Vulcan: who pressed THE button?
 

A visit to the Vulcan cockpit at Woodford Avro Heritage Centre (highly recommended by the way) left me asking where in the cockpit a nuclear weapon would have been released from; button/key? And by which crew member?

It's all about the Vulcan ;)

In the Sea King there was an authorisation bit of switchology to be done in the front via a panel next to the pilot on the right cockpit wall, which also selected the yield.

The observer would then make the selections in the back to drop the Bomb, Aircraft, HE 600lb MC.

When the RAN purchased the Sea King the wiring was (inadvertantly?) included up to the cockpit. For many years it was thought to be the wiring for the heated clothing which the 817 crews thought to be fairly superfluous to their operating region. Nearly as superfluous as the real use for the wiring loom!

In the single pilot Wasp he did it all by himself, trusted by the ship to carry out directions over the radio :ok:

"Standy-by Dustbin, 2 minutes, Surface Zero Position"

Authentication.

"200ft, 100kts"

"Beware, Beware"

"Dustbin, Dustbin"

Still remember as a kid seeing a Wasp land on the deck of HMNZS Canterbury while she was docked at Lyttelton.
Seems extraordinary that little helicopter could deliver a WE.177 depth charge.
Yes, interested too to know who pressed the button in the Vulcan...

On the recent Guy Martin documentary about XH558 he actually picked up and used the manual bomb release equipment in another Vulcan-I assume the Nav radar was responsible for that although I'm sure that was a back up to the automatic system (presumably different for the likes of YS than BS).


I do believe the Captain had to authorise release using some switches on a panel on his left hand side though (thought I saw that in another documentary)?

The weapon would have been released by a pulse from the NBS if a fully IMC attack was made, the Nav Radar having locked on to his offsets and the system working to specification. There were manual release buttons - one at the front between the pilots for instance - but the system was automated for night/IMC. Numerous checks and authentication procedures had to be complete before any weapon could be released. It was standard procedure to press all the buttons after the NBS release just to ensure the bomb bay was empty before closing the doors and legging it.

Excuse the ignorance - what does NBS stand for?
Navigation and Bombing System?
Hmm question answered I think?
http://www.tatjavanvark.nl/tvve/dduck0.html
Gosh - so it could be a fully automated process?
Makes sense I suppose, given the speed you are travelling at - the need for the weapon to fly the correct profile etc.
There must have been a point in programming the system where you were effectively committed to a release.
Perhaps the OP's question shouldn't have been who pushed the button, but who could abort the weapon release!

The RN WE177 was a smaller and lighter version of the weapon, hence the 600lb designation. Even so, it required the Wasp to be substantially lightened with extraneous seats, etc removed. The weapon was too long to be carried fore and aft as with the Mk 44, so it was offset with the nose to starboard & tail to port.

http://nuclear-weapons.info/images/we177-wasp.jpg

John I've always wondered what those large paddle things above each door were for?

They are the flotation bags: designed to keep the aircraft afloat and recoverable, whilst keeping the crew underwater :hmm:

I'm sure P.N. will be along later but the automated NBS system went something like this. The Nav. Rad. lined up his range and bearing markers to the target using the target or offset returns, from this , and other inputs, height, airspeed and the ballistics of the weapon etc. I think there were 8 terms in the formula, the NBS calculated a steer signal, displayed on the pilot's panel, and a forward throw value which was displayed on the Nav Panel. The NBS took the forward throw value and used that to calculate 2 other pre release signals, Lock Out and Bomb Doors. Lock Out froze the system and prevented any further input changes from altering the forward throw value and Bomb Doors was a fixed value dependant on the time taken for the doors to open. When Range To Target equalled Forward Throw the weapon was released.


What crew actions were required to permit release I have no idea.

The 2-man principle was intended to ensured that no 'unauthorised acts or incorrect procedures' were made when the crew was involved in nuclear weapon activity.

As 50+Ray states, it would be most likely that the weapon would have been released automatically. A sequence of checklist items involving the navigators and first pilot would ensure that the bomb would release when the NBS signal was given.

There was an 'instantaneous' manual release button on the centre console between the pilots and another on the co-pilot's side, which was routed via a time delay unit. Another manual release/TDU button was situated at the rear crew's station, as was the TDU. I guess there was another at the visual bombing position, but we never used that in my day.

V-force crews were subject to various security assessment checks; once the positive release code had been received there would have been no question of anyone being so disloyal as to try 'abort' nuclear weapon release.

The 'approved' visual bombing technique in my day included setting up the SFOM bomb sight and calculation of the correct TDU setting from the release initiation point. In practice it was simpler (and achieved better scores) if you tracked the target through the probe and pressed the centre console button just as you thought it was in line with the no. 3 rpm gauge.

