SDSR 15
 

So, as 2015 approaches and the associated SDSR draws near, I thought it might be worth starting a dedicated thread, to support discussion and debate.

To get things rolling, and to allow for comparison, here is a summary of the main changes arising from SDSR 10.

Personally, I'd like to see SDSR15 be a properly strategic review, that looks at the threat before the cost - and then adjusts to ensure affordability (rather than the other way around) and I'd like to see it finish the business it started in 2010, so far as cross-departmental capabilities and responsibilities are concerned.

Sun.

SDSR 2010, the currently active document, has already been archived off the gov.uk website. It can be found here.
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.g.../dg_191634.pdf

From the foreword, signed by the PM/DPM.

Does the document then list the threats to the UK's interests?
No
On what basis can a clear strategy therefore be formed?
It can't.
And how could Ministers do this when, by their own admission..
Ministers 'didn't know Tornado from torpedo' over Afghan strategy - Telegraph

..and how well have the objectives been met anyway?
They haven't.

It's a cost-cutting exercise, and not a good one at that.

Sorry SW,

I beg to differ.

We all know that the next 5 years is going to see the HM Treasury squeeze the MoD budgets beyond anything we have experienced thus far since the recession. Afghan has managed to be an artificial funding ring fence where we have managed to keep our military (less so the Fisheads) on a trained and operational footing.

The MoD has been able to provide HM Govt and the nation with flexibility/contingency by using those very same highly trained, well equipped and experienced personnel to deliver small bespoke 'shows of force' and support to the FCO/NGO (everything from small exercises in Poland/Estonia, assisting Air Campaign against IS to Ebola and Sierra Leone and helping with flood defences in support of the Environment Agency).

But Afghan is now a distant memory for both politicians and many of the public. There is no requirement to spend money on training many personnel to a high standard (as per the Afghan tour cycles). Those that did benefit from this training and the corporate memory of both technical, kinetic and yet simple war fighting operations are leaving in large numbers across all 3 Services of all branches and trades.

It appears that when talking about 'hard choices ahead' then many of the political elite/'leaders' either are taking the world's developing strategic geopolitical situation on risk, or recognise that they can only do small token operations on the world stage (therefore reducing any political leverage that may come with such a token force) or are ignoring the advice from CDS/PUS and independent think tanks like RUSI.

Therefore in answer to your question I personally believe that ahead of the next SDSR the next Chancellor of the Exchequer and HMT should provide the MoD with its 5 year budget, with SDSR providing and prioritising the Defence Roles it requires and then the MoD review and then tell the Government of the day what they will get for the budget that they have allocated.

If that means 'capability holidays' (rubbish term) or moth balling/suspended animation/long term storage of ships, aircraft, and infantry battalions then so be it.

Having a fantasy SDSR 15 that talks the talk about what the real threats are to our nation etc, that does not have the resourcing (notably finance, but also the right quality and experience of people) will only result in either increased overall financial cost, political risk in not being able to deliver and possibly worse of costing more lives.

I personally get the feeling that the politicians strategic vision is should the requirement arise for a strong, well equipped Armed Forces (Cold War really does return, or IS really does need sorting out or AQAP require military action or a different posture than our current token efforts, then the HMT will throw money at the problem (as per HERRICK after the first few tours didn't go to plan).

If any future SDSR is not funded or resourced it quickly becomes irrelevant and everyone is forced to make it up as they go along, fire fighting and reverting to the use of the term of 'best effort' which has seen us through the last 13 years.

MM4,

I find nothing to disagree with in what you say and I might not have articulated myself very well, as I think we're essentially saying the same thing.

My aspiration for SDSR goes like this:

1. Decide upon and define the threat.
2. Decide upon and define the necessary stance to mitigate that threat.
3. Cost it.
4. Adjust according to budget.

Unaffordable capability is not capability.

Point 4 involves describing and then understanding and accepting, any 'capability gaps' (we both agree that's a crap term) that result.

Sun.

I can see a moratorium on all equipment that has not yet been ordered, an (even) earlier end to the C-130J, further delays to the Astute, and early retirement of the 4 remaining Trafalgar, class SSNs, probable dithering over a Trident replacement - or cancellation if there's a lib-lab-snp coalition, earlier retirement of T1 Typhoons and GR4 Tornados. Wouldn't put too much cash on Sentinel seeing out the decade either. Do we need ~400 tanks? Probably, but that won't mean we keep them. Oh, also: niggardly pay rises, further pension 'restructuring'.

That's just off the top of my head anyway.

