Super Seasprites – who is responsible?
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Without stretching this thread to the ridiculous level...
There are many constraints on DMO purchasing, beyond buying the best piece of kit for the job (unfotunate, but true).
Consider the following:
1. Australian content (protecting AS jobs, commendable)
2. Capability (can't argue with that one)
3. Coherence with existing platforms (OK, Sea Sprite was designed to go with a platform envisaged/conceptualised/NOT ordered by the previous Labor govt, which was cancelled by the following Liberal govt, so why did we sign on for the Sea Sprite???)
4. Political favours (this is where final decisions are made, in the house on the hill, not in the offices at R2)
Therefore, it is easy to get one small decision, based on point 4, which snowballs to a massive procurement, based on point 2, which satisfies neither point 2 or point 1....
Yes, I do have personal experience regarding the machinations of the DMO, and the cr
ap that flows from the house with the biggest flagpole.
Happy to discuss specifics, particularly relevant to engineering specs, but not here...
Spanner
There are many constraints on DMO purchasing, beyond buying the best piece of kit for the job (unfotunate, but true).
Consider the following:
1. Australian content (protecting AS jobs, commendable)
2. Capability (can't argue with that one)
3. Coherence with existing platforms (OK, Sea Sprite was designed to go with a platform envisaged/conceptualised/NOT ordered by the previous Labor govt, which was cancelled by the following Liberal govt, so why did we sign on for the Sea Sprite???)
4. Political favours (this is where final decisions are made, in the house on the hill, not in the offices at R2)
Therefore, it is easy to get one small decision, based on point 4, which snowballs to a massive procurement, based on point 2, which satisfies neither point 2 or point 1....
Yes, I do have personal experience regarding the machinations of the DMO, and the cr
ap that flows from the house with the biggest flagpole.Happy to discuss specifics, particularly relevant to engineering specs, but not here...
Spanner
The performance of Kaman and CSC has been lamentable through the whole debacle. Whilst poorly administered by the Navy and DMO, Litton pulled out because they, as an experienced defense contractor, saw the the minefield ahead. Having personal knowledge of CSCs recent past performances in technically demanding contracts I am not surprised at the end result.
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Well; that didn't go to well, did it Dick?
Still penguins, ice floes melting & reforming and increasing numbers of polar bears to be counted at the North Pole.
DK
ps>>take David Hicks with you (we assume he has now learnt to count)
Still penguins, ice floes melting & reforming and increasing numbers of polar bears to be counted at the North Pole.
DK
ps>>take David Hicks with you (we assume he has now learnt to count)
Thread Starter
Dark Knight, What do you mean? I believe the posts and explanations are generally top class.
The key to the problem is those involved didn't ask advice from those who may have experience and a few clues.
I see this problem in our Aviation industry- don't ask advice or copy the success of proven systems overseas as it may look as if you don't know everything.
Six people were killed at Benalla because our archaic airspace and procedures were designed before radar was introduced and those responsible for change never ask how it can be done better.
One day a big one will go in and then the changes will be forced on us.
The key to the problem is those involved didn't ask advice from those who may have experience and a few clues.
I see this problem in our Aviation industry- don't ask advice or copy the success of proven systems overseas as it may look as if you don't know everything.
Six people were killed at Benalla because our archaic airspace and procedures were designed before radar was introduced and those responsible for change never ask how it can be done better.
One day a big one will go in and then the changes will be forced on us.
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Six people were killed at Benalla because our archaic airspace and procedures were designed before radar was introduced and those responsible for change never ask how it can be done better.
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Times running out.
Spot on Dick, that and the fact that most of the people making the decisions have never had to sign the cheques.
However those changes that may be forced on us will be 'more of the same', business as usual' etc. etc.
SAD.
BP
However those changes that may be forced on us will be 'more of the same', business as usual' etc. etc.
SAD.
BP
Thread Starter
Quokka, what do you mean by “incorrect”?
In North America – that is, the USA and Canada, an IFR aircraft in radar covered airspace is not permitted to go below the lowest safe or minimum safe altitude until the pilot has “cancelled IFR” or it is clear that the pilot is on the correct and legal approach path.
In Australia, because we are still using the old “Flight Service” rules in low level radar covered airspace, there is no requirement to report when visual.
I have a feeling that you have a closed mind in relation to this. Have you ever personally flown in North America or acted as an air traffic controller there? Those who have will know that all IFR flights are conducted in controlled airspace and the air traffic controller has a responsibility to the pilot – which is not there when an aircraft is in uncontrolled airspace.
