Well, did you ever.
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Well, did you ever.
Investigation: AO-2010-111 - Collision with terrain - Piper Aircraft PA-30, VH-EFS, 2 km NE Camden Airport, 23 December 2010
In all your short life.
End of training.
Hear or see the like. Long live enforcement of subjective interpretation of our beloved CAO 40.1.
In all your short life.
End of training.
Hear or see the like. Long live enforcement of subjective interpretation of our beloved CAO 40.1.
It's a shame that the high value of this accident -and the chilling video - as a lesson to every instructor are lost in your cryptic, desultory writings.
This is an accident report that those young impressionable instructors (and some older ones too) need to read and memorise.
This is an accident report that those young impressionable instructors (and some older ones too) need to read and memorise.
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The extra engine in a light twin should get you to the scene of the crash. The Comanche is no aircraft I would like to be doing engine failures in below 5000ft.
CASA don't believe this to be a valid concern however.
The Queen Air in the link below has been done here on another thread and illustrates what can happen and so quickly when you have an engine failure even in straight and level flight. You will hear the engine popping moments before the pilot looses control.
GMA News: YouScooper captures chilling video of Parañaque plane crash (December 10, 2011) - YouTube
CASA don't believe this to be a valid concern however.
The Queen Air in the link below has been done here on another thread and illustrates what can happen and so quickly when you have an engine failure even in straight and level flight. You will hear the engine popping moments before the pilot looses control.
GMA News: YouScooper captures chilling video of Parañaque plane crash (December 10, 2011) - YouTube
Credit where it is due though. RM is not an instructor I ever really clicked with, but he did work me very hard for my endorsement on EFS. He is a very competent and skilled pilot/instructor. No doubt it was his quick thinking actions that saved both his own life and that of the student. 
This accident highlights the critical importance of conducting the appropriate response actions following both an actual or simulated engine failure in a multi-engine aircraft; and the inherent risks of using the mixture control to simulate a failure at low altitude.
Obviously a bit more often.....
he Comanche is no aircraft I would like to be doing engine failures in below 5000ft.
I think you are being a bit dramatic with your comment, however like any aircraft doing silly things in them can kill you. I don't remember the details of this accident and can't be bothered clicking on the link so this comment may not apply, however some instructors do try to be too "realistic".
Re comparisons.....
I well remember the day at YPKG in an AC-50 which is 'supposed' to behave 'well' on one......
3 POB, not quite 'full tanks' and on a S/E approach, had a 'single climb rate' comparable to...the venerable 'Twin Com'. in that it was a negative for the density alt of the day....so, we quickly 'relit' the other one and climbed away....safely...
NOT to be 'fiddled with'.!
And, just for the 'heck' of it...I did my 'Initial Twin' in good ole' DFH, (PA-30)mostly at Camden, and 'BARELY' missed the hill on a EFATO....TORT ME A LOT!!!. Thanks AL......
Sorry for the 'drift' Mr 'K', But....T'was givin me the 'whoops'!!!
Cheers
I well remember the day at YPKG in an AC-50 which is 'supposed' to behave 'well' on one......
3 POB, not quite 'full tanks' and on a S/E approach, had a 'single climb rate' comparable to...the venerable 'Twin Com'. in that it was a negative for the density alt of the day....so, we quickly 'relit' the other one and climbed away....safely...
NOT to be 'fiddled with'.!
And, just for the 'heck' of it...I did my 'Initial Twin' in good ole' DFH, (PA-30)mostly at Camden, and 'BARELY' missed the hill on a EFATO....TORT ME A LOT!!!. Thanks AL......
Sorry for the 'drift' Mr 'K', But....T'was givin me the 'whoops'!!!
Cheers
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but he did work me very hard for my endorsement on EFS
No doubt it was his quick thinking actions that saved both his own life and that of the student
Why the F%# do people still shut engines down after takeoff for training???
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My apologies Dawny et al.
Put it up in a rush yesterday and omitted the following:-
There are some significant differences and inconsistencies between the pilots statements and witness reports which leave a lot of questions unanswered by the ATSB report.
