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-   -   Vulcan: who pressed THE button? (https://www.pprune.org/military-aviation/572151-vulcan-who-pressed-button.html)

ShotOne 20th Dec 2015 21:27

Vulcan: who pressed THE button?
 
A visit to the Vulcan cockpit at Woodford Avro Heritage Centre (highly recommended by the way) left me asking where in the cockpit a nuclear weapon would have been released from; button/key? And by which crew member?

John Eacott 20th Dec 2015 22:13

It's all about the Vulcan ;)

In the Sea King there was an authorisation bit of switchology to be done in the front via a panel next to the pilot on the right cockpit wall, which also selected the yield.

The observer would then make the selections in the back to drop the Bomb, Aircraft, HE 600lb MC.

When the RAN purchased the Sea King the wiring was (inadvertantly?) included up to the cockpit. For many years it was thought to be the wiring for the heated clothing which the 817 crews thought to be fairly superfluous to their operating region. Nearly as superfluous as the real use for the wiring loom!

In the single pilot Wasp he did it all by himself, trusted by the ship to carry out directions over the radio :ok:

"Standy-by Dustbin, 2 minutes, Surface Zero Position"

Authentication.

"200ft, 100kts"

"Beware, Beware"

"Dustbin, Dustbin"

tartare 20th Dec 2015 22:28

Still remember as a kid seeing a Wasp land on the deck of HMNZS Canterbury while she was docked at Lyttelton.
Seems extraordinary that little helicopter could deliver a WE.177 depth charge.
Yes, interested too to know who pressed the button in the Vulcan...

Treble one 20th Dec 2015 22:34

On the recent Guy Martin documentary about XH558 he actually picked up and used the manual bomb release equipment in another Vulcan-I assume the Nav radar was responsible for that although I'm sure that was a back up to the automatic system (presumably different for the likes of YS than BS).


I do believe the Captain had to authorise release using some switches on a panel on his left hand side though (thought I saw that in another documentary)?

50+Ray 20th Dec 2015 22:55

The weapon would have been released by a pulse from the NBS if a fully IMC attack was made, the Nav Radar having locked on to his offsets and the system working to specification. There were manual release buttons - one at the front between the pilots for instance - but the system was automated for night/IMC. Numerous checks and authentication procedures had to be complete before any weapon could be released. It was standard procedure to press all the buttons after the NBS release just to ensure the bomb bay was empty before closing the doors and legging it.

tartare 20th Dec 2015 23:21

Excuse the ignorance - what does NBS stand for?
Navigation and Bombing System?
Hmm question answered I think?
http://www.tatjavanvark.nl/tvve/dduck0.html
Gosh - so it could be a fully automated process?
Makes sense I suppose, given the speed you are travelling at - the need for the weapon to fly the correct profile etc.
There must have been a point in programming the system where you were effectively committed to a release.
Perhaps the OP's question shouldn't have been who pushed the button, but who could abort the weapon release!

John Eacott 20th Dec 2015 23:24


Originally Posted by tartare (Post 9216504)
Still remember as a kid seeing a Wasp land on the deck of HMNZS Canterbury while she was docked at Lyttelton.
Seems extraordinary that little helicopter could deliver a WE.177 depth charge.

The RN WE177 was a smaller and lighter version of the weapon, hence the 600lb designation. Even so, it required the Wasp to be substantially lightened with extraneous seats, etc removed. The weapon was too long to be carried fore and aft as with the Mk 44, so it was offset with the nose to starboard & tail to port.

http://nuclear-weapons.info/images/we177-wasp.jpg

tartare 20th Dec 2015 23:45

John I've always wondered what those large paddle things above each door were for?

John Eacott 20th Dec 2015 23:57


Originally Posted by tartare (Post 9216544)
John I've always wondered what those large paddle things above each door were for?

They are the flotation bags: designed to keep the aircraft afloat and recoverable, whilst keeping the crew underwater :hmm:

The Oberon 21st Dec 2015 06:45

I'm sure P.N. will be along later but the automated NBS system went something like this. The Nav. Rad. lined up his range and bearing markers to the target using the target or offset returns, from this , and other inputs, height, airspeed and the ballistics of the weapon etc. I think there were 8 terms in the formula, the NBS calculated a steer signal, displayed on the pilot's panel, and a forward throw value which was displayed on the Nav Panel. The NBS took the forward throw value and used that to calculate 2 other pre release signals, Lock Out and Bomb Doors. Lock Out froze the system and prevented any further input changes from altering the forward throw value and Bomb Doors was a fixed value dependant on the time taken for the doors to open. When Range To Target equalled Forward Throw the weapon was released.


What crew actions were required to permit release I have no idea.

BEagle 21st Dec 2015 07:01

The 2-man principle was intended to ensured that no 'unauthorised acts or incorrect procedures' were made when the crew was involved in nuclear weapon activity.

As 50+Ray states, it would be most likely that the weapon would have been released automatically. A sequence of checklist items involving the navigators and first pilot would ensure that the bomb would release when the NBS signal was given.

There was an 'instantaneous' manual release button on the centre console between the pilots and another on the co-pilot's side, which was routed via a time delay unit. Another manual release/TDU button was situated at the rear crew's station, as was the TDU. I guess there was another at the visual bombing position, but we never used that in my day.

V-force crews were subject to various security assessment checks; once the positive release code had been received there would have been no question of anyone being so disloyal as to try 'abort' nuclear weapon release.

