Typhoons Need Midair Collision Avoidance System, Safety Officials Say
 

Typhoons Need Midair Collision Avoidance System, Safety Officials Say

LONDON – Military air safety officials have described as "unsustainable" a decision not to install an airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS) on the Royal Air Force’s (RAF) fleet of Eurofighter Typhoons.

In its annual safety report from last August – made public on Jan. 13, the director general of the U.K. Military Aviation Authority (MAA), Air Marshal Richard Garwood, said that an airborne collision warning system for the Typhoon needed to be pursued with "great haste," particularly in light of the MAA’s findings in the midair collision of two Panavia Tornado GR4s in Scotland in July 2012. Three airmen were killed.

The MAA’s report on the crash criticized the U.K. defense ministry for "consistently deferring, reprogramming and reprioritizing the introduction of a collision warning system for the aircraft." The U.K. Tornado fleet is finally getting such a system, but only four years before the type exits service and after the loss of more than 40 lives in midair collisions alone since the Tornado’s introduction to service.

Garwood said that Defense Science and Technology Laboratory studies showed the Typhoon was potentially at a higher risk of midair collision because of its role and performance levels. The report says that the aircraft is perhaps the most likely – though improbable – of the U.K.’s fast jet aircraft to potentially collide with a commercial aircraft, and that under U.K. health and safety rules, any event that killed 50 people or more would have "adverse repercussions for the institution responsible – in this case, the government of the day."

Garwood says that he has informed Secretary of State for Defense Michael Fallon of his concerns, adding "ultimately, the Typhoon will be [in] service for many years and if the MoD [defense ministry] elects not to fit an ACAS, the decision will need to be well documented and the risk held at the highest levels of defense."

In addition, the report raises concerns that the F-35 Lightning II also does not have an ACAS. "We must also be clear on how this capability might be delivered on (F-35) Lightning II, which will provide a whole range of technical and JSF partner-related challenges to any potential program," Garwood writes.

The U.K. Airprox Board, which reports and advises on near misses between aircraft in British airspace, reports there were 14 incidents between U.K. military and commercial aircraft, one of which was reported as posing a real risk of collision.

Responding to the report, the U.K. defense ministry said it was acting on its comments and recommendations and that a concept phase for a collision warning system on the Typhoon was already underway, due for completion in April. "Funding to support full embodiment of the recommended system for the Typhoon is currently being assessed within the ABC [activity-based-costing] 15 financial approvals process," the ministry says, while such a system for the F-35 would be subject to lobbying for inclusion "at a suitable juncture within the JSF program." It adds that such a system would likely be U.K. unique and probably increase the project’s cost.

Major investments in collision avoidance systems for the U.K.’s helicopter fleet are already underway, with much of the front-line helicopter fleet due to be retrofitted by late 2017.

For the second year in a row, Garwood has also warned about the lack of suitably qualified and experienced personnel in aircraft engineering trades. The report also describes a psychological impact of crews coming back from Afghanistan who no longer have to deal with in-theater battlefield threats, but may take flying risks to seek what the report calls "inappropriate stimulation through their flying activities."

The report also alludes to the loss of the Airbus Zephyr pseudo satellite as being the subject of an MAA investigation, but details of when and where the incident occurred have been redacted. The U.K. defense ministry was testing the Zephyr in the winter in the Southern Hemisphere to prove the system’s ability to operate during shorter winter days.

Having flown with TCAS in 'fast jets' for a couple of years now, I wouldn't fly without it. It must be considered as a 'no go' item if u/s. It is beyond comprehension that it is not mandatory on all Service aircraft.

It beggars belief. A Tucano collided with a Police helicopter near Wookey in Somerset in 1997 and still nothing has been fitted to RAF jets.

TCAS saved us at FL330 over Germany in a B747 when, another transport, on a plan view collision course was cleared to FL320 and - well, you've guessed already :ooh:

I now fly air ambulance in the southern lake district, you have NO idea how close a FJ looks as it flies over you as you are landing.........

