Also, it took much longer to determine if “No Go” equipment was working, so when (and where!) was the new No Go/Abort decision point made? Pretty good question from someone who knows nothing about how aircraft operate. As usual, tourist prefers personal insult over substance. The reports tuc alludes to admit the aircraft leaving the carrier didn't have functioning radar, jtids or iff and half the comms weren't yet working. All were No Go kit. So when is the decision made? The same reports say this was all new kit in the Mk7 so the decision process must have been different. If they'd aborted early, they wouldn't have collided. Not blaming any crew but would want to know what they were taught, or was the conversion course as brief as Tourist implies. |
To be fair, I accept Tourist knows more about operating aircraft than me. Of course he does. The difference is, when I spot an obvious question like that I ask those who should know, I don't dictate the answer. Nor do I automatically rubbish them if they provide an answer I don't understand. I await an answer, or an opinion, by the way. Should be a no-brainer to a Sea King operator who is wholly familiar with all those new systems and changes in operating procedures brought about by a completely different Statement Operating Intent and Usage. Or maybe not, given the necessary contract was cancelled on the grounds they should just make up procedures on the fly!
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if mistakes/breaks from the rules were made they were well intentioned in what the person or persons thought were the best interests of the service. |
Tuc
The problem with your posts on your pet crusade are that sometimes I find myself reading them and nodding along because of the work you put into them....... And then I balance that against the one area of which you talk where I have some knowledge and I find you twisting reality to fit your opinions and I doubt the rest of it all... |
Dervish
This again just like the enthusiastic amateur crash investigation threads. You don't even know what is relevant! IFF u/s you say. Don't think anybody is getting airborne without mode 4 at that point. Get shot down by red crown pretty quick methinks. IFF on off broken fixed who cares! Why would that be relevant? Do you think that any of the other helicopters even had the ability to see an IFF? Or had TCAS. Or were even radiating!? Radar not functioning. Hmm. Really? An aircraft that has only one purpose which is to be an airborne radar and they were going flying without the radar? I think not. Did it perhaps have limited functionality? This might seem like a strange question to someone with no knowledge of maritime ops. Let's assume for the sake of argument that the bagger was getting airborne without a serviceable radar. For fun maybe. How exactly do you think that this would affect the collision? What do you think that radar does/is good for? An aircraft with u/s JTIDS, u/s radar is no more dangerous than all the other aircraft in the air that day not fitted with JTIDS or radar.... |
Accepted tuc. I’ve got a few questions of my own I don’t understand but Tourist will know. Lifted these from the report as I don’t really understand them myself.
Why did the Board criticise the crew for not seeking a Radar Advisory Service despite the RTS forbidding it? Could a carrier provide a RAS if it didn’t have IFF and the aircraft didn’t have radar or IFF? Why did the RTS allow use of NVG when the aircraft wasn't fitted for it? They weren’t using NVG but the problem I see is the Board didn’t know what the RTS said and recommended its use is considered. Lots of similar questions come out of that report and it bothers me no one seems to have asked them before. All collision related so not thread drift. |
Radar not functioning. Hmm. Really? An aircraft that has only one purpose which is to be an airborne radar and they were going flying without the radar? I think not. Did it perhaps have limited functionality? Puzzled you keep denying MoD have said things in open source reports. |
Ah, that's more like it.