I believe (happy to corrected) that the tip tanks were full which, if I remember correctly is a big no no for the type of airwork exercise they were going to do. (AFM anyone ?). This was not mentioned by the ATSB report.
Had the training pilot had been influenced by the current 'fad' for absolute compliance with 'black letter' law enforced by local FOI ?. Remember this was a training exercise, the aim is to get the student to perform the drills correctly, manage the flight path and land, repeat as needed until the lesson is learnt. Way back when, I remember that when the aircraft was gear up and accelerating the instructor would simulate the failure and, away we'd go; piece of cake. But this notion of a 'dead cut', low and slow gives me the heebies. The ATSB report does not provide information on the how, where and when of this incident.
The changes made to the company operation manual are interesting in that they reflect a couple of poorly thought out statements, and reflect the current mania in the Sydney basin for enforcing a 'dead cut'; or, if that freaks you out, using a 'simulator'. The simulator notion alone is worth some discussion, do they mean a simulator or a procedures trainer?. I mean it adds a whole new dimension to the 'value' of the training and it's legal validity if the 'sim' is 'generic'.
For my dollar, the ATSB have skimmed over the surface of this report in a slip shod manner and the case needs to be examined in depth. As stated previously, we keep killing folks. I would like to know exactly what happened at Camden and more importantly the underlying forces which lined up the holes in this particular bit of Cheese.
There are some significant differences and inconsistencies between the pilots statements and witness reports which leave a lot of questions unanswered by the ATSB report.
I believe (happy to corrected) that the tip tanks were full which, if I remember correctly is a big no no for the type of airwork exercise they were going to do. (AFM anyone ?). This was not mentioned by the ATSB report.
Had the training pilot had been influenced by the current 'fad' for absolute compliance with 'black letter' law enforced by local FOI ?. Remember this was a training exercise, the aim is to get the student to perform the drills correctly, manage the flight path and land, repeat as needed until the lesson is learnt. Way back when, I remember that when the aircraft was gear up and accelerating the instructor would simulate the failure and, away we'd go; piece of cake. But this notion of a 'dead cut', low and slow gives me the heebies. The ATSB report does not provide information on the how, where and when of this incident.
The changes made to the company operation manual are interesting in that they reflect a couple of poorly thought out statements, and reflect the current mania in the Sydney basin for enforcing a 'dead cut'; or, if that freaks you out, using a 'simulator'. The simulator notion alone is worth some discussion, do they mean a simulator or a procedures trainer?. I mean it adds a whole new dimension to the 'value' of the training and it's legal validity if the 'sim' is 'generic'.
For my dollar, the ATSB have skimmed over the surface of this report in a slip shod manner and the case needs to be examined in depth. As stated previously, we keep killing folks. I would like to know exactly what happened at Camden and more importantly the underlying forces which lined up the holes in this particular bit of Cheese.
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ATSB reccomendation to casa
Recommendation issued to: Civil Aviation Safety Authority
Output No: R20040069
Date Issued: 25 June 2004
Safety Action Status:
Background:
Output Text
Safety Recommendation
The ATSB recommends that CASA consider and evaluate options to improve the suitability of industry practices for training pilots to make appropriate decisions when responding to engine failures and other emergencies during critical phases of flight in multi-engine aircraft below 5,700 kg MTOW.
This review should include an assessment of the suitability of utilising synthetic training devices for the purpose of training pilots to make decisions regarding emergencies.
Initial Response
Date Issued: 23 August 2004
Response from: Civil Aviation Safety Authority
Response Status: Closed - Partially Accepted
Response Text:
The training syllabus for the initial issue of a multi-engine aeroplane endorsement is currently published by CASA in Civil Aviation Advisory Publication (CAAP) 5.23-1. It describes in detail the course of flight and ground training, which candidates seeking their first multi-engine endorsement (rating) should undertake.
The syllabus is also applicable to subsequent endorsements and provides the knowledge and training requirements that detail appropriate decision making procedures to be employed by pilots when responding to engine failures and other emergencies in multi-engine aircraft.