The Director General of the MAA should not be pleading with the Military Air Operator (the MOD) to fit such an essential safety system as TCAS, he should be compelling it to do so. The reason he cannot do so of course is that the MAA is a subsidiary of the MOD, and just as bizarrely the MilAAIB is a subsidiary of the MAA. Unless and until all three are separate and independent of each other, the MOD can do, or not do, as it pleases.

As to the severe shortages of qualified and experienced personnel in RAF Engineering Trades, there is an even greater shortage of engineers, both Service and CS, qualified and experienced in airworthiness provision. As the DG well knows, that was as a direct result of the MOD's deliberate policy of replacing them with unqualified and inexperienced non-engineers in Haddon-Cave's so called 'Golden Period'. Why doesn't he say so? Because the MAA is a subsidiary of the MOD!

Granted, but at least Dick is making it as plain as possible that any accidents are on the Minister's head.

Chug

You repeatedly state that the MOD, MAA and MilAAIB must be separate and independent of each other. For civil aviation, the AAIB and CAA are independent of each other but both belong to the Dept of Transport and answer to the same minister. (Yes, EASA is an added layer, but it is DofT that acts on behalf of the State with EASA, not the CAA.)

I am not quite clear how you think an independent MAA would be able to compel the MOD - a Department of State - without elevating its ownership to Cabinet level. And if you put the MAA with the CAA in DofT, you then have the spectacle of an OGD telling the MOD what its spending priorities are, which would definitely not be a good thing. This is not the same as Treasury having a say in affordability or budgetary control.

I can see there may be an argument for separating the MilAAIB from the MAA, though again I am not sure where you would put it, but you still end up with the risk being held by SofS as the point where all this meets.

For now, you have an MAA (and a DG prepared to say what he thinks) that is at least independent of the single Services and answerable through PUS to SofS. I do not see how you are going to get a better arrangement by taking the regulatory function outside the MOD, when control of their own specialist regulation is a core function of all Govt Departments.

I think what we may all be agreed on is that key safety measures should be treated separately within the overall resourcing process.

ff

Well done Distant Voice. Further proof, in any is needed, that the MoD/MAA need look no further than pprune for its Corporate Knowledge.

Well said Chug.

Well said Dick Garwood, although an acknowledgement that (a) you're simply repeating evidence to Haddon-Cave and Lord Philip and (b) it was the RAF's Chief Engineer who began the decimation and marginalisation of engineering posts in 1991, wouldn't have gone amiss.

Why so long to release the report? Coincidence that last week the chair of the HoC Defence Committee (Rory Stewart MP) called forward a report into another accident, which made all the above points and was summed up by one be-knighted MP as "I fear we are faced with another Chinook situation"?



Well said. Yet another old policy ditched by the RAF Chief Engineer in 1991! Resurrection was recommended to DPA's DCE in January 2000, and again to H-C and Philip. Hopefully the MAA will change its mind and support you. So far, they've sided with their MoD bosses.

Fortissimo:-
I repeatedly say so because the MOD and its subsidiary, the RAF, have repeatedly demonstrated their ability and willingness to subvert the Regulatory and Investigation processes (which are presently vested in the MAA and the MilAAIB).

You cite the DoT as an exemplar but of course they are not a major operator as is the MOD, let alone an air operator. I notice though that even then the DoT contains executive agencies, the DVLA and the DVSA (Driver & Vehicle Safety Agency). If the MAA and MilAAIB were outwith the MOD but responsible to the SoS for Defence (who could thus be briefed by them as well as by the MOD) perhaps a lot of the disinformation that is the MOD's forte could be confronted.

I do not know what the answer to this bureaucratic tangle is, it's well above my pay grade, but lives have been lost, much money wasted, and defence capability compromised or completely lost. Trenchard came up with a solution to a similar dilemma nearly 100 years ago. Time perhaps for another Trenchard to appear? Is there such a one?

:mad:

What if it kills 40?

Transponders with Mode S have been around for years and are not that expensive. If security is a problem, Mode 5 (a cryptographically secure version of mode S) transponders are available for not much more. A single mid air collison prevented will more than pay for all the transponders.

