Engine-out training on aircraft
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Engine-out training on aircraft
Sometimes we too easily accept the old adage "we have always done it like that". Why do we still insist on doing EFATO on high performance twin turboprops? When was the last time an engine failed at a critical time after take off in such an aircraft?
In reality engine failure at a critical phase of flight in such aircraft are rare and most aircraft of this nature have auto feather that at least takes some of the sting out of the situation. Sure, the workload can be high but it should not be beyond the capability of a two crew operation of average capability.
I can understand that when the regs were first developed they were designed to take account of twin engine piston engine aircraft in single pilot opeartions with limited performance capability with an engine out.
I am aware of 3 EFATO accidents that have occured on training flights but I can only think of one that has occured in turboprop revenue operations in Australia (the B200 Advance Airlines accident in the early 80's) in recent times.
Insisting on simulator training for all RPT operations is great in theory but unlikely to occur in practice for a multitude of reasons, not all of them financial. Is it not time we started to think outside of the square and analyize the risk of EFATO training on the aircraft against the benefits?
Time, and with it, aircraft performance and reliabilty has too. Shouldn't our regs and our way of looking at such training also move on?
In reality engine failure at a critical phase of flight in such aircraft are rare and most aircraft of this nature have auto feather that at least takes some of the sting out of the situation. Sure, the workload can be high but it should not be beyond the capability of a two crew operation of average capability.
I can understand that when the regs were first developed they were designed to take account of twin engine piston engine aircraft in single pilot opeartions with limited performance capability with an engine out.
I am aware of 3 EFATO accidents that have occured on training flights but I can only think of one that has occured in turboprop revenue operations in Australia (the B200 Advance Airlines accident in the early 80's) in recent times.
Insisting on simulator training for all RPT operations is great in theory but unlikely to occur in practice for a multitude of reasons, not all of them financial. Is it not time we started to think outside of the square and analyize the risk of EFATO training on the aircraft against the benefits?
Time, and with it, aircraft performance and reliabilty has too. Shouldn't our regs and our way of looking at such training also move on?
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I would lean more towards mandated simulator training for RPT ops. Not only can you do events that are considered too dangerous in the real aircraft but you carry out your practice to a logical conclusion. The contribution to a safer operation with consistent standards would be significant. Having seen how the low end operates if it's not mandatory operators won't do it. I don't think it's as difficult as you might think tho I'd be interested in how much a sim for a twin turbo prop would cost per hour.
The lives of a low capacity crew are just as valuable as the lives of a high capacity crew.
The lives of a low capacity crew are just as valuable as the lives of a high capacity crew.
When was the last time an engine failed at a critical time after take off in such an aircraft?
But yeah not all that common, fortunately.
FWIW I've shut down an Aerostar engine at about 200' after takeoff as it dumped all it's oil a couple of seconds beforehand. Turned it around very quickly and got it back on the ground - the shortest flight I've ever done!
It would help if CASA mandated simulator, so that all operators were equally affected. Then no one could claim that the costs were driving them under. If a business can afford a high performance twin, it should be able to afford annual simulator for its pilots. If not, maybe they need to get out of aviation because what else can't they afford? However, for smaller operators - where perhaps the nearest simulator is in the USA or Europe - CASA should re-examine the requirement to conduct engine failure drills twice yearly in favour of a more comprehensive annual simulator programme.
My experience is that six monthly base checks in the aircraft are usually a bit of a token exercise to tick the boxes. The operator does not want the aircraft droning around burning fuel so it tends to be rushed; ATC requirements may make it difficult to fit exercises in so procedures may not be flown fully engine-out to demonstrate how marginal terrain clearance could be; and it's illegal to do V1 cuts at night or in IMC - so where's the realism? Also the aircraft itself is not at a representative weight, so pilots gain a false impression about performance margins.
A really good work-out at Flight Safety or somewhere similar once a year would have far more lasting value. It would make pilots realise that their precious twin at high weight and high temperature is not the hotrod they may think it is when one engine quits at an inconvenient and unplanned time. Plus all the real nasties like electrical and hydraulic failures and a bit of ice could wipe a few complacent smiles away.