So, the radar was not u/s as stated, it just wasn't up and running yet. The IFF was perfectly servicable. The Radar was not able to see IFF yet because it was not up and running yet. JTIDS voice has no possible bearing on the accident. The pilots would not be on it anyway. UHF voice was obviously working because they were talking to the ship. So in the space of a few posts we have gone from:- Radar IFF and JTIDS u/s To:- Radar not turned fully on yet IFF perfectly servicable JTIDS generally servicable and nothing to do with anything anyway. This is exactly what I'm talking about. Attempts to skew reality. It no wonder you get ignored. Let's talk further about it. Exactly when would a helicopter turn on the radar on leaving the ship in an operational scenario? Do you imagine under normal circumstances a helicopter turns on the radar at takeoff? Can you just for a moment imagine that we have developed procedures that allow aircraft in and out with the radars, IFF, HISLs off so as not to give the position of the carrier away? Is there another helicopter in the entire British military that even had the capability to see other IFF? Do you honestly think that radar in the military is like on telly where a little blip on the screen moves towards you and you tell the pilot and he makes a miraculous manuever and all is well? This does seem like a personal attack, but that is purely because this is a personal and misguided crusade rather than a topic for discussion. |
the radar was not u/s as stated, |
Based on MoD’s reports and admittedly with my non-aircrew limitations;
I FF u/s you say. Don't think anybody is getting airborne without mode 4 at that point. Get shot down by red crown pretty quick methinks. IFF on off broken fixed who cares! First you say no-one would get airborne without Mode 4, then Who Cares if it isn’t working. The Tornado crew got airborne because they thought it ok, and died not knowing it wasn’t. Why would that be relevant? Do you think that any of the other helicopters even had the ability to see an IFF? Or had TCAS. Or were even radiating!? Radar not functioning. Hmm. Really? An aircraft that has only one purpose which is to be an airborne radar and they were going flying without the radar? I think not. Did it perhaps have limited functionality? This might seem like a strange question to someone with no knowledge of maritime ops. Let's assume for the sake of argument that the bagger was getting airborne without a serviceable radar. For fun maybe. How exactly do you think that this would affect the collision? What do you think that radar does/is good for? An aircraft with u/s JTIDS, u/s radar is no more dangerous than all the other aircraft in the air that day not fitted with JTIDS or radar... And had they trained for this yet in both Full Mission Trainer and Sim, given the RTS only provided a Switch On Only clearance (“not to be relied upon in any way whatsoever”)? I’ll be honest and say I think this was an error, but it’s a hell of an error to make in the Master Airworthiness Reference and indicative of this entire area not being managed properly. The Mk7 differs enormously from the Mk2. Both RadHaz and time to initiate software meant the radar could never be fully operational deck to deck. Essentially, the Mk2 could radiate as soon as the interlocks were freed when the swing arm deployed. But the Mk7 would have to wait longer. The BoI refers to this at length. What is also clear from the reports is that in certain respects the ship’s procedures hadn’t changed from Mk2, despite the aircraft form, fit, function and use being completely different. The need to change designation from AEW Mk2 to AEW Mk7 (ASaC was a late affectation) was THE big clue. Here’s another question for you. Why do you think the Comms/GPS passed full integration testing and trials in 2000, yet in 2003 Time of Day was not integrated with UHF radios? Who agreed to de-specify or de-modify the aircraft to such an extent? And were the Trainer, Sim and Aircraft Specifications (and hence Safety Case) modified to reflect this new Build Standard? Was there a problem with Time of Day in general? Bearing in mind the GPS was only capable of providing 2 ToD loads without a Buffer Unit, was this Buffer unit serviceable, or even fitted? In which case JTIDS, IFF and/or Comms may not work or have intermittent problems. When trying to load software, does the routine include looking for and verifying ToD? If there was a problem, that MAY explain why JTIDS didn’t load. Just a thought, not addressed by MoD. Edit UHF voice was obviously working because they were talking to the ship. |
Sometimes I want to give up.....
One last try. Both the pilots were pingers by trade. That means that they were trained from the crib to operate from carriers in a Mk6 Mk6 normal ops would be to lift from a carrier with the radar off. Lights off. Radio silent. IFF mode4 only. No JTIDS. The loss of all those items would not be a big deal. It's normal ops. Even radar on in a MK6 it is blind in the front aspect would you believe. On this flight, they were nav lights on, lower HISL off, (normal with both the controversial HISL and the previous strobe due to distracting reflections off the sea) radio on, two way comms with the ship. Hardly operating outside their comfort zone. Was everything thing perfect? No, they were constrained in their use of height separation which is not ideal, but these things happen operationally. IFF is necessary to not get shot down or even be allowed into the operational area but had no effect on the accident, thus who cares. Re the JTIDS. DONT CARE! Nothing to do with me flying the aircraft. Re operational on the deck DONT CARE Nothing to do with me flying the aircraft. Your points are all about bagging capability which is irrelevant, not flying the airframe safely which is relevant. |
Tourist, I have no problem with what you've just said. But I sincerely do recommend you read the reports.
