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ATSB reports

Old 29th Nov 2013, 21:44
  #61 (permalink)  
 
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Talking IOS elephant propping up the bar at the LBGYC!

It would appear that McScreamer is testing the waters..here is an excerpt from his latest missive included in the monthly propaganda from Fort Fumble ...
"CASA understands and values the importance of our relationship with the Australian Transport Safety Bureau and we {is that a royal "WE"??} have processes in place{ that would be the ubiquitous, behind the scenes Mr ALIU } to ensure the outcomes of the Bureau’s investigations are carefully analysed and appropriate regulatory and safety actions are taken {or ozfuscated as the need is required}. Any steps that can be taken to further {ozfuscate} develop our relationship with the Australian Transport Safety Bureau, and other aviation agencies, will be positive both for CASA and further buggerise the aviation safety system."

Hmm ..kind of like saying to the Minister..." WE understand that you've been forced to do this (TASRR) but WE really have it all under control Minister".

However there is the small hurdle of the imminent government response to the Senator's PelAir report/recommendations (IOS elephant ), so in keeping with the theme of the thread here is a gentle reminder of some of those recommendations:
Recommendation 14
7.15 The committee recommends that the ATSB-CASA Memorandum of Understanding be re-drafted to remove any ambiguity in relation to information that should be shared between the agencies in relation to aviation accident investigations, to require CASA to:
  • advise the ATSB of the initiation of any action, audit or review as a result of an accident which the ATSB is investigating.
  • provide the ATSB with the relevant review report as soon as it is available.
Recommendation 15
7.16 The committee recommends that all meetings between the ATSB and CASA, whether formal or informal, where particulars of a given investigation are being discussed be appropriately minuted.


Recommendation 17
9.18 The committee recommends that the ATSB prepare and release publicly a list of all its identified safety issues and the actions which are being taken or have been taken to address them. The ATSB should indicate its progress in monitoring the actions every 6 months and report every 12 months to Parliament.

Recommendation 18
9.40 The committee recommends that where a safety action has not been completed before a report being issued that a recommendation should be made. If it has been completed the report should include details of the action, who was involved and how it was resolved.

Recommendation 19
9.42 The committee recommends that the ATSB review its process to track the implementation of recommendations or safety actions to ensure it is an effective closed loop system. This should be made public, and provided to the Senate Regional and Rural Affairs and Transport Committee prior to each Budget Estimates.

Recommendation 20
9.44 The committee recommends that where the consideration and implementation of an ATSB recommendation may be protracted, the requirement for regular updates (for example 6 monthly) should be included in the TSI Act.

Recommendation 21
9.45 The committee recommends that the government consider setting a time limit for agencies to implement or reject recommendations, beyond which ministerial oversight is required where the agencies concerned must report to the minister why the recommendation has not been implemented or that, with ministerial approval, it has been formally rejected.


OK slight drift...Para377:
As creamy would say 'talk talk talk'. Mi mi mi Beaker and his tautological outcomes, all folly.
It would appear that McScreamer and Beaker are swapping ozfuscation notes..from DAS speech at Clive's dinosaur park...

"The recent claims made by some sections of the industry appear to compare the standby requirements specified in the new CAO 48.1 with foreign regulators’ airport standby arrangements. However, these are two very different concepts, and comparing them is tendentious and misleading."

Err..Minister a leopard does not change its spots!
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Old 30th Nov 2013, 00:39
  #62 (permalink)  
 
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Spots - what spots.

Err.. Minister a leopard does not change its spots!
That's a Yes Minister – not in my jungle they don't. Thing that really gets the elephants panties in a bunch is that the glove puppet actually thinks that anyone, without a lobotomy that is, could believe the constant flow of carefully polished propaganda....
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Old 30th Nov 2013, 10:13
  #63 (permalink)  
 
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Tick tock and it won't be too long before the piper must be paid.
Tick Tock indeed Government cronyism, cover ups, malfeasance and incompetence is a sort of favourite past time of mine. I have experienced it first hand, under two different countries who operate under the Westminster system, so I have an ongoing interest in the rights of the little bloke.

One thing is for certain in Australia this time around, the stakes are higher friends. There are some very serious aviation concerns being raised about Australian aviation oversight by other highly ranked Aviation entities external to Australia. The concerns are of such a nature that for these entities to mitigate, well I will put it this way, it will become a parlous financial blow to the Australian economy. These powerful entities have and are avoiding this potential mess as best as they can, but the length of rope has finally run out.