In North America – that is, the USA and Canada, an IFR aircraft in radar covered airspace is not permitted to go below the lowest safe or minimum safe altitude until the pilot has “cancelled IFR” or it is clear that the pilot is on the correct and legal approach path.
In Australia, because we are still using the old “Flight Service” rules in low level radar covered airspace, there is no requirement to report when visual.
I have a feeling that you have a closed mind in relation to this. Have you ever personally flown in North America or acted as an air traffic controller there? Those who have will know that all IFR flights are conducted in controlled airspace and the air traffic controller has a responsibility to the pilot – which is not there when an aircraft is in uncontrolled airspace.
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Six people were killed at Benalla because...
It is normal for a person who is faced with the loss of people they love and respect to look for someone to blame for that loss, someone other than those whom they love and respect. In this case, the person seems to have focused the blame on, not just the controller on duty at the time of the incident, but all Air Traffic Controllers.
Situational Attribution Error
Six people were killed at Benalla because...
Last edited by Quokka; 24th Apr 2008 at 02:58. Reason: Typographical.
Thread Starter
Quokka, I have spoken to a number of people who are close to those involved in the Benalla accident, and not one of those people blames air traffic controllers for the accident. They blame the “archaic airspace and procedures that were designed before radar was introduced.” They also blame “those responsible for change that never ask how it can be done better.”
I know many air traffic controllers who would like to see proper procedures introduced for radar covered airspace that is presently uncontrolled. It is just that the “bosses” at Airservices and CASA are almost completely useless and can’t bring in any change at all.
By the way, who in their right mind would bother to wait for the ATSB investigation? Instead of making any comment about using proper procedures or changing the airspace at Benalla, its only recommendation was for the introduction of some type of flight data recorder for aircraft of that size.
Their final report completely ignored my Unsafe Skies publication (see here). It is obvious that the ex-air traffic controllers involved in writing the report simply couldn’t think laterally and see – as many controllers can – that there are better ways of handling the airspace at Benalla that could have prevented the needless loss of life.
I know many air traffic controllers who would like to see proper procedures introduced for radar covered airspace that is presently uncontrolled. It is just that the “bosses” at Airservices and CASA are almost completely useless and can’t bring in any change at all.
By the way, who in their right mind would bother to wait for the ATSB investigation? Instead of making any comment about using proper procedures or changing the airspace at Benalla, its only recommendation was for the introduction of some type of flight data recorder for aircraft of that size.
Their final report completely ignored my Unsafe Skies publication (see here). It is obvious that the ex-air traffic controllers involved in writing the report simply couldn’t think laterally and see – as many controllers can – that there are better ways of handling the airspace at Benalla that could have prevented the needless loss of life.
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Six people were killed at Benalla because our archaic airspace and procedures were designed before radar was introduced and those responsible for change never ask how it can be done better.
Do you ever read reports or just always blart out whatever crap suits your political stance of the time? You got it wrong then, you are still wrong.
If you don't like it, then maybe the Seasprite isn't so bad after all...
Thread Starter
jumpuFOKKERjump, are you suggesting that the airspace design and procedures remain the same at Benalla? I would imagine you are – seeing that nothing has changed there.
I can assure you that at Benalla (or a comparable airport) a similar accident will happen in the future because those in the position to make changes and improvements haven’t looked at the accident and worked out that by following proven safe overseas procedures, the chance of a similar accident can all but be eliminated.
Why have a $350+ million radar system if it is not used to help to prevent controlled flight into terrain accidents, as well as midair collisions?
I can assure you that at Benalla (or a comparable airport) a similar accident will happen in the future because those in the position to make changes and improvements haven’t looked at the accident and worked out that by following proven safe overseas procedures, the chance of a similar accident can all but be eliminated.
Why have a $350+ million radar system if it is not used to help to prevent controlled flight into terrain accidents, as well as midair collisions?
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If you want to terminally drift your own thread you xxxxxx, so be it
As previously posted by one of my colleagues:
Prior to this crash not all RNAV approach points were available to ATC to insert into flight plans, so if a flight was cleared direct to such a point in E airspace or a pilot advised he was doing so in G airspace we would just expect him to be up to 15 NM away from his planned route.
Now the points have been defined and it has been indicated to ATC that we must monitor tracking and advise discrepancies, regardless of the class of airspace.
