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MD-83 RTO Overrun at KYIP
Pictures and Twitter comments in the article linked below:
Michigan basketball's plane slides off runway, no injuries reported By Brendan F. Quinn | [email protected] on March 08, 2017 at 3:49 PM, updated March 08, 2017 at 4:34 PM WASHINGTON D.C. -- A charter plane carrying the University of Michigan men's basketball team was involved in an accident at Willow Run Airport on Wednesday afternoon. No injuries have been reported. The plane was bound for Washington D.C., where Michigan is set to begin Big Ten Tournament play on Thursday. A statement from Michigan basketball said the accident was due to high winds. Per U-M: "After attempting to take off in high winds, takeoff was aborted and, after strong braking, the plane slide [sic] off runway. The plane sustained extensive damage but everyone on board was safely evacuated and is safe." Michigan coach John Beilein told MLive that no one was injured seriously, but a few people are banged up. "All is OK," Beilein said. Michigan said the team is making alternate travel plans. Officials at Willow Run Airport were not immediately able to provide a report on details and additional causes of the accidents. In addition to the Michigan team, the plane was also carrying band members, cheerleaders and members coaching staffs' families. Michigan, the No. 8 seed in the tournament, is scheduled to play No. 9 Illinois at noon Thursday. Washtenaw County, where Willow Run Airport is located, was under a High Wind Advisory warning on Wednesday afternoon. Wind gusts were expected to potentially reach up to 60 mph. According to a tweet from U-M, the charter flight was set to take off shortly after 2 p.m. ET. A picture with the slides deployed, including the one in the tailcone, in this article: Airport closed after plane carrying U-M basketball team slides off runway - WXYZ.com |
Well at least everyone is safe and no injuries.
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Have to admire the safety enhanced water drainage system as well.
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Yep, who knew that an aircraft might go off the end of a runway, who knew? :confused:
A few more pictures here: https://twitter.com/CampSanderson/st...527571/photo/1 Interview with Coach Beilein concerning the evac in this article: Michigan basketball team plane slides off runway at Willow Run Airport - WXYZ.com |
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Originally Posted by Capn Bloggs
(Post 9700223)
Strong, those Maddogs are. A lesser, tinfoil machine would have buckled in the middle...
Originally Posted by Huck
(Post 9700469)
Would you prefer Mighty Dog? (MD-11)
Originally Posted by pax britanica
(Post 9700514)
Sports team charters seem to figure quite bit in these kind or RTO or landing over runs, I suppose the guarantee the incident makes the enws but I wonder if the fact that most of the pax are approaching twice the weight of the 'standard' pax might mean the actual weight is rather more than the books suggest
Anyway, looks like they just arrived in IAD on a Delta B-752, N662DN, for a noon game three hours from now. |
Sports team charters seem to figure quite bit in these kind or RTO or landing over runs, I suppose the guarantee the incident makes the enws but I wonder if the fact that most of the pax are approaching twice the weight of the 'standard' pax might mean the actual weight is rather more than the books suggest They keep having incidents because most of them are sh!tbag operators putting excessive pressure on their crews. |
Nobody curious about a flight crew deciding to go when it's gusting 50?
KYIP 081653Z 26035G50KT 10SM CLR 11/M11 A2981 RMK AO2 PK WND 26055/1639 SLP095 T01061106 http://www.flyingmag.com/sites/flyin...1lTXV&fc=50,50 Wonder what they aborted for and at what speed...a shart maybe?:suspect: |
Ex TWA
It's an ex-TWA airplane. I flew it.
At TWA we referred to it as the POS. The MDD airframe is as strong as a Convair 880. |
Good stuff.
I flew the MD80 for four years, not impressed, crummy handling, poor brakes, leaked in the rain, self generated wing ice, non-existent AC in the summer. Mad was my decision to leave the superb B727 for it.. |
[QUOTE]Nobody curious about a flight crew deciding to go when it's gusting 50?
[QUOTE] What was the Xwind component? G50 isn't a show stopper. ORD yesterday was G49 at the top end for my landing, ops normal with hundreds of arrivals and departures as the winds were right down the 27s/28s. |
Looks like under 10kts if the direction held steady and it was 27. Direction being the x-factor that can catch one out in gusts, particularly on a tab-controlled aircraft like the MD.