The other difference at the moment lays with the Australian Senators work. Sure, they have done a pretty good job up til now, and admittedly there have been inquiries before, but thiS time around the CAsA, the former Alabanese and the now Truss have under estimated the veracity of Xenophon and Fawcett, as well as under estimated the Senators determination, will, conscience and intelligence. If people think the situation in Australia has been ozfuscated into the history pages as well this time around, think again. There is a storm front coming that may even shock the most ardent CASAsexual, onlookers or even the IOS!

Watch this space
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Old 30th Nov 2013, 21:48
  #64 (permalink)  
 
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Maybe I am missing the point here, I confess to only skim reading the last few posts. Tell me how on earth ANY rule changes would have made any difference to that ABC crash, or any other.

Operating under the IFR you still need to take off, and hand fly at least a little bit, and the crash happens in that phase of flight.

The only rule that will prevent crashes like this is to ban night flight in all instances. And we all know how practical that is.

Is this just a media beat up? Did the ATSB suggest something that was….errr dumb?
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Old 1st Dec 2013, 04:00
  #65 (permalink)  
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Thank you,Jabawocky.

I was wondering much the same thing but thought that I had indeed missed something.
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Old 1st Dec 2013, 04:50
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Maybe I am missing the point here, I confess to only skim reading the last few posts. Tell me how on earth ANY rule changes would have made any difference to that ABC crash, or any other.
The pilot of the ABC machine was not instrument rated and never had been from a Civil perspective. Unless I am mistaken he also wasn't current by the company's SOP's. Mandating an IFR rating for dark nights or similar, perhaps two pilots minimum would have enhanced the safety of the flight and the outcome.
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Old 1st Dec 2013, 05:20
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Media beat up or missed point (MP1)??

MP1: Media beat up...no IMO Aunty has missed the point!

MP2: It is not whether the ATsB SR is good, bad, a total WOFTAM or (ironically) if it would have made any difference to the tragic outcome of the Aunty Chopper accident .

Here's a quote from the tail end of my post #53:
Quote:
16. The Coroner supports CASR draft regulations point 61 and 133 becoming final.
17. That beacons, both visual and radio, be placed on prominent and appropriate high points along routes commonly utilised by aero-medical retrieval teams, including Cape Hillsborough.
18. The Coroner supports the ATSB recommendations 20030213,and promulgation of information to pilots; 20040052, assessment of safety benefits of requiring a standby altitude indicator with independent power source in single pilot night VFR; 20040053, assessment of safety benefits of requiring an autopilot or stabilisation augmentation system in single pilot VFR; and R20050002, review operator classification and minimum safety standards for helicopter EMS operations.


Starting to join the dots?? More to follow..Sarcs (K2)

Addendum:

CASA SRs for AO-2011-102: AO-2011-102-SI-02 , AO-2011-102-SI-03

CASA SRs for air200304282: R20040053,R20050002, R20010195, R20030213.

Note: With the courage of their convictions and experience, you will note that the bureau of old issued R20030213 within a month of the accident.. compare that to ATSBeaker...27 months was it??
So if the original SR's from 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005 (as listed above) were more appropriately addressed (instead of ozfuscated ) then the new ATsB SR issued for the ABC chopper crash wouldn't have been necessary and maybe (big maybe) this accident may not have occurred...why you ask? Well because the risk of spatial disorientation would hopefully have been highlighted and learnt from, leading to a risk mitigator like for example better SOPs from the operator; or better currency rules from the operator; or incorporated recurrency training for similar scenarios...the list goes on.

Even if the accident still occurred we would still be a decade ahead and looking at other risk mitigators..
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Old 1st Dec 2013, 10:06
  #68 (permalink)  
 
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Sarcs, very very succinctly put
What we often (or used to have) were good ATSB reports and SR's. These on occasion would be followed up by a Coroner recommendation. So now we have two sources recommending changes within a system that failed. Then as the third link in the chain we have..........Fort Fumble. The lazy, laconic, inept ozfucator. They then decide that the ATSB and Coroner recommendations be, dare I say, 'taken on notice'. In other words nothing gets done, and in a lesson in fate, tautology and Groundhog Day the same accident/incident occurs again (for example study the Robbo fuel tank issue and how innocent people have been burnt alive).
In many instances had the 'R'egulator introduced the SR's as recommended by the ATSBeaker or the Coroner, history may have never repeated itself, lives might have been saved, families could have avoided the heartache and pain that they were caused.