Lots of capability holidays to come. No redundancies though, people are too busy PVRing. The Argies, amongst others, will be laughing their collective cocks off.

The process will look like this:

1 - Identify threats to national interests (which include threats to international order)
2 - Define and cost responses to these threats that will preferably deter them and if necessary defeat them
3 - Prioritize threats
4 - From bottom to top, either eliminate or scale the responses until the budget target is met

Two overarching problems, not exclusive to UK:

1 - Limits on what can be done to some costs, such as personnel and overhead, which drive the cutting burden disproportionately to modernization (R&D/procurement)
2 - A very small number of very expensive programs (nukes, carriers) that are hard to cancel, limit or stretch (because the unit costs get even worse) but that mean that as the overall procurement budget goes down by X per cent, what is left for other needs goes down by XY per cent, because all the bills have to be paid by smaller programs.

GLWT...

SDSR10:
• two new carriers, with one equipped to allow full interoperability with key allies; Rollover to SDSR15
• introduction of the more capable carrier variant of the Joint Strike Fighter instead of the vertical take off variant; Denied by contractor building the ships who was making the ships and had a far bigger stake/interest in the less capable VSTOL version
• six state of the art Type 45 air defence destroyers; Done - and good they are but not enough of them
• seven of the most advanced Astute-class hunter-killer submarines in the world; Delayed but some in service within SDSR10 timeframe
• replacing Type 23 frigates with Type 26 frigates and reducing the total number of frigates and amphibious ships; Delayed
• restructuring amphibious shipping to enable the landing of a Commando Group (up to 1,800 personnel); Done
• five Multi-Role Brigades with a range of capabilities to operate across the variety of possible future conflicts; Done
• a significant increase in Special Forces enabling manpower (medical, signals, logisticians); Done
• reducing the Army’s non deployable regional administrative structures and rationalising deployable HQs; Done
• 12 new Chinook heavy lift helicopters; In delivery
• 14 A330 strategic tanker and transport aircraft to replace the ageing VC10 and TriStar fleets; In delivery
• the withdrawal of Nimrod MRA4 and the Harrier; Done
• introduction of 22 A400M transport aircraft; In delivery
• rationalising the defence estate through the sale of surplus land and running cost reductions; Massive screw ups by DIO mean that there is still large swathes of out of use estate not sold off
• accelerating the re-basing of our forces from Germany; Well in progress
• reducing the civilian workforce by around 25,000 and military personnel by around 17,000 by 2015. Pretty much complete

So for SDSR15, I predict:
More blah about the new flat-tops?
More blah about the A330s/A400Ms?
More blah about SCAVENGER - which is Reaper coming into core?
Loss of Sentinel?
Announcement on Future Combat Air System? (Taranis)
Shake up of DIO and actually getting some receipts in for some of the land? This will include the basing and airfields study?
More on the NEM and the use of Reserves? (Cost cutting in other words!)
Rationalisation of training? (single gateways for all 3 services?)
Some blah on MFTS?
Loss of some tanks?
Setting out a pathway for the new deterent? (Sea, land or airborne?)
More Army manpower reductions?

There you go, my two-penneth

LJ

Both of these could be reworded as "Take risk to meet budget" as that is what will happen (as it does today). Whether the 'risk mitigation' is worth the paper it's written on is another thing (mitigation such as rely on allies to provide suitable assets or capability / lead time will be sufficient to retrain forces / sufficient sea lift, and time, will be available to move equipment / 100% of reserves will be available for mobilisation are words, nothing else). Sadly, there are plenty of VSOs who are prepared to sign up to these risks (and plenty of cabinet ministers who are happy to stick their heads in the sand [they won't take responsibility, clearly]) in order to carry on up the slippery pole safe in the knowledge that the effects of their decisions will not be fully felt "on their watch".

Defence reform report recommendations (sep 13)
 

The Department should reduce the size of the senior cadre of Defence
and the management levels below it. To enable this, the Department
should review all non-front line military posts from OF5 (Captain / Colonel
/ Group Captain) and civilian posts from Band B (Grade 7), to determine
the need for the post, whether it needs to be civilian or military, and
optimum management structures.

Clearly not happened as Air Cdre and above is currently 115% over manned.

Best you take it up with Lord Levene and his staff - according to his Annual Reviews, and the progress made against defence reform recommendations, he has reported the following against the one you quote (Recommendation 11a):

In 2012 (First Review)

In 2013 (Second Review)

In 2014 (Third Review)

Detail can be found here.

Whilst it may be that one particular rank in one Service currently is 'over manned' this may be because 1* RAF officers are filling more than their "fair share" of joint appointments.