Yes but in civilian aviation, the regulatory bodies (CAA, EASA, AAIB etc) are completely independent of the aircraft operators. This is not the case with the MAA.

One word of caution; Transponders and TCAS/NDS-B will not stop Mid Airs from happening. An awful lot of users in Class G airspace (light aircraft, gliders, microlights etc) don't have a transponder, and are often the hardest to acquire visually. TCAS is a massive improvement, but it is not a total solution.

Ok, so the inevitable argument for a totally independent MAA rears its head again, but putting that to one side for now and focussing on the system we currently have to work with, what Dick Garwood has done is clearly put the responsibility for the next none-TCAS equipped RAF FJ mid-air squarely on the shoulders of the Defence Minister. Which is where it should lie. It's his decision, put up or take responsibility.

Yes, the RAF have delayed, prevaricated and delayed again, but surely this is an example of exactly how the MAA can put pressure on specific people outside their domain?

JMHO.

Herod

Quite right.

Make no mistake, there are some in MoD who chose to interpret this HSE definition as meaning MoD don't need to bother if the aircraft holds under 50. The same people who continue to advise Ministers that, if a safety related fault or defect is identified in an aircraft, only that tail number need be fixed.

But well done, again, Dick Garwood for daring to voice these opinions. And, of course, they only are opinions, because the MAA does not get funding to mitigate the risks, so is really only a monitor, not a true Authority (or manager or leader). As it took great delight in pointing out during the Mull Review when asked by Minister about safety. I wonder if DG will now ask his MoD masters and Ministers to change the official line that only one MoD employee has thought it proper to have safe aircraft, and that this employee was utterly wrong. A line reiterated last year, yet again, by DE&S Secretariat. And copied to the MAA.


Para 9 Slightly odd wording. Surely he'd just phone CAS and ask "Have you written to SoS?", and then make a firm statement in the report?

My main concern upon reading this report? Reinventing the wheel. Does his staff not know that many of the intiatives are mandated policy? The section on Def Stan 00-970 completely ignores the fact 00-970 was mandated in every aircraft related contract by Controller Aircraft. The problem is that direct entrants to MoD (the majority now) have been taught for over 20 years that no Def Stan is mandated. Trouble is, they use this as an opportunity to save money, by removing the standard from the contract and allowing the contractor to deliver sub-standard designs. There is no appreciation that if you waive one relevant standard, you must invoke another, because standards are one of the 4 pillars of airworthiness (along with Compliance, Independence and a Safety Management System).


Ah, Independence. Defined by MoD as;

“Being commercially and managerially independent of the (insert body) both to preserve objectivity and to minimise pressure for premature acceptance.”


Does the MAA satisfy this definition?

Err, Tucano has got TCAS I fitted - for about the last 10 years or so! See page 6 of the following link:

http://www.raf.mod.uk/downloads/RAFp...a_vol3_no4.pdf

As for Typhoon, it rarely flies at low level as it p!sses fuel out the back! It has a good air-to-air RADAR that allows it to detect other aircraft and this is coupled to an interrorgator that can detect Mode A (Mode 3) and Mode S. It has an IRST that can also spot anti-col lights, engine heat and aircraft-in-poor-weather. So TCAS would only really augment a good amount of sensors anyway. Also, as some have already pointed out, TCAS will only detect those that transpond - the primary means for all aircraft avoidance in Class G is 'See and Avoid' until the Air Navigation Order mandates transponder carriage in all aircraft in Class G. The lookout in Typhoon is better than many FJs.

So I would say that this is a nice-to-have rather than a must-be-fitted item. I applaud AVM Dick for raising this, but if it means slowing up operational capability (like a full weapons drop clearance), and there is a finite pot of money, then TCAS/ACAS should wait in my opinion.

Lj

Genuine question, what mil fast jets have TCAS?:8

So when did ANNUAL BUDGET CYCLE change its name then! :ugh:

LJ :cool:

Hawk T2 has it fitted, I believe?