We had a back-up dayglo band around the probe on one aircraft, it corresponded to the release parameters used for an earlier bomb comp. When asked at air shows why it was there, the usual reply was "It's just lipstick"...:eek:

FT=Vg x (sqrt 2H/g+H dot/g+Tau+Time Advance) + H Tan Lamda x Cos delta

Vg = Groundspeed
H = Height
H dot = rate of climb/descent
Tau = Bomb ballistics IIRC
Time Advance = 0.55 seconds IIRC to allow for firing train
Lamda = trail angle
delta = drift

There are your 7 terms I think

Bomb doors took 7 seconds and would be opened by the NBS pulse

Lock out was IIRC 10.55 seconds

In the 70s it was decided that bomb doors should be opened manually somewhat earlier in case of unknown battle damage or the failure of one of the hydraulic pipes. BEagle would be better to advise on that as it was after my time.

Finally, Strangeglove like, it would have been possible to set the NBS on BOMB around 140 miles out, set all the switches, and then bail out. The main problem would have been the speed for a rear crew bail out if cruising at 325 kts or the risk of the auto pilot dropping out when the pilots stepped out.

Just a point of the bomb firing button for the nav rad or visual bomb aimer; initially this was a simple bomb firing tit identical with that on WW2 bombers.

A simple wire to a small, bulb-like, housing with a protruding button. Someone twigged that this was not exactly a piece of sound engineering and it was replaced around 1965 with a flexible reinforced sheath around the cable, a substantial case, a recessed button and, I think, a metal flap that could be wire-locked shut with a tell-tale lead seal.

During weapon acceptance, part of the check was that all bomb release button flaps were closed with a lead sealed restraint wire - and that it wasn't possible to reach the button without breaking the seal.

This was tested during the annual visit by the team from Collyweston - woe betide any crew who cocked up their weapon procedure. During one such visit, our Nav Radar brought the test to a halt by claiming that his bomb release button hadn't been sealed properly - although it didn't seem to have worried the previous 3 or 4 crews.....:(

We stopped the test, got out and waited for the loading team to reseal the nav's bomb tit. As I walked out of the zone, I noticed something metallic poking out of a pile of snow in front of one of the undercarriage legs. It was a large picketing pin - which would have undoubtedly have destroyed the tyres if the aircraft had been scrambled. So I picked it up and gave it to the WST umpire - "Oh bugger, we didn't put that there and no other crew noticed it...." I don't know what they decided, but we passed our test OK in the end.

I'm sure that we still used 'Bomb Doors...AUTO' when I was flying the Vulcan?

Beagle, PN, thanks for that, fascinating stuff.


Personally, I'm glad you and your colleagues were there to prevent it having to happen for real. All due to the credibility of the deterrence you all manned so ably.


Many thanks
TO

BEagle, having been on WST, we never criticised a crew where an issue was discovered after the event.

I did criticise a couple of sqn cdr though.

One, a frequent visitor to these rooms, gave an absolutely impecable performance during the questionnaire. So knowledgeable was he that I had to make an adverse comment as he had not allowed any of his crew to answer. While he didn't fail he put himself up for a retest at our second visit.

The other was my ex-boss. He and his crew swanned out to the aircraft, passed the RAFP and gathered at the locked entrance door. Meanwhile, in the line hut we waited with crew chief and 700. He was LIVID; he still failed :)

Another time with some Bucc crews, ex-V-Force that I knew, they suggested a reverse questionnaire. So I gave them the answers.

A. 46 metres. Q . . .

A. Flocculating particles. Q . . .

Q -NLZ?


Q - What do you get with a conventional only explosion?

T7a,
Q1, close but no.
Q2, close too

V-bomber dispersal were set out 50 yards between centres. This set the distance between nuclear armed aircraft. When everything became metricated it became 46 metres. Really there was no logical reason why aircraft on large aprons should be parked at that interval.

The other question you suggested would have been What is single point safe?

Would it not have been better to stay with the aircraft and continue East or South instead of parachuting in to a burning waste land ?

ATC, Sweden? Tall leggy blondes, beautiful furs or rancid butter, animal skins and a comfy yurt. Difficult choice.

The continue east suggestion was actually a realistic option for CENTO missions with UK some 3000-4000 miles away. For western Russia there were other options, how realistic I could not say.

Sounds pretty much like the B-52: and in addition, in the overhead of the bomb/nav compartment, the BUF had a couple of pull-down handles that operated a (very last-ditch) cable system that dropped the bombs mechanically. Through the bomb bay doors, IIRC, but it's been forty years.