That aside, looks to be a reasonable bet that it was within company limitations. |
It's an ex-TWA airplane. I flew it. Sports team charters seem to figure quite bit in these kind or RTO or landing over runs |
Update today from the NTSB:
The following facts are provided as an investigative update: • Parties to the investigation include the Federal Aviation Administration, The Boeing Company and Ameristar Air Cargo, Inc. • Both pilots held airline transport pilot certificates with DC-9-series type ratings (this rating includes the MD-83). • The pilot-in-command, who was the Ameristar chief pilot, was in the right seat and was providing differences training to the captain, who was in the left seat and was the pilot flying the aircraft. • The Ameristar chief pilot had 9,660 total flight hours, with 2,462 hours in DC 9 series airplanes. The captain (flying pilot) had 15,518 total flight hours, with 8,495 hours in DC-9-series airplanes. • Post-accident examination revealed movement of the control column in the cockpit appeared normal; the control columns were free to move, and the elevator control tabs moved as commanded. However, when investigators tried to move the elevator surfaces by hand, the left elevator moved normally, but the right elevator was jammed in a trailing edge-down position (airplane nose down). Upon further inspection, the right elevator geared tab inboard pushrod linkage was found damaged which restricted movement of the right elevator surface but allowed movement of the control tab. After the damaged components were removed, the elevator could be moved by hand. • Examination of the flight data recorder data indicates that during the taxi and take-off roll, the left elevator moved normally, but the right elevator did not move. During takeoff roll, the left elevator began a large airplane nose-up movement (consistent with rotation) at an airspeed of about 152 knots and continued for five seconds to about 166 knots. There was no change in the airplane pitch attitude during this time. The airplane data then are consistent with the takeoff being rejected. The maximum recorded airspeed was about 173 knots. • Review of previous flight data showed normal movement of both the left and right elevator surfaces. The airplane flew to Ypsilanti two days before the accident. • The flight and cabin crewmembers indicated in post-accident statements that all slides except for the forward right door deployed correctly. The slide was removed from the airplane and will be examined by investigators at a future date. |
Well that sure sounds like a legitimate aborted take off.
NO DC-9/MD83 experience here but what does the book say about inflight (partial) elevator blockage? |
Sounds like a job really well done. Good case in point for the naysayers about post V1 aborts.
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So in this case, the high winds likely saved some lives. Imagine the outcome of aborting at 170 knots + with no headwind component!
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Not too familiar with the MD's, what is that stenciled area above "N7" of the registration that can be seen in the photo in post #8?
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Avro
That is an area used by emergency services to get access to the interior if this is not possible by other means. The square indicates an area were the fuselage can be breached with an axe by the firefighters. There should be no further structure in the way and provide a clear path for casualty extraction. |
Originally Posted by B2N2
(Post 9700850)
On team flights they use team provided weights for pax and luggage, not standard weights.
They keep having incidents because most of them are sh!tbag operators putting excessive pressure on their crews. Charter flight carrying IU team gets stuck before takeoff at Monroe Airport | News | heraldtimesonline.com Airport director called the incident "a nonissue" |
Link to NTSB Press release.
Expanding on Dave Reid's post, here is the link to the NTSB press release (with pictures.)
https://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-rele...R20170322.aspx Considering how fast this aircraft was going when they found that it would not rotate, I doubt that there were any better options available. This crew gets an attaboy in my book. The DC-9/MD-80 elevators have a mind of their own at rest since there is no direct connection to the elevator from the control column. Jet blast and wind can move them to extreme positions. If one knew to look for the bent piece in the NTSB picture, then you could discover the problem before flight. As old as this series of aircraft is, there should have been some prior experiences with the problem. It will be interesting to see what the NTSB says about this. |
Good case in point for the naysayers about post V1 aborts |
If the wreckage had been consumed by fire, the failure evidence would have been destroyed. And the accident would have been blamed on the flight crew.