So yes, there is a link between rules and regulations and incidents and accidents. Transair at Lockhart is a prime example of how the risks were identified several years before the accident. Fort Fumble ignored the glaring red flags, sat on their collective asses and then ran like cockroaches when all hell broke loose.

Last edited by Paragraph377; 1st Dec 2013 at 10:42.
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Old 1st Dec 2013, 20:47
  #69 (permalink)  
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The backlog grows

In November there were 10 new occurrences vs 8 reports released. October was 24 vs 17. September 19 vs 15. So in the last 3 months alone the backlog of reports has gown by 21.

This is a body with 116 employees and an annual budget of about $25m for an average cost of about $150k each. Surely lack of resource is not the reason.
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Old 2nd Dec 2013, 04:21
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Would love to know where to find out more.

116 total.

CEO, CIO, CFO and C something... take away 4 or more.

Payroll, admin, reception, legal, hr... hmmm... 15 (conservatively).

Take away 1.5 for maternity leave.

Take 88% of what's left for annual leave and sick leave.

Take away 1.0% that are on long service leave.

Let's conservatively take away 3 more that sit there collating the monthly lists of incidents, following up etc.

116 - 15 - 1.5 * .88 - 1% - 3 = ~80.

Last 3 months of occurences, 10+24+19 = 53.

That's 53 accidents / incidents in the last 3 months that require detailed analysis.

With 7.5 hours in the public service working day across the remaining conservative 80 employees.

80 employees across Aviation, Marine and Rail. 80/3 = 26.

Based incorrectly on 20 working days per month, we have 60 working days across 3 months for the remaining 26 employees....

3,900 man hours per month.
3900 / 53 = 73 hours per incident per person. 73 / 37.5 hours per week = 1.95 weeks....

1 incident per investigator for 2 weeks.

Hardly enough eh?

So many unknowns... I'll bet there are a string of admins that I haven't accounted for and I'd be surprised if those remaining are all of investigator type qualifications. We also don't know the split if aviation versus rail and shipping.

I'm not surprised at your figures then Old Akro.

Would love to know more!
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Old 2nd Dec 2013, 18:54
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And, so say all of us.

Triple X # 76 –"Would love to know more!".
Sen McDonald seems to be a bear on the CASA annual report (see the RAAA for comments on the obscene profit margins); perhaps it's time the ATSB was looked at in a similar light. Some old thoughts:-

Everyone enjoys a good story, well told; it is a deeply entrenched part of human kinds development from its origins. Mostly, human beings relate to a clearly defined entertaining story, the lesson or objective of the story is most apparent and easily understood then.

During some of the darker periods in history, it has not been possible for many authors to tell their story in a clear, concise manner thus the message and lesson must be camouflaged and the informed reader must glean the true meaning by being able to interpret or 'read' the subtext and extract the subtle messaging from under the cover of the outer, defensive layers.

Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) seems an unlikely candidate for this form delivery; their report with the mundane title 200501977 appears to be the least likely candidate to tell a story which has all the ingredients of a first class thriller. But it has; in spades. Properly read, it provides all the essential elements of a classic; although the purist would decry the lack of a love interest, this is the only element missing.

200501977 contains a modest two hundred and forty six pages which can be skimmed through in about thirty minutes, the readers eyes glazing over somewhere during that period. This is a reader mistake. To properly read the report the reader must first understand the nature of a long running battle between two powerful entities for power, money, influence and kudos. The history of these rival groups is coloured, metaphorically speaking, in blood.

In today's world, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) is in the political ascendancy, attracts the media attention, enjoys well filled coffers and basks in the security of public and political confidence. The ATSB is chronically under funded, attracts very little media attention and the general public have only a vague notion that it exists.

And so, the ATSB must be careful to protect it's rice bowl, not rock too many boats and mind it's manners.

How then can the ATSB weave the unpleasant truths about this aviation disaster into the fabric of the public lives, when their very existence is a daily struggle. Their answer is in subtle, cleverly camouflaged writing which, correctly interpreted, inevitably leads the informed reader to the correct answer.

Selah.

Last edited by Kharon; 2nd Dec 2013 at 19:11.
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Old 4th Dec 2013, 02:02
  #72 (permalink)  
 
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Squirrel accident comparison - VH-NTV v C-FBHN

I wonder if the Canucks (TSBC), while conducting their review of the ATSB, have touched on comparing investigation methodology with this just released TSBC Final Report on a Squirrel accident...

Aviation Investigation Report A12P0079

...to the ABC Lake Eyre accident??