For training in decision-making procedures, it is considered necessary to replicate as accurately as possible, the situation where an emergency could take place. In Australia, synthetic training devices for this class of aircraft are typically generic in nature and are seen as a useful aid in the training of emergency procedures.
However, due to the lack of realism, it is considered that they fail to simulate the environment sufficiently to be of benefit in this type of human factors training. It should also be noted that there is a substantial cost involved in the acquisition and operation of synthetic training devices.
Assessment of human factors is currently included in all pilot licence theory examinations and an assessment is made during flight testing. With the implementation of Civil Aviation Safety Regulation (CASR) Part 61, CAS A will incorporate human factors training in the Manual of Standards (MOS) for all flight crew licences. Additionally, aspects of human factors are embedded within the MOS as 'Manage
Flight' elements and provide for an assessment of the decision-making process and behaviour that must be achieved for the issue of a qualification.
Last update 01 April 2011
casa response to ATSB: This is the 2004 response. The Camden PA-30 loss would not have occurred if casa "stepped up to the plate" and delivered to the industry.
The British CAA say it all: http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/130711_...Techniques.pdf
Look at the Norwegian loss of the Metro [ http://www.aibn.no/Aviation/Reports/2011-40]
and the short report:
"Description: The accident flight was a skill-test for a candidate that was to become a first officer on SA226-T(B) Merlins. The weather was not suited for flying skill-tests. It was low ceiling, rain showers and winds up to 40 kt and turbulence. The circuit breaker for the Stall Avoidance and Stability Augmentation System (SAS²) was pull presumably to avoid nuisance activations of the stick pusher in turbulence during previous demonstrations of slow flight.
When demonstrating stalls, the examiner asked for a slow flight up to first indication of stall, and not an actual stall. He asked for call outs and a minimum loss of altitude recovery. The commander undertook the tasks of adding power and retracting gear and flaps on the candidate's request. It was IMC. During this exercise the crew lost control of attitude and airspeed. The stall warning came on, but the airspeed decreased, even with full power applied. Radar data show that the altitude increased 200 - 400 ft during the period where control was lost. Airspeed decreased to about 30 kt and a sink rate of about 10 000 ft/min eventually developed. The airplane hit the sea in a near horizontal attitude about 37 sec. after control was lost. All three on board were fatally injured."
Surely we must ensure that a flight test is not a test of how good the "tester" is, but that it ensures "demonstration".
Why not at a survivable level and a zero-thrust situation.
Output No: R20040069
Date Issued: 25 June 2004
Safety Action Status:
Background:
Output Text
Safety Recommendation
The ATSB recommends that CASA consider and evaluate options to improve the suitability of industry practices for training pilots to make appropriate decisions when responding to engine failures and other emergencies during critical phases of flight in multi-engine aircraft below 5,700 kg MTOW.
This review should include an assessment of the suitability of utilising synthetic training devices for the purpose of training pilots to make decisions regarding emergencies.
Initial Response
Date Issued: 23 August 2004
Response from: Civil Aviation Safety Authority
Response Status: Closed - Partially Accepted
Response Text:
The training syllabus for the initial issue of a multi-engine aeroplane endorsement is currently published by CASA in Civil Aviation Advisory Publication (CAAP) 5.23-1. It describes in detail the course of flight and ground training, which candidates seeking their first multi-engine endorsement (rating) should undertake.
The syllabus is also applicable to subsequent endorsements and provides the knowledge and training requirements that detail appropriate decision making procedures to be employed by pilots when responding to engine failures and other emergencies in multi-engine aircraft.
For training in decision-making procedures, it is considered necessary to replicate as accurately as possible, the situation where an emergency could take place. In Australia, synthetic training devices for this class of aircraft are typically generic in nature and are seen as a useful aid in the training of emergency procedures.
However, due to the lack of realism, it is considered that they fail to simulate the environment sufficiently to be of benefit in this type of human factors training. It should also be noted that there is a substantial cost involved in the acquisition and operation of synthetic training devices.