Of course, you have got it wrong again.
The ATSB report makes it quite clear the controller WAS monitoring the track of the aircraft, he was just confused about which point the flight was heading for. Despite the points not being defined the discrepancy WAS noted, but the when the ATC weighed the probabilities of he or the GPS being wrong he decided he must have got it wrong. We all know better now.
Except you apparently. By the way, while you are barking at the base of you NAS tree, the Seasprite is getting away over there...
As previously posted by one of my colleagues:
I mistakenly thought that after this terrible accident that there would be a quick move to utilise the radar properly in this area – i.e. introduce new procedures or Class E airspace. Of course, this has not happened.
Now the points have been defined and it has been indicated to ATC that we must monitor tracking and advise discrepancies, regardless of the class of airspace.
Of course, this has not happened.
The ATSB report makes it quite clear the controller WAS monitoring the track of the aircraft, he was just confused about which point the flight was heading for. Despite the points not being defined the discrepancy WAS noted, but the when the ATC weighed the probabilities of he or the GPS being wrong he decided he must have got it wrong. We all know better now.
Except you apparently. By the way, while you are barking at the base of you NAS tree, the Seasprite is getting away over there...
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Getting away from Benalla..............
Some people here are close to the issues, some are way off the mark.
To apend blame here is pointless, most have moved on............
To investigate the policies and protocols that allowed the poor decisions is what is needed to assist in those poor decisions never happening again, or in the real world being minimised to an acceptable level. From where I sit that learning is in place now to a certain extent, which is good news.
There are a squillion reasons why this happened. There was a whole pile of holes in the cheese lining up, from ADF, DMO, Kaman, CSC etc that would have made Nias look small.............(no disrespect to what happened there).
The comments saying that the aircraft are "airworthy" and "ready to go and have been for years" are way off the mark, as is the comment on converting output from the ADC into digital. That is spin from Kaman, it always need at least 3 ADC's for a start. That issue, isn't even a pimple on other issues that were, (as a result of an evolving airworthiness environment) going to have a far greater affect on the operation of the aircraft.
Airworthiness, operational capability and risk management have never before been used to the extent that they were in this decision to cancel the program. Not for $150 Mil or even triple that, were we ever going to get a capability close to what we wanted, with any acceptable level of risk..............period.
Thank god it is gone. Money in this cancellation should never have been a player. But as a taxpayer I am angry at the waste as well, move on and learn and vow never to let it happen again.
Better to feel bad over lost dollars than more lost personnel............
Some people here are close to the issues, some are way off the mark.
To apend blame here is pointless, most have moved on............
To investigate the policies and protocols that allowed the poor decisions is what is needed to assist in those poor decisions never happening again, or in the real world being minimised to an acceptable level. From where I sit that learning is in place now to a certain extent, which is good news.
There are a squillion reasons why this happened. There was a whole pile of holes in the cheese lining up, from ADF, DMO, Kaman, CSC etc that would have made Nias look small.............(no disrespect to what happened there).
The comments saying that the aircraft are "airworthy" and "ready to go and have been for years" are way off the mark, as is the comment on converting output from the ADC into digital. That is spin from Kaman, it always need at least 3 ADC's for a start. That issue, isn't even a pimple on other issues that were, (as a result of an evolving airworthiness environment) going to have a far greater affect on the operation of the aircraft.
Airworthiness, operational capability and risk management have never before been used to the extent that they were in this decision to cancel the program. Not for $150 Mil or even triple that, were we ever going to get a capability close to what we wanted, with any acceptable level of risk..............period.
Thank god it is gone. Money in this cancellation should never have been a player. But as a taxpayer I am angry at the waste as well, move on and learn and vow never to let it happen again.
Better to feel bad over lost dollars than more lost personnel............
Thread Starter
jumpuFOKKERjump, the fact that the points were not defined in the ATC database is unbelievable shocking neglect. However, even now that they are defined it might solve a future tracking problem, but it would not solve the problem if a pilot had unintentionally descended below the lowest safe or minimum safe altitude when on track.
No doubt we will have to have an accident like that (say, killing 50 or 100 people) and then we will introduce Class E airspace, or some other system, so the pilot reports when visual, and the air traffic controller has a responsibility to not allow the pilot to go below the legal safe altitude until receiving the visual report.