But don't let facts get in your way.....

Or the population is such that 1 or 2 extra officers creates a 'large' % increase.

The problem is, and will always be, that any 'strategic' analysis will be coloured by what we've got in the toy box and what on order from Toys r Us (BAES), and (of course) how much pocket money we can beg and take in advance.

Accordingly, responses to security risks (incipient problems) and threats (emergent problems) will be equipment-focussed, rather than effects-based.

One example I recall from a few years ago in MB, was when we entered in to long discussions with the Army over the introduction of loitering munitions. They were convinced that the only answer to attacking time-sensitive and dynamic targets was loitering munitions (kamikaze UAVs, for ease of explanation). They just didn't get the concept of joint fires, ie the kinetic effect is what is desired, not necessarily the means of delivery.

Of late I have been involved in guiding the drafting defence strategies for an emerging economy, and they follow the cascade method from Grand Strategy, National Security Strategy, National Military (defence) strategy and so forth. It works; but they are also prepared to fund the resultant programmes.

It's nearer 50 than one or two. The point being they are over manned as are all ranks at Sqn Ldr and above.

Of course, the fact that Strategy exists

Alanbrooke, quoted in British Defence Doctrine

Means that all those who whine on about financial constraints and the current EP simply don't get it.

Stars
 

Interesting to note that while overall numbers have dropped by over 20% in the last 3 years, it seems starred posts have fallen by just over 8% if the 2014 figures above are right. Not saying that's wrong but it paints a picture.

Oh JayC change the record old stick, will you? We've already covered this before:

You obviously have a serious chip on both shoulders on this one, what do you propose? SACs/Cpls/Sgts/WOs in every defence attache or NATO post? I can tell you that without at least rank equivalency in these kinds of posts then the UK's voice will be lost. The same goes for joint appointments and then the singular Service loses out as well. :ugh:

LJ

PS When has "11" been "nearer 50"?

No point in having a voice when you carry a short stick that can't be in two places at once.

WW - true, but even our short stick is a lot bigger than the majority of our Allies (just!)

LJ

Is an SDSR in election year good or bad? To me, it makes for hasty decisions. None of the parties have published their defence policies to the level of detail required. Our planners in MoD main building will be spread very thin trying to cover all bases, which will suit the politicians. The answers to "what if?" questions may not be well thought out.

In addition to the above list, BOWMAN is being replaced. It is only 11 years since the contract was let, but it bought a lot of kit that had already been obsolescent for over 10 years, almost immediately scrapping hundreds of millions worth. It blew over £2Bn and didn't come close to delivering what was required, and never will. Volume programmes such as this, as opposed to ships or aircraft with a higher unit cost, tend to be ignored. BOWMAN is a double whammy because the requirement is largely driven by the US, and the need for interoperability. If that ever became policy, then we'd really be in the clag!

Ah, BOWMAN... I agree, what a POS. So much so that we had to procure these to be able to do the things we needed to do:

http://www.satnews.com/images_upload...sanprc117g.jpg

I wouldn't mind if our industry was incapable of producing a Harris 117 equivalent, but there is still something really screwed up with our procurment system, that we can't. I often think it is down to the way we muddle in the R&D phase and don't let industry get investors to produce what they think we might need.

LJ

Tuc,

Good point. I think there is a serious possibility that SDSR will be delayed until 2016. I think that would be a good thing.

Sun.

And that is the problem with Stats - they are just a snapshot in time; a day later and the picture might change dramatically. So (as has been pointed out before but you have ignored) I know of 6 air cdres that have PVRd in the last couple of months; I've also heard of a couple of brigadiers who have done the same. So a snapshot today might not be vastly different but it will change in pretty short order!

Unfortunately, several of those who have PVRd are our brightest and best; which doesn't necessarily bode well for the rest of us and the future!! :ugh:

I also agree that SDSR should be job for 15/16; with the actual decisions and announcement into 2016. Let's face it SDSR 10 was rushed and certainly not a true Strategic review!

SDSR 16
 

My understanding is if you delay into 16 that means the CSR from HMT has already allocated the money for the next 3 years at least. Therefore you can review all you want but the budget is set and fixed making SDSR 16 an internal resource shuffle/cut rather like the current ABC rounds (annual planning round in new speak). If you allign with the CSR in 15 you can at least argue your point for capability based on some proper assessment.

Leon

It's the timing that upsets the top shop.

The BOWMAN HF replacement was specified, trialled, delivered and in theatre, all in the space of 2 months in 2003 - and not under a UOR. UORs took far longer!

