CASA Class G Discussion Paper
Well said also, Sunfish
One Q: can you elaborate on this i.e. who is attempting to prevent you from communicating or refusing information:
One Q: can you elaborate on this i.e. who is attempting to prevent you from communicating or refusing information:
What I do not like is the idea of being prevented from communicating with anyone or being refused information that might be critical to my safety just because I am driving a VFR bug smasher.
Thread Starter
I’m really glad that CaptainMidnight brought up Voices of Reason. It gives me the chance again to post one of the best views of Voices of Reason. It is about Class E airspace and was posted on 22 April 2004.
Capn Bloggs warning! Do not read the above post!
Class E airspace Is Safe
Class E Airspace and United States Practice
We have watched with incredulity at the dangerously naive statements being made on threads in the Australian PPRuNe sites, concerning the operation of Class E airspace. Class E airspace is NOT an unsafe categorization of airspace, and is in fact used safely and effectively in substantial portions of the globe.
EACH AND EVERY transport and passenger carrying aircraft operating in the United States is required to operate for some portion of their flight in designated Class E airspace – effectively between 18,000 feet and the upper limit of Class B, C or D airspace – or the surface for non controlled aerodromes. This equates to over 10,000 passenger-carrying flights per day, every day of the year. The Class E airspace within which they operate is in the so-called most dangerous phase of flight – climb or descent. Your national carrier is no exception.
There are in excess of 150,000 general aviation aircraft operating in the United States, to either the visual or instrument flight rules – many many thousands per day.
There are CONSTANT interactions between IFR passenger carrying aircraft and VFR aircraft on a daily basis – with no hint that this practice is unsafe.
There are countless examples where aircraft provided with routine terminal area instructions whilst still in Class E airspace are routinely provided sequencing descending turn instructions by controllers in one breath, and VFR traffic information in the other.
We agree that Class E airspace is mostly within radar cover in the United States – probably the greater part of 95%. In that airspace, air traffic controllers positively separate IFR flights from other IFR flights – and where they can, provide traffic information on VFR flights.
Radar coverage is NOT a prerequisite for Class E airspace, and in fact in several cases the Class E airspace linking certain aerodromes to upper airspace is not covered by radar. In that airspace, air traffic controllers positively separate IFR flights from other IFR flights – and as they cannot observe VFR, do not pass traffic unless they know by some other means. That positive IFR-to-IFR separation may, in many cases, be applied on a “one in at a time” basis. The airlines accept that mode of operation.
NOT ONE SINGLE AIRLINE in the United States is lobbying for a higher level of service in current Class E areas.
Our observation in relation to the Australian experience has been one of giving proper effect not just to training and education, but also to the cultural change requirements. Pilots need to understand that operating in Class E airspace IS FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT to the service that they have received in the past – but need to accept that this is a normal way of doing business.
Australian controllers need to STOP being negative, embrace the concept of Class E airspace and to be blunt, get on with it. Controllers in the United States provide services in Class E, without questioning its “safety”, day in and day out, and have done so [either as Class E, or its predecessor], for over 50 years.
NOT ONE SINGLE CONTROLLER in the United States is lobbying for a higher level of service in current Class E areas.
We are concerned that this constant questioning and second-guessing by your pilot and controller fraternity will in fact generate a safety deficiency larger that the problem you are trying to solve. By our estimation, there is NO JUSTIFICATION for the large amount of Class C airspace presently designated in Australia, and subject to the appropriate change management processes we have previously described, you should introduce Class E airspace wherever possible.
Class E Airspace and United States Practice
We have watched with incredulity at the dangerously naive statements being made on threads in the Australian PPRuNe sites, concerning the operation of Class E airspace. Class E airspace is NOT an unsafe categorization of airspace, and is in fact used safely and effectively in substantial portions of the globe.
EACH AND EVERY transport and passenger carrying aircraft operating in the United States is required to operate for some portion of their flight in designated Class E airspace – effectively between 18,000 feet and the upper limit of Class B, C or D airspace – or the surface for non controlled aerodromes. This equates to over 10,000 passenger-carrying flights per day, every day of the year. The Class E airspace within which they operate is in the so-called most dangerous phase of flight – climb or descent. Your national carrier is no exception.
There are in excess of 150,000 general aviation aircraft operating in the United States, to either the visual or instrument flight rules – many many thousands per day.
There are CONSTANT interactions between IFR passenger carrying aircraft and VFR aircraft on a daily basis – with no hint that this practice is unsafe.
There are countless examples where aircraft provided with routine terminal area instructions whilst still in Class E airspace are routinely provided sequencing descending turn instructions by controllers in one breath, and VFR traffic information in the other.
We agree that Class E airspace is mostly within radar cover in the United States – probably the greater part of 95%. In that airspace, air traffic controllers positively separate IFR flights from other IFR flights – and where they can, provide traffic information on VFR flights.