No doubt we will have to have an accident like that (say, killing 50 or 100 people) and then we will introduce Class E airspace, or some other system, so the pilot reports when visual, and the air traffic controller has a responsibility to not allow the pilot to go below the legal safe altitude until receiving the visual report.
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Your premise was:
Yet the only people that say this roll in the ground where you wee. The procedures HAVE been changed.
Why is that? Who called for the points to put into the Eurocats data? Individual groups who thought it was a good idea put it in, while not really being sure they should. There is not a single VOR or NDB approach defined in the data, is it a shocking neglect that they haven't been? What about missed approaches???
On the other hand, if the airspace is defined as you want it such airspace will revert to 'one-in-one-out', when the Seasprite wants to go IFR. Is that REALLY what you are after?
Six people were killed at Benalla because our archaic airspace and procedures were designed before radar was introduced and those responsible for change never ask how it can be done better.
...the fact that the points were not defined in the ATC database is unbelievable shocking neglect.
On the other hand, if the airspace is defined as you want it such airspace will revert to 'one-in-one-out', when the Seasprite wants to go IFR. Is that REALLY what you are after?
Moving right along..... Agony said:
Any response, PAF or Ultralights?
The comments saying that the aircraft are "airworthy" and "ready to go and have been for years" are way off the mark, as is the comment on converting output from the ADC into digital. That is spin from Kaman, it always need at least 3 ADC's for a start. That issue, isn't even a pimple on other issues that were, (as a result of an evolving airworthiness environment) going to have a far greater affect on the operation of the aircraft.
Airworthiness, operational capability and risk management have never before been used to the extent that they were in this decision to cancel the program. Not for $150 Mil or even triple that, were we ever going to get a capability close to what we wanted, with any acceptable level of risk..............period.
Airworthiness, operational capability and risk management have never before been used to the extent that they were in this decision to cancel the program. Not for $150 Mil or even triple that, were we ever going to get a capability close to what we wanted, with any acceptable level of risk..............period.
Thread Starter
jumpuFOKKERjump, the chance of two IFR aircraft wanting to operate at the same time at Benalla is pretty slim, and if it is going to save lives, yes it is what I want.
Your mind seems to be fixed in what was done in the past. If professional pilots can operate in Class G airspace in cloud without it being “one in, one out”, then why can’t air traffic controllers operate in this airspace with the same rules?
If professional pilots have decided that this is a safe way to operate (for the last 50 years) there is no reason why air traffic controllers can’t be given the same “standards.”
I’ll say it again. We are a sovereign country and our only obligation is to notify a difference with ICAO if we need to. The US and Canadian system is certainly not “one in, one out” – even in non-radar procedural Class E airspace. They have a number of enlightened procedures which result in the airspace being used in a very similar way to the way we operate now – but with the advantage of air traffic control actually “controlling.”
Your mind seems to be fixed in what was done in the past. If professional pilots can operate in Class G airspace in cloud without it being “one in, one out”, then why can’t air traffic controllers operate in this airspace with the same rules?
If professional pilots have decided that this is a safe way to operate (for the last 50 years) there is no reason why air traffic controllers can’t be given the same “standards.”
I’ll say it again. We are a sovereign country and our only obligation is to notify a difference with ICAO if we need to. The US and Canadian system is certainly not “one in, one out” – even in non-radar procedural Class E airspace. They have a number of enlightened procedures which result in the airspace being used in a very similar way to the way we operate now – but with the advantage of air traffic control actually “controlling.”
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The $150 mill to fix the ADC ,the AFCS and other issues was not all that was needed IMHO. There were plenty more issues that were not included in that figure that would have well and truly surfaced in due course. This in no shape included iTAS which was still not out of the SIL....... (at least not in AUS)
After that was spent we would have had to continue with more bandaids as the program continued.
The eventual number of bandaids and delays would have resulted in gaining a capability, not to the level of that originally intended. This delay then ensures that newer platforms with later technology would have left the SH2G a generation behind.
Not sure what the flying pig is intended for unless you are closer to the program than I am guessing.........
After that was spent we would have had to continue with more bandaids as the program continued.
The eventual number of bandaids and delays would have resulted in gaining a capability, not to the level of that originally intended. This delay then ensures that newer platforms with later technology would have left the SH2G a generation behind.
Not sure what the flying pig is intended for unless you are closer to the program than I am guessing.........
Last edited by Agony; 24th Apr 2008 at 06:57. Reason: spelling.......and comment
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Not sure what the flying pig is intended for
.