Light Aircraft Crash in Whitsundays
Foreign Type Certificate Details
Type Certificate: Number A00009CH
Issued by: Federal Aviation Administration
Manufacturer: Cirrus Design Corporation
Model: SR20 SR22
Engines: Teledyne Continental IO-360-ES Teledyne Continental IO-550-N
Propellers: Hartzell BHC-J2YF-1BF/F7694 Hartzell PHC-J3YF-1RF/F7694
Hartzell PHC-J3YF-1xF/F7392-1
MCTOW 2900 lb. 3400 lb.
3000 lb. (s/n 1148 and on, or with SB 20-01-00 embodied)
Noise Category: FAR 36
The certification basis of the Cirrus SR20 is Part 23 of the Federal Aviation Regulations
effective February 1, 1965, as amended by 23-1 through 23-47, except some specified
paragraphs are up to Amendment 23-52. The certification basis of the Cirrus SR22 is Part
23 of the FARs effective February 1, 1965, as amended by 23-1 through 23-53, except for
§23.301 at Amendment 23-47 and three paragraphs being not applicable.
The Cirrus is the first type certificated aircraft equipped with a ballistic recovery parachute
(called Cirrus Airframe Parachute System CAPS) as basic equipment, and a Special
Condition was applied by the FAA to this feature In addition, an equivalent level of safety
finding was required by Cirrus to allow the provision of CAPS to be used in lieu of
meeting stall recovery criteria. Another ELOS was made for the engine controls, similar to
one granted in the past to Cessna. These have been reviewed and accepted by the CAA.
This is an acceptable certification basis in accordance with NZCAR Part 21B Para §21.41,
as FAR 23 is the basic standard for Normal Category Airplanes called up under Part 21
Appendix C. There are no non-compliances and no additional special conditions have been
prescribed by the Director under §21.23.
Type Certificate: Number A00009CH
Issued by: Federal Aviation Administration
Manufacturer: Cirrus Design Corporation
Model: SR20 SR22
Engines: Teledyne Continental IO-360-ES Teledyne Continental IO-550-N
Propellers: Hartzell BHC-J2YF-1BF/F7694 Hartzell PHC-J3YF-1RF/F7694
Hartzell PHC-J3YF-1xF/F7392-1
MCTOW 2900 lb. 3400 lb.
3000 lb. (s/n 1148 and on, or with SB 20-01-00 embodied)
Noise Category: FAR 36
The certification basis of the Cirrus SR20 is Part 23 of the Federal Aviation Regulations
effective February 1, 1965, as amended by 23-1 through 23-47, except some specified
paragraphs are up to Amendment 23-52. The certification basis of the Cirrus SR22 is Part
23 of the FARs effective February 1, 1965, as amended by 23-1 through 23-53, except for
§23.301 at Amendment 23-47 and three paragraphs being not applicable.
The Cirrus is the first type certificated aircraft equipped with a ballistic recovery parachute
(called Cirrus Airframe Parachute System CAPS) as basic equipment, and a Special
Condition was applied by the FAA to this feature In addition, an equivalent level of safety
finding was required by Cirrus to allow the provision of CAPS to be used in lieu of
meeting stall recovery criteria. Another ELOS was made for the engine controls, similar to
one granted in the past to Cessna. These have been reviewed and accepted by the CAA.
This is an acceptable certification basis in accordance with NZCAR Part 21B Para §21.41,
as FAR 23 is the basic standard for Normal Category Airplanes called up under Part 21
Appendix C. There are no non-compliances and no additional special conditions have been
prescribed by the Director under §21.23.
cant get onto faa website but caa nz refers...
I'm prepared to stand partially corrected, in that I have no refutable proof, but the above document doesn't actually prove your allegation in post #36.
Not having flown the aircraft, I can not know, but it would appear to me that it is likely to have been able to pass the spin certification, were that the chosen path for the manufacturer. Of course, since having the BRS negates (in this particular case)the requirement to have it certified for spin recovery, it would appear to me that the maker may have simply chosen to not certify it for same, and therefore does not necessarily reflect on the "spinnability" of the product.
A spin recovery chute, much smaller and less costly, would have achieved the certification requirement if the aircraft couldn't.
Not having flown the aircraft, I can not know, but it would appear to me that it is likely to have been able to pass the spin certification, were that the chosen path for the manufacturer. Of course, since having the BRS negates (in this particular case)the requirement to have it certified for spin recovery, it would appear to me that the maker may have simply chosen to not certify it for same, and therefore does not necessarily reflect on the "spinnability" of the product.