Radar coverage is NOT a prerequisite for Class E airspace, and in fact in several cases the Class E airspace linking certain aerodromes to upper airspace is not covered by radar. In that airspace, air traffic controllers positively separate IFR flights from other IFR flights – and as they cannot observe VFR, do not pass traffic unless they know by some other means. That positive IFR-to-IFR separation may, in many cases, be applied on a “one in at a time” basis. The airlines accept that mode of operation.
NOT ONE SINGLE AIRLINE in the United States is lobbying for a higher level of service in current Class E areas.
Our observation in relation to the Australian experience has been one of giving proper effect not just to training and education, but also to the cultural change requirements. Pilots need to understand that operating in Class E airspace IS FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT to the service that they have received in the past – but need to accept that this is a normal way of doing business.
Australian controllers need to STOP being negative, embrace the concept of Class E airspace and to be blunt, get on with it. Controllers in the United States provide services in Class E, without questioning its “safety”, day in and day out, and have done so [either as Class E, or its predecessor], for over 50 years.
NOT ONE SINGLE CONTROLLER in the United States is lobbying for a higher level of service in current Class E areas.
We are concerned that this constant questioning and second-guessing by your pilot and controller fraternity will in fact generate a safety deficiency larger that the problem you are trying to solve. By our estimation, there is NO JUSTIFICATION for the large amount of Class C airspace presently designated in Australia, and subject to the appropriate change management processes we have previously described, you should introduce Class E airspace wherever possible.
post one of the best views of Voices of Reason
subject to the appropriate change management processes we have previously described,
midnight:
i think the idea was that vfr does not monitor area, therefore vfr receives no information on possible vfr/vfr collisions and won't even know where to look for fir traffic. ATC doesn't have to provide vfr traffic advisories, but they do on occasion now, which has potentially saved my life once. if vfr isn't expected to monitor Area frequency that possibility won't exist unless we introduce special zones in G when we are expected to monitor area. - more complexity. leave what we now have alone.
Well said also, Sunfish
One Q: can you elaborate on this i.e. who is attempting to prevent you from communicating or refusing information:
Quote:
What I do not like is the idea of being prevented from communicating with anyone or being refused information that might be critical to my safety just because I am driving a VFR bug smasher.
One Q: can you elaborate on this i.e. who is attempting to prevent you from communicating or refusing information:
Quote:
What I do not like is the idea of being prevented from communicating with anyone or being refused information that might be critical to my safety just because I am driving a VFR bug smasher.
Change managment??? Dick, if you stayed out of...."Change Managment"...everything would have evolved rather than...Changed!
After seeing the hardware..and seeing which way FS was starting to head prior to.....1991...it would have been interesting to see if demarcation could have ameliorated to an extent to allow a melding of minds to incorporate the technology and expertise in a combined system. After 1991, there were only survivors and ATC.....that is where "Change Managment" failed!
After seeing the hardware..and seeing which way FS was starting to head prior to.....1991...it would have been interesting to see if demarcation could have ameliorated to an extent to allow a melding of minds to incorporate the technology and expertise in a combined system. After 1991, there were only survivors and ATC.....that is where "Change Managment" failed!
i think the idea was that vfr does not monitor area, therefore vfr receives no information on possible vfr/vfr collisions and won't even know where to look for fir traffic. ATC doesn't have to provide vfr traffic advisories, but they do on occasion now, which has potentially saved my life once. if vfr isn't expected to monitor Area frequency that possibility won't exist unless we introduce special zones in G when we are expected to monitor area. - more complexity. leave what we now have alone.
Change managment??? Dick, if you stayed out of...."Change Managment"...everything would have evolved rather than...Changed!
After seeing the hardware..and seeing which way FS was starting to head prior to.....1991...it would have been interesting to see if demarcation could have ameliorated to an extent to allow a melding of minds to incorporate the technology and expertise in a combined system. After 1991, there were only survivors and ATC.....that is where "Change Managment" failed!
After seeing the hardware..and seeing which way FS was starting to head prior to.....1991...it would have been interesting to see if demarcation could have ameliorated to an extent to allow a melding of minds to incorporate the technology and expertise in a combined system. After 1991, there were only survivors and ATC.....that is where "Change Managment" failed!
Therefore, every time I hear Mr Smith spruiking efficiency and money savings...I have a little chuckle to myself.
AND...(2)it wasn't how they did it in the USA !
https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org.../systemops/fs/
Thread Starter
Peuce. Yes my board did cancel FISADs.
Simple reason. I wanted all pilots in radar coverage to be able to communicate directly with the person with the radar screen. Pretty simple really!
It now happens. The MDX outcome could have been quite different if the pilot had been communicating directly to the person with the radar screen.
Same resistance to change then as from some of you today!
Simple reason. I wanted all pilots in radar coverage to be able to communicate directly with the person with the radar screen. Pretty simple really!
It now happens. The MDX outcome could have been quite different if the pilot had been communicating directly to the person with the radar screen.
Same resistance to change then as from some of you today!
Thread Starter
My plans were always to have a FS as per the USA
Airservices removed this system and if I remember correctly I took action in an attempt to stop this. I lost.
Airservices removed this system and if I remember correctly I took action in an attempt to stop this. I lost.
