can proudly point to the regulations and laws both pilots broke, where is the simple CASA training of all pilots to guard against such mistakes?
- "safety" is what we say it is.
- The law and regulations exist to ensure "safety".
- Therefore the law and regulations are what we say they are.
The net result is to maximise career outcomes for CASA staff and politicians at the expense of the industry and general public.
Yet despite all the money and mountains of unreadable law and regulation produced by CASA, we still have GA accidents that result in serious injury and death...
-An aircraft is overloaded and stalls.
- Another lands downwind and overruns.
How is it that such apparently relatively simple errors are not avoided (knocks on wood)? While CASA can proudly point to the regulations and laws both pilots broke, where is the simple CASA training of all pilots to guard against such mistakes?
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Perhaps the operator has other more systemic problems that manifested itself in this problem with the lack of prof checks, hence the action? We won’t know
WRT DJ, totally agree, way over the top, you should ask the head of the ATSB why he took that course of action, he signed the forms suspending DJs licence
WRT DJ, totally agree, way over the top, you should ask the head of the ATSB why he took that course of action, he signed the forms suspending DJs licence
CAsA is all confused and blinded by its own self serving image . It is purely a regulatory authority, compliance is all they can see and that is all they are interested in. In no way can CAsA be regarded as an authority on safe, civil aviation. One can be 100% compliant and yet not be safe, the reverse is also true.
All the 'laws' and regulations written by the likes of the ICAO's, EASA's, FAA's, NZCAA's and our own gem, CAsA of this world are useless and in some cases an impediment if one does not comply and practice the management of the balance between the 4 forces, lift, weight, thrust and drag. Everything else written is standardisation of fluff.
Our dear CAsA are leading experts in the world of fluff.
CC
All the 'laws' and regulations written by the likes of the ICAO's, EASA's, FAA's, NZCAA's and our own gem, CAsA of this world are useless and in some cases an impediment if one does not comply and practice the management of the balance between the 4 forces, lift, weight, thrust and drag. Everything else written is standardisation of fluff.
Our dear CAsA are leading experts in the world of fluff.
CC
Last edited by Checklist Charlie; 27th Feb 2018 at 20:54. Reason: .
Thread Starter
Perhaps the operator has other more systemic problems that manifested itself in this problem with the lack of prof checks, hence the action? We won’t know
WRT DJ, totally agree, way over the top, you should ask the head of the ATSB why he took that course of action, he signed the forms suspending DJs licence
WRT DJ, totally agree, way over the top, you should ask the head of the ATSB why he took that course of action, he signed the forms suspending DJs licence
I think you’ll find ATSB doesn’t have power to suspend anyone’s licence. And I’m not sure Dom’s licence was ever suspended and, even if it was, it was for a short time. The regulatory torture (inflicted by CASA) was about conditions/limitations on his licence.
Jeez Baloony ...you great verbal output makes you sound like Aleck...were you infected when in CAsA ?
Smart Aleck sent me a three page 'thesis' of convoluted verbiage explaining how LIES, given as false sworn testimony with a view to a prosecution, weren't that at all. just..
"discrepancies in the wording, or use of discrepant words"
See, with a barrow load of CAsA BS, anything can be justified. EVEN LYING.!
Not criticising the points yr making...but "safety" belongs to them.
However they see it, however they have to mould it to make their case.
With the CAsA train still on their rails its true that GA IS well and truly fcuked.!!!
Smart Aleck sent me a three page 'thesis' of convoluted verbiage explaining how LIES, given as false sworn testimony with a view to a prosecution, weren't that at all. just..
"discrepancies in the wording, or use of discrepant words"
See, with a barrow load of CAsA BS, anything can be justified. EVEN LYING.!
Not criticising the points yr making...but "safety" belongs to them.
However they see it, however they have to mould it to make their case.
With the CAsA train still on their rails its true that GA IS well and truly fcuked.!!!
Lead Balloon / Sunfish, I believe that the ever growing complexity of the Regulations prove only one thing - the industry is trying to legislate against stupidity. In my limited time in GA, there are a number of ATSB reports which could be summarised as "The Pilot In Command was being a dick, and doing sh!t that the PIC was not trained, competent and confident to do. #gameover"
I also believe that the ever growing complexity of the Regulations is fuelled by a growing number of consultants. Gotta keep coming up with ever more fanciful risks which must be addressed according to these lengthy procedures (which I am happy to write for you at the bargain basement price of $2500 per day).
Instead of the common sense approach of saying - the chances of this happening are 1 in a million, you have more chance of winning Lotto.
I agree, aroa - GA is in a worse condition that a hooker during Fleet Week!
I also believe that the ever growing complexity of the Regulations is fuelled by a growing number of consultants. Gotta keep coming up with ever more fanciful risks which must be addressed according to these lengthy procedures (which I am happy to write for you at the bargain basement price of $2500 per day).
Instead of the common sense approach of saying - the chances of this happening are 1 in a million, you have more chance of winning Lotto.
I agree, aroa - GA is in a worse condition that a hooker during Fleet Week!
Last edited by outnabout; 27th Feb 2018 at 23:56.
Fortunately, despite all the doom and gloom that is within General Aviation in Australia, a few of us still get to enjoy really fun trips. Most are far away from home. 
"The Pilot In Command was being a dick, and doing sh!t that the PIC was not trained, competent and confident to do. #gameover"
The OM could be;
1.1.1 The Company's operations shall be conducted in accordance with the POH, AFM and common sense.
1.1.2 Ties shall be worn on Tuesdays.
Yes, despite all the CAsA induced doom and gloom there are many folk out there enjoying aviating as they see fit. Good on em !
The more the better, keep flying in spite of CAsA,.... not because 'they' let you.
The more the better, keep flying in spite of CAsA,.... not because 'they' let you.
I agree with you, 601 (except for the bit about ties.)
But I will bet a seriously good bottle of red that every GA Ops Manual in the country has at least one section which is in the Ops Manual because it was the current hobby horse of the FOI overseeing at that particular time, or it was CASA's flavour of the month. That section is not there to improve safety, and is included in the company's Ops Manual despite the wishes of the CP or the owner.
"Accepted, not approved" - Utter, utter bollocks
But I will bet a seriously good bottle of red that every GA Ops Manual in the country has at least one section which is in the Ops Manual because it was the current hobby horse of the FOI overseeing at that particular time, or it was CASA's flavour of the month. That section is not there to improve safety, and is included in the company's Ops Manual despite the wishes of the CP or the owner.
"Accepted, not approved" - Utter, utter bollocks
Man Bilong Balus long PNG
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Watts on second.