AO-2011-102_final_1_.pdf

Although not perfect in comparison e.g. terrain, day v night etc it does have enough similarities to explore differences in investigative methodology and to review the end result over investigations that were being run over a similar period and timeframe.

NOTE: The following passage from the TSB report is very interesting and also draws some remarkable parallels to the ATSB Final Report and SRs from the 17 October 2003 Bell 407 Cape Hillsborough accident..
During the period of January 2000 through May 2012 in Canada, at least12 occurrences involved VFR helicopter flights colliding with terrain in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). Of those occurrences, 4 involved a loss of control at sufficient height above the surface to result in collision with terrain in an unusual attitude. These 4 occurrences involved 9 persons, 7 of whom were injured, 3 fatally.

Previously, the Transportation Safety Board (TSB) had identified a safety deficiency associated with helicopter pilot instrument flying skills. On 13 November 1990, the TSB authorized the release of the following recommendation (A90-81):Footnote 7
The Board recommends that:
The Department of Transport require verification of proficiency in basic instrument flying skills for commercially-employed helicopter pilots during annual pilot proficiency flight checks.
On 05 September 2012, the TSB issued the following Board Assessment of Response to A90-81:Footnote 8
TSB does not dispute TC’s contention that “inadvertent” VFR into IMC events constitute a small percentage of the total VFR into IMC events. However, TSB believes that given the fatality rate of these events, TC’s efforts to date to reduce the causes of VFR into IMC events are inadequate.

Consequently, Recommendation A90-81 concerns itself with refreshing skills, acquired during licence training, which are designed to assist pilots in extracting themselves from a VFR into IMC event. The fact that the majority of VFR into IMC events may be preceded by poor pilot decision making does not diminish the value of maintaining piloting skills intended to deal with such an event.

TC’s response is critical of the 180-degree-turn procedure which is outlined in its TP9982E Helicopter Flight Training Manual. TC explains that, due to a combination of an unstabilized helicopter, a panicked pilot and the inherent difficulty in transitioning to instruments, the successful use of the 180-degree-turn procedure is unlikely. TC’s response suggests that this VFR into IMC situation is exacerbated by the pilot being “without any recency in instrument flight”. TSB understands that the instrument flying instruction as conducted during licence training does not qualify any pilot to fly IFR. However, the training emphasizes that the recommended 180-degree-turn procedure is to be used in an emergency and is characterized as the “safest and most expedient procedure” to transition back to VMC.
TC states that because Canadian regulations do not require day VFR aircraft to be equipped with the instruments necessary to safely fly in IMC, all such aircraft would need to be upgraded to accomplish manoeuvres such as a 180-degree turn. It concludes that implementing Recommendation A90-81 would be prohibitively expensive. TSB appreciates that the instrument flying taught during licence training is designed for a pilot who encounters a VFR into IMC event while flying a helicopter not suitably instrumented for IFR flight. The “basic instrument flying skills”, referred to in Recommendation A90-81, are those taught during licence training which does not require use of an IFR equipped helicopter. Therefore, a universal upgrade of the current day VFR helicopter fleet would not necessarily be required to implement Recommendation A90-81.

TC’s comparison between the U.S. and Canadian commercial helicopter experience operating under VFR into IMC focuses on the limitations of the U.S. air ambulance and a regional sightseeing phenomenon. The FAA’s NPRM, referred to in TSB’s assessment, is entitled Air Ambulance and Commercial Helicopter Operations, and the two referenced NTSB recommendations calling for enhanced training for commercial helicopter pilots resulted from accidents under flat light conditions involving commercial helicopters.

While TC believes there is value in including an instrument flying exercise as part of the licence training, its current analysis sees no benefit in enhancing recurrent training in the manner described in Recommendation A90-81. While it has stated a concern for the fact that 50% of VFR into IMC accidents result in fatalities, it maintains that the status quo in mitigating these risks is the obvious and most effective means of preventing these accidents.

Currently, the risks associated with VFR flight into adverse weather remain substantial and TC has not indicated it plans any action to reduce the risks associated with allowing a non-instrument rated commercial helicopter pilot’s basic instrument flying skills to deteriorate as described in Recommendation A90-81. Consequently the reassessment remains as Unsatisfactory.

