Amazing Spin by Airservices re. Lack of Radar in Tasmania
Dick: #22/#28
I'll start with the basics. I agree it's past time surveillance was introduced to Tasmania. You want the US system, there are other options, such as tower based approach. You really should spend some time watching a sector when there is moderate to busy traffic. Oz sector controllers have huge airspace, are are already working to or beyond maximum at times. If the sector controllers get the approach function, I can bet it will be limited to clearing the approach and handing off to the tower, probably with directed traffic info gained from the radar. HB and LT can get sequences of around 6 or more jets (it's not uncommon, couple or few arrivals from Vic, another from FLI, and one or two to depart in the meantime), which need separation, sequencing, holding, before being sorted out with the local traffic. There is no way an en route controller could possibly have the time to do this with the current staffing and organisation. Then, we have the same sector guy/gal running two real sequences, one into HB, another into LT, forget somewhere else that could be happening like DPO or even Victoria.
Let me remember the history a little. Until a grand new plan about 20 years ago, aircraft in CTA were separated. Then "someone" had the great idea that light aircraft operation VFR could transit over head airports with jet operations, and all they had to do was listen out, maybe announce their presence, and maybe deviate a little if the pilot thought it was necessary. Class E over D. Works great in US, why not here, with no, niente, nulle nixt surveillance. Despite serious concern from pilots and controllers, the idea was introduced. So now the safety of hundreds depended on a VFR pilot with possible less than 100 hours, determining the threat, then the reaction. That lasted about 3 weeks, if I recall, until the already mentioned Virgin encounter near LT. Now, tell me again, that I or my ideas are ridiculous. Really, you should have quietly pulled your head in over that one, and thanked someone that it wasn't a noisy aluminium shower.
I also recall "someone" again, in an airspace review/restructure arguing for more space for lighties, which would be so incredible that flying training would flourish, creating jobs and wealth for everyone. One result of that gave us CTA steps AO85 at 30 miles. What's wrong with that? Nothing really, just that many times every day of the year, RPT jets have to apply power, waste fuel, and often cause the approach to be above profile, because they are held to AO90 until 30 miles. Why, well, because of all that VFR traffic beneath them. How many VFR, less than a handful a year; how many jet approaches stuffed around, conservatively 1000 a year, just for a place like HB. Any jet drivers here want to dispute that, arriving from Clark with a good tailwind, but landing on 12 because of the every present sea breeze.
Just a couple of examples of a little knowledge, from a well meaning, high profile amateur.
Now, tell me again that I'm being ridiculous.
Back to the story. After the LT E airspace event, a portable radar was installed in LT. This was at the time when aircraft numbers were taking off, pun intended. Accordingly, TASWAM was introduced, which gave en route pretty well a picture of en route airspace; aircraft were, from memory, separated by "radar" (not really radar) from above about AO60, lower in some areas.
Lets look at a couple more of your statements. You suggested that ASA are running airspace management with the priority of giving a few mates in HB a job. Are you serious?? ASA would sack every controller if they could manage, the controllers are pushed pretty hard in the new world. I know, I'm just being ridiculous.
You admitted in one of your posts, that you didn't even know the radar separation standard, but you are ready to reorganise Oz airspace.
You also said CFIT was the major threat. It was, but until recently, at least, the major threat has been related to runway occupancy. Now, at Hobart, still no taxiways to the thresholds, so backtracks, prolonged time on the active are normal every day. Using logic and statistics, the greater threat to safety at HB is the taxiway/runway situation. You would be better pushing for taxiways than radar.
Back to sector controllers providing approach function. In US, I'll bet the sector/approach controller will be providing directed traffic, based on paints he/she observes on the screen. The same information could be gained by the pilots from their own TCAS display, if acft in the area had transponders. I'll get flamed for this, but mandatory transponders would save a lot of time, talk, etc. ASA would save a pile, get the same result, if they paid or heavily subsidised the fitting of transponders. If ASA were to run with the sectors providing the approach function, there will be quite a few extra controllers needed, believe me.
I'll repeat, I agree that surveillance in TAS is an idea long overdue, it's a matter of consultation and consideration, and there are other pressing issues.