When in reality, they knocked it out of the park. As did the cabin crew and first responders..... |
Since Vr follows V1 and your aircraft refused to rotate, what do you think ANY pilot is going to do? I mean, really? I'd rather take my chances with the abort though, unless perhaps faced with an obstacle like a deep ravine or something else equally unsavory. |
If the wreckage had been consumed by fire, the failure evidence would have been destroyed. And the accident would have been blamed on the flight crew. |
I recall a similar DC 9 / MD incident many years ago. The pre takeoff control check was completed at the hold; take off clearance was given to 'quickly' follow the departing aircraft, such that the departing jet blast disturbed debris / stones which jammed the elevator which was not detected until rotate.
Follow-on activity including the need for a control check after lining up, and advice as to detect a jammed elevator, vice servotab, in a free moving system. There may have been regulatory change re ability to fly with one side jammed ( elevator or tab? ) and the need / operation of an automatic control split to continue flight - again a split system may only account for a servotab jam depending on design |
Back in the mid-nineties my company had a Fokker 100 abandon after V1. The details are a bit hazy after this length of time, but somehow the hydraulic feed to the elevators wasn't there. The abandon was successful. It was suggested by engineering that a force some six times normal would have enabled the aircraft to fly, as noted in the in-flight emergencies section of the manual. Like you're going to try that, post V1?
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The Stabilizer Trim can be moved with electric motors one is the same of the pitch function of the A/P and a more powerful one.
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Originally Posted by Machinbird
(Post 9716029)
The DC-9/MD-80 elevators have a mind of their own at rest since there is no direct connection to the elevator from the control column. Jet blast and wind can move them to extreme positions.
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Doves. If you're referring to the F100, yes, I agree with you. It's the way of dealing with a jammed elevator. But would you want to start trying that after V1?
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Sorry Herod. My fault.
I was talking about MD 80 series. ‘But would you want to start trying that after V1?’ from safetypee I recall a similar DC 9 / MD incident many years ago. The pre takeoff control check was completed at the hold; take off clearance was given to 'quickly' follow the departing aircraft, such that the departing jet blast disturbed debris / stones which jammed the elevator which was not detected until rotate. Follow-on activity including the need for a control check after lining up, and advice as to detect a jammed elevator, vice servotab, in a free moving system. During last period as an airline commander I Always did such a check just before the take off run. |
Did six years on the series from the 32 to the 81... fabulous pilots aircraft.
Crew did a fantastic job. |
"Anybody know if there is anything that you check up there on the walk around?"
Airbubba, Not really. Look up...count elevators. Two is a good number. The split is very common. I lost track of the number of times I explained that to nervous pax. ;-) |
Originally Posted by bafanguy
(Post 9717094)
The split is very common. I lost track of the number of times I explained that to nervous pax. ;-)
Originally Posted by safetypee
(Post 9716302)
I recall a similar DC 9 / MD incident many years ago. The pre takeoff control check was completed at the hold; take off clearance was given to 'quickly' follow the departing aircraft, such that the departing jet blast disturbed debris / stones which jammed the elevator which was not detected until rotate.
https://aviation-safety.net/database...?id=19700908-1 https://www.fss.aero/accident-report...09-08-2-US.pdf Executive Summary: A Trans International Airlines Douglas DC-8-63F, K4863T, Ferry Flight 863 crashed during takeoff at John F. Kennedy International Airport, New York, at 1606, September 8, 1970. Approximately 1,500 feet from the initiation of the takeoff roll , the aircraft was observed rotating to an excessively nose-high attitude. The aircraft became airborne about 2,800 feet down the runway after which it continued to rotate slowly upward to an attitude estimated to be between 60' and 90' above the horizontal, at an altitude estimated to be between 300 to 500 feet above the ground. The aircraft rolled about 20' to the right , rolled back to the left until it reached approximately a vertical angle of bank, and then fell to the ground in that attitude. The aircraft was destroyed by impact and postimpact fire. All 11 crewmembers, the only occupants of the aircraft, died in the accident. The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was a loss of pitch control caused by the entrapment of a pointed, asphalt-covered object between the leading edge of the right elevator and the right horizontal spar web access door in the aft part of the stabilizer. The restriction to elevator movement, caused by a highly unusual and unknown condition, was not detected by the crew in time to reject the takeoff successfully. However, an apparent lack of crew responsiveness to a highly unusual emergency situation, coupled with the captain's failure