Our survey says....XXX wrong

Let me help

https://www.cps.gov.uk/victims_witne...osecution.html

Trim Stab, I don't think CM ever picked an argument with you. He just told you that you were wrong to take the debate in that direction at this stage. If he hadn't, I would have.

Yes, the decent is within the bounds of what little is know of his DA from the document you quote for reasons that have already been covered here.

You can be as interested as you like in any legal process, but going on line and saying you wonder if the pilot might be persecuted is rather like going to a F1 race and saying that you wonder if you might see someone crash - simply distasteful and pointless as you have already answered your own question. Investigations, Police, CPS. If you knew all that, why ask?

Post 825
 

That just about says it all I heartily agree!

CAA review terms of reference issued. I note that the MAA will read across any lessons learned into military display regs. It seems, however, that are very few persons with display flying experience on the governance groups.

Airshow Review Terms of Reference | Safety & Risk Management | Operations and Safety

In essence the end of air displays as we have known them, if not eventually stopped all together.

For what it's worth, the commentator at today's Duxford show referred several times to restrictions that were in force due to the proximity of the M11. It was still a thoroughly enjoyable afternoon.

So these guys are going to report early in the new year, or rather well before any final AAIB report and all of the elements in that terms of reference already should have robust process around them so this seems utter idiocy.

Edited to add: The point being of course that this review then becomes a generic overview rather than specific to this accident which then one could question the motives of. i.e. is it simply to have a box ticked by the panel that provides a bill of health to the CAA process that was in place at the time? Of course that is a cynical view but if one looks at CAP403 flying display amendments here:-

http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/CAP%204...l%20events.pdf

and relate that to the AAIB's recommendations from the 2009 G-HURR accident and the CAA's response one wonders how things will get squared with the many parallel human factors cited as issues for this new review.

https://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/factor...%20revised.pdf

Of course they may conclude that current rules are entirely reasonable and then actually nothing should change, although that would depend upon the confidence in decision making thus far.

Pittsextra,
I am not so sure it is idiocy for the CAA report to be produced ahead of the AAIB report.
As has been alluded to elsewhere in this thread, it is possible, and in my view necessary, to split the analysis of this tragedy into two parts:
-What caused the aircraft to crash
-How there came to be a major road junction under it when it did.

Whilst I would expect the AAIB report to address both aspects, it does not seem necessary to wait for their report before addressing the wider issues related to event and display planning. Even from a purely practical perspective, it would be useful to event organisers to have some indication of any changes well before the display season commences.
As to what changes might arise from the CAA review, clearly we will have to wait and see. For sure there will be some, and I would take it as read that the type of language used in the relevant CAA documentation will become considerably more precise and prescriptive than it is at present. As it stands, I would hazard to suggest that it is rather "light" in places, and not least some way off the pace in terms of contemporary thinking and practice in relation to risk management.
That said, I would emphasise that I have no basis for suggesting that there was anything amiss with the planning of the Shoreham Air Show. It does however seem necessary that the actions of those responsible for the planning and risk assessment should be subject to the same level of scrutiny as those of the Pilot

I have no doubt you are right and that the aims are to go some way down the road you suggest in addressing items you suggest being "light" re: risk management. I used the word idiocy for several reasons. The first is what path does that take you down, when many things aviation come down to good judgment?

Take the simple matter of base height, weight, temperature, speed and then factor in the requirement to practice your display. One can see the obvious interplay of factors and if you can't then no doubt your mentor DAE will and can. This isn't rocket science and with good judgment people keep themselves safe. Just how could you try and write a set of rules and regulations for all combinations?

The next question is what does it say about the confidence the CAA has in its own process thus far? When you look at the documentation around flying displays it is inconceivable that this accident would not have been prevented if you take a combination of good judgment and the existing documentation. I know that the hackles will be rising on many peoples neck but I'm doing nothing more sophisticated than taking the same view as fits the majority of all accidents. There are very few new ways to crash.

Finally what could or does this review hope to achieve that the existing format couldn't? Those engaged in this activity professionally have already made up there minds with some degree of certainty why this crash happened and whilst the AAIB report may throw a curved ball its more likely not to (Glasgow helicopter crash - does anyone really expect that to throw up a technical fault, or that it was fuel mismanagement?).