Assessment of human factors is currently included in all pilot licence theory examinations and an assessment is made during flight testing. With the implementation of Civil Aviation Safety Regulation (CASR) Part 61, CAS A will incorporate human factors training in the Manual of Standards (MOS) for all flight crew licences. Additionally, aspects of human factors are embedded within the MOS as 'Manage
Flight' elements and provide for an assessment of the decision-making process and behaviour that must be achieved for the issue of a qualification.
Last update 01 April 2011
casa response to ATSB: This is the 2004 response. The Camden PA-30 loss would not have occurred if casa "stepped up to the plate" and delivered to the industry.
The British CAA say it all: http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/130711_...Techniques.pdf
Look at the Norwegian loss of the Metro [ http://www.aibn.no/Aviation/Reports/2011-40]
and the short report:
"Description: The accident flight was a skill-test for a candidate that was to become a first officer on SA226-T(B) Merlins. The weather was not suited for flying skill-tests. It was low ceiling, rain showers and winds up to 40 kt and turbulence. The circuit breaker for the Stall Avoidance and Stability Augmentation System (SAS²) was pull presumably to avoid nuisance activations of the stick pusher in turbulence during previous demonstrations of slow flight.
When demonstrating stalls, the examiner asked for a slow flight up to first indication of stall, and not an actual stall. He asked for call outs and a minimum loss of altitude recovery. The commander undertook the tasks of adding power and retracting gear and flaps on the candidate's request. It was IMC. During this exercise the crew lost control of attitude and airspeed. The stall warning came on, but the airspeed decreased, even with full power applied. Radar data show that the altitude increased 200 - 400 ft during the period where control was lost. Airspeed decreased to about 30 kt and a sink rate of about 10 000 ft/min eventually developed. The airplane hit the sea in a near horizontal attitude about 37 sec. after control was lost. All three on board were fatally injured."
Surely we must ensure that a flight test is not a test of how good the "tester" is, but that it ensures "demonstration".
Why not at a survivable level and a zero-thrust situation.
Why not at a survivable level and a zero-thrust situation.
In short, because "CASA" does not "permit" it, because it "does not comply" with "their" "definition" of an "engine failure" ---- the engine must be failed ---- and running at a zero thrust setting is an engine running, not "failed", and therefor not "compliant" with having an "engine failure"., and it must be "on takeoff".
"Compliance" requires ignoring the CAAPs, CAAPs not being regulatory, the "Orders" (CAOs) trump the CAAPS.
All a matter of "black letter law", with criminal penalties for non-compliance ---- except for, apparently, the regulation requiring compliance with the aircraft AFM.
Sadly, this nonsense, with the inevitable result of a steadily rising toll of the dead goes further than CASA, the "industry" is not short of gunghoe idiots ( cf: the last fatal twin at Camden) who want to demonstrate their bigger balls ----- but CASA should be clamping down down ----- not "mandating" that such attempted suicide continue.
No doubt it was his quick thinking actions that saved both his own life and that of the student
---- why was he, the student??? This is core issue that ATSB declined to investigate.
Tootle pip!!
PS: And I do mean attempted suicide ---- every time you go outside the certified performance envelope of any aircraft ( and you are not a test pilot with a planned test objective) you are creating an unnecessary and avoidable hazard.
We have known for years that the hazard of shutting down an engine during asymmetric training, versus zero thrust, provides no training benefit worth the risk ----- but the practice persists in Australian, despite the steadily mounting and totally avoidable death toll.
PS2: Re. the last twin fatal at Camden, the two pilots did not die in the accident, they were both horribly burned, as well as other injuries, and as I recall the PIC died the following day, but the other poor bastard lingered for weeks before he finally died ---- and he only came to Australia with his family for a flying holiday, he was an airline captain --- he would never have expected that anybody would do what the PIC did --- and was well known, locally, for doing.
A great pilot has the ability to get you out of a bad situation, a superior pilot doesn't put you in that situation in the first place.
Why the F%# do people still shut engines down after takeoff for training???
Why the F%# do people still shut engines down after takeoff for training???