Further CASA CTAF problems shows not working!
Dick, sector sizes are based around workload - providing an approach service is more workload intensive than simply providing traffic so to cater for this a sector will need to be smaller. Also providing an approach service on a 500NM wide screen is hardly ideal and do you really want the controller fixated on the approach service (out of necessity) in one corner of his screen while ignoring the other stuff is going on elsewhere? Would you hand fly an ILS approach in ****ty weather and try to play a game on your phone at the same time?
Maybe, just maybe they can do it in the US because their sectors are the right size to handle it. You're not wanting to copy the whole system - you're wanting to shoehorn it in regardless of whether it will actually fit into the current infrastructure.
Maybe you need to get that into your fixed mind......
Show me that it can be done with current resources. Show me where you are going to get the extra controllers to allow for training for the approach rating - training requires time away from the console so someone needs to be available to fill the seat. Where are we going to source all the instructors, the sim time.
I know you won't because you've been asked this countless times in the past and never answer.
Maybe, just maybe they can do it in the US because their sectors are the right size to handle it. You're not wanting to copy the whole system - you're wanting to shoehorn it in regardless of whether it will actually fit into the current infrastructure.
Maybe you need to get that into your fixed mind......
Show me that it can be done with current resources. Show me where you are going to get the extra controllers to allow for training for the approach rating - training requires time away from the console so someone needs to be available to fill the seat. Where are we going to source all the instructors, the sim time.
I know you won't because you've been asked this countless times in the past and never answer.
LeadSled, the pilot of the VFR Tobago involved in the Launcy AIRPROX was quite demonstrably clueless - just read the report. 2 degrees at 15NM was adequate? It nearly killed him and a 737 load of pax.
The VFR pilots who do have a clue (and that's probably a large percentage) are not the threat, it's the percentage who are clueless that are. I've witnessed many, many VFRs fly through active restricted areas that are active every day, i.e. they didn't just get caught out by missing a NOTAM. Seen numerous merrily fly through CTA without a clearance while not listening on any frequency ATC has access to. I've seen them fly through approach paths at major airports requiring evasive action by RPTs.
It's not about denigrating, it's about surviving the lowest common denominator - the clueless VFR.
The VFR pilots who do have a clue (and that's probably a large percentage) are not the threat, it's the percentage who are clueless that are. I've witnessed many, many VFRs fly through active restricted areas that are active every day, i.e. they didn't just get caught out by missing a NOTAM. Seen numerous merrily fly through CTA without a clearance while not listening on any frequency ATC has access to. I've seen them fly through approach paths at major airports requiring evasive action by RPTs.
It's not about denigrating, it's about surviving the lowest common denominator - the clueless VFR.
Last edited by le Pingouin; 26th Mar 2016 at 13:54.
[I]t's about surviving the lowest common denominator - the clueless VFR.
(Or is it F? I keep forgetting whether it's you or Captain Midnight who insists it's F. Or maybe it's Capt Bloggs...
)
Thread Starter
I spoke to the pilot flying the Tobago at Launy. He said that he had the Virgin aircraft sited at all relevant times and there was never ever any chance of a collision. That's how alerted see and avoid works all around the world .
The system worked as designed . Because we added the extra mode C transponder mandate in Australia his aircraft appeared on the TCAS and that was then used to reverse the proven airspace system .
Virgin aircraft fly everyday in class G terminal airspace with no transponder requirement for VFR and you accept this because that's what we have done for years. In effect your minds say that if it's the way We have done it before it must be acceptable. If Launy that day had been like Ballina there would have been no incident reported as a transponder would not have been required in the VFR aircraft. Remember the Virgin crew never sighted the Tobago. It only appeared on the TCAS.
The aircraft passed a mile apart- clearly adequate for an alerted see and avoid system in good VMC. Such separation happens all the time in 100s of G airports in Australia every day.
The system worked as designed . Because we added the extra mode C transponder mandate in Australia his aircraft appeared on the TCAS and that was then used to reverse the proven airspace system .
Virgin aircraft fly everyday in class G terminal airspace with no transponder requirement for VFR and you accept this because that's what we have done for years. In effect your minds say that if it's the way We have done it before it must be acceptable. If Launy that day had been like Ballina there would have been no incident reported as a transponder would not have been required in the VFR aircraft. Remember the Virgin crew never sighted the Tobago. It only appeared on the TCAS.
