Recommendation issued to: Civil Aviation Safety Authority
Output No:
R20040069
Date Issued: 25 June 2004
Safety Action Status:
Background:
Output Text
Safety Recommendation
The ATSB recommends that CASA consider and evaluate options to improve the suitability of industry practices for training pilots to make appropriate decisions when responding to engine failures and other emergencies during critical phases of flight in multi-engine aircraft below 5,700 kg MTOW.
This review should include an assessment of the suitability of utilising synthetic training devices for the purpose of training pilots to make decisions regarding emergencies.
Initial Response
Date Issued: 23 August 2004
Response from: Civil Aviation Safety Authority
Response Status: Closed - Partially Accepted
Response Text:
The training syllabus for the initial issue of a multi-engine aeroplane endorsement is currently published by CASA in Civil Aviation Advisory Publication (CAAP) 5.23-1. It describes in detail the course of flight and ground training, which candidates seeking their first multi-engine endorsement (rating) should undertake.
The syllabus is also applicable to subsequent endorsements and provides the knowledge and training requirements that detail appropriate decision making procedures to be employed by pilots when responding to engine failures and other emergencies in multi-engine aircraft.
For training in decision-making procedures, it is considered necessary to replicate as accurately as possible, the situation where an emergency could take place. In Australia, synthetic training devices for this class of aircraft are typically generic in nature and are seen as a useful aid in the training of emergency procedures.
However, due to the lack of realism, it is considered that they fail to simulate the environment sufficiently to be of benefit in this type of human factors training. It should also be noted that there is a substantial cost involved in the acquisition and operation of synthetic training devices.
Assessment of human factors is currently included in all pilot licence theory examinations and an assessment is made during flight testing. With the implementation of Civil Aviation Safety Regulation (CASR) Part 61, CAS A will incorporate human factors training in the Manual of Standards (MOS) for all flight crew licences. Additionally, aspects of human factors are embedded within the MOS as 'Manage
Flight' elements and provide for an assessment of the decision-making process and behaviour that must be achieved for the issue of a qualification.
Last update 01 April 2011
casa response to ATSB: This is the 2004 response. The Camden PA-30 loss would not have occurred if casa "stepped up to the plate" and delivered to the industry.
The British CAA say it all:
http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/130711_...Techniques.pdf
Look at the Norwegian loss of the Metro [
http://www.aibn.no/Aviation/Reports/2011-40]
and the short report:
"
Description: The accident flight was a skill-test for a candidate that was to become a first officer on SA226-T(B) Merlins. The weather was not suited for flying skill-tests. It was low ceiling, rain showers and winds up to 40 kt and turbulence. The circuit breaker for the Stall Avoidance and Stability Augmentation System (SASē) was pull presumably to avoid nuisance activations of the stick pusher in turbulence during previous demonstrations of slow flight.
When demonstrating stalls, the examiner asked for a slow flight up to first indication of stall, and not an actual stall. He asked for call outs and a minimum loss of altitude recovery. The commander undertook the tasks of adding power and retracting gear and flaps on the candidate's request. It was IMC. During this exercise the crew lost control of attitude and airspeed. The stall warning came on, but the airspeed decreased, even with full power applied. Radar data show that the altitude increased 200 - 400 ft during the period where control was lost. Airspeed decreased to about 30 kt and a sink rate of about 10 000 ft/min eventually developed. The airplane hit the sea in a near horizontal attitude about 37 sec. after control was lost. All three on board were fatally injured."
Surely we must ensure that a flight test is not a test of how good the "tester" is, but that it ensures "demonstration".
Why not at a survivable level and a zero-thrust situation.