If the CAA wanted to throw resource at this it would be better to aim it toward the AAIB so that reports and follow up become more timely all IMO of course.

Pittsextra
 

My personal view is that the rules are either reasonable or not. If they are reasonable, then someone didn't apply (adequate) reason. The only thing which is certain is that it was entirely unreasonable for 11 people to die.

PittsExtra, you misunderstand the scope and purpose of the CAA review. It is triggered by the Shoreham accident, but not dealing with any specific causal factors pertaining to it. It will review all the supervisory, planning and safety aspects of public displays. This approach is measured, appropriate, timely and expected.

I haven't read the latest TOR for the review, but the early concept was that it should, among other things, conduct an exhaustive review to make sure that the regulations include sufficient measures to mitigate risk in order to reassure the public, but not pre-emptying or impinging on any findings that may or may not later arise from the AAIB investigation.

That is NOT to say that this is PR exercise. It is not. But it is a necessary step following Shoreham. There are areas that some have questioned in recent years, but not necessarily the ones mentioned by certain posters here. The supervision, mentoring and clearance methods are very tight and well respected.

Well in so far that they don't have an official accepted cause but given the elements being investigated by this review when the AAIB investigation is complete it is unlikely that this review has not dealt with ANY of the specific causes.

and

There is a huge contradiction with these two paragraphs without this sentence :-

So why not focus upon those items - whatever they maybe? Thus coming to the point more quickly and more effectively without dancing around the houses and having the wobbles over parts of the current process that until know everyone had the utmost faith in.

Of course the bigger question is if there had been questions over such fundamental areas what, who and why were the barriers to change.

The CAA needs to maintain its credibility and its current issue with "high energy" aerobatics is a worry.... When you pull into the vertical with "high energy" since when was that seen as a bad thing.... until now!

PittsExtra, I need to be be brief here before a morning meeting.

The CAA review will report long before the conclusion of the AAIB investigation. If there is a further release before then that is relevant, they will include that in their considerations. That could significantly prolong the process. The plan now is not to wait for that report but to focus on matters arising from the accident (NOT specifics of causal factors - there is none identified at the moment).

And

And

I didn't say wobbles, I did say not issues being posted here and I didn't say they were issues of safety concern. I get the impression you believe there are flaws in the processes that don't necessarily exist. The review will exmine all aspects anyway, which is always a healthy thing. Don't be disappointed if they don't find fault in the sytem.

I have seen no barrier to change. Changes are implemented openly all the time. What barriers have you become aware of in the display world?

From your earlier post

The professionals I am engaged with most certainly have not.

No causal factors identified yet, we do not know which previous accidents to compare to.

Finally,

The AAIB is independent of the CAA for very good reasons. The AAIB will call for any expert advice or assistance from wherever it considers necessary. The forensic investigation is not something you can simply throw people or money at to speed it up.

Must dash.

I hope that when the CAA report back, they take on board some of the lessons that came from the manner in which they published CAP1145.....

CAP1145: Civil Aviation Authority ? Safety review of offshore public transport helicopter operations in support of the exploitation of oil and gas | Publications | About the CAA

APG, You said earlier that this is more than PR and yet the trigger for this review is entirely driven by their feeling that the public need some comfort. It isn't a surprise that there is a feeling of need to do that, but it is a surprise that they seem less confident in their own process.

I say this because the AAIB recommendation 2009-57 following the accident to G-HURR seemed to suggest that they were comfortable with the current operating requirements and that the forum for change would be the DAE seminars.

So now that isn't adequate? Hence I used the word "wobble", because whilst one outcome maybe to do nothing the very fact there is a review is telling.

The term barriers to change was simply a response to your own point here:-

I'm not able to put words in your mouth as to what those areas are and because you don't say its another one of those "riddle me this" type responses where people hold a view, could have some constructive input but hold back because they don't want to open themselves up, have some feeling of loyalty to those affected or whatever else.

I'm unclear as to why you think forensic investigation is not helped by better resourcing, be that human or capital.

Whilst it is not necessarily a bad thing to conduct a review one can't help but feel it is playing, in part, lip service and too little too late. Regardless of any final outcomes by the AAIB this has already highlighted many elements re: the configuration of the machine, conditions, peoples interpretation of heights as well as the sequence itself that should be obvious potential "gotcha's".

