Launceston 17 th June 2016 737 incident
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Correct me if I'm wrong, but I think that might be a CASA implemented restriction? I'm not up on it too well myself. Procedural control is safe, there are separation standards to keep the aircraft separated, not put them in an unsafe situation...
I'm sure a fully staffed Radar site for all Airports in the World would indeed make it safer in some circumstances where CFIT is an issue. Yes Cairns is one.
For this example in YMLT during a missed approach in a high performance 737 it's my opinion that a fully staffed Radar facility wouldn't have made it any safer.....
And yes where I spend most of my flying ( VHHH ) HKG APP/DEP have indeed saved a few stupid operators from heading toward Lantau peak....
Doesn't it all come down to affordable safety?
Cost benefit analysis etc etc....
For this example in YMLT during a missed approach in a high performance 737 it's my opinion that a fully staffed Radar facility wouldn't have made it any safer.....
And yes where I spend most of my flying ( VHHH ) HKG APP/DEP have indeed saved a few stupid operators from heading toward Lantau peak....
Doesn't it all come down to affordable safety?
Cost benefit analysis etc etc....
I reckon that the pilots of this aircraft probably decided that there was no collision risk with the ground much like the knob in the Tobago deciding there was no collision risk with the 737.
No I reckon they probably stuffed up, it happens. Lucky for them they were not going to hit anything........
I just don't think Radar would have stopped this particular mistake....
I just don't think Radar would have stopped this particular mistake....
Thread Starter
AsA have now claimed that they use the radar ( OK - multilateration) operated from the Melbourne centre for separation when the tower is closed but use non radar procedural when the tower is open and airline passengers are flying.
This seems the opposite to commonsense.
Can anyone explain?
Block. Procedural control surely can't be as safe as a servailence based service. What happens if a pilot makes a simple error and descends too early coming in from Flinders Island to Launy? It happened at Cairns and was only saved by the radar operator.
Or are our professional pilots perfect?
This seems the opposite to commonsense.
Can anyone explain?
Block. Procedural control surely can't be as safe as a servailence based service. What happens if a pilot makes a simple error and descends too early coming in from Flinders Island to Launy? It happened at Cairns and was only saved by the radar operator.
Or are our professional pilots perfect?
Dick, Dick, Dick! The tower can do procedural control quite satisfactorily, which includes runway separation. An approach controller can't do that. When the tower's closed, approach just goes to MEL (and we have the poxy system where the crew are conversing on two separate frequencies at the same time...)
Safe enough! On the one hand, you were quite happy to have no-radio VFRs mixing it with A380s at major airports, and RPT jets at regional airports, and on the other you're implying that procedural is so unsafe we've got to have radar everywhere? It's so illogical it doesn't make sense!
Err, no, that's why we have EGPWS. It's the third time I've mentioned it and you refuse to even knowledge it. You know that EGPWS has largely shot down your "radar prevents CFIT" argument, but aren't prepared to admit that technology has advanced from 30 years ago and now saves money as well as keeping airline passengers safe.
Procedural control surely can't be as safe as a servailence based service
Or are our professional pilots perfect?
Dick, what happens when the radar controller makes a simple error and assigns you an unsafe level?
ATC surveillance systems are primarily for separating aircraft from each other. They aren't designed to separate aircraft from anything else.
ATC surveillance systems are primarily for separating aircraft from each other. They aren't designed to separate aircraft from anything else.
Thread Starter
Le ping. That's ridiculous. The NSTB claims the best way to reduce CFIT accidents is controlled airspace .
and radar.
With proper training and procedures the ATC could have informed the pilot in the Benalla accident so the accident could have been prevented.
Blogs. I have never supported non radio aircraft mixing with airline aircraft. My AMATs changes introduced MBZs
However if you want a traffic information service on VFR that's a minimum of ICAO class D airspace.
I designed and built the first beep back units so pilots would at least know if they were transmitting a carrier wave. Better than calling in the blind because there is so much resistance to US style Unicoms.
and radar.
With proper training and procedures the ATC could have informed the pilot in the Benalla accident so the accident could have been prevented.
Blogs. I have never supported non radio aircraft mixing with airline aircraft. My AMATs changes introduced MBZs
However if you want a traffic information service on VFR that's a minimum of ICAO class D airspace.
I designed and built the first beep back units so pilots would at least know if they were transmitting a carrier wave. Better than calling in the blind because there is so much resistance to US style Unicoms.
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Can any class D Tower operators confirm whether they have an ADS-B (or multilateral) display in front of them while processing traffic procedurally?
It seems to me they must have because they seem to know were I am and how high to a greater degree of accuracy than procedural techniques would allow.
If so, they would be in a position to caution me re CFIT even if that is not officially their job.
It seems to me they must have because they seem to know were I am and how high to a greater degree of accuracy than procedural techniques would allow.
If so, they would be in a position to caution me re CFIT even if that is not officially their job.
Aerocat, scheduled perhaps but I don't think freight counts as fare paying passengers.
