Great Shot
 

Ah When we had a proper air force with proper aircraft with Guns, tanks, and hard points. Now who is going to work out where, when and whom.

FGA9

Somewhere east of Suez possibly

43 Sqn, Khormaksar, Aden?

Just follow ATC's pic URL ... 208 Squadron MEC overhead Embakasi Airport Nairobi early 60's. Pic Pete McLeland.

208 Sqn Gallery Page 5

The AAIB Bulletin for Feb 2016 includes ejection seat and maintenance recommendations. No further findings.

Anyone have any insight into that AAIB ejection seat bulletin? Is it just routine bureaucratic procedure grinding out bulletins? Is it their way of grounding jets like the Hunter? Did it have something to do with the accident, like was the pilot unable to eject? Seems like an odd thing to expend resources on at this stage of the investigation.

If, in the course of any air accident investigation, aspects relevant to the safe operation of aircraft are identified then they should be notified to potentially affected organisations asap in order to enhance the safety of their operations, irrespective of whether or not these aspects were causal to the accident. If you read the Bulletin in this context then hopefully it will make sense as to why it was issued.

PPRT,

It isn't thought that he tried to eject. The cartridge life was discovered as a result of any investigation of this type probing into everything. This bulletin is a standard monthly report and there was a section on Hunter crash because there were findings to report. Resources are expended on all aspects of the accident until each thread is either exhausted or concluded. In this case, the AAIB has uncovered something that it feels is relevant to the safe operation of, in this case, ex-military aircraft fitted with ejection seats; an issue that affects aircraft currently being operated. Meanwhile resources are expended on many other threads. Therefore, they continue to report as they find.

The AAIB don't ground jets, the CAA have that authority. AAIB investigate, report facts and, where appropriate, make recommendations.

OK, thanks. I looked up the Hunter on the AAIB site and the document I read was much shorter and only about the ejection seat in the Hunter. Didn't realize it was part of a much larger, routine document.

My (educated, I have used the mk4 seat for real) guess is that if he had tried to eject he would not have survived.
The Mk 4 seat in the T 7 is safe to use at ground level at 90 knots. However, a MB rule of thumb is,was that in a descent it needs additional height equal to 10 % of the Rate of descent. A quick calculation shows he was never within that envelope after reaching the downwards vertical.

That is a very good point, RB.

The Elephant in the room is being ignored as usual.

I'm a pilot. Every so often, I drop a bollock..

What I don't like, is folk who try to call a spade a shovel.

And just for those who are interested, this is all about a pilot who ran out of sky. Can we not as a community of pilots recognise that thing that is clear for even a simpleton to see?

He cocked it up!

So? Who hasn't?


I'm fed up of this PC, 'Skirting-around -the-edges' bollocks'.

He banjoed WV392, and thank God- he's still alive.

For pities sake, call it for what it is.

Atom Kraft - you may, of course (and in time), be right. But the big difference at this point in time is that you know when you have

but you don't know (yet....)

It's a bit like trying to foresee the outcome of a referendum or election - you don't know for sure until the result is announced.....;)

AtomKraft,

I admire your persistence in this matter and your passion and certainty where you opinion is concerned. Your conclusion may be right. But none of us would be terribly good pilots if we jumped to conclusions about the condition of our aircraft in an emergency until we had analysed the situation carefully and gathered all the information we could before making a diagnosis.

If you fly a very simple aircraft, you may not have much information gathering to do. More complex aircraft and more complex situations require more care and patience in analysis. You think you have all the facts you need to analyse this situation? Let me offer a purely hypothetical situation.

A hunter is at the top of a low lever manoeuvre, one that has a vertical element. Soon after the pilot has started to pull the nose below the horizon, he feels a control restriction and sees a caution light. In the time it takes him to read the caption and look at the hydraulic gauges, he realises that the aircraft is now in a very nose low attitude so his attention is focussed on the ground, his altitude, his control restriction and the arcraft's attitude. He rolls the aircraft to the nearest horizon, closes the throttle and pulls. The next thing he sees is the ground rush and then.....

Now you tell me how you know that,mor something similar didn't happen last year. Then tell us all why you feel you can be so sure of what you just posted that you can claim to belong to a "community of pilots" and serve such a verdict on a member of the community you would clearly love to belong to without knowing all the facts.

You should be ashamed of what you just posted. I for one, as a very long term member of that community, turn my back on you. I hope for your sake that if you ever find yourself in a similar situation your community of pilots don't publicly denounce you before all the facts are known.

AK

You may well be proved right in time.
I am opened minded and wait for the conclusions of the AAIB. My personal hope is that there will be a finding which shows the accident was not in any way down to AH.
However, I recognise that the majority of accidents are caused by pilot error and this may join the list of statistics. Indeed from what the AAIB have so far published there was no obvious fault with the plane that caused the crash.
You can give vent to your opinion if you wish, it's a free democracy in the UK and no proceedings are active. I doubt however that the AAIB will be coming to you for expert opinion even with your number of hours. If it transpires that AH did drop a bollock, many people will be interested from a flight safety perspective to know why if there was any reason why, and how other pilots can learn from AH's error.
As for it being the elephant in the room. I would suggest that the great proportion of pilots on this forum would not be surprised by an AAIB finding of pilot error. Doesn't make anyone who says the finding will be one of pilot error in advance of the report's publication particularly intelligent or uniquely insightful into the world of single turbine aerobatics. In fact, probably the opposite.

.............

CM excellent reply to Atomkrafts diabolical post.

AK
May I suggest you apply for the recently advertised AAIB inspectors job I am certian they will be waiting to accept you on to their team with open arms :ugh:

"He banjoed WV392, and thank God- he's still alive"

He is, yes. But what about the poor innocents that aren't? Well done on a half-cocked rant, containing drivel and insensitivity in abundance.

All this discussion about pilot error misses what is, to me, the real elephant in the room.

IMVHO, Shoreham is primarily a risk management failure.

Pilots, however well trained, experienced or current, occasionally make mistakes (and I'm not saying that happened here). This was known before Shoreham.

Airframes, engines & systems, however well tested, certified and maintained, occasionally fail (and once again I'm not saying that happened here). This was also known before Shoreham.

If either of these failures occur during a low level aerobatic display, the result could be a high energy impact with the ground. This, too, was known before Shoreham (and has happened with somewhat alarming frequency in the recent past).

Any persons unfortunate enough to be in close proximity to such a high energy impact are likely to be killed or seriously injured. Again, this was known before Shoreham.

It's possible to argue that a truly objective risk analysis prior to the event may have shown that the combined probability of all of the above holes lining up was simply too great to be acceptable, given the potential consequences.

There is a danger when conducting risk analysis to start with the assumption that an event should take place, and to put the case together in such a way as to justify the desired outcome, rather than to accept what the analysis is objectively saying. The best example I know of is the risk analysis which was conducted on the events leading up to the Challenger disaster, which was subsequently shown to be seriously flawed and to wholly underestimate the probability of a catastrophic event.

In the case of Shoreham, it's perhaps about believing the chances of a major disaster happening are one in a million years, when real world experience now shows the reality may be that it's one in 66 years or so.

Although I really don't know how their risk assessment was carried out, I think you raise a good point, Sillert, and I'm certain it will apply to a number of other venues - I've mentioned Farnborough here before. As the urban areas in the UK have expanded, they have encroached on the open areas that used to surround a lot of airfields and airports to the extent that even normal arrivals and departures are flown over houses very close to the thresholds.

I fully agree with your point about risk assessments finding the answer they want, too.