LJ

Downsizer
 

The Hawk T2 has TCAS. It has it's limitations but it has proved its worth several times over already.
BV:ok:

Tcas (especially the latest versions)is such a good system it would be foolhardy & almost criminally negligent NOT to fit it to any mil aircraft that are capable of carrying it. Obviously it has its limitations & does not remove the need for a good lookout, but it is another layer (and a thick layer it is) of safety that is always welcome.

Having flown military aircraft with and without TCAS, I am not convinced that it is so obvious.
It is quite good for your SA, and definitely helps you achieve visual contact with other aircraft, however it leads to complacency in my opinion, and the RA has no relevance to military flying. It is vastly over cautious for military operations and essentially puts a stop to all normal military operations with multiple aircraft.

Everybody's first thought is always "it wants me to manuever for that tiny aircraft in the distance?!?! Ridiculous!!"
A military optimised system would have to be developed that could cope with an aircraft that can move like a Typhoon or it would be pointless.
TCAS is designed for airliners and it is reasonably good at that, though it still leads to lookout complacency.

As always, the aim must be kept in mind.
The ultimate aim of the military is operational effectiveness, not safety.
Just because fitting TCAS might reduce collisions with civil aircraft is not enough of a reason in itself to fit it if in doing so we reduce our ability to operate multiple aircraft in close proximity.
Stopping flying altogether would have an even better effect on safety.....

Which I think is quite attractive to some people.

These are all perfectly valid points.

What would concern me is, despite the raft of sensors listed, it remains stated MoD policy that they need not be properly integrated and proven functionally safe before being released for training or operational use. This basic requirement has been fully funded on every programme I've ever known (so lack of funding isn't an issue), but the Gods have consistently ruled it can be waived if it means meeting time. Or chopped if something else runs over budget. This remains common today in MoD, as many here will confirm.

This all comes under Technology and System Integration Maturity. Just look at the losses we've had because of FLAT REFUSAL to attain such maturity, with FALSE declarations made that it has been achieved. Tornado ZG710. Chinook ZD576. Sea Kings XV650 & 704 (a mid-air). And so on. The Wg Cdr Spry thread says it all. The MAA can't even get the basic definitions right, so what chance the job being done properly.

Sorry, I do not react well when two 2 Stars tell me to my face that they do not care about the risk of collision, that they'll look at it again if it happens. And when it happened, they still did nothing. This is the background one needs to appreciate when reading Dick Garwood's report. I'd bet my house no-one told him of it.


The point you miss is that false declarations have been made to the effect aircraft are safe, when they were not. That is completely different from you being told the truth and being able to make allowances and informed decisions.

You're ex-RN. You lost 7 colleagues in 2003. The 3 main contributory factors noted by the BoI wholly coincided with the 3 main areas of degradation between the AEW Mk2 and ASaC Mk7. That degradation was not noted in the RTS. All 3 directly and adversely affected collision avoidance. All 3 had been recognised years before and mitigation put in hand. All 3 were cancelled. Not replaced by alternate mitigation, but CANCELLED because someone (an unqualified civilian who had self-delegated airworthiness authority - again, something Dick Garwood doesn't mention because it would open MoD to legal action) decided the risk would only be addressed if the risks materialised. When they did, 7 died. THAT ethos is what concerns me.

Tuc

Give it a rest.
Your knowledge of military aviation in general and Seaking ops in particular reminds me of reading the Far East air crash threads. Lots of well intentioned amateurs who are very knowledgeable in areas that have some tertiary relevance to aviation, but totally lacking in the big picture and spout bollocks.
In your case I honestly think you believe the process is more important than the end result.
Military flying can be safe or effective. I have yet to see any evidence it can be both.

Question... Does TCAS keep firing off if flying as a 2 (or more) ship at the same altitude? If so, then surely is it only good for individual aircraft?

Thanks Tourist.

Why don't you tell me what was incorrect about my post, instead of denigrating someone who wants you to have a safe aircraft.

First, I recommend you read the BoI and RNFSAIC and understand what they got wrong because information was withheld or they didn't understand. But more importantly, read the report on the investigation conducted in Jan/Feb 2004 that MoD denies took place. That denial is key.

And please tell us what process YOU would like to see undertaken to ensure your aircraft are safe as reasonably possible and fit for purpose. You obviously disagree with the regulations but never say why.