I'll start with the basics. I agree it's past time surveillance was introduced to Tasmania. You want the US system, there are other options, such as tower based approach. You really should spend some time watching a sector when there is moderate to busy traffic. Oz sector controllers have huge airspace, are are already working to or beyond maximum at times. If the sector controllers get the approach function, I can bet it will be limited to clearing the approach and handing off to the tower, probably with directed traffic info gained from the radar. HB and LT can get sequences of around 6 or more jets (it's not uncommon, couple or few arrivals from Vic, another from FLI, and one or two to depart in the meantime), which need separation, sequencing, holding, before being sorted out with the local traffic. There is no way an en route controller could possibly have the time to do this with the current staffing and organisation. Then, we have the same sector guy/gal running two real sequences, one into HB, another into LT, forget somewhere else that could be happening like DPO or even Victoria.
Let me remember the history a little. Until a grand new plan about 20 years ago, aircraft in CTA were separated. Then "someone" had the great idea that light aircraft operation VFR could transit over head airports with jet operations, and all they had to do was listen out, maybe announce their presence, and maybe deviate a little if the pilot thought it was necessary. Class E over D. Works great in US, why not here, with no, niente, nulle nixt surveillance. Despite serious concern from pilots and controllers, the idea was introduced. So now the safety of hundreds depended on a VFR pilot with possible less than 100 hours, determining the threat, then the reaction. That lasted about 3 weeks, if I recall, until the already mentioned Virgin encounter near LT. Now, tell me again, that I or my ideas are ridiculous. Really, you should have quietly pulled your head in over that one, and thanked someone that it wasn't a noisy aluminium shower.
I also recall "someone" again, in an airspace review/restructure arguing for more space for lighties, which would be so incredible that flying training would flourish, creating jobs and wealth for everyone. One result of that gave us CTA steps AO85 at 30 miles. What's wrong with that? Nothing really, just that many times every day of the year, RPT jets have to apply power, waste fuel, and often cause the approach to be above profile, because they are held to AO90 until 30 miles. Why, well, because of all that VFR traffic beneath them. How many VFR, less than a handful a year; how many jet approaches stuffed around, conservatively 1000 a year, just for a place like HB. Any jet drivers here want to dispute that, arriving from Clark with a good tailwind, but landing on 12 because of the every present sea breeze.
Just a couple of examples of a little knowledge, from a well meaning, high profile amateur.
Now, tell me again that I'm being ridiculous.
Back to the story. After the LT E airspace event, a portable radar was installed in LT. This was at the time when aircraft numbers were taking off, pun intended. Accordingly, TASWAM was introduced, which gave en route pretty well a picture of en route airspace; aircraft were, from memory, separated by "radar" (not really radar) from above about AO60, lower in some areas.
Lets look at a couple more of your statements. You suggested that ASA are running airspace management with the priority of giving a few mates in HB a job. Are you serious?? ASA would sack every controller if they could manage, the controllers are pushed pretty hard in the new world. I know, I'm just being ridiculous.
You admitted in one of your posts, that you didn't even know the radar separation standard, but you are ready to reorganise Oz airspace.
You also said CFIT was the major threat. It was, but until recently, at least, the major threat has been related to runway occupancy. Now, at Hobart, still no taxiways to the thresholds, so backtracks, prolonged time on the active are normal every day. Using logic and statistics, the greater threat to safety at HB is the taxiway/runway situation. You would be better pushing for taxiways than radar.
Back to sector controllers providing approach function. In US, I'll bet the sector/approach controller will be providing directed traffic, based on paints he/she observes on the screen. The same information could be gained by the pilots from their own TCAS display, if acft in the area had transponders. I'll get flamed for this, but mandatory transponders would save a lot of time, talk, etc. ASA would save a pile, get the same result, if they paid or heavily subsidised the fitting of transponders. If ASA were to run with the sectors providing the approach function, there will be quite a few extra controllers needed, believe me.
I'll repeat, I agree that surveillance in TAS is an idea long overdue, it's a matter of consultation and consideration, and there are other pressing issues.
Thread Starter
I introduced mandatory transponders for all aircraft in class E and I have pushed for 25 years to update selected class G terminal airspace to class E. So we get a double safety improvement.
Yet it has'nt happened because you claim it will cost a little more money . How come other developed countries can afford this basic safety issue and not Australia?
The only reason the Launceston incident was known about was because I introduced mandatory transponders in that airspace and the VFR aircraft was so equipped . With the previous airspace above Launceston there was no transponder requirement and if the VFR aircraft was on the same flight path without a clearance no one would have ever known.
You have forgotten that the Tower and the airline pilots never sited the VFR aircraft. It appeared on the TCAS because it was transponder equipped. In the USA there is no transponder requirement in E below 10,000' over D . So it would not have been an incident. The VFR pilot said the Jet was sited at all relevent times through radio alerting and he was remaining clear . Are you suggesting radio alerted see and avoid doesn't work? Then how about our 100 or more G airports which use that in the terminal area? If it's not safe why don't you insist on a minimum of class E with mandatory transponder.?
