King Air down at Essendon?
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So, can I ask the experts on policy, policy implementation, the Flight Manual etc:
Where does the fact where the person in 0A, directs the F/o to go-around, then takes over from him, then elects to discontinue the go-around, the aircraft makes contact with the runway, that disarms the auto spoiler and the autobrake, then touches down on a runway with standing water which is unreported, tries to stop without auto brakes and no speedbrakes up, neglects to select ANY reverse ( let alone idle), no one realises the spoilers haven't deployed so they are faired until the end of the landing roll, and one engine is in forward thrust which is undetected or unreported by any of the pilots.
Who in the hell discontinues a go around anyway? I haven't ever seen any landing data that gives a runway distance required for a discontinued go around, let alone on a contaminated runway.
The only cheese that suits what happened is not Swiss, it's a smelly blue cheese, one that is the product of something well out of the ordinary.
A few minutes earlier the 0A seated person on another aircraft on the other parellel runway carried out a go around which was not discontinued. They landed after a second approach and were in the hotel whilst the other one was checking out the golf course.
Where does the fact where the person in 0A, directs the F/o to go-around, then takes over from him, then elects to discontinue the go-around, the aircraft makes contact with the runway, that disarms the auto spoiler and the autobrake, then touches down on a runway with standing water which is unreported, tries to stop without auto brakes and no speedbrakes up, neglects to select ANY reverse ( let alone idle), no one realises the spoilers haven't deployed so they are faired until the end of the landing roll, and one engine is in forward thrust which is undetected or unreported by any of the pilots.
Who in the hell discontinues a go around anyway? I haven't ever seen any landing data that gives a runway distance required for a discontinued go around, let alone on a contaminated runway.
The only cheese that suits what happened is not Swiss, it's a smelly blue cheese, one that is the product of something well out of the ordinary.
A few minutes earlier the 0A seated person on another aircraft on the other parellel runway carried out a go around which was not discontinued. They landed after a second approach and were in the hotel whilst the other one was checking out the golf course.
Join Date: May 2002
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Wombat watcher, I think that is an oversimplification of what occurred. I will admit that it is a very long time since I read the report on QF1, but, I think it was the FO as PF who initiated the go-around (2nd one), that decision disabled the auto-spoilers and auto-brakes, not the contact with the runway, the Capt. then sights the runway and takes over and lands the aircraft, albeit well down the runway. By now it was confusion aplenty in the cockpit and no-one knows what the responsibilities are or what they should be looking for.
Yes there were shortcoming all round but it did highlight something which I think still rings true today, that the most dangerous thing in aviation is the accountant mentality.
Yes there were shortcoming all round but it did highlight something which I think still rings true today, that the most dangerous thing in aviation is the accountant mentality.
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"When the aircraft was approximately 10 ft above the runway, the captain instructed the first officer to go around. As the first officer advanced the engine thrust levers, the aircraft’s mainwheels touched down (1,002 m along the 3,150 m runway, 636 m beyond the ideal touchdown point). The captain immediately cancelled the go-around by retarding the thrust levers, without announcing his actions. Those events resulted in confusion amongst the other pilots, and contributed to the crew not selecting (or noticing the absence of) reverse thrust during the landing roll. Due to a variety of factors associated with the cancellation of the go-around, the aircraft’s speed did not decrease below the touchdown speed (154 kts) until the aircraft was 1,625 m or halfway down the runway."
Lovett, here it is for you to read and modify your opinion.
Lovett, here it is for you to read and modify your opinion.
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PLovett, not quite. The FO was PF, and was looking good till very short final, although a little fast. Entering IMC he then slipped high on slope. The Captain called the go around approaching the flare, at which point the FO advanced the throttles. Suddenly in reasonable vis though, the Captain then decided to cancel the go around (without informing anyone) and retarded three of the four throttles, but missed one which consequently remained set at TOGA. This is what disarmed the auto-brakes. By this stage, thanks to being high and fast on final, attempting to initiate a missed approach and then extending the flare/AoA/nose high attitude into a gentle touch, and having one engine at TOGA, they were a considerable distance from the threshold by the time they started applying manual brakes. The gentle touch assisted the dynamic aquaplaning that then occured, and reverse thrust was not employed.
EVERYWHERE I've ever worked, the SOPs over ride the AFM/POH
This was to cover a couple situations where a third party not familiar with the AFM/POH published conflicting information in the OM or the AFM/POH was amended that put the OM in conflict with the AFM/POH.
The only SOP that I know off that was against the AFM was in one company who flew a mixed fleet of fixed gear and retractable gear aircraft where the undercarriage up and down calls were standard across the fleet.
And that's why CASA changed the laws about 20 years ago to "Accepting" rather than "Approving" Ops manuals. They shifted the legal burden away from themselves to the AOC holder and pilots.
One crucial bit of the approach in QF1 that the ATSB missed and did not comment on, which would have prevented the accident, was during the approach where one of the crew stated, during the investigation, that the runway was only visible to the crew directly behind the sweep of windscreen wipers. I believe that it is a requirement for the runway to be continuously visible to the crew when continuing the approach below the DA.