That you apparently don't want or need a safe aircraft puzzles more than a few here. The comment about my experience, in safety and airworthiness, having tertiary relevance to aviation is a cracker. Without it, you can have no aircraft to fly. Or are you saying we should ignore the subject altogether? That would please many in MoD!

See and avoid 1980
 

Mil Low Flying in W-Germany 1980 was 90.000 hours (slow and fast movers)
Mil Low Flying was possible on 120 days (WX, holidays).
That gives 750 Mil LL hours/ day.
About 100 military aircraft in LL / hour.
Dispersed over about a 1/4 of the BRD (airspace, ADIZ, WX, Notams)
In an altitude band from 250-1500 feet AGL
Accumulating in good WX areas (where civil traffic was flying as well)
No advisory service, no TCAS, no IFF, limited on board radar, no coordination.

How did we survive?

Today the traffic is about 1/20 of those figures in much more airspace (W+E- Germany), think they would compare to other western nations as well.

ilitary traffic maybe... but civilian traffic has increased...

Tuc

You consistently and deliberately overstate findings from the board to give the impression that they were the cause of the accident whereas in reality they were errors in process.

You are always excited about the Mk7 HISL because it was never properly trialled on the Mk7.

The fact that it was properly trialled on the Mk6 means nothing to you, because they are as far as you are concerned different aircraft.

Do you know how long the conversion course is for a pilot from the Mk6 to the Mk7?

The answer will give you a clue as to importance of a Mk7 HISL trial.

The fact that you state that without a safety and airworthiness dept there would be no aircraft shows how far from the pointy end you are.
You are aware that we had aircraft before safety and airworthiness even existed?

I fully support whichever senior officers have repeatedly blanked/ignored you. Despite your obvious best intentions (I'm sure you are a lovely bloke), you would have negative influence on operational capability and have no business in military aviation.

I do actually believe that safety and airworthiness are important, but they are a long way from the most important aspect of any effective military.

Incidentally, for those who think that F35 is naked without TCAS, go and have a little look at the open source info on the F35 systems and have a think for a moment.

Something else to think on is of course that TCAS is only useful in peacetime for obvious reasons, and TCAS has the unfortunate effect of making people trust and rely on it. This is a bad thing in wartime when it is suddenly turned off....
Train as you fight.

TCAS RA is designed to remove thought and decision making from the pilot.

In civil aircraft I think this is a great idea implemented quite badly.

The system tells the pilot what he must do to avoid the other aircraft by the proscribed margin.
He is also told that he is not to think, not to look but just to obey instinctively.

Personally, If that is the way you want to go I have never understood why the pilot is not removed from the scenario altogether.
If the pilot is to be merely a conduit, then he can only add errors.
Remove him from the system.
Let the autopilot control the TCAS RA. It's what they are good at. It's only a gentle climb, gentle, descent or level.
Funnily enough, TCAS RAs in the civil world are handled extraordinarily badly. On of the UKs largest carriers admits to a less than 50% rate of correctly handled TCAS RAs.
Fortunately, there are quite correctly huge margins built into the system to protect the soft bodies of passengers.

My personal opinion is that this sort of thing has no place in a military aircraft. The pilot should make the decisions or why is he even there, plus why limit yourself to height change only?
Even the transport fleet will have to turn off the TCAS in wartime so best not to get used to relying on it.

By the same token they'll have to switch off their HISLs and Nav Lights, so best to not get used to them either, Tourist?

Your Lord Flashheart's dialogue no doubt goes down well with the 20 minuters, but that is rather the point isn't it? The "Safety and Airworthiness" people, whom you speak of so dismissively, seek to extend those 20 minutes to allow you to at least close with the enemy and destroy him or be destroyed. A rather more meaningful outcome than colliding with another of your own side, spontaneously exploding, suffering a UFCM, getting blown out of the sky by a Blue on Blue SAM, or any other airworthiness associated nasties on the way there. At least I would have thought so, though perhaps you don't...

Chugalug

Taking your comments at face value for a minute.

