t7a. I never made it to Germany having been trapped in the Lincs. V force for most of my career. I would like to learn more about the Jaguars role, a quick Google doesn't say much, any pointers would be most welcome, similarly Buccs.

Fonsini
 

I presume that the Buccaneer Navs were told their targets in advance , as the V Force crews were, so they could do some detailed route planning/timing (SAM and other AD avoiding routes) in the event of the Cold war turning hot? Having said that I'm not aware they were part of the SIOP as were V Force/SAC crews....I may be wrong.


There doesn't seem to be as much information out there regarding Cold War Nuclear Ops from Germany (I've read some Canberra stuff but nothing much about Bucc/Jag etc)-maybe I'm not looking in the right places, or maybe there's a good reason for that...

When the Canberras stood on Q in Germany during the 70s they were loaded with a U.S. weapon which needed the constant supervision of a U.S. Executive Actions Officer. There was one particular specimen of uninspiring EAO who used to paint plastic models in the Q shed. A cunning plan to enervate him was during target study when the brief went "O.K. then we are agreed. When the balloon goes up we head east till out of range then turn west, drop the cookie in the Atlantic and head for Bermuda".
The EAO snuck out of the briefing and picked up a phone next door. The crew picked up at the same time as he dialled his boss. They heard him say in a quavering voice, "Sir, they're talking like that again"
It passed the time.

Treble One - The SIOP is the US national nuclear war plan. The UK nuclear deterrent was/is assigned to NATO along with the other nuclear armed NATO countries (including those US forces assigned to NATO). The NATO plan would have been carried out in conjunction with the US SIOP.

t7a
 

Thank you-I stand corrected.
Apologies
TO

Exercise Codewords
 

I have just recalled another exercise codeword that trips off the tongue:

bandolero

Also, not long after Anthony Gray's book, The Penetrators was published I noticed that he used the same codeword in his novel as was in the Bomber Command Alert and Readiness Plans. In BCARs the order for implementation of Alert Condition One was Prometheus and Gray used the same codeword. The next codeword he used was Apocalypse. Had he compromised our codewords?

I reported what I found and an investigation found that it had been a coincidence, a bit like the D-Day crossword, and the BCAR codeword had been chosen after Gray's novel was published.

Thanks all - I suppose it makes sense to research your target in advance and learn the entry and egress routes, although I assume the comment about "Buccaneers targeting SA-2 sites" was with conventional weapons, not tactical nukes ?

As an eager spotty teenager I remember getting a map of Europe and placing pins in all the RAF bases and then tracing radius of action arcs for each type of aircraft. It was surprising how little penetration into "enemy" territory there was for anything that wasn't a Vulcan. Especially the much hyped 200 foot low level attacks which burned off so much fuel.

Of course it never occurred to me that some of those missions may have been planned and briefed as one-way only.........

SAC Targets
 

Plenty of just-released SAC targeting details from 1959 available here.

'Go code'
 

I was rather surprised to hear in a recent documentary, the final V Force release code word stated during the programme.

I presume it referred to the position of the 'start line' ?

As for RoA, it was an error to assume either one-way missions (the idea was anathema to the crews when it was posited to crews in Cyprus) or that we planned to return to base.

Just checked one of our routes. The whole route was 2,200 miles with 700 miles at low level and a total of 900 miles in enemy territory. From take-off to top of descent was about 850 miles.

I can assure you that Buccs were not targeted against SA2 sites with nukes.

On the Bucc one way missions were never, to the best of my knowledge, discussed. However, the planned landing airfield was not always the same as the one used for take-off so there was an option to increase strike radius that way. Some of the targets also required a climb to high level rather soon after the strike in order to have the fuel to reach the planned destination; a somewhat high risk option!

t7a,

Agreed, like the RAFG toom fleet they were more likely to be strike committed against SA-3 and SA-6 sites and associated command and control.

I confess to being obsessed with radius of action questions, fuel burn and tactical range has always fascinated me for reasons I can't explain - a Tornado laden down with 8 thousand pounders on the fuselage stations, 2 drop tanks, max internal, and ECM/chaff Flare pods on the outers just never seemed to have much in the way of range if it was committed to a draggy flight at 200 feet through East Germany - at least that was the equation I could never get straight in my adolescent brain, then there was the line I recall from TSR2 development notes about it being able to "take a triple to Moscow" - really ?

In short I could never reconcile the vast distances required for flights into the former Soviet Union, the warload required, and the need to maintain highly inefficient low level flights. Except for the Vulcan as always which had the legs of course.

Apologies for derailing the nuclear weapons discussion, because as interested as I am in that topic (the Green Grass device deserves a discussion of its own for example) I do find the question of fuel and range more interesting.

The Bucaneers in Germany were probably on there way to zap the Blinder bases just inside the curtain, as their residents would probably pass them on the way to do the same to Bruggers, Wildy, and Gutersnipe.

17a

Peter Hennesay's new book on the British nuclear submarine fleet and it was the same for the V Force that the deterrent was able to be used by the RAF/RN for national issues. Polaris and Trident come under the Bermuda Agreement signed by McMillan and Kennedy.

WE 177 was all British in design development and deployment whilst integrated into the NATO war plan.

air pig - true, and it also included the RAFG Buccs and Jaguars. Whether a National plan was credible was another matter!!

In the 60s the V-Force target plans were coordinated at SAC. When the French withdrew from the integrated command structure their staff at SAC became observers :)

Our target data sheets had both SAC and Bomber Command ALNs.

It was the loss of his Valiants that SACEUR was most concerned with as they were allocated to him, the Vulcan and Victor force remained under British control.

A crucial factor was timing.

As a retaliatory force we would have followed any Soviet attack whereas a premptive attack could be at a time of our choosing.

So, would the Russians plan for TOT in USA during the night? Assuming 2100 start in US it could be 0200 UK (roughly) but how did that accord with exercise 0400 alerts to generate but daytime scrambles a couple of days later?

Having experienced an operational alert on a Friday lunch time and another at 2000 I can attest to which was more difficult and confusing. With an 0400 alert everything ran on rails. For the real deal confusion reigned.

Vulcan: who pressed THE button?
 

Surely nobody, or wouldn't we have heard!:)