You don't because it's all about resisting change .
Yet it has'nt happened because you claim it will cost a little more money . How come other developed countries can afford this basic safety issue and not Australia?
The only reason the Launceston incident was known about was because I introduced mandatory transponders in that airspace and the VFR aircraft was so equipped . With the previous airspace above Launceston there was no transponder requirement and if the VFR aircraft was on the same flight path without a clearance no one would have ever known.
You have forgotten that the Tower and the airline pilots never sited the VFR aircraft. It appeared on the TCAS because it was transponder equipped. In the USA there is no transponder requirement in E below 10,000' over D . So it would not have been an incident. The VFR pilot said the Jet was sited at all relevent times through radio alerting and he was remaining clear . Are you suggesting radio alerted see and avoid doesn't work? Then how about our 100 or more G airports which use that in the terminal area? If it's not safe why don't you insist on a minimum of class E with mandatory transponder.?
You don't because it's all about resisting change .
Last edited by Dick Smith; 12th Jul 2015 at 02:55.
One result of that gave us CTA steps AO85 at 30 miles. What's wrong with that? Nothing really, just that many times every day of the year, RPT jets have to apply power, waste fuel, and often cause the approach to be above profile, because they are held to AO90 until 30 miles.
Having grown a head, how about putting some facts in said head.
Every jet I have flown, 9000 at 30 track miles to run would be on or below profile.
Any pilot who didn't account for such a step in his aircraft handling, so that power application was not needed to pass 9000 @ 30 is taking money under false pretenses.
As for the rest of your posts, maybe you are an example of what is wrong with ATC in Australia, and a complete inability to believe that it is done far better in a number of countries, of which US is one.
By far better, I mean better separation assurance standards combined with more efficient traffic handling.
Tootle pip!!
Dick,
The pilots did mutually sight each other, it was quite close.
You are fixated on E, what I'm really saying is make it transponders for everyone.
For you to say that if the TCAS alert didn't happen, it was never an incident: What are you smoking man? They came close enough to count rivets. If a controller had done that, we'd never hear the end of it from you.
Leady,
Thanks for you patronising post. I definitely know what I'm talking about here, you may be correct, Oz is full of incompetent pilots.
There must be heaps of pilots reading this forum, I'll leave it up to them to confirm or deny the truth of this matter. Complaints re the profile onto 12, with the winds as described (local factors, i.e. tailwinds of 30kts or more become headwind below 1000 is a very common situation) are practically a daily moan.
I'm not against change. I think you might be stuck in the groove with the US model. The sector/approach function traffic info will be derived from transponder provided data that the controller sees on the screen. That's already passé.
Today, using transponders and TCAS, we can eliminate the need for the controller to verbally advise individual aircraft. Saves frequency time, effort and money. The pilot doesn't need to be told about the traffic, he can see the relative position from his/her cockpit display.
The pilots did mutually sight each other, it was quite close.
You are fixated on E, what I'm really saying is make it transponders for everyone.
For you to say that if the TCAS alert didn't happen, it was never an incident: What are you smoking man? They came close enough to count rivets. If a controller had done that, we'd never hear the end of it from you.
Leady,
Thanks for you patronising post. I definitely know what I'm talking about here, you may be correct, Oz is full of incompetent pilots.
There must be heaps of pilots reading this forum, I'll leave it up to them to confirm or deny the truth of this matter. Complaints re the profile onto 12, with the winds as described (local factors, i.e. tailwinds of 30kts or more become headwind below 1000 is a very common situation) are practically a daily moan.
I'm not against change. I think you might be stuck in the groove with the US model. The sector/approach function traffic info will be derived from transponder provided data that the controller sees on the screen. That's already passé.
Today, using transponders and TCAS, we can eliminate the need for the controller to verbally advise individual aircraft. Saves frequency time, effort and money. The pilot doesn't need to be told about the traffic, he can see the relative position from his/her cockpit display.
Growahead,
Having grown a head, how about putting some facts in said head.
Every jet I have flown, 9000 at 30 track miles to run would be on or below profile.
Any pilot who didn't account for such a step in his aircraft handling, so that power application was not needed to pass 9000 @ 30 is taking money under false pretenses.
As for the rest of your posts, maybe you are an example of what is wrong with ATC in Australia, and a complete inability to believe that it is done far better in a number of countries, of which US is one.