The MDX outcome could have been quite different if the pilot had been communicating directly to the person with the radar screen.
If NAS had been in place, would he have been in E, just because there was radar? So he would have had to have been subject to on-request flight Following? Because VFR in E don't need a clearance, or even be speaking to ATC, how would they know what he was meant to be doing vs what he was actually doing? If "free in G" how would the ATC have known that a VFR paint randomly changing direction was not doing exactly as the pilot intended. After all, he is OCTA and can do what he wants. Are you suggesting that anywhere there is radar the ATC watch and query every paint, even if they have no responsiblity to monitor the track?
There have been plenty of aircraft disappear off radar screens even when subject to positive control. Radar is not a panacea for poor airmanship.
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Having looked at the report, the aircraft was in turbulence and icing, losing height with failed instruments on a NGT VFR Flight which probably should never have become airborne in the first place. How would radar have helped other than to possibly narrow the search area?
Drifting further from the subject of this thread.
Drifting further from the subject of this thread.
Peuce - In regard to FISADS how do you think it was getting information to put on the FSO display? At the time there was no ADS-B, primary radar was being used by ATC with only about eight transponder icons available. My guess was that other FSOs were inputting information into a Commodore 64 that drew vague tracks on a map overlay. This gave the FSO a pictorial view of where the aircraft might be if all of the information was correct and he/she then applied a rudimentary separation standard to assist in avoiding collisions.
At the same time ICAO was introducing A - G airspace and this Australian version of what was to become G did not fit into it and would have been incredibly manpower intensive. Who was going to pay? Not the airlines they had already refused to pay for services they did not use.
I think FISADS was a great idea but there was already a better one in use. It was called radar and was to become TAAATS that also had the ability to create "flight plan tracks" like FISADS something it still does automatically. The efficiency problem was that TAAATS was wasted in the hands of FSOs whose separation skills were limited to giving traffic information. Better that the FSOs were upskilled to become ATCs so that they could become part of a system without demarcation lines and where the available equipment could be put to its best use.
That is the system we have now; thanks Dick!
At the same time ICAO was introducing A - G airspace and this Australian version of what was to become G did not fit into it and would have been incredibly manpower intensive. Who was going to pay? Not the airlines they had already refused to pay for services they did not use.
I think FISADS was a great idea but there was already a better one in use. It was called radar and was to become TAAATS that also had the ability to create "flight plan tracks" like FISADS something it still does automatically. The efficiency problem was that TAAATS was wasted in the hands of FSOs whose separation skills were limited to giving traffic information. Better that the FSOs were upskilled to become ATCs so that they could become part of a system without demarcation lines and where the available equipment could be put to its best use.
That is the system we have now; thanks Dick!
Thread Starter
Traffic and Fujii
Distort it in every way you can to justify concrete minds
The pilot went for 20 minutes at right angles to the correct track before he ended up north of Singleton and started to get into problems.
If the AMATS resisted changes had been in place there was a very good chance that the person the pilot was communicating to and would have been sitting in front of a radar screen may have actually informed the pilot that he was heading in totally the wrong direction well before he got into the icing and extreme turbulence.
Yes. Just possibly he could have sat there twiddling his thumbs and not informed the pilot but I don’t think so.
So lie and distort in every way you can to justify the terrible negligence in not using the excellent radar coverage in that area or anywhere OCTA to actually prevent fatalities.
I am glad that we were able to make the shockingly delayed changes at the time of AMATS.
We will never know how many lives we have saved
You all should be ashamed of justifying the delay in using the radar properly!
Distort it in every way you can to justify concrete minds
The pilot went for 20 minutes at right angles to the correct track before he ended up north of Singleton and started to get into problems.
If the AMATS resisted changes had been in place there was a very good chance that the person the pilot was communicating to and would have been sitting in front of a radar screen may have actually informed the pilot that he was heading in totally the wrong direction well before he got into the icing and extreme turbulence.
Yes. Just possibly he could have sat there twiddling his thumbs and not informed the pilot but I don’t think so.
So lie and distort in every way you can to justify the terrible negligence in not using the excellent radar coverage in that area or anywhere OCTA to actually prevent fatalities.
I am glad that we were able to make the shockingly delayed changes at the time of AMATS.
We will never know how many lives we have saved
You all should be ashamed of justifying the delay in using the radar properly!
Last edited by Dick Smith; 9th Jan 2018 at 09:27.
Thread Starter
The pilot had a full position flight plan in the system.
Fujii. Your claims are so serious they require an equally serious response.
I don’t know who you are trying to protect. Possibly just the status quo,
The pilot and passengers were seriously let down by the 1930s system.
The radar should have been used.
Fujii. Your claims are so serious they require an equally serious response.
I don’t know who you are trying to protect. Possibly just the status quo,
The pilot and passengers were seriously let down by the 1930s system.
The radar should have been used.
Deja vu, all over again, again, again, again and yet again.
If you want to change anything, Dick, you need to buy some politicians.
If you want to change anything, Dick, you need to buy some politicians.