My experience is that six monthly base checks in the aircraft are usually a bit of a token exercise to tick the boxes. The operator does not want the aircraft droning around burning fuel so it tends to be rushed; ATC requirements may make it difficult to fit exercises in so procedures may not be flown fully engine-out to demonstrate how marginal terrain clearance could be; and it's illegal to do V1 cuts at night or in IMC - so where's the realism? Also the aircraft itself is not at a representative weight, so pilots gain a false impression about performance margins.
A really good work-out at Flight Safety or somewhere similar once a year would have far more lasting value. It would make pilots realise that their precious twin at high weight and high temperature is not the hotrod they may think it is when one engine quits at an inconvenient and unplanned time. Plus all the real nasties like electrical and hydraulic failures and a bit of ice could wipe a few complacent smiles away.
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Shouldn't our regs and our way of looking at such training also move on?
As for future developments, my own company, based a little bit to the north of where you, will soon to be starting to train for minor abnormals and non-events. Normally, our checking training consists of flying perfectly serviceable aircraft or ones which at least have at least one catastrophic failure. As a result, too many guys find they have only one tool in the "non-standard" toolbox - the Full Emergency one. So, when a single minor event takes place, like the failure of gear to retract, they over react. The goal of this new program will be to add an aeronautical equivalent of an adjustable spanner or Leatherman to the pilots "toolbox". This should hopefully lead to a more measured and balanced response to such incidents.
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Compressor stall. You got me, sounds wrong the way I wrote it. I guess in my defence higher performance aircraft have more complex systems and can go pear shaped quicker. I would also advocate the use of simulation in multi IFR training. The right systems well used can be invaluable training tools.
BombsGone - It wasn't so much the size of the aircraft I was thinking about, rather that Bras etc are widely used as charter aircraft. In fact there are many transport cat aircraft used as charter aircraft. Admittedly most Bras charter operators are also RPT operators, so the crews would be caught by the RPT regs, but my CHTR/RPT issue still stands.
It's always bothered me that just because you book the whole aircraft and leave when you want you most likely get an aircraft maintained to a lesser standard and a crew trained to a lesser standard than if you jump on the 1630 flight with other rabble.
It's always bothered me that just because you book the whole aircraft and leave when you want you most likely get an aircraft maintained to a lesser standard and a crew trained to a lesser standard than if you jump on the 1630 flight with other rabble.
and if your going to use a weight range don't start at above 5700kgs, make it 5700kgs and above! You need to rope in the 200's that can carry more pax than their big brother the 350.
Weight is such arbitrary crap. The criteria for setting aircraft maintenance and training standards should be based solely on whether you as an individual can buy a ticket on it, or a group can hire it. All of which should be classified as 'public transport' - forget whether it is 'regular'. What's running to a schedule got to do with safety? Or weight? Would you accept that the brakes on the Toyota Coaster your kids go to school in were maintained to a lesser standard than the brakes on a Greyhound Bus? Or that the driver of the Coaster was allowed to be less competent?
It would help if CASA mandated simulator, so that all operators were equally affected. Then no one could claim that the costs were driving them under....
Somehow I cannot see this (very much needed) CASA directive falling into place unless places like the Ansett Sim Ctr etc are given active encouragement (pick a mechanism/carrot: tax break/loan/subsidy etc) to install the infastructure to support any CASA ruling on 100% utilisation of simulators for this type of initial or recurrent training.
Everyone needs to be on board for it to work is all that I am saying.
Regards,
OpsN.
When was the last time an engine failed at a critical time after take off in such an aircraft?
I am afraid that I don't have much sympathy for operators who acquire orphan aeroplanes because they are cheap, then bleat because of the higher support costs that usually accompany such financial decisions. However, having said that, I think some creativity with SIMILAR simulation can achieve better and safer results than box-ticking base training exercises. Examples are the Bae 146 simulator which is quite different in its operation to the Avro RJ, because the RJ is far more automated. But the mandated engine-out stuff and sufficient other exercises can still be done in the simulator to allow pilots to maintain suitable proficiency. The reverse applies with the B737-300 simulator, which can be suitably 'dumbed-down' to fly like a 737-200 even though the two aeroplanes have completely different engines and are two different endorsements.
Obviously with such a compromise approach, certain systems revision in the actual aeroplane is required, but much of this can be done on line checks and on the ground with systems powered up.
Obviously with such a compromise approach, certain systems revision in the actual aeroplane is required, but much of this can be done on line checks and on the ground with systems powered up.