By far better, I mean better separation assurance standards combined with more efficient traffic handling.
Tootle pip!!
Having grown a head, how about putting some facts in said head.
Every jet I have flown, 9000 at 30 track miles to run would be on or below profile.
Any pilot who didn't account for such a step in his aircraft handling, so that power application was not needed to pass 9000 @ 30 is taking money under false pretenses.
As for the rest of your posts, maybe you are an example of what is wrong with ATC in Australia, and a complete inability to believe that it is done far better in a number of countries, of which US is one.
By far better, I mean better separation assurance standards combined with more efficient traffic handling.
Tootle pip!!
Last edited by Awol57; 12th Jul 2015 at 02:46. Reason: Spelling, apparently I'm not so good at it on the phone
Thread Starter
Grow ahead. You don't even know the facts.
I will quote from the ATSB report.
" the 737 crew did not see the Tobago at any time "
So now give me a correct answer now that you know this fundamental point!
I will quote from the ATSB report.
" the 737 crew did not see the Tobago at any time "
So now give me a correct answer now that you know this fundamental point!
Thread Starter
And they didn't come close enough to count rivets. All a con. The jet never saw the Tobago and the Tobago pilot said they were never in any risk of a collision. It was a giant con to prevent australia from allocating airspace on a risk based formulae.
Dick,
The pilots did mutually sight each other, it was quite close.
You are fixated on E, what I'm really saying is make it transponders for everyone.
For you to say that if the TCAS alert didn't happen, it was never an incident: What are you smoking man? They came close enough to count rivets. If a controller had done that, we'd never hear the end of it from you.
Leady,
Thanks for you patronising post. I definitely know what I'm talking about here, you may be correct, Oz is full of incompetent pilots.
There must be heaps of pilots reading this forum, I'll leave it up to them to confirm or deny the truth of this matter. Complaints re the profile onto 12, with the winds as described (local factors, i.e. tailwinds of 30kts or more become headwind below 1000 is a very common situation) are practically a daily moan.
I'm not against change. I think you might be stuck in the groove with the US model. The sector/approach function traffic info will be derived from transponder provided data that the controller sees on the screen. That's already passé.
Today, using transponders and TCAS, we can eliminate the need for the controller to verbally advise individual aircraft. Saves frequency time, effort and money. The pilot doesn't need to be told about the traffic, he can see the relative position from his/her cockpit display.
The pilots did mutually sight each other, it was quite close.
You are fixated on E, what I'm really saying is make it transponders for everyone.
For you to say that if the TCAS alert didn't happen, it was never an incident: What are you smoking man? They came close enough to count rivets. If a controller had done that, we'd never hear the end of it from you.
Leady,
Thanks for you patronising post. I definitely know what I'm talking about here, you may be correct, Oz is full of incompetent pilots.
There must be heaps of pilots reading this forum, I'll leave it up to them to confirm or deny the truth of this matter. Complaints re the profile onto 12, with the winds as described (local factors, i.e. tailwinds of 30kts or more become headwind below 1000 is a very common situation) are practically a daily moan.
I'm not against change. I think you might be stuck in the groove with the US model. The sector/approach function traffic info will be derived from transponder provided data that the controller sees on the screen. That's already passé.
Today, using transponders and TCAS, we can eliminate the need for the controller to verbally advise individual aircraft. Saves frequency time, effort and money. The pilot doesn't need to be told about the traffic, he can see the relative position from his/her cockpit display.
Dick,
If the report says the 737 crew didn't sight, I'll accept that. However, the captain, in an agitated tone, transmitted that he had half (meaning one side) of the passengers seeing the Tobago. That may or may not be included in the transcript, but take it from me.
If you can't accept that this was a very serious incident, then there is no point talking about it any further, we are universes apart.
The whole concept of allowing light aircraft to transit overhead an airport with frequent jet movements, and not needing to announce, and being completely invisible electronically, is unbelievable. In the states the model worked because there was surveillance.
Oz controllers do a pretty good job with the available resources. A major reason traffic moves better in some overseas countries is because of infrastructure. Pretty every airport I'll flown into in the US, which is reasonable number, has had multiple parallel runways, crossing at that. Places like San Franscisco, where you are on final with two other aircraft next to you, with three lined up on the crossing ready to roar. As you know, we have nothing like that in Oz.
At the end of the day, the traffic, meaning delays also, is determined by the runway availability, something like one a minute. Then we have other pieces such as high speed taxiways, allowing minimum time on the runway.