previous strobe due to distracting reflections Of course, the irony is that FLEET's stance means they disagreed with the Service Deviation permitting lower forward to be switched off if the pilot saw reflected light. According to them, the reflected light had to be ignored. Glad you agree there was a "previous strobe". I agree too. The IPT told the investigator there was no such thing. A quick look at any Sea King told him they told porkies. (In fact, I understand he was standing next to a series of photographs on the IPT office wall when they told him this!) Presumably one reason why his report was destroyed. :ugh: We're getting there. |
The system tells the pilot what he must do to avoid the other aircraft by the proscribed margin. He is also told that he is not to think, not to look but just to obey instinctively. |
Of course, the irony is that FLEET's stance means they disagreed with the Service Deviation permitting lower forward to be switched off if the pilot saw reflected light. According to them, the reflected light had to be ignored. Tourist, surely some of that bagger capability you mention contributes to the ability to fly the aircraft safely, especially if he's trying to locate another aircraft in darkness? The board discussed the mission tape a lot and that the incoming pilot was relying on information from the rear. Are you saying he shouldn't have been? From what i read it seems he was a bit limited where he could go due to the tlam corridor. Would that make him more reliant on other sensors apart from his eyes? |
Basil, yes that is correct.
You should not assume the TCAS contact is the one you see since the positions are very inaccurate. You should just follow the RA. All very well in a airliner cockpit with poor visibility and manoeuvrability but not really military compatible. |
You see now you've got the Daily Mail started now: Typhoon jets could smash into airliners, RAF chief warns* | Daily Mail Online
What a completely moronic headline. Do you know what, my Mini Cooper could smash into an airliner as well!!! :ugh: Anyway, if we are to fit TCAS, or other such anti collision detection devices, into the military fleet then let's think about it. How about a non-cooperative collision avoidance device that helps you stop hitting non-squawkers (ie. Aircraft with a transponder on standby or not fitted) or large birds/balloons/model aircraft etc...? Also, let's start fitting the fleet that doesn't have air to air sensors first and thus Typhoon should be one of the last - logically. Fitting a non-cooperative system would also have utility in war time and peacetime. Finally, if I can't see an airliner with my RADAR, datalink picture, my IRST, my transponder interrogator all sensor fused to my helmet mounted sight with my Mk1 eyeballs then there is something massively wrong! As you can probably work out, I do not support the idea of TCAS for Typhoon as I think that it will probably cause more problems than it will cause as TCAS was never designed for the type of dynamic manoeuvring a Typhoon can do - there will be Resolution Advisories all over the place as the Typhoon manoeuvres!! :ugh: LJ |
Here's an interesting tidbit: The F-35Bs bought by the UK don't have TCAS either!!
Is that crazy, foolish, short sighted, or what? |
Here's an interesting tidbit: The F-35Bs bought by the UK don't have TCAS either!! S-D |
I'd like to hear how your mini-cooper could smash into an airliner, Leon. Seriously though, it would be interesting to examine the arguments against fitting a standard commercially available TCAS to most (all?) current RAF types. Sure, it won't cope with all eventualities like formation and high g manoeuvres. But it's inexpensive, available now, and is a very useful piece of kit, surely better than waiting for a yet-to-be-invented all dancing version which may never come.
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Leon
You made the mistake of going back on thread bang on though. |
So those who have flown with the system, how does it go with formation flying? The RHWR goes off enough with a/c in close, I can't imagine what manoeuvring formation jets in and out of close would do to TCAS. Then if you turn it off when in formation, for mil jets virtually all the time, what is the point? Also is the system keyed into the performance of the jet or is it generic thinking a typhoon is going to turn like an airliner trying to avoid spilling coffee?