If they had conducted a missed approach when the continuous visibility requirement was lost, we would not be talking about this today.
Anyway this is completely of topic.
Back to the B200. Auto-feather is there for a reason, especially with Raisbeck 4 bladed props. Use it. End of story.
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with the loss of oil pressure when the engine shuts down, why doesn't the prop feather without the need of a separate system?
Eddie, a lot depends on what the failure was and whether or not the core is still rotating.
With an engine that is shut down and the plane flying along you still get airflow through the engine and you'll see it on the Ng.
Now, since the Ng doesn't stop completely (unless say a bearing fails) the oil pump is still driven and sending oil to the primary governor, which boosts the pressure and the prop keeps spinning.
On the ground if you shut a PT6 down and don't feather it, they'll spin for a long time, stop, and as the Ng has also stopped the blades will feather themselves.
The need for the "separate system" you mention (the auto feather) is not because you cannot feather the prop (there's a lever for that), but if you go back several posts it is due specifically for Vmca certification criteria on specific King Airs.
In short the 4-bladers require autofeather because if they windmill they are VERY draggy. The auto feather system will feather it quicker than relying on the pilot to do it. But, you can still manually feather if the auto system fails (which I've never heard about, it's fairly simple and quite robust).
With an engine that is shut down and the plane flying along you still get airflow through the engine and you'll see it on the Ng.
Now, since the Ng doesn't stop completely (unless say a bearing fails) the oil pump is still driven and sending oil to the primary governor, which boosts the pressure and the prop keeps spinning.
On the ground if you shut a PT6 down and don't feather it, they'll spin for a long time, stop, and as the Ng has also stopped the blades will feather themselves.
The need for the "separate system" you mention (the auto feather) is not because you cannot feather the prop (there's a lever for that), but if you go back several posts it is due specifically for Vmca certification criteria on specific King Airs.
In short the 4-bladers require autofeather because if they windmill they are VERY draggy. The auto feather system will feather it quicker than relying on the pilot to do it. But, you can still manually feather if the auto system fails (which I've never heard about, it's fairly simple and quite robust).
No Sunny, no negative torque switches.
A very basic rundown for you if your interested:
There's a main autofeather system switch, arm test off. Let's say it's switched to arm.
There is a micro switch on each power lever. Their position corresponds to roughly a position that commands 90% N1. With these switches made, the system knows you are commanding high power (pull one or both back and it will disarm the AFX system).
In the AFX system, on each side, there are two torque switches; one set to open at 200 ft/lbs and the other set to open at 400 ft/lbs, as the power is increased.
Now, high power is set and the torque switches are open. You then suffer an engine failure. Tq on that engine drops below 400 and closes the first switch- this disarms the autofeather on the opposite side (you cannot have a double-auto-feather event). Then when the failed engine drops below 200 ft/lbs this will close the second switch- this then commands the dump valve to open and feather the failed prop.
A very basic rundown for you if your interested:
There's a main autofeather system switch, arm test off. Let's say it's switched to arm.
There is a micro switch on each power lever. Their position corresponds to roughly a position that commands 90% N1. With these switches made, the system knows you are commanding high power (pull one or both back and it will disarm the AFX system).
In the AFX system, on each side, there are two torque switches; one set to open at 200 ft/lbs and the other set to open at 400 ft/lbs, as the power is increased.
Now, high power is set and the torque switches are open. You then suffer an engine failure. Tq on that engine drops below 400 and closes the first switch- this disarms the autofeather on the opposite side (you cannot have a double-auto-feather event). Then when the failed engine drops below 200 ft/lbs this will close the second switch- this then commands the dump valve to open and feather the failed prop.
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The PT6A is a free-turbine engine, the compressor turbine and compressor are on a different shaft than the power turbine. The latter driving the reduction gearbox and the the propeller. These two shafts are not connected.
On the other hand, Negative Torque Sensing or NTS system is installed on a single [spline] shaft like the TPE331 engine. Where all engine components (compressor, power turbinne, gearbox & propeller, accessories, etc.) are geared to that one shaft.
Just released.
Investigation: AO-2017-024 - Collision with terrain involving B200 King Air VH-ZCR at Essendon Airport, Victoria on 21 February 2017
Have begun reading, somewhat interesting so far.
Lack of CVR recording is going to make it more difficult.
Investigation: AO-2017-024 - Collision with terrain involving B200 King Air VH-ZCR at Essendon Airport, Victoria on 21 February 2017
Have begun reading, somewhat interesting so far.
Lack of CVR recording is going to make it more difficult.
Bugger, raises more questions than it answers.
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And gear down/locked, and called Mayday seven times.
If your vital actions after OEI called are Pitch, Power, Cleanup, I would expect the gear to have been raised, or at least raising as the aircraft went over the perimeter fence.
Strange about the CVR. How many flights would have been operated in the seven weeks between 3 January and 21 February?
If your vital actions after OEI called are Pitch, Power, Cleanup, I would expect the gear to have been raised, or at least raising as the aircraft went over the perimeter fence.
Strange about the CVR. How many flights would have been operated in the seven weeks between 3 January and 21 February?