We also have political issues like curfews. Come on, back in the 727 days, a valid concern. Today, modern jets make more aerodynamic noise, which is very little, on approach, an not that much more on departures. So we have the artificial bottleneck every morning around 6 am as the internationals arrive. Seriously, any train line makes more noise these days, why not put a curfew on trains?
If we had multiple crossing runways in the major airports, it would make a huge difference. But no, it's those overpaid, lazy, leftie controllers deliberately delaying the pilots.
Anyway, you have convinced me that I am an idiot, so you can sit on the top of the sandpile in the playground. It's all yours. Ciao ciao
If the report says the 737 crew didn't sight, I'll accept that. However, the captain, in an agitated tone, transmitted that he had half (meaning one side) of the passengers seeing the Tobago. That may or may not be included in the transcript, but take it from me.
If you can't accept that this was a very serious incident, then there is no point talking about it any further, we are universes apart.
The whole concept of allowing light aircraft to transit overhead an airport with frequent jet movements, and not needing to announce, and being completely invisible electronically, is unbelievable. In the states the model worked because there was surveillance.
Oz controllers do a pretty good job with the available resources. A major reason traffic moves better in some overseas countries is because of infrastructure. Pretty every airport I'll flown into in the US, which is reasonable number, has had multiple parallel runways, crossing at that. Places like San Franscisco, where you are on final with two other aircraft next to you, with three lined up on the crossing ready to roar. As you know, we have nothing like that in Oz.
At the end of the day, the traffic, meaning delays also, is determined by the runway availability, something like one a minute. Then we have other pieces such as high speed taxiways, allowing minimum time on the runway.
We also have political issues like curfews. Come on, back in the 727 days, a valid concern. Today, modern jets make more aerodynamic noise, which is very little, on approach, an not that much more on departures. So we have the artificial bottleneck every morning around 6 am as the internationals arrive. Seriously, any train line makes more noise these days, why not put a curfew on trains?
If we had multiple crossing runways in the major airports, it would make a huge difference. But no, it's those overpaid, lazy, leftie controllers deliberately delaying the pilots.
Anyway, you have convinced me that I am an idiot, so you can sit on the top of the sandpile in the playground. It's all yours. Ciao ciao
Growahead: I'm with you. The two biggest waste of time, effort, staffing and money in the history of aviation in OZ have been NAS airspace and SDE. It still astounds me that there is this surveillance and controlled airspace down to 1500ft over Tasmania during the night with only two or three regular week day movements for the whole shift when Canberra airspace, during the same time, is uncontrolled Class G to 8500ft. Now there's security for you over the nation's capital when Joe Lunchbucket can load his aircraft up with fertiliser and fly it to Canberra and plunge it into Government House and nobody would know - or dare I say care!!
For you to say that if the TCAS alert didn't happen, it was never an incident: What are you smoking man?
Thread Starter
Grow. We have many class G airports with RPT jet services and VFR traffic flying through the terminal area without survailance and without transponders. Ballina is an example. Don't even have a Unicom radio operator to report a plane taxiing on the wrong frequency as they all do for safety in the USA.
If we upgrade them to class E we get full Separation of all aircraft in IMC and also mandatory transponder so TCAS will work. But Bloggs is happy with the status quo at these airports because " that's how we did it in the 1950s and nothing must change"
If we upgrade them to class E we get full Separation of all aircraft in IMC and also mandatory transponder so TCAS will work. But Bloggs is happy with the status quo at these airports because " that's how we did it in the 1950s and nothing must change"
Thread Starter
If the VFR aircraft did not have a transponder requirement - say as at Ballinna today- no incident would have been reported as the VFR pilot has always maintained that he had the jet visual and was not going to run into it. That's how alerted see and avoid works all around the world
If we upgrade them to class E we get full Separation of all aircraft in IMC and also mandatory transponder so TCAS will work. But Bloggs is happy with the status quo at these airports because " that's how we did it in the 1950s and nothing must change"
Stop trotting out the "change resistance" bull**** Dick. You and your mates are the ones so stuck in a rut your ears are clogged with dirt. Show us the money!
Last edited by le Pingouin; 12th Jul 2015 at 15:19. Reason: typo
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Perspective
I'm struggling to follow your logic Dick, let me briefly explain
Ballina Area
In the Newspaper and on here you say you want Class E CTA and a Unicom;
In the Newspaper it mentions a possible lowering of the CTA base to 5,000ft (from 8,500ft); What do you want to happen between 5,000ft and the circuit? Installation of radar? Multlat, ADS-B Mandate for IFR and VFR? Cost v's Safety Benefit?