My first thought is false positives would make it a pointless system. |
Interesting views, I had a feeling this would not be considered a cut and dry "no brainer" decision by some here. As such it is questionable whether the MAA was right to go so public on this - now the scope for a debate on its importance has effectively been taken out of the decision makers hands and it has become a political/red top presentational issue.
Presumably they have done the numbers on risks and usefulness of something like ACAS and are confident that they have scored the trade off correctly. I hope so. |
I'd like to hear how your mini-cooper could smash into an airliner, Leon. An airliner doesn't have to be in the air to crash into it...:cool: You see the problem with TCASII - ie. The one that most jet airliners use is that they 'talk' to other TCAS II units to give resolution advisories (RAs). Typically, an RA will be issued 20-30 seconds from collision, so if you have a Typhoon climbing at 15,000ft/min and there is an airliner 7,500ft above it then it will alert even though the Typhoon can see the airliner, is going to stay outside the controlled airspace the airliner is flying in and is a perfectly safe manoeuvre. The airliner will get an RA to climb, or even descend, rapidly to break the collision in the vertical - now how safe is that? In the horizontal it can be just as bad, a jet flying at 500kts+ IAS near an airliner doing 300kts+ IAS can have a closure rate of 800kts+ at lower levels or over 1100kts at medium/high level - that is 18 nautical miles a minute of closure. So everytime the Typhoon flies within 9 miles of the centreline of the airway it could trigger an alert to the airliner; even though it will be no-where near a mid air collision if it is pulling 9g. Fitting TCASI would only give traffic advisories and only really does the job that the Typhoon's RADAR/Interrogator/IRST/MIDS will do. An airliner's TCAS will see the Typhoon's Mode S or Mode 3/A and does not 'handshake' with other TCAS Is like the later and more capable TCASII (which we discussed above is unsuitable for FJ type performance in my opinion). So, that is why we have been trying to develop an Airborne Collision Awareness System for the Tornado GR for the past 15 years or so. It was as easy as plopping in a TCAS into a high performance FJ then it would have been done years ago! LJ |
Sorry folks, but the advantages of TCAS are being ignored. The RAF has/(and had!) several types that easily integrate TCAS function into their operations. It is not beyond the wit of man to write SOP's that get the best from the system and avoid most of the pitfalls. :)
OAP |
Typhoons Need Midair Collision Avoidance System, Safety Officials Say
TCAS in the Hawk T2.
I started on the jet when it was still at a reasonably early stage of syllabus development in the RAF and the integration caused a few headaches. Since the kit is in the jet it is very hard to justify ever turning it off. Formations in segregated airspace operating visually with each other would be one time this could be done. It did create a few problems especially at times when you didn't want your student to know there was another jet coming (low level evasion for instance). It was also quite annoying that it would steal your left hand screen whenever it issued a warning. I wasn't the biggest fan of it initially and was happy that I had a fairly effective lookout scan but with the best eyes in the world you can still miss things. The bottom line is that since a couple of guys I knew died in the GR4 midair I believe it is getting harder to justify not fitting it to all FJs. TCAS II is not a perfect system and I would much rather see something that is optimised for FJ use but in the meantime I would just fit it anyway. It would be much easier to sleep at night for some folks. It almost certainly would have prevented the midair in question but who knows if it could prevent more in future. Once it's fitted you'll never know. The problems it causes can be mitigated against and despite what I've said on previous threads I'd take the rough with the smooth personally. BV |
Bob.
Would you also us the RA functionality? |
Typhoons Need Midair Collision Avoidance System, Safety Officials Say
We would always turn it on in controlled airspace and then select it off when exiting. Never had an RA to respond to though.
As an aside it always struck me as worrying that a TCAS RA could happily tell you to descend regardless of height. Unless I've misunderstood something. BV |
Yes, though in an airliner the EGPWS would protect you in that circumstance.
