The report I read said that the command eject function did not work but didn't mention if it had been deactivated. Also, the flight surgeon had awarded the passenger a maximum limit of +3G, but this was not communicated to the pilot. The abrupt pull up of 4G on take off, plus the sudden push over into negative G, spooked the passenger into thinking something had gone wrong.

Thank you sitigeltfel.

Yep, as sitigeltfel says the critical statement/conclusion in the report is the boxed:


"L’action involontaire du passager sur la poignée d’éjection est liée à un défaut de compréhension et de préparation à certains effets inhérents au vol en avion de chasse."

Reflex action/startle due to the passenger not understanding WTH was going on...

As I understood it from someone involved in the Rafale community the command eject system was live and was triggered by the rear ejection. The initial sequence for the front seat was complete (pyro gases triggering canopy, seat harness retraction etc) but failed at the very last step - the main cartridge for the front seat gun itself. Apparently the front seat sequencer was energised / impinged by the pyro gases but rather than sequencing correctly it exploded and was physically blown free of the seat mounting structure.

So the pilot got to land a cabriolet, having been subject to a power retract of his harness and with an explosively damaged seat underneath him.

Thank you JTO.

Hence the reason he exited the cockpit 'a tout vitesse' after landing. Sitting on a semi activated bomb!

Steve Trimble has a comprehensive report in AvWeek. It fills in some of the gaps.
https://aviationweek.com/defense-spa...e6fea12f62e665

airsound

Not if he was not strapped in properly.

Somewhat gash all round and both very lucky to get away with it.

Thanks Airsound.

So command eject set to 'both' with a passenger on a jolly in the back. Presuming that was so the pilot could make the decision, if necessary, for both? OOPS.

So, what questions were raised concerning the pilot’s seat? Martin-Baker Mk16F manufactured/maintained by SEMMB

”SEMMB (Société d'Exploitation des Matériels Martin Baker), a 50/50 joint company of Safran (France) and Martin-Baker Aircraft (UK), has produced its 250th MKF16F ejection seat for the Rafale multirole fighter. With about 50 employees, SEMMB designs, develops, produces and supports ejection seats for all French-designed combat aircraft,”.......

I would very much like to think it could not happen in the modern RAF. Tell me it couldn't please.
There are cockups and cockups,, but this cockup was monumental, thoroughly gash all round.
Can I say Third World at its worst but without the corruption?
Breathtaking story, you couldn't make it up.

"Could not happen" is always going to be too ambitious a statement where people are involved. People are forever finding new and often convoluted ways to screw up despite the very best efforts of other people to design systems that stop them screwing up. So yes, it could happen in the modern RAF. Is it likely? I don't know. I'd say the Tutor midair (arthritic pilot allowed to fly aerobatic aircraft despite being unable to look out properly), Cunningham ejection (ill-advised seat maintenance regime, inappropriate time pressures leading to incorrect harness routing and moving seat pins at high speed during landing roll), Voyager negative-g incident (unsecured loose article), Catterick Puma crash (gross indiscipline), GR4 Moray Firth midair (not the direct cause, but still of concern: staff WSO afraid of medium level flight), Reds engineer killed at Valley (inadequate crew training or inappropriate designation of supernumerary crew, take your pick) - and those are just off the top of my head - all indicate that RAF people have shown themselves more than capable of making disastrous mistakes and misjudgements in recent memory.

[Coincidental or not, rather a lot of those killed or injured in that list were people to whom the RAF owed a special duty of care: air cadets, students and passengers.]

Salute!

Scary to find a defect in the seat system, huh?

One reason we liked the ACES II setup for our family model in the Viper was two of our options intentionally prevented the front seat from going if the "guest" pulled the loop.

- most of us flew in "NORM" so the guest could eject by hisself, but I couldn't unless he had already departed. If I initiated the process, we both went with him first, then me.
- the "SOLO" mode let each go on their own, and we mainly used that when back seat was empty, as you could cook the guest if you went first. It also cut time for your seat to go .... witness the infamous T-bird ejection at Mountain Home.
- the third mode ejected both in sequence no matter who yanked on the handle. My hero deputy had engine failure after a speedy low altitude drop and he was in front seat. Confirmed backseater had the knob in that position so he would go if backseater pulled the handle. Both went out per the spec and flew a few days later. My position was I would take the risk if backseat went and my seat failed, as it would likely have failed anyway, so flew in "NORM". If he pulled and didn't go, then maybe the routing from my seat would get us both out. Oh well, all is better than it could have been.

Lastly, even on our "zoom" departure for FCF we did not pull 4 + gees just as gear was retracting. I can not believe that is normal training takeoff. And then negative gees? Doesn't add up. And then the poor strap in for a guest. Sheeesh. Where was the personal equipment dude? Or another pilot to help the poor fellow? Make no mistake, I flew many guests such as VIP's, maintenance folks as incentive flights or x-country carrying parts. I even had a high speed taxi run down the rwy with my wife during one of the early year groundings. Extensive pre-flight instructions and such and constant banter from the front ( me ) kept the guest calm.

Gums sends....

Of course you are correct, but the sheer list of incompetences in the case in question suggests drink. drugs or deranged to me: ........ negligence, disobedience, idiocy, farce.
Your list pinpoints single primary causes.

This story is covered in today’s Times ( 10 April ) and makes for interesting reading, it appears he was poorly briefed and not properly strapped in. On some vigorous manoeuvring he panicked and pulled! Just fortunate no more serious injuries occurred 😖

Seems to be ambiguous as to whether he consciously pulled the handle or, finding himself lifting out of the seat, grabbed at it to hold himself in?

I don't think it is ambiguous.
The pax wasn't strapped in properly, his helmet was loose if not unfastened altogether and he had no way of communicating with the pilot with the mask not fitted. He was already severely nervous before the flight.
He's then properly alarmed by an abrupt application of 4g and a rocket-like climb, and upon the -.6g pushover at the top left his seat due to the loose straps, probably felt the helmet coming off and in a panic grabbed whatever he could find to pull himself back into his seat.
Lucky he wasn't injured more seriously as his ejection posture must have been awful.
French swiss cheese must have much larger holes in it than we ever imagined.

Of course, this was a failure in a duty of care by the MoD, and not the WSO

DV

He didn't want to be there in the first place.

Yes indeed. I didn’t mean to infer otherwise. It’s a similar failing to that which allowed the arthritic Tutor pilot into his aircraft. I am slightly wary of using the term ‘MOD’ too liberally because ultimately it was people (squadron flying supervisors, medics, medical disclosure policy writers) who made the mistakes in both cases; it’s easy to forget that when considering ‘organisational’ issues.

To langleybaston’s comment that I had merely listed main causes, well that was not quite my intent with the examples chosen. In the Moray accident there were lots of other causes to choose from but I selected the WSO one to demonstrate British failings as basic or shocking as aspects of the French accident.

If you want multiple causes then see the crash of Yak-52, G-YAKB.