The Unicom. Who would man it and when? What training? Who pays for it, Who insures it (Strict Liability – Not agreeing it is right, just asking)? Will it need things such as recorders for liability, investigation etc? Will it operate on the CTAF frequency? How would you ensure the Unicom did not impede pilot to pilot Comm's that may be of and urgent or critical nature on either CTAF or AREA ATC?
You said
Lets assume for argument that Class E over Ballina is put in place down to 700ft
VFR non-transponder aircraft are immediately excluded – OK
VFR transponder equipped aircraft could neglect to turn the transponder on (Unicom won't know, ATC won't know, TCAS RPT won't know – OK
The cost or ATC terminal services would cost extra – OK
I assume from your previous comments regarding the necessity of Regulatory Impact and Cost/Benefit processes, you will of course support those processes to determine if the changes you want are a proper allocation of finite Industry funding.
In contrast to the Ballina Class G to E debate. It seems a completely different issue to that of the controlled Tasmanian terminal airspace as that is much busier and is currently Class C and D (full ATC control of VFR and IFR traffic).
Tasmanian Airspace
I am struggling with your arguments as things don't add up. You say
https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/24413/...305235_001.pdf
Prior to the NAS class E airspace in which this Airprox occurred, The Airspace was Class C which requires an ATC clearance via Radio and Transponder carriage and use, and the aircraft would have been separated (presumably vertically 1,000ft or an amended route) by Air Traffic Control. You say
From the ATSB Final
and;
and;
I trust you can see the difficulty in reconciling your comments, both in accuracy and context.
I am sure I am not the only reader troubled by the mixing of two very different change agendas. The efficacy of changing G (uncontrolled) to E (half control) in Ballina is a very different thing to changing C (full control) to E (half control) in Tasmania irrespective of the availability of ATC surveillance.
Along the same lines, I can't imagine good outcomes are assisted at all by megaphone diplomacy that invokes responses such as this;
https://newsroom.airservicesaustrali...e-australian-4
As others have indicated, if change is necessary in Ballina, Tasmania, or elsewhere, then so be it. You will of course support the necessity for open, transparent Regulatory Impact and Cost/Benefit (and the like) processes to determine if the changes you want are a proper allocation of finite Industry funding.
Regards
Q
Ballina Area
In the Newspaper and on here you say you want Class E CTA and a Unicom;
In the Newspaper it mentions a possible lowering of the CTA base to 5,000ft (from 8,500ft); What do you want to happen between 5,000ft and the circuit? Installation of radar? Multlat, ADS-B Mandate for IFR and VFR? Cost v's Safety Benefit?
The Unicom. Who would man it and when? What training? Who pays for it, Who insures it (Strict Liability – Not agreeing it is right, just asking)? Will it need things such as recorders for liability, investigation etc? Will it operate on the CTAF frequency? How would you ensure the Unicom did not impede pilot to pilot Comm's that may be of and urgent or critical nature on either CTAF or AREA ATC?
You said
I introduced mandatory transponders for all aircraft in class E and I have pushed for 25 years to update selected class G terminal airspace to class E. So we get a double safety improvement.
VFR non-transponder aircraft are immediately excluded – OK
VFR transponder equipped aircraft could neglect to turn the transponder on (Unicom won't know, ATC won't know, TCAS RPT won't know – OK
The cost or ATC terminal services would cost extra – OK
I assume from your previous comments regarding the necessity of Regulatory Impact and Cost/Benefit processes, you will of course support those processes to determine if the changes you want are a proper allocation of finite Industry funding.
In contrast to the Ballina Class G to E debate. It seems a completely different issue to that of the controlled Tasmanian terminal airspace as that is much busier and is currently Class C and D (full ATC control of VFR and IFR traffic).
Tasmanian Airspace
I am struggling with your arguments as things don't add up. You say
The only reason the Launceston incident was known about was because I introduced mandatory transponders in that airspace and the VFR aircraft was so equipped . With the previous airspace above Launceston there was no transponder requirement and if the VFR aircraft was on the same flight path without a clearance no one would have ever known.
From 27 November 2003, the airspace in which the 737 and Tobago were operating at the time of the occurrence was classified as Class E airspace (see Appendix B). In the Class C airspace operative prior to 27 November (see Appendix C), both aircraft would have been subject to an ATC airways clearance and would have been separated in accordance with prescribed standards.