A spin recovery chute, much smaller and less costly, would have achieved the certification requirement if the aircraft couldn't.
Originally Posted by VH-XXX
Tarq, don't worry about it, as a good mate mate says, "only the guilty justify."
I might have to use that. Sure I'll find a situation somewhere.
Could easy be turned against one, if not a bit careful, though.
Resolution for 2012: "Must be less argumentative."
"Says who?"
Lycoming will be having some interest in this one.
The message you have entered is too short. Please lengthen your message to at least 10 characters.
While a small
percentage of Cirrus pilots may be able to successfully recover from an inadvertent spin, Cirrus
contends that the far larger portion of pilots would not do so in a surprise departure spin situation.
Cirrus has accordingly concluded, as a result of the further extensive flight test conducted pursuant
to the JAA Study Group direction in April 2000, that in an inadvertent spin entry, time and altitude
is too critical to allow for any pilot reaction except the simple and quick process of reaching for
the CAPS handle and activating the system. Cirrus believes it is better to accept some airframe
losses through CAPS activation when the airplane could have been flown away following a
successful recovery, in order to save the lives of the far larger number of pilots who would not be
able to successfully execute a spin recovery.
percentage of Cirrus pilots may be able to successfully recover from an inadvertent spin, Cirrus
contends that the far larger portion of pilots would not do so in a surprise departure spin situation.
Cirrus has accordingly concluded, as a result of the further extensive flight test conducted pursuant
to the JAA Study Group direction in April 2000, that in an inadvertent spin entry, time and altitude
is too critical to allow for any pilot reaction except the simple and quick process of reaching for
the CAPS handle and activating the system. Cirrus believes it is better to accept some airframe
losses through CAPS activation when the airplane could have been flown away following a
successful recovery, in order to save the lives of the far larger number of pilots who would not be
able to successfully execute a spin recovery.
I read something similar.
The Cirrus contention is probably valid, and appears to me to be as much to do with a failed training philosophy as an explanation as to why they elected to not bother putting the airframes through a spin certification test regime.
Clearly if someone has allowed their aircraft to stall at low altitude and let it develop into a spin, there wasn't much hope in the first place, was there?
I bet if those crew-members in Buffalo had a BRS (have to be a big 'un) they would have used it. (But maybe not, the SA disconnect might have precluded even that, by the time it got to that point.)
Anyway, this is a bit OT. (Sorry.) So if you want to have the last word on this issue, go for it.
The Cirrus contention is probably valid, and appears to me to be as much to do with a failed training philosophy as an explanation as to why they elected to not bother putting the airframes through a spin certification test regime.
Clearly if someone has allowed their aircraft to stall at low altitude and let it develop into a spin, there wasn't much hope in the first place, was there?
I bet if those crew-members in Buffalo had a BRS (have to be a big 'un) they would have used it. (But maybe not, the SA disconnect might have precluded even that, by the time it got to that point.)
Anyway, this is a bit OT. (Sorry.) So if you want to have the last word on this issue, go for it.
As far as I could tell desmo, Cirrus simply tested that the chute would get the aircraft down safely following a spin, and to make life easy put that in the flight manual as the spin recovery. From my experience with the aircraft I would certainly attempt a normal spin recovery before blowing the chute (time/alt permitting) and to be honest I would expect higher than 50% chance of the aircraft recovering (no science, just a guess, it's much nicer in the stall than a lot of other spin approved aircraft)
While it may be true to an extent, I believe that the BRS is to help sell a new single engine aircraft to people who might be considering the safety of a twin vs single, so they can say "you don't have any risk of losing control if the engine blows compared to a twin, and even if you're over tiger county and it happens, you can just pop the parachute and it'll drop in nice and easy"
While it may be true to an extent, I believe that the BRS is to help sell a new single engine aircraft to people who might be considering the safety of a twin vs single, so they can say "you don't have any risk of losing control if the engine blows compared to a twin, and even if you're over tiger county and it happens, you can just pop the parachute and it'll drop in nice and easy"
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It was probably floating quite happily and would do so for a long period if it was upright however sounds like it possibly flipped over as the landing was not stabilised due to the low altitude at which the chute was deployed, so in theory it would be a great aircraft to bob around in the ocean in whilst waiting for recovery (versus a high wing where you'd be sitting on the wing, in this case, you'd be sitting on the wing, but in a nice leather seat.
Now where is that metar again????? I'm beginning to sound like old Planky.