Next TSB Action (05 September 2012):
The Board has determined that as the residual risk associated with the deficiency identified in Recommendation A90-81 is substantial and because no further action is planned by TC, continued reassessments likely will not yield further results.
The deficiency file is assigned a Dormant status.
The Canucks have definitely not moved on to beyond all sensible reason and they still heavily rely on past Safety Recommendations i.e. their SR database... Hmm now there's a point of difference in methodology!
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Old 4th Dec 2013, 18:15
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What a pleasure to read the TSB/TC debate; expert opinion and practical negotiated agreement, all designed to prevent recurrent accidents. No waiting 27 months for a response, no 10 year old promises to provide regulatory support, no coroners deceived into making soft, disregarded recommendations.

Sarcs you little gem, you have once again cheered me up. Wouldn't it be nice if someone on the Canuck threads were saying "Gee wiz Martha, those Aussie boys are on the ball".

Heigh Ho.
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Old 8th Dec 2013, 22:08
  #74 (permalink)  
 
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A 'point in time'..?? Page of quotes!

“We have come to a point in time where using common sense, speaking factual truths and asking honest questions have been deemed radical behavior. While in turn, manipulation, thoughtlessness and dishonesty is often rewarded and rules the day.” - G Hopkins

Kharon:
Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) seems an unlikely candidate for this form delivery; their report with the mundane title 200501977 appears to be the least likely candidate to tell a story which has all the ingredients of a first class thriller. But it has; in spades. Properly read, it provides all the essential elements of a classic; although the purist would decry the lack of a love interest, this is the only element missing.
And from the archives of Crikey (2008) a small inconsequential passage of text written by Richard Farmer (no not that Richard Farmer.. ) : Richard Farmer’s political bite-sized meaty chunks
Government and business are not the same. Public administration has gone through a period when governments, Labor as well as Liberal-National, were keen to flick a lot of responsibilities from ordinary departmental administration to what was believed to be a more efficient form based on a private enterprise model. Nowhere was this change more pronounced than in aviation where the once omnipotent Department of Civil Aviation was first merged into an overall Transport Department and then had most of its functions split off into separate corporations. Where once there was a Minister and a Departmental Secretary looking after everything from airports to air traffic control licensing of operators and setting and administering safety standards there are now privately owned airports, Air Services Australia with an eye to its profitability and failing to provide adequate numbers of air traffic controllers, a Civil Aviations Safety Authority setting the rules and regulations and an Air Traffic Safety Bureau still in the Transport Department headed by a chief executive with considerable independent powers. That there is a downside to all this deregulation and private enterprise methods is wonderfully (or should that be horribly?) illustrated in the recent report by Mr Russell Miller into the relationship between CASA and ATSB. The Miller inquiry followed critical comments made by the Coroner in his consideration of the Lockhart River aircraft crash and the report released by the Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government Anthony Albanese is quite an indictment of how badly the split system actually works in practice. A sensible Minister would put the whole system back under his own departmental control.
Sarcs quote: "Err...no comment!"
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Old 12th Dec 2013, 06:51
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The latest round of short investigation bulletins are out. Some are hardly worth a mention, others more serious. The common thread is no real advice, feedback or suggestions are given by the ATSB.

Meanwhile, this one was due to be released in September, but still nothing...

Investigation: AO-2012-024 - Wheels-up landing involving Fairchild SA227-AT (Metro), VH-UZA, Brisbane Airport, 15 February 2012

Word on the street this accident was handed over by the ATSB to the organisation involved to investigate themselves. The cause was determined within a day, yet over 18 months on still no mention about why we were all fecked around that morning.
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Old 12th Dec 2013, 10:00
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ATSB - All about juggling pots of money and mi mi mi

What folly. So 18 months after a Metro goes wheels up at Brisbane there is still no finalised report? Typical of the now incompetent ATSB. No deaths, no hull loss, yet 18 months roll by.
In comparison, just for fun, a NTSB report below. A DC-10, Dallas, almost 30 years ago, complete hull loss and 134 dead. Investigation completed in approximately 12 months!
I know you can't compare apples with oranges but FFS, it is still an unbelievable difference don't you think?

http://libraryonline.erau.edu/online...s/AAR86-05.pdf
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Old 17th Dec 2013, 10:24
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Unhappy Was Whyalla catalyst for BASR??

Phearless Phelan has rehashed a classic article covering the 'other' side of the fence take on the causal chain of the Whyalla tragedy...: Hot Spots – Whyalla accident revisited

Now most would agree that the ATSB Whyalla investigation was (prior to 2008..) not one of the bureau's finest hours in AAI.. It was also probably about the time that FF began to believe they were untouchable when it came to heavyhanded enforcement action post accident/incident. It was also probably the start of their standard modus operandi of burying an unfavourable third tier operator (LCRPT/Charter).. PP article quote:
In a post-accident pattern of behaviour now familiar to the general aviation industry, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) launched a series of post-accident “special audits,” interviewing various individuals including a former chief pilot (who had been dismissed six weeks earlier for alleged misconduct not related to his aviation duties); the chief pilot of another operator; and the bereaved partner of the deceased pilot.
You can read the rest of the text on FF's actions/shennanigans...best summed up by stating.."GROUNDHOG DAY!"