The VFR pilot said the Jet was sited at all relevent times through radio alerting and he was remaining clear .
the 737’s cabin crew reported to the pilot in command that passengers saw the aircraft on the left side of the 737. The pilot in command reported that based on the TCAS display, the aircraft passed slightly to the left, and certainly within both 1 NM from the 737 and 200 ft below.
The pilot of the Tobago was monitoring the Launceston and Melbourne Centre ATC frequencies and heard the initial transmission from the crew of the 737 to Launceston ATC. He noted from that transmission that the 737 was inbound to Launceston on the 009 radial of the Launceston VOR and also believed that the 737 had been cleared to track direct to right base runway 32L. As the pilot of the Tobago was tracking via the 007 VOR radial he considered that there would be sufficient lateral spacing with the 737 on the 009 VOR radial at the point where they were likely to pass each other7. He also considered that the lateral distance between them would increase if the 737 was tracking direct to right base rather than tracking inbound on the 009 VOR radial.
The pilot of the Tobago reported that he had selected the aircraft’s navigation, strobe and landing lights ‘ON’. He subsequently saw the 737 and he believed that it would pass safely to his right. The pilot reported that he flashed the Tobago’s landing lights at the 737 several times, but become concerned when the 737 appeared to turn to the right across the nose of the Tobago. The Tobago pilot reported that he observed the 737 climbing above him ‘appearing to come from starboard to port’. However, he said that, as the 737 was ascending in front of the Tobago and at his 11 o’clock position, there was no need to consider whether there should be an alteration of course or a decision to descend. A review of track and heading information from the 737’s flight data recorder (FDR) did not reveal any indication of a tracking change8 , although there was a minor heading change of 4 degrees.
The pilot of the Tobago reported that he had selected the aircraft’s navigation, strobe and landing lights ‘ON’. He subsequently saw the 737 and he believed that it would pass safely to his right. The pilot reported that he flashed the Tobago’s landing lights at the 737 several times, but become concerned when the 737 appeared to turn to the right across the nose of the Tobago. The Tobago pilot reported that he observed the 737 climbing above him ‘appearing to come from starboard to port’. However, he said that, as the 737 was ascending in front of the Tobago and at his 11 o’clock position, there was no need to consider whether there should be an alteration of course or a decision to descend. A review of track and heading information from the 737’s flight data recorder (FDR) did not reveal any indication of a tracking change8 , although there was a minor heading change of 4 degrees.
The Tobago pilot subsequently advised ATSB investigators that he was aware that the appearance of cross-tracking was probably an illusion which resulted from the strong wind.
ANALYSIS
Throughout this analysis it should be noted that the pilots of the aircraft involved in this incident were operating in accordance with the rules and procedures for operation in Class E airspace associated with the NAS phase 2b, implemented on 27 November 2003. The closing speed of the aircraft was approximately 360 kts. The reason the Tobago passed to the left of the 737 could not be conclusively determined (see footnotes 6 and 7). The investigation found that the aircraft came within such close proximity at about the time of the RA alert provided by the TCAS on board the 737 as to constitute an ‘airprox’ serious incident and the response by the crew to that alert, may have averted a mid-air collision.
Throughout this analysis it should be noted that the pilots of the aircraft involved in this incident were operating in accordance with the rules and procedures for operation in Class E airspace associated with the NAS phase 2b, implemented on 27 November 2003. The closing speed of the aircraft was approximately 360 kts. The reason the Tobago passed to the left of the 737 could not be conclusively determined (see footnotes 6 and 7). The investigation found that the aircraft came within such close proximity at about the time of the RA alert provided by the TCAS on board the 737 as to constitute an ‘airprox’ serious incident and the response by the crew to that alert, may have averted a mid-air collision.
I am sure I am not the only reader troubled by the mixing of two very different change agendas. The efficacy of changing G (uncontrolled) to E (half control) in Ballina is a very different thing to changing C (full control) to E (half control) in Tasmania irrespective of the availability of ATC surveillance.
Along the same lines, I can't imagine good outcomes are assisted at all by megaphone diplomacy that invokes responses such as this;
https://newsroom.airservicesaustrali...e-australian-4
We have responded to numerous questions from your journalist on both of these issues over several days. Despite extensive information being provided by Airservices, these articles do not give a fair and balanced perspective, which is contrary to News Limited’s own Code of Conduct.
We ask that you refrain from repeating these inaccurate and misleading claims and publish corrections at the earliest opportunity.
We ask that you refrain from repeating these inaccurate and misleading claims and publish corrections at the earliest opportunity.