to monitor adequately the takeoff, contributed to the failure to reject the takeoff. The Board has recommended to the Federal Aviation Administration that all DC-8 operators be advised of the circumstances of this accident; that takeoffs in DC-8's should be rejected when premature or unacceptable rotation of the aircraft occurs during takeoff; and that provisions for the detection of jammed elevators and determination of elevator position be provided to DC-8 crews. The FAA replied that engineering evaluations are being completed and they will advise the Board of the results. The FAA also requested further data regarding the recommendation that takeoffs should be aborted when premature or unwanted rotation was experienced in the DC-8. The Board also recommends that a review should be conducted on the subject of rejected takeoff procedures in air carrier operation with a view to amplifying, clarifying, and standardizing each pilot's role in that procedure. More specific information regarding the dynamics of rejected takeoffs and pre-takeoff briefings should also be considered. Obviously, the DC-8 tail is different from the DC-9 and MD-80 series tails, e.g. two jackscrews instead of one for example. But I believe the control tabs are similar. Seems like there was an elevator control check on taxi out in the DC-8 where the FE announced 'drop-rise, drop-rise' (or 'double drop-rise' at United I believe). Also, I think the yoke was cycled in pitch at 80 knots on the takeoff roll to ensure that a foreign object had not caused a jam as in the JFK crash. |
Thanks Airbubba; I strongly believe that the earlier incident involved a DC9 / MD because of its servotab control system, which at that time related to the aircraft in my operation (146 / RJ), 1980-90s.
Was the DC8 elevator / pitch control a conventional aerodynamic servo tab system? Based on the photos so far, it is difficult to understand how a restriction so significant that it prevented rotation, could not be detected before flight. |
Originally Posted by safetypee
(Post 9717558)
Was the DC8 elevator / pitch control a conventional aerodynamic servo tab system?
On the MD-80 series a third set of 'anti-float' tabs was added outboard of the geared tabs. Here's a great online guide to subtle external differences in the DC-9 and twin MD variants: AIRLINERCAFE.COM - Ultimate DC-9/MD-80/MD-90/MD-95 Guide
Originally Posted by safetypee
(Post 9717558)
Thanks Airbubba; I strongly believe that the earlier incident involved a DC9 / MD because of its servotab control system, which at that time related to the aircraft in my operation (146 / RJ), 1980-90s.
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NTSB Accident Docket opened here:
https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/d...013&mkey=94839 CVR transcript: https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/61000-61...013/613633.pdf |
The NTSB report has been published, kudos to the crew. :ok:
The flight crew completed all preflight checks, including a test of the flight controls, and found no anomalies before initiating the takeoff roll on the accident flight. The NTSB said that there was no way that the pilots could have detected the flight control jam until it was too late. “This is the kind of extreme scenario that most pilots never encounter – discovering that their plane won’t fly only after they know they won’t be able to stop it on the available runway,” said NTSB Chairman Robert L. Sumwalt. “These two pilots did everything right after things started to go very wrong.” Investigators said that the captain’s quick decision to abort the takeoff and the other crewmember’s coordinated efforts to assist him had likely contributed to the survivability of an accident in which there were no serious injuries among the 110 passengers and six crewmembers. The Ameristar Charters Boeing MD-83, which was transporting the University of Michigan basketball team to Washington, D.C., was substantially damaged. https://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases/Pages/NR20190307.aspx The NTSB determines that the probable cause of this accident was the jammed condition of the airplane’s right elevator, which resulted from exposure to localized, dynamic wind while the airplane was parked and rendered the airplane unable to rotate during takeoff. Contributing to the accident were (1) the effect of a large structure on the gusting surface wind at the airplane’s parked location, which led to turbulent gust loads on the right elevator sufficient to jam it, even though the horizontal surface wind speed was below the certification design limit and maintenance inspection criteria for the airplane, and (2) the lack of a means to enable the flight crew to detect a jammed elevator during preflight checks for the Boeing MD-83 airplane. Contributing to the survivability of the accident was the captain’s timely and appropriate decision to reject the takeoff, the check airman’s disciplined adherence to standard operating procedures after the captain called for the rejected takeoff, and the dimensionally compliant runway safety area where the overrun occurred. https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1901.pdf |
Wow thanks for sharing. I flew the MD88/90 for many years and never encountered anything like this. Sounds like the crew did all they could. Interesting findings for sure. I certainly am glad not to fly that airplane anymore. |
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