I'm struggling to follow your logic Dick, let me briefly explain
Ballina Area
In the Newspaper and on here you say you want Class E CTA and a Unicom;
In the Newspaper it mentions a possible lowering of the CTA base to 5,000ft (from 8,500ft); What do you want to happen between 5,000ft and the circuit? Installation of radar? Multlat, ADS-B Mandate for IFR and VFR? Cost v's Safety Benefit?
The Unicom. Who would man it and when? What training? Who pays for it, Who insures it (Strict Liability – Not agreeing it is right, just asking)? Will it need things such as recorders for liability, investigation etc? Will it operate on the CTAF frequency? How would you ensure the Unicom did not impede pilot to pilot Comm's that may be of and urgent or critical nature on either CTAF or AREA ATC?
You said
I introduced mandatory transponders for all aircraft in class E and I have pushed for 25 years to update selected class G terminal airspace to class E. So we get a double safety improvement.
Lets assume for argument that Class E over Ballina is put in place down to 700ft
VFR non-transponder aircraft are immediately excluded – OK
VFR transponder equipped aircraft could neglect to turn the transponder on (Unicom won't know, ATC won't know, TCAS RPT won't know – OK
The cost or ATC terminal services would cost extra – OK
I assume from your previous comments regarding the necessity of Regulatory Impact and Cost/Benefit processes, you will of course support those processes to determine if the changes you want are a proper allocation of finite Industry funding.
In contrast to the Ballina Class G to E debate. It seems a completely different issue to that of the controlled Tasmanian terminal airspace as that is much busier and is currently Class C and D (full ATC control of VFR and IFR traffic).
Tasmanian Airspace
I am struggling with your arguments as things don't add up. You say
The only reason the Launceston incident was known about was because I introduced mandatory transponders in that airspace and the VFR aircraft was so equipped . With the previous airspace above Launceston there was no transponder requirement and if the VFR aircraft was on the same flight path without a clearance no one would have ever known.
https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/24413/...305235_001.pdf
From 27 November 2003, the airspace in which the 737 and Tobago were operating at the time of the occurrence was classified as Class E airspace (see Appendix B). In the Class C airspace operative prior to 27 November (see Appendix C), both aircraft would have been subject to an ATC airways clearance and would have been separated in accordance with prescribed standards.
Prior to the NAS class E airspace in which this Airprox occurred, The Airspace was Class C which requires an ATC clearance via Radio and Transponder carriage and use, and the aircraft would have been separated (presumably vertically 1,000ft or an amended route) by Air Traffic Control. You say
The VFR pilot said the Jet was sited at all relevent times through radio alerting and he was remaining clear .
From the ATSB Final
the 737’s cabin crew reported to the pilot in command that passengers saw the aircraft on the left side of the 737. The pilot in command reported that based on the TCAS display, the aircraft passed slightly to the left, and certainly within both 1 NM from the 737 and 200 ft below.
The pilot of the Tobago was monitoring the Launceston and Melbourne Centre ATC frequencies and heard the initial transmission from the crew of the 737 to Launceston ATC. He noted from that transmission that the 737 was inbound to Launceston on the 009 radial of the Launceston VOR and also believed that the 737 had been cleared to track direct to right base runway 32L. As the pilot of the Tobago was tracking via the 007 VOR radial he considered that there would be sufficient lateral spacing with the 737 on the 009 VOR radial at the point where they were likely to pass each other7. He also considered that the lateral distance between them would increase if the 737 was tracking direct to right base rather than tracking inbound on the 009 VOR radial.
The pilot of the Tobago reported that he had selected the aircraft’s navigation, strobe and landing lights ‘ON’. He subsequently saw the 737 and he believed that it would pass safely to his right. The pilot reported that he flashed the Tobago’s landing lights at the 737 several times, but become concerned when the 737 appeared to turn to the right across the nose of the Tobago. The Tobago pilot reported that he observed the 737 climbing above him ‘appearing to come from starboard to port’. However, he said that, as the 737 was ascending in front of the Tobago and at his 11 o’clock position, there was no need to consider whether there should be an alteration of course or a decision to descend. A review of track and heading information from the 737’s flight data recorder (FDR) did not reveal any indication of a tracking change8 , although there was a minor heading change of 4 degrees.
and;
The Tobago pilot subsequently advised ATSB investigators that he was aware that the appearance of cross-tracking was probably an illusion which resulted from the strong wind.
and;
ANALYSIS
Throughout this analysis it should be noted that the pilots of the aircraft involved in this incident were operating in accordance with the rules and procedures for operation in Class E airspace associated with the NAS phase 2b, implemented on 27 November 2003. The closing speed of the aircraft was approximately 360 kts. The reason the Tobago passed to the left of the 737 could not be conclusively determined (see footnotes 6 and 7). The investigation found that the aircraft came within such close proximity at about the time of the RA alert provided by the TCAS on board the 737 as to constitute an ‘airprox’ serious incident and the response by the crew to that alert, may have averted a mid-air collision.
I trust you can see the difficulty in reconciling your comments, both in accuracy and context.
I am sure I am not the only reader troubled by the mixing of two very different change agendas. The efficacy of changing G (uncontrolled) to E (half control) in Ballina is a very different thing to changing C (full control) to E (half control) in Tasmania irrespective of the availability of ATC surveillance.
Along the same lines, I can't imagine good outcomes are assisted at all by megaphone diplomacy that invokes responses such as this;
https://newsroom.airservicesaustrali...e-australian-4
We have responded to numerous questions from your journalist on both of these issues over several days. Despite extensive information being provided by Airservices, these articles do not give a fair and balanced perspective, which is contrary to News Limited’s own Code of Conduct.
We ask that you refrain from repeating these inaccurate and misleading claims and publish corrections at the earliest opportunity.
As others have indicated, if change is necessary in Ballina, Tasmania, or elsewhere, then so be it. You will of course support the necessity for open, transparent Regulatory Impact and Cost/Benefit (and the like) processes to determine if the changes you want are a proper allocation of finite Industry funding.
Regards
Q