The aircraft passed a mile apart- clearly adequate for an alerted see and avoid system in good VMC. Such separation happens all the time in 100s of G airports in Australia every day.
Thread Starter
Le ping. Thanks for saying the sectors are based on workload. Could you contact Mr Skidmore and explain this to him. He and others think it reflects VHF coverage of the ground station. Under NAS we suggested monitoring the nearest VHF outlet if communication to ATC was required. All the " workload designed" frequency boundaries were put back on the charts and even at 8500' there are many places where there is no radio coverage to a ground station on the now required frequency. Crazy. Just trying to return to the 1950s! Same re Launceston. Get a rational brain is my suggestion.
He said that he had the Virgin aircraft sited at all relevant times and there was never ever any chance of a collision.
The objective collision risk was infinitesimally small, not because of the Tobago pilot's judgment of the risk, but rather because there was an infinitesimally remote possibility that the aircraft could have collided even if both pilots had tried to collide.
Thread Starter
La Ping
FAA controllers I have flown with here in Australia reckon our traffic information service at non tower airports is often more labor intensive than a class E separation service.
But you wouldn't know because for 25 years since the AMATS decision you and others have prevented a trial of class E at even one location anywhere in Australia .
That's why I will not give in to ignorance. I can assure you one day I will get a trial going and then we can see if Australian ATCs can be as professional and as capable as those in other leading aviation countries. Nothing has convinced me that we have to be second rate here.
I don't want more needless deaths like Benalla where the ATC following the inferior Australian training and regulatory requirements did not inform the pilot that the tracking alarm had gone off. Why? Because the pilot was heading to class G airspace and it wasn't the ATCs responsibility if the pilot made an error and killed everyone on board,
Class E at Benalla would have most likely meant all those people would be alive today yet you constantly try and keep a discredited system that clearly kills people.
How many more deaths before you will support a trial of just one airport with E to 700 agl being operated by the existing en route Controllor? I wonder.
FAA controllers I have flown with here in Australia reckon our traffic information service at non tower airports is often more labor intensive than a class E separation service.
But you wouldn't know because for 25 years since the AMATS decision you and others have prevented a trial of class E at even one location anywhere in Australia .
That's why I will not give in to ignorance. I can assure you one day I will get a trial going and then we can see if Australian ATCs can be as professional and as capable as those in other leading aviation countries. Nothing has convinced me that we have to be second rate here.
I don't want more needless deaths like Benalla where the ATC following the inferior Australian training and regulatory requirements did not inform the pilot that the tracking alarm had gone off. Why? Because the pilot was heading to class G airspace and it wasn't the ATCs responsibility if the pilot made an error and killed everyone on board,
Class E at Benalla would have most likely meant all those people would be alive today yet you constantly try and keep a discredited system that clearly kills people.
How many more deaths before you will support a trial of just one airport with E to 700 agl being operated by the existing en route Controllor? I wonder.
then we can see if Australian ATCs can be as professional and as capable as those in other leading aviation countries
the pilot made an error and killed everyone on board
then we can see if Australian ATCs can be as professional and as capable as those in other leading aviation countries
I spoke to the pilot flying the Tobago at Launy. He said that he had the Virgin aircraft sited at all relevant times and there was never ever any chance of a collision.
I'm afraid I have to agree with Dick. if something works well overseas in an environment that we can broadly replicate in Australia then why not copy it instead of reinventing. the wheel each time?
it is, in my opinion, up to those those who want to reinvent the wheel or revert to 1950's procedures to demonstrate that their system will produce a better safety outcome which in my opinion, should be analysed by an independent ATSB as the final authority.
to me the combination of a profit driven ATC service, combined with a hidebound ineffective regulator produces the worst of all possible worlds for achieving safe aviation.
to put that another way, we seem to be copying the bureaucracy of Europe, the cultural resistance to innovation of the British, the (apocryphal) attitude to safety of Italy, the business ethics of China and the punitive practices of Saudi Arabia.
it is, in my opinion, up to those those who want to reinvent the wheel or revert to 1950's procedures to demonstrate that their system will produce a better safety outcome which in my opinion, should be analysed by an independent ATSB as the final authority.
to me the combination of a profit driven ATC service, combined with a hidebound ineffective regulator produces the worst of all possible worlds for achieving safe aviation.
to put that another way, we seem to be copying the bureaucracy of Europe, the cultural resistance to innovation of the British, the (apocryphal) attitude to safety of Italy, the business ethics of China and the punitive practices of Saudi Arabia.