HISLs and Anti Cols on my aircraft don't in any way affect the way I operate. I cannot see them. They enable others to see me.
Thus they don't require me to change my procedures whether they are on or off.
Thus they are all gain when available and no pain in procedure/skills changing.

TCAS, as any pilot knows, is good enough that you start to rely on it. I think that subconsciously you start to trust it and your lookout gets worse. Perhaps not everybody, but certainly me. I am back to flying an aircraft without TCAS at the moment and I have had to really work on getting my lookout back up to speed.

I, like you, firmly believe that safety and airworthiness has an important role to play. The difference is that I don't think that it should rule the roost. Operational effectiveness should be the god we worship, not safety at all costs.

I can tell that my lack of worship of safety and airworthiness dept irks you, but please don't imagine that being referred to as a twenty minuter upsets me for a moment. If only I had the balls.

I have cited the findings of the BoI. In the past YOU have called into question the competence of the Board members. I share SOME of your concerns. I have questioned why vital information was withheld from them that proved, beyond any doubt, that the 3 main contributory factors THEY cited were also the 3 main areas of degradation between Mk2 and Mk7. That is a simple fact. Had the BoI been aware, I like to think they'd have altered some of their findings and placed emphasis elsewhere.

Again, the BoI cited HISL, not I. I followed the evidence that showed, again, the BoI were not told that HISL was not permitted in the aircraft and the process (yes!) whereby only properly authorised staffs are permitted to accept the design was systematically abused by a non-technical civilian, who self-delegated an authority to dictate and approve (!) the design.
Read the reports. HISL was never endorsed by the RN, but a late decision was made to fit it AFTER trials had commenced. That is one long way into the programme, and some 6 years after the contractor was instructed by the RN that HISL would NOT be in the design. Contrary to what MoD now claim, photographic evidence proves it was not fitted to the first Trials Aircraft. Why not? Because there was no requirement and the aircraft was delivered without it! Very simple, verifiable facts.



Also, you confuse the HISL lights themselves with the Installation Design. The lights are fine in isolation, although most would say the wrong type were fitted. (I’d speculate the dimmable ones would have been more suitable, to avoid having to switch them off, but trials would determine that). The installation is very different in form, fit and use to the Mk2 (again, MoD claim HISL is exactly the same as Mk2’s red/rotating ACLs – it isn’t, by a long way), therefore trials are required to establish performance and limitations. (Sorry, not my rules, mandated by SofS). The BoI conducted such a trial and found the installation design, not the lights, wanting. By the way, testing (not trials) determined a serious EMC failure caused by DHSA's installation.


You say there was a Mk6 trial and I cannot disagree as I wasn’t there, but why then did DHSA REFUSE to provide any evidence of these trials when it was requested; or evidence that the trials results had been incorporated into the Mk2 Safety Case and RTS? If the Mk2/6 Authority (DHSA) refuses to provide this safety evidence, then the Mk7 Authority (the PE programme manager) has NOTHING to read across from! You may be able to help there – do you know why DHSA would not provide such evidence? The 2004 investigator, your fellow officer (Lt Cdr John B#####ll), could not find it either and was told by the very same people (by now the Sea King IPT) that they knew NOTHING of HISL or why it was fitted to Mk7. Think about that. He could find no reference whatsoever to HISL in the files of the Sea King IPT at Yeovilton. Now ask why MoD deny this investigation took place!

Haven’t a clue. The question at the time would have been conversion between Mk2 and Mk7. There were significant differences in form, fit, function and use, so I assume some conversion was needed; not least because the final decision had been made on who controlled swing arm deployment. Also, it took much longer to determine if “No Go” equipment was working, so when (and where!) was the new No Go/Abort decision point made? Perhaps you could say why, throughout the programme, the RN insisted that the entire FAE of Mk2s, plus the additional 5 aircraft, and all aircrew, would be converted over a single week-end. That was utterly deranged, and it lies at the root why your ASE then withdrew altogether from the programme in 1995. In the event, both Marks were in service together for about 3 years. That’s a hell of a miscalculation. You ask a good question, but mine is a cracker.