Now where is that metar again????? I'm beginning to sound like old Planky.
To end all the uninformed opinions (like we get anything but on PPrune
)
From the SR22 Flight Manual
This is a fairly standard spin recovery technique.
If it doesn't work, that's what the chute is for!
PS-Channel Nine in Brisbane has just cottoned onto the story. Breaking news four days later.........
Apparently he broke the back window to get out. (The 1 foot square one behind the back seats??!??)
Gotta love the media.
)From the SR22 Flight Manual
The SR22 is not approved for spins, and has not been tested or
certified for spin recovery characteristics. The only approved and
demonstrated method of spin recovery is activation of the Cirrus
Airframe Parachute System (See CAPS Deployment, this section).
Because of this, if the aircraft “departs controlled flight,” the CAPS
must be deployed.
While the stall characteristics of the SR22 make accidental entry into
a spin extremely unlikely, it is possible. Spin entry can be avoided by
using good airmanship: coordinated use of controls in turns, proper
airspeed control following the recommendations of this Handbook,
and never abusing the flight controls with accelerated inputs when
close to the stall (see Stalls, Section 4).
If, at the stall, the controls are misapplied and abused accelerated
inputs are made to the elevator, rudder and/or ailerons, an abrupt
wing drop may be felt and a spiral or spin may be entered. In some
cases it may be difficult to determine if the aircraft has entered a
spiral or the beginning of a spin.
If time and altitude permit, the following procedures may be used to
determine whether the aircraft is in a recoverable spiral/incipient spin
or is unrecoverable and, therefore, has departed controlled flight.
■ WARNING ■
■ In all cases, if the aircraft enters an unusual attitude from
which recovery is not expected before ground impact,
immediate deployment of the CAPS is required.
■ The minimum certified altitude loss for a CAPS deployment
from a one-turn spin is 920 feet. Activation at higher altitudes
provides enhanced safety margins for parachute recoveries.
Do not waste time and altitude trying to recover from a
spiral/spin before activating CAPS.
1. Power Lever ............................................................ .................IDLE
2. Control Yoke........................................................ .................Neutral
3. Rudder..........................Briskly Apply Opposite Yaw/Spin Direction
■ Note ■
If disorientation precludes visual determination of the
direction of rotation, refer to the symbolic airplane in the turn
coordinator. If the spiral/spin was entered while applying
rudder, then the opposite rudder should be applied for
recovery.
4. Just after the rudder reaches the stop, move the yoke briskly
forward far enough to break the stall. Full down elevator may be
required. Hold these control inputs until rotation stops. Premature
relaxation of control inputs may prolong the recovery.
5. After rotation stops, neutralize rudder, and make a smooth
recovery from the resulting dive. Add power as required. Be
prepared for possible engine power loss if rotation causes fuel
starvation.
If the above steps do not recover the aircraft and/or it has been
determined that the aircraft has departed controlled flight:
6. CAPS........................................................ ...........................Activate
certified for spin recovery characteristics. The only approved and
demonstrated method of spin recovery is activation of the Cirrus
Airframe Parachute System (See CAPS Deployment, this section).
Because of this, if the aircraft “departs controlled flight,” the CAPS
must be deployed.
While the stall characteristics of the SR22 make accidental entry into
a spin extremely unlikely, it is possible. Spin entry can be avoided by
using good airmanship: coordinated use of controls in turns, proper
airspeed control following the recommendations of this Handbook,
and never abusing the flight controls with accelerated inputs when
close to the stall (see Stalls, Section 4).
If, at the stall, the controls are misapplied and abused accelerated
inputs are made to the elevator, rudder and/or ailerons, an abrupt
wing drop may be felt and a spiral or spin may be entered. In some
cases it may be difficult to determine if the aircraft has entered a
spiral or the beginning of a spin.
If time and altitude permit, the following procedures may be used to
determine whether the aircraft is in a recoverable spiral/incipient spin
or is unrecoverable and, therefore, has departed controlled flight.
■ WARNING ■
■ In all cases, if the aircraft enters an unusual attitude from
which recovery is not expected before ground impact,
immediate deployment of the CAPS is required.
■ The minimum certified altitude loss for a CAPS deployment
from a one-turn spin is 920 feet. Activation at higher altitudes
provides enhanced safety margins for parachute recoveries.
Do not waste time and altitude trying to recover from a
spiral/spin before activating CAPS.