Regards
Q
Thread Starter
So the USA , Canada and many other countries can provide this safer system but not Australia. At the present time we get an ATC service where the risks are minimal but when the risks go up- in the terminal area- pilots have to become their own " ATCs" . Pathetic system at busy non tower airports most would reckon.
How come the work load on controllers is clearly so much lower than in other leading aviation countries.?
I have spoken to Aussie controllors of low level en route airspace and some claim they could also do approach work as long as we had the FAA enlightened procedural separation standards.
This was supposed to happen in 1992. Why not trial just one airport before we claim it would be too expensive?
And a number of controllors have told me that giving traffic information in our old 1950s way is more labor intensive than actually separating the aircraft in some circumstances .
But we would not know because we have never used en route controllors to provide a terminal service at non tower airports.
How come the work load on controllers is clearly so much lower than in other leading aviation countries.?
I have spoken to Aussie controllors of low level en route airspace and some claim they could also do approach work as long as we had the FAA enlightened procedural separation standards.
This was supposed to happen in 1992. Why not trial just one airport before we claim it would be too expensive?
And a number of controllors have told me that giving traffic information in our old 1950s way is more labor intensive than actually separating the aircraft in some circumstances .
But we would not know because we have never used en route controllors to provide a terminal service at non tower airports.
Last edited by Dick Smith; 13th Jul 2015 at 02:00.
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I observe!!
Come on, let Dick place his argument.
I for one have faith in what he does say as since 1997, when the last big change was to foisted on us, we did stop this attempt to protect the rice-bowls of ASA employees at the time.
Again, No Safety Case was advanced and I note watching the October 2014 and May 2015 Senate estimates, that #ASA still protects it's rice-bowl.
Need I remind you that the ASA Board made a decision on moving the Adelaide facility to Melbourne without the benefit of a safety case - Attitude advanced to the Senator's was that "...we can do it later and it really is OK anyway..."
Comments?? Le P, Grow, P lovett [I can supply you a rice-bowl if you wish!!]
I for one have faith in what he does say as since 1997, when the last big change was to foisted on us, we did stop this attempt to protect the rice-bowls of ASA employees at the time.
Again, No Safety Case was advanced and I note watching the October 2014 and May 2015 Senate estimates, that #ASA still protects it's rice-bowl.
Need I remind you that the ASA Board made a decision on moving the Adelaide facility to Melbourne without the benefit of a safety case - Attitude advanced to the Senator's was that "...we can do it later and it really is OK anyway..."
Comments?? Le P, Grow, P lovett [I can supply you a rice-bowl if you wish!!]
Join Date: Feb 2012
Location: West of SY OZ
Posts: 82
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I observe!!
Come on, let Dick place his argument.
I for one have faith in what he does say as since 1997, when the last big change was to foisted on us, we did stop this attempt to protect the rice-bowls of ASA employees at the time.
Again, No Safety Case was advanced and I note watching the October 2014 and May 2015 Senate estimates, that #ASA still protects it's rice-bowl.
Need I remind you that the ASA Board made a decision on moving the Adelaide facility to Melbourne without the benefit of a safety case - Attitude advanced to the Senator's was that "...we can do it later and it really is OK anyway..."
Comments?? Le P, Grow, P lovett [I can supply you a rice-bowl if you wish!!]
I for one have faith in what he does say as since 1997, when the last big change was to foisted on us, we did stop this attempt to protect the rice-bowls of ASA employees at the time.
Again, No Safety Case was advanced and I note watching the October 2014 and May 2015 Senate estimates, that #ASA still protects it's rice-bowl.
Need I remind you that the ASA Board made a decision on moving the Adelaide facility to Melbourne without the benefit of a safety case - Attitude advanced to the Senator's was that "...we can do it later and it really is OK anyway..."
Comments?? Le P, Grow, P lovett [I can supply you a rice-bowl if you wish!!]
The AFP seen at most airports in the states are state police dressed in AFP uniforms.
Bottums Up
the big benefit (not) for any airside police need in HBA is that the local Tassie Police don't have ASIC, don't have airside access, and have to be met by a Duty Manager and escorted to the place of need.
No escort, no police. Not to mention that if, say, the police were busy with a siege of some sort, an aerodrome issue is put down the priority list, and the flight crew & aeroplane can just wait.
No escort, no police. Not to mention that if, say, the police were busy with a siege of some sort, an aerodrome issue is put down the priority list, and the flight crew & aeroplane can just wait.