The 'approved' visual bombing technique in my day included setting up the SFOM bomb sight and calculation of the correct TDU setting from the release initiation point. In practice it was simpler (and achieved better scores) if you tracked the target through the probe and pressed the centre console button just as you thought it was in line with the no. 3 rpm gauge.

We had a back-up dayglo band around the probe on one aircraft, it corresponded to the release parameters used for an earlier bomb comp. When asked at air shows why it was there, the usual reply was "It's just lipstick"...:eek:

Pontius Navigator 21st Dec 2015 09:06

FT=Vg x (sqrt 2H/g+H dot/g+Tau+Time Advance) + H Tan Lamda x Cos delta

Vg = Groundspeed
H = Height
H dot = rate of climb/descent
Tau = Bomb ballistics IIRC
Time Advance = 0.55 seconds IIRC to allow for firing train
Lamda = trail angle
delta = drift

There are your 7 terms I think

Bomb doors took 7 seconds and would be opened by the NBS pulse

Lock out was IIRC 10.55 seconds

In the 70s it was decided that bomb doors should be opened manually somewhat earlier in case of unknown battle damage or the failure of one of the hydraulic pipes. BEagle would be better to advise on that as it was after my time.

Finally, Strangeglove like, it would have been possible to set the NBS on BOMB around 140 miles out, set all the switches, and then bail out. The main problem would have been the speed for a rear crew bail out if cruising at 325 kts or the risk of the auto pilot dropping out when the pilots stepped out.

Pontius Navigator 21st Dec 2015 09:12

Just a point of the bomb firing button for the nav rad or visual bomb aimer; initially this was a simple bomb firing tit identical with that on WW2 bombers.

A simple wire to a small, bulb-like, housing with a protruding button. Someone twigged that this was not exactly a piece of sound engineering and it was replaced around 1965 with a flexible reinforced sheath around the cable, a substantial case, a recessed button and, I think, a metal flap that could be wire-locked shut with a tell-tale lead seal.

BEagle 21st Dec 2015 10:01

During weapon acceptance, part of the check was that all bomb release button flaps were closed with a lead sealed restraint wire - and that it wasn't possible to reach the button without breaking the seal.

This was tested during the annual visit by the team from Collyweston - woe betide any crew who cocked up their weapon procedure. During one such visit, our Nav Radar brought the test to a halt by claiming that his bomb release button hadn't been sealed properly - although it didn't seem to have worried the previous 3 or 4 crews.....:(

We stopped the test, got out and waited for the loading team to reseal the nav's bomb tit. As I walked out of the zone, I noticed something metallic poking out of a pile of snow in front of one of the undercarriage legs. It was a large picketing pin - which would have undoubtedly have destroyed the tyres if the aircraft had been scrambled. So I picked it up and gave it to the WST umpire - "Oh bugger, we didn't put that there and no other crew noticed it...." I don't know what they decided, but we passed our test OK in the end.

I'm sure that we still used 'Bomb Doors...AUTO' when I was flying the Vulcan?

Treble one 21st Dec 2015 11:27

Beagle, PN, thanks for that, fascinating stuff.


Personally, I'm glad you and your colleagues were there to prevent it having to happen for real. All due to the credibility of the deterrence you all manned so ably.


Many thanks
TO

Pontius Navigator 21st Dec 2015 12:26

BEagle, having been on WST, we never criticised a crew where an issue was discovered after the event.

I did criticise a couple of sqn cdr though.

One, a frequent visitor to these rooms, gave an absolutely impecable performance during the questionnaire. So knowledgeable was he that I had to make an adverse comment as he had not allowed any of his crew to answer. While he didn't fail he put himself up for a retest at our second visit.

The other was my ex-boss. He and his crew swanned out to the aircraft, passed the RAFP and gathered at the locked entrance door. Meanwhile, in the line hut we waited with crew chief and 700. He was LIVID; he still failed :)

Another time with some Bucc crews, ex-V-Force that I knew, they suggested a reverse questionnaire. So I gave them the answers.

A. 46 metres. Q . . .

A. Flocculating particles. Q . . .

t7a 21st Dec 2015 12:59

Q -NLZ?


Q - What do you get with a conventional only explosion?

Pontius Navigator 21st Dec 2015 13:10

T7a,
Q1, close but no.
Q2, close too

V-bomber dispersal were set out 50 yards between centres. This set the distance between nuclear armed aircraft. When everything became metricated it became 46 metres. Really there was no logical reason why aircraft on large aprons should be parked at that interval.

The other question you suggested would have been What is single point safe?

Above The Clouds 21st Dec 2015 14:46


Finally, Strangeglove like, it would have been possible to set the NBS on BOMB around 140 miles out, set all the switches, and then bail out. The main problem would have been the speed for a rear crew bail out if cruising at 325 kts or the risk of the auto pilot dropping out when the pilots stepped out.
Would it not have been better to stay with the aircraft and continue East or South instead of parachuting in to a burning waste land ?

Pontius Navigator 21st Dec 2015 15:09

ATC, Sweden? Tall leggy blondes, beautiful furs or rancid butter, animal skins and a comfy yurt. Difficult choice.

The continue east suggestion was actually a realistic option for CENTO missions with UK some 3000-4000 miles away. For western Russia there were other options, how realistic I could not say.


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