1. Power Lever ............................................................ .................IDLE
2. Control Yoke........................................................ .................Neutral
3. Rudder..........................Briskly Apply Opposite Yaw/Spin Direction
■ Note ■
If disorientation precludes visual determination of the
direction of rotation, refer to the symbolic airplane in the turn
coordinator. If the spiral/spin was entered while applying
rudder, then the opposite rudder should be applied for
recovery.
4. Just after the rudder reaches the stop, move the yoke briskly
forward far enough to break the stall. Full down elevator may be
required. Hold these control inputs until rotation stops. Premature
relaxation of control inputs may prolong the recovery.
5. After rotation stops, neutralize rudder, and make a smooth
recovery from the resulting dive. Add power as required. Be
prepared for possible engine power loss if rotation causes fuel
starvation.
If the above steps do not recover the aircraft and/or it has been
determined that the aircraft has departed controlled flight:
6. CAPS........................................................ ...........................Activate
If it doesn't work, that's what the chute is for!
PS-Channel Nine in Brisbane has just cottoned onto the story. Breaking news four days later.........
Apparently he broke the back window to get out. (The 1 foot square one behind the back seats??!??)
Gotta love the media.
for
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Yeah was Stevo; rear window escape my big fat bum. Try the left side window in the door after it wouldn't unlock...
650' agl cough splutter, fan stops, sweat starts, 1st thought is turn back, 2nd thought is bugger not gonna make it, 3rd thought is pull the bloody lever. Plane was still doing a reasonable forward speed on contact and flipped endish for end. Pulled the raft, floated until nearby boats got there. Minor neck/shoulder injuries and cuts from glass.
Not saying that's what happened here but SLS had a history of fuel flow and starvation issues as well as CHT probs. Many a man-hour has been wasted fixing stupid mechanical "shouldn't-happens" on that biatch. I had a couple of no-gos in that thing thanks to fuel. I bloody wish they'd leave turbos to Kenworth Trucks and WRXies.
Many lucky factors here, could have happened at 25,000' over the Outback or worse. I don't like to say here and you can't really argue but not too many would know the Cirrus better than him; that plane he actually owned.
McDooz.
650' agl cough splutter, fan stops, sweat starts, 1st thought is turn back, 2nd thought is bugger not gonna make it, 3rd thought is pull the bloody lever. Plane was still doing a reasonable forward speed on contact and flipped endish for end. Pulled the raft, floated until nearby boats got there. Minor neck/shoulder injuries and cuts from glass.
Not saying that's what happened here but SLS had a history of fuel flow and starvation issues as well as CHT probs. Many a man-hour has been wasted fixing stupid mechanical "shouldn't-happens" on that biatch. I had a couple of no-gos in that thing thanks to fuel. I bloody wish they'd leave turbos to Kenworth Trucks and WRXies.
Many lucky factors here, could have happened at 25,000' over the Outback or worse. I don't like to say here and you can't really argue but not too many would know the Cirrus better than him; that plane he actually owned.
McDooz.
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Photo emailed to me by boatie mate at Hammo:
Looks like broken Rear Back/Row 2 window to me.
(Would have attached photo but don't know how to from desktop).
Apparently the aircraft was under water N/W of Dent Island, then towed to a beach by the floating chute. During the attempt to relocate to Shute Harbour, it got away and sank in 15-20 m of water.
Looks like broken Rear Back/Row 2 window to me.
(Would have attached photo but don't know how to from desktop).
Apparently the aircraft was under water N/W of Dent Island, then towed to a beach by the floating chute. During the attempt to relocate to Shute Harbour, it got away and sank in 15-20 m of water.
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If the 22 did not have a chute a controlled ditching [with the door unlatched] would have probably ended with an upright aircraft floating in the water long enough to get out.[ah-la "Sully"]
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It's the age old golden question, who knows whether it would flip over on landing or not, the Cirrus is certainly not a STOL machine so chances are it would flip as it would hit pretty hard.
With fixed gear, reducing the forward speed is going lessen the chances of nosing over when ditching. I would have definitely used the chute.
I would have definitely used the chute
That said, it's all a bit of a gamble. I'd prefer to back my own ability to get the plane down safely on the water.
Some here prefer to pop the chute.
At the end of the day, luck has the final say. Hopefully good, not bad!
PS...
The chute gives you a choice you didn't have before. A bit like a single verses a twin when one fails on take off. Do you or don't you continue?
Choice can lead to a false sense of security. If in fact it existed to begin with!
Last edited by Capt Fathom; 29th Dec 2009 at 09:47. Reason: PS added