No issue with turning it on in controlled airspace shared with civilian traffic. Entering the MATZ is a different matter though. As I remember it initially the brief was "ignore RA if positive visual ID" This was then changed to "always obey an RA" which I strongly disagreed with. The problem is that even a hawk has the ability to operate well outside the limits that TCAS was ever designed to cope with, so often the RA is just wrong. It was designed for an airliner, not something that can produce rates or turn/climb like a fast jet. It also has huge protection bubbles, and in my opinion a military pilot has to be comfortable in close proximity to other aircraft. RAs are reasonably regular at Heathrow when a departing aircraft has a slightly high rate of climb on the SID. It sound like a big deal, but when you look at the separations involved very few would be worthy of comment or even notice in a MATZ. |
Of course a military pilot has to be comfortable in close proximity but that's hardly an argument against TCAS. I did acknowledge most of those limitations about ten posts ago. But are we really better off with nothing? Or are we holding out for a (not yet invented) catch-all "magic bullet" system which may not arrive for years, or in context of Tornado, ever?
PS Leon, airports these days are circled by barriers that are more robust than a mini-cooper... But I suppose you could drop one out of a herc! |
TCAS II is not a perfect system and I would much rather see something that is optimised for FJ use In a reply to a recent written PQ on risk MoD declared that the Typhoon's overall risk to life is "0 in 1000", simply because no one has died, yet. This approach on risk assessment, within the MoD (which includes the MAA), has remained unchanged for years. How does this sit with the DG's report? Perhaps the DG has the Tornado FAI in mind, which appears to have gone from "Unlikely" to "Probable" over the last six months, and he is just trying to protect his back. If he wants to be really brave he should declare the risk of collision for Typhoon as not being ALARP. DV |
I fail to see how TCAS can be very useful in a military aircraft in terms of safety.
In controlled airspace the risk of collision is already very low and TCAS RA could be selected without any real problems, but it is a solution without a problem in controlled airspace. In the open FIR, jets cause all kinds of problems for current TCAS equipped aircraft with RA selected, so I fail to see how fitting it to jets would help. If left in TA mode it can be quite useful at times, but as anyone who has used it knows it is very rough and ready as a kind of map view. Not convinced the time spent looking at it wouldn't be best spent looking out. I found it most useful for spotting reaper/pred in their orbits at medium level. Tricky things to spot visually, but I would mention that they can take a long while to find. longer than you would have steaming through at speed. |
The HMS Liverpool Lynx, which had encroached into the CCZ, was radiating in the sense her radar was working as was her I Band transponder. |
Typhoon TCAS
If Typhoon or Lightning II need TCAS to achieve SA, we the taxpayers have been duped.
If there is a current front-line Typhoon driver who would rather have TCAS than improved operational sensors (and fusion) then let him/her speak up and I'll get back in my box. Tonkas, trainers & truckies? Well that's a different story. |
There is some utter, utter xxxx being spouted by some on here. ;)
OAP |
Dude, it's the Internet, 99% of it is utter xxxx, 76% of people know that :ok:
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OAP
Not exactly the most constructive post you have ever made..... We don't even know which side of the argument you come down on. |
Minnie Burner, you say;
If there is a current front-line Typhoon driver who would rather have TCAS than improved operational sensors (and fusion) then let him/her speak up and I'll get back in my box. Beware of adopting the same mentality as MoD of no deaths, so no risk; so lets ignore all the near misses and keep going until something goes wrong. DV |
DV
I think you are being unreasonable. Do you imagine for a moment that the Typhoon drivers are likely to be unaware of TCAS? It is a spectacularly simple system which is why the idea is very clever and very effective in the environment it is designed for, ie unmaneuverable aircraft that proceed in a stately manner about the skys operating in a system designed to ensure that they never get close to each other. That does not really describe a modern military aircraft. |
Do you imagine for a moment that the Typhoon drivers are likely to be unaware of TCAS? DV |
The bit where you said that they were not in possession of the facts perhaps?
Since the relative safety advantages of TCAS or operational sensors was what was being discussed, the only facts I could see you might think they were not aware of was the usefulness or otherwise of TCAS. |
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