PittsExtra, I get the feeling you have some issues to debate, but I am unclear quite what they may be. I'll put my cards on the table now now and state that I do not and will not expend too much time and effort on any PPRuNe discussion - my initial post in reply to you was purely to help fill in some gaps in your understanding of what is going on (and it's lunchtime - so just deal with any typos in a rushed reply). I am not going to enter into a protracted discussion with you where you simply keep trying to use me to challenge AAIB and CAA processes to some undeclared end. If you care to tell me your role in either regulatory or display activities (and hence, your great interest in this) I could consider further discussion.

I shall reply to your previous response. This time please read and understand instead of drawing incorrect conclusions and trying to misconstrue my words in public.

NO! I said,

I did not say it is "more than PR", I said it was NOT PR." Furthermore I did not say that "trigger for this review is entirely driven by their feeling that the public need some comfort.

How have you reached the conclusion that that is the case?

I cited no barriers - in fact I have explained that I see none. I simply stated that the processes are constantly questioned and reviewed.

Please forgive me for addressing your other points directly and in oerder. I intend no disprespect, it is simply expediency:

Finally:

I don't have AAIB reports at hand, but I think you're refering to the Hurricane crash at the same location. I believe there were four or five recomendations from that accident and all have long since been actioned. And, YES, the AAIB were generally comfortable with the "current operating requirement."

If you would domethe decency of declaring your professional interest in all this, I may continue. For now, I have better things to do.

"I do not and will not expend too much time and effort on any PPRuNe discussion"

Perhaps a temporary hold could be put in place until some official information becomes available?

gr.

The critical segment
 

Having followed this discussion from the beginning with interest, must say I’m dismayed after nearly two weeks’ absence to find it has descended into recrimination and arguments over aspects of litigation. Informed speculation on the causes of an accident may not be universally popular; on its possible legal implications rather less so. Maybe it’s time to try and buck that trend, and get back to the flying?

Despite lack of fast-jet or aerobatics credentials, I’m going to give in to temptation by attempting briefly to summarise what appear to be the key points leading up to this accident, and offer a couple of speculative ideas for the consideration of the real aeronauts here.

Whatever the pilot’s intention during the climb, at some point while still inverted after going over the top he became committed to completing a looping manoeuvre. The mystery, therefore, seems to be the discrepancy between the pitch-rate (low) and the surplus height available (none, or minimal) during the intermediate segment of the looping descent.

That leads one to ask: was the low pitch-rate intentional or unintentional?

If unintentional, was it caused by a flight-control problem or pilot incapacitation? If the former, was it a system failure or a restriction in the movement of the stick?

If intentional, did the pilot underestimate the height needed for such a recovery, or overestimate the height available? The former is implausible, which leaves the unlikely possibility that he simply did not know how little height there was.

We are told that there are three altimeters in the cockpit, but I imagine the pilot would only be using one of them for the display. Is it possible that distraction or dazzle might have prevented him from reading it while going over the top? Subsequently, if so, he might have been relying on visual cues to keep track of progress in the descending half-loop. Finally, could the normal visual cues at that early part of the descent have somehow misled him into overestimating his height?

From Chris Scott:

'Despite lack of fast-jet or aerobatics credentials.....
Whatever the pilot’s intention during the climb, at some point while still inverted after going over the top he became committed to completing a looping manoeuvre.'

Well Chris, I have flown the Hunter solo and obviously perform aerobatics. Much speculation has been made of this tragic incident, but though we know a few facts, we do not know everything or why it occurred. Hopefully we will as I am told that the pilot is at home and in reasonably good shape. Obviously, that is merely hearsay and may not be true. Whatever, Chris, with regard to your comment 'while still inverted after going over the top he became committed' I'm sure that if he realised he was in trouble, he would have rolled the right way up and aborted the manoeuvre. Thus he was either incapacitated or unaware of the danger. Andy was a great pilot and obviously would not have performed any manoeuvre that he thought would end in disaster.

Or there was a technical malfunction, control restriction, distraction, physiological problem, etc, etc, etc. More assumption. Surprising after your correct comment about not knowing the facts or cause.

WAS a great pilot?