But I diverge...at the tailend of the PP article there is a link which takes you to a critique/analysis of the ATSB Whyalla report, plus a couple of more plausible scenarios for the accident itself:

Pelican's Perch #57:
The Whyalla Report — Junk Science?


Many on here have probably read, or can vaguely remember reading.., this John Deakin article but for old time's sake it is well worth refreshing the memory. Needless to say (with a title like that) Deakin does not hold back in lambasting the ATSB final report...:
In December, 2001, the ATSB (Australian Transport Safety Bureau, similar to the U.S.'s NTSB) published one of the worst accident reports I can remember reading.

In my opinion, the ATSB has taken junk science, pure speculation and profound ignorance to levels seldom before seen. They have not only perpetuated "Old Wives' Tales," but they have invented a few new ones. I'm afraid we'll be hearing about "lead oxybromide deposits" for all eternity. As best I can tell, that term seems to have been INVENTED in this accident report. (Try a search on the Internet for "lead oxybromide"!)
So here is a thought....maybe, at the time, the bureau had got too big for its boots?? And then after the resounding pizzling they got over Whyalla followed by their subsequent back-peddling on the Final Report conclusions we had set our safety watchdog on the downward spiral to today's insipid...'beyond all sensible reason' (BASR..)..politically correct..penny pinching...lapdog bureau that we have today!

Food for thought: Hmm..maybe if they had swallowed their pride, spent some money and called in the experts we would still have a credible AAI??
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Old 17th Dec 2013, 10:50
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Phelan lights another Xmas candle! Love it.

Sarcs, interesting thought provoking post, and an interesting Phelan article.
I am a bit of a fan of the old bureau days and particularly Alan Stray and Kym Bills, so out of my own general interest I might look around the chook shed to see if any light can be shed on the 'poor investigation'. There could be some valid reason (or non valid reason), a root cause even, for why an investigation pissed off the Coroner so much? As an example, although I have great respect for the NTSB, I have seen surprising reports, some quite crappy in fact, come out of investigations which one could classify as being 'sensitive', or 'political hot potatoes' I am not alluding to anything untoward by the ATSB, but most certainly 'every action has a reaction', and if the Whyalla report was not of a standard commensurate with the bureau's normal and regular capabilities, quality and high standards then there must be a reason. Perhaps the answers are out there and a little spade work and digging from a different angle and depth is required??

Incidentally, from another thread relating to the Tiger Moth crash off beautiful Straddie, it appears mi mi mi Beaker has opened his ATSB jam jar just a fraction and is providing a few cents more than he normally would for the investigation process to be a little more 'robust'. Perhaps the well manicured bureaucrat is trying to avoid the tendentious commentary he received after the Hempel and PelAir fiasco's? Or maybe the Canucks are out here still and have been advising Beaker on how to conduct a mi mi mi investigation?
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Old 17th Dec 2013, 10:56
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Devil

No…..Quite simply the ATSB and for that matter CASA have virtually NIL knowledge and understanding of piston engines and their fleet operations.

I doubt this has improved since the Whyalla crash.

I strongly suggest you read the George Braly evidence provided to the SA coroner.

I would suggest you go see Doug Sprigg at Arkaroola re this topic. I suggest also ask why did CASA shut down a engine shop who was about to provide evidence to the coroner over a couple of paint tins in the back of a cupboard that were past their use by date? Funny, they dropped all claims after the Ada Oklahoma evidence was presented.

Funny thing CASA / ATSB could not block that.

Coincidence? Surely not. Maybe I had too many rums on board when I was educated by Mr Sprigg. But given the victim of such strange action is now a colleague and friend of mine, the dots are lining up.

Smoke=Fire they say.

Last edited by Jabawocky; 17th Dec 2013 at 11:42.
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Old 17th Dec 2013, 11:22
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Very god post Jabba See folks, it doesn't take long when looking at these matters, even briefly as I have, to see the dazzling effects of a CASA circus show!
Very interesting Jabba, interesting indeed mate. And yes, I do see a lot of 'smoke' surrounding this case.
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