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There are many points, obviously, for all sides of this discussion.
However, having flown B777 test flights out of Everett on a weekend (i.e. 'G') and out of places like Glasgow Montana (not the 'international airport, the ex USAF base owned by Boeing) where there is Nothing in the way of airspace, ATC always provide a service.
This intrigued me so when I questioned an ATC supervisor about what service ATC gave to IFR aircraft in 'G', he was a little confused.
His answer, 'we give IFR a full service as best we can regardless of the airspace classification the aircraft is in. Most controllers do not even worry or care what the airspace classification is', or words to that effect.
Isn't that what we want as an 'end game' here in OZ regardless of how we get there or what we call the airspace?
However, having flown B777 test flights out of Everett on a weekend (i.e. 'G') and out of places like Glasgow Montana (not the 'international airport, the ex USAF base owned by Boeing) where there is Nothing in the way of airspace, ATC always provide a service.
This intrigued me so when I questioned an ATC supervisor about what service ATC gave to IFR aircraft in 'G', he was a little confused.
His answer, 'we give IFR a full service as best we can regardless of the airspace classification the aircraft is in. Most controllers do not even worry or care what the airspace classification is', or words to that effect.
Isn't that what we want as an 'end game' here in OZ regardless of how we get there or what we call the airspace?
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I am not an airspace expert by any means and I certainly bow to those who are airspace experts; however, if we are going to play the 'name game', looking at the ICAO definitions of airspace what we call 'G' seems to me to actually be 'F'.
Le Ping,
This seems to be your bailiwick, is that correct, we actually have 'F'?
Le Ping,
This seems to be your bailiwick, is that correct, we actually have 'F'?
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If my memory regarding the Launy is correct, the RPT jet was given the option to either turn left immediately for a RH downwind and base, or to overfly and join for LH downwind and base. The crew of the jet did not transmit precisely what there intentions were, and did their own thing (overfly for LH downwind). So they did not do themselves any favours, instead of being in an alerted see and avoid area, it became see and avoid only, based upon their actions. So if the critics of the Launy incident do not want to see a repeat of that incident, then something has to be done with all of the aerodromes in Class G that are serviced by RPT. Mandating radio carriage in Class G isn't it, because a non radio aircraft is an aircraft which (1) doesn't have one fitted, or (2) is on the wrong frequency, or (3) volume is too low, or (4), or the PIC presses the map light instead of the transmit button, or (5) doesn't use it properly, or (6) the list goes on. The mitigator has to be a third party, that's the whole premise of the ICAO airspace model. Risks becomes intolerable due to mix/volume, introduce another mitigator.
Thread Starter
Actus. You are 100% correct. In other countries such as the USA , Canada and the U.K. ATCs just separate IFR whenever they can. It's only in Aus that ATCs are trained to be obsessed with airspace categories. It's because of our history and a total lack of leadership
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Vref. You are correct. The alerted see and avoid was made more difficult because the airline crew did not communicate where they were heading . Same could happen in G. That's why it's important to remain alert at all times.
Thread Starter
Traffic. My comments are accurate. I get a control service en route on a one way air route when the collision risk is minuscule . Then in the terminal area at a place like Mt Hotham I get no separation of MSA service at all. And that's where the risks are clearly higher.
Many ATCs I talk to would like to give a proper service but are stopped by near zero leadership. Of the type that posts on this site!
Many ATCs I talk to would like to give a proper service but are stopped by near zero leadership. Of the type that posts on this site!
So Dick, you finally admit that the service you're getting in the US is not as per the NAS model but the result of over-servicing and controllers ignoring the the very airspace model you're wanting to introduce.
If you believe the system worked as per spec then that system is incredibly broken - it nearly killed a 737 full of pax. Without TCAS there's every chance they would have flown right though the Tobago because the Tobago pilot clearly didn't have a clue. When the lowest common denominator is a clueless VFR you're in trouble - E is a system designed to fail.
If you believe the system worked as per spec then that system is incredibly broken - it nearly killed a 737 full of pax. Without TCAS there's every chance they would have flown right though the Tobago because the Tobago pilot clearly didn't have a clue. When the lowest common denominator is a clueless VFR you're in trouble - E is a system designed to fail.