Given the above, and that the Mk2 TI aircraft pitched up without HISL, then one assumes the conversion would include use of HISL, and operating with it at night. But because HISL was NOT required, there were no night flying trials scheduled.

Just because MoD only mandated Safety Cases for modifications (e.g. Mk2 to Mk7) in the early 90s, doesn’t mean it was ignored before that. It was simply called the Safety Argument, and probably something similar for decades before. You misunderstand engineering if you think someone suddenly recently dreamed up safety of design and aircraft certification.

You fully support the officers who made false declarations that military aircraft were safe and compliant, knowing they were not? Your prerogative but forgive me if I don’t break the law. They're allowed to, I'm not.



You misunderstand airworthiness and fitness for purpose. That is not a criticism; the MAA/MoD are the same. Attaining airworthiness should be largely invisible to you, and for a long time was. What you see discussed now is only because the senior officers you support decided not to bother, so it came to the fore when aircrew died in what MoD (not me) stated were airworthiness related accidents. The catalyst was the raft of Chinook losses that led to CHART in 1992. Read the very first paragraph. Like many, when you talk about “airworthiness” you actually mean Fitness for Purpose. By definition, attaining airworthiness must precede FFP. Without airworthiness certification, you simply do not see the aircraft. (Chinook Mk2 being the obvious exception!). But I’m afraid you do get aircraft that are improperly certified. The Mk7 is a good example; the RTS in 2003 was error-strewn. I would like the process you hate to be largely invisible to you again, because that would mean the regulations have been implemented. Leaving you to make other difficult decisions on FFP.

Again, a total lack of understanding.

Do you know what a Mk7 pilot is?

A Mk7 pilot of the crash era is a Mk5/6 pilot that pissed off the appointer and has to spend a tour in purgatory bagging before being allowed to escape. From the pilots perspective it's just a pinger with the fun/interesting stuff and somebody to chat to removed.

Mk7 pilots might come from a Mk2 (if they had really pissed off the appointer!)but more likely from a mk5/6

I know what a HISL is. I have flown Seakings with them and without them. I don't need a trial to know what they do and how they work. They are a flashing light.

Empires can get out of hand, and safety and airworthiness is just such an empire.

New Airbus' do (including RW EC225s). Why spill your coffee, drop your paper and disconnect the AP when it'll do it for you? :E:E (fly the RA that is, not drop your coffee....)

212man

That's good to know! About time. Seems crazy the old system.

A Safety and Airworthiness Empire? Yer avin a larf, aintcha? The whole point of tuc's testimony is that the process of UK Military Airworthiness provision was broken (mainly by RAF VSO's I'm sad to say, though hopefully that makes your day Tourist) in the early 90's.

So what, that's decades ago, time has moved on and so have we, etc etc. Unfortunately the short term gains that those idiots sought then came at the price of the loss of corporate knowledge, never mind the poor sods who paid the price in resultant fatal air accidents. The MAA doesn't do Airworthiness because it doesn't understand it. It may bother you with lots of form filling, courses, papers, definitions, etc, etc. Unfortunately those are the actions of a bureaucracy, not an Authority (because they have none!). Some Empire, if only!

As tuc says, all this stuff should be invisible. It is part of Air Safety when all you should be concerned about is the other part of Air Safety which is Flight Safety. That is all I had to concern myself with as a Sqn FSO back, ...well a long time ago. The reason why the Mk10 seat that killed Flt Lt Cunningham never had a Safety Case was because of the deliberate sabotage carried out against the Royal Air Force by its own Very Senior Officers, and you say that they have your full support? Says it all really.

Chug

More silly rhetoric.

I'm not surprised you get ignored.
In amongst the explosion of words you two produce at the drop of a hat are no doubt some reasonable points in your areas of knowledge. You lose all credibility when you stray into others areas and talk about sabotage.
Sabotage is deliberately damaging to the service.
I don't know the rights or wrongs of the case to which you refer, in fact I know nothing about it, however I am entirely 100% sure that if mistakes/breaks from the rules were made they were well intentioned in what the person or persons thought were the best interests of the service.
To suggest otherwise is childish.