Dick, how is it ridiculous? WAM only shows transponder equipped objects. Any terrain avoidance is provided by controller monitoring referencing a terrain chart or the surveillance system effectively doing the same. Neither of which is an inherent property of a surveillance system.
Dick, how is it ridiculous? WAM only shows transponder equipped objects. Any terrain avoidance is provided by controller monitoring referencing a terrain chart or the surveillance system effectively doing the same. Neither of which is an inherent property of a surveillance system.
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Derfred, I have been in the Launie tower and seen the display. It gives much the same information that a conventional radar display gives; ident, speed and height. From memory the display is also marked with distance and controlled airspace boundaries.
I think all Class D towers now have some sort of TSAD. Broome may be the exception with INTAS.
As stated it gives similar info to a normal radar, plus we can select various maps (mostly approach over lays).
Up here, we only show ADSB traffic, the nearest SSR is to far away to pick up anything below about FL180.
As stated it gives similar info to a normal radar, plus we can select various maps (mostly approach over lays).
Up here, we only show ADSB traffic, the nearest SSR is to far away to pick up anything below about FL180.
Thread Starter
In a properly designed ATC system with safety at the fore the pilot remains with the radar centre controller when in IMC at a class D airport. This is to maximise safety and allows an alarm system to be enabled in the centre and warn if the pilot descends below certain pre determined altitudes when in cloud. Just commonsense really. Even though resisted by some dopey ATCs and pilots.
A class D tower controller should be concentrating on traffic where the collision risk is greatest. That is close to and on the runway. Once again just commonsense -but not in Australia. There is simply no way the same controller can also provide an effective radar service at the same time. The class D tower controller needs to be looking outside- not down at a radar screen.
It took a five year fight by myself and others to get our radar used properly in en route un controlled airspace Before the AMATS changes pilots in un controlled airspace in good radar coverage under the J Curve were forced by law not to be able to talk to the radar operator.
It was the prime reason that the pilot of VH- MDX was not informed at any time by the radar controller that he was heading at right angles to the stated track for over 20 minutes.
Not at any time before the crash that killed all onboard was the pilot able to communicate to the radar controller directly despite being in some of our best radar covered airspace in Australia.
I was told endlessly at the time " Dick you don't understand- un controlled airspace is Flight Service airspace and Flight Service is not trained to operate radar- you are so ignorant Dick "
After the BASI investigation no change was made because investigators, pilots and controllers had minds set in concrete and supported the way we did things before radar was introduced.
Just like Le Ping 30 years later.
A class D tower controller should be concentrating on traffic where the collision risk is greatest. That is close to and on the runway. Once again just commonsense -but not in Australia. There is simply no way the same controller can also provide an effective radar service at the same time. The class D tower controller needs to be looking outside- not down at a radar screen.
It took a five year fight by myself and others to get our radar used properly in en route un controlled airspace Before the AMATS changes pilots in un controlled airspace in good radar coverage under the J Curve were forced by law not to be able to talk to the radar operator.
It was the prime reason that the pilot of VH- MDX was not informed at any time by the radar controller that he was heading at right angles to the stated track for over 20 minutes.
Not at any time before the crash that killed all onboard was the pilot able to communicate to the radar controller directly despite being in some of our best radar covered airspace in Australia.
I was told endlessly at the time " Dick you don't understand- un controlled airspace is Flight Service airspace and Flight Service is not trained to operate radar- you are so ignorant Dick "
After the BASI investigation no change was made because investigators, pilots and controllers had minds set in concrete and supported the way we did things before radar was introduced.
Just like Le Ping 30 years later.
Last edited by Dick Smith; 22nd Jun 2016 at 21:57.
There is simply no way the same controller can also provide an effective radar service at the same time. The class D tower controller needs to be looking outside- not down at a radar screen.
Thread Starter
No. No dopey ATCs or Pilots post on or read this site.
It's only the really bright lateral thinking ones so I can't possibly be offending anyone personally.
Bloggs. That's my very point. In the UK Europe, Canada and the USA at non radar class D towers or equivalent the airspace to the minima remains with the centre when IMC exists and the pilot remains on the centre radar frequency.
Only in Australia are we forced to change to the tower frequency when below 10,000, in many cases , even though the tower controller is not radar rated. Crazy. No doubt fixed when there is an accident.
And I reckon this resistance to change is the primary reason that the multilateration system in Tasmania is not properly used in the terminal area to help reduce the chance of a CFIT.
It's only the really bright lateral thinking ones so I can't possibly be offending anyone personally.
Bloggs. That's my very point. In the UK Europe, Canada and the USA at non radar class D towers or equivalent the airspace to the minima remains with the centre when IMC exists and the pilot remains on the centre radar frequency.
Only in Australia are we forced to change to the tower frequency when below 10,000, in many cases , even though the tower controller is not radar rated. Crazy. No doubt fixed when there is an accident.
And I reckon this resistance to change is the primary reason that the multilateration system in Tasmania is not properly used in the terminal area to help reduce the chance of a CFIT.