Mmmmm, sorry to raise this.

Are your former duties still not covered under an act you signed?

MS, indeed, however in addition to knowing that many of us also know the rules. THere are two topics that I would not comment upon and curiously have never been asked.

Holiday destinations would be one! (No question asked!)

CG

No cigar?

CG

The one incident that I do remember, was that at STM, the first pilot and Nav going through the cordon and then splitting up to check both the aircraft and the 177. They were both nearly shot by the surrounding US Marines! They never did it again! (2-man principle etc.)

We may assume that the nuclear bomb drill for the Vulcan equally applied to the other two V-bombers but what of the Canberra and Buccaneer?

Or even the single seaters; Jaguar, Harrier (did they carry THE bomb), and that Wasp with everything stripped out. How do you maintain the 2 man principle when erm... there weren't 2 men?

I was involved with all this at the same time as PN. But, to be honest, I now find the whole thing rather distasteful. Surely we have moved on from such discussions.

The Buccanner was an interesting case, well they all were really.

As the pilot couldn't see the nav and vice versa the control was split with both requiring to complete but only one to abort. In the training rig though they sat side by side.

On one check the nav made all the correct switch movements and reported the correct lamp indications. As the checker sitting behind and the pilot sitting to the side we both saw the nav make a further improper switch action. While the reported lamp indications were correct the weapon would have dudded. It was an automatic fail.

However my boss, an engineer, guessed that the Sqn Cdr wanted the man chopped and my boss did not want us to be responsible; that crew were rechecked and passed.

The Valiant (TBF), F4 and Canberra had a US system with different security arrangements. The Nimrod had a US weapon but procedures were more akin to British procedures.

I can't answer for the Jag - British single man (or F104 NATO single man)

Pontiflex, I see your point but I think Peter Hennessey would disagree. Indeed in his radio broadcast cast, Finger on the Button, he had extracts from a drill on an SSBN and that it current ops.

The discussion is really how did it work, was it safe, and would we have done it.

Although I had NBS experience with free fall weapons, I had previously worked on Blue Steel Victors. As the Blue Steel had it's own inertial nav. was the same release precision required or was it just a case of being within range and launching in the general direction of the target ?

It's an important part of history Pontifex.
To stand under the Vulcan bomb bay at Hendon Museum and watch the film of a streamed take off brings home the terrible solemnity of what it would have been like if it had ever happened.
As does imagining being on board and seeing that blinding flash through the windows (probably the last thing your non-eye patched eye would see).
Personally, as a child of the digital age, it's highly instructive to learn in detail about the analog systems that made the weapons system work, particularly their precision - all well before GPS.

https://youtu.be/oJDGcxAf9D8

My (late) RadNav stepfather claimed it wa he wot had the pickle button in 'is 'and.

tdracer,

It depends on how hypothetical you want to get I suppose, but as nothing more than a straight answer to your question, notwithstanding the structural damage to the underside of the aircraft that would occur, yes you would be able to lower the undercarriage, but not via the normal system. For normal operation, the Vulcan was fitted with three engine driven hydraulic pumps, plus an electrical hydraulic pack, which operated the U/C system, the braking system, Nose Wheel Steering system, Bomb Doors and randomly enough the AAPP inlet scoop.

In the event of failure of the normal system and in line with most military aircraft, the U/C could be 'blown down' using high pressure nitrogen from stored bottles. This, in our hypothetical Thunderball situation, is how the U/C could be lowered as we dropped to the sea bed! :ok:

I'm still not sure how we would manage to swim from the cockpit, through the No2 fuel tanks and into the Bomb Bay though!! :E


Flipflopman

Flip flop, I would need to see the film again but wonder if it was the radome hatch they used.

As for damage on ditching, I seem to recall a wheels up landing with minimal damage given the huge ground effect from the delta.

WW, indeed. Nav Rad would hold the button and watch the NBS lights, plotter would have his finger on the button in the table. Both pilots would have theirs on the control stick.

Every button would be pressed.

Remember the aircraft would have flown the gauntlet of fighters, SA 2, SA 3, ADA, and maelstrom of hell. Who knew what damage it may have sustained or who might be incapacitated at the last moment.

Oberon, I was not on Blue Steel and only have an outline of the system. In the final run the missile would indeed been on its own. Prior to that a series of radar fixes would have been taken and a procedure based on fix-monitored-azimuth performed. Essentially was the missile inertial navigator properly aligned. Was its stable table stable. Values of kE and kN would be input and inertial drift minimised.

While the launch point was not as important as a bomb release point it was still important as it would determine the safe route for the missile.