A month later, the BOWMAN main contract was let to buy its predecessor. This was so embarrassing, the BOWMAN IPT lobbied for the replacement programme to be cancelled, but the PM told them to push off, the replacement would prevent losses whereas in many ways BOWMAN was going to contribute to losses (and so it proved). But they were partially successful as the replacement, at first scheduled for 3 "special" users, wasn't pulled through for everyone else. But BOWMAN did eventually make a supplementary buy outwith their main contract for proper antennae, which had been left out of the contract. Radios. No antennae. You couldn't make it up. Mind you, first things first. The batteries didn't work either, as well as costing 3 times as much as those from other suppliers, and being to a 10 years out of date specification (and not built to that spec). And don't mention battery chargers. Or exploding batteries. Or the total recall and destruction order, that left troops short of power for around 2 years. As the General Officer Commanding said in a press briefing in January 2006, the BOWMAN HF replacement was "the comms system of choice in AFG". What an indictment.

Point being, we need to avoid waste like this before deciding on cuts, otherwise the cuts are from an uninformed and false baseline.

Tuc

Yet again I agree. The waste in our procurement is a disgrace to the hard working taxpayers that pay for the capability. The sooner we start actual 'smart' procurement, like we have with Reaper, Harris 117, Mastiff, Ridgback, Shadow, SigSauer P226, Sharpshooter, M6-895 mortar and others, then the better - all of these have been brought into service at significantly lower cost than the normal method of procurement. The guys at General Atomic were agog when I told them how much we paid contractors to develop something like Watchkeeper or Phoenix - originally we went to look at Predator and then the company asked if we might like to see their next generation of un-manned armed-ISR; this was Reaper, and it was developed from the company's own investment. Furthermore, look at the Jaguar aircraft when the ability to bolt on bits from off the shelf and trial them, came in? The step-change in capability versus amount spent was exceptional.

I agree that procurement is where the majority of savings should come from and the other part from the mismanagement of infrastructure by DIO and their rip-off Regional Prime Contractors who add a "40% variance" to the price of the work before they even start! For example, some simple corrugated roof work was quoted by a local roofing contractor at £750+VAT (they were all HSE approved) and then the Regional Prime Contractor got the job at ~£2,200+VAT - how's that for value for money!!!

Makes me grumpy...:*

LJ

In the example above why not report the episode to the MOD fraud and abuse waste line?

Have you got a link - I'm pretty sure I have enough to employ someone investigating it for 12 months!

Sadly, as it is a 'closed shop' for Regional Prime Contractors and also those under the Catering Retail and Leisure (CRL) contract (that also charge silly prices for their services when an outside firm could do better) then it is unlikely to get a satisfactory conclusion for the taxpayer.

LJ :ok:

LJ Check PMs

Leon, never was a truer word said - there are more savings here than you would care to believe.

I agree that procurement is where the majority of savings should come from

The problem is, you have to do it properly if you want to make the savings. That means a proper/mature/stable specification, open and fair competition, and preventing interference from parties with vested interest during the procurement process.

Oh, and ditching the belief that appointing certain companies as "strategic resources" is the only way of achieving technology and capability transfer.

New Procurement Regs coming in April are going focus the MoD's mind on that one.

Vasco

Many thanks PM sent back. I also found thus amongst the FOI stuff - https://www.gov.uk/government/upload...regularity.pdf

Sad thing is that all of the Regional Contractors are changing to a single source right now - Carillion (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/444bb632-1...#axzz3NPhIPg3x). So now it is just a "one horse race" and I cannot see how this can possibly offer value for money as there is no competition!

I am glad that the current apparent 'cowboy builders' have been shown the door though!

LJ

The construction industry was regarded as the most corrupt and organised-crime ridden sector in Britain, at least in the 1990s, when I spent time auditing. For example, on average 20% of goods ordered never arrived on site - being 'pilfered' along the way.

The scaffolding industry was particularly prone to OC activities; in another example in 1995 a contractor working at RAF Lyneham had a number of his vehicles fire-bombed in Bristol and thus withdrew from the contract, requiring 'single-tender action' to permit work to continue - and to allow a much larger - and more shadier - firm to take over. That sort of behaviour was particularly prevalent.

Hence the famed 1970s graffiti

IN COMMUNIST CHINA WORKERS TAKE THE LEAD!

Beneath which, in a different hand

IN SOCIALIST BRITAIN THE B***ERS NICK THE COPPER PIPING

Leon

Sad thing is that all of the Regional Contractors are changing to a single source right now - Carillion (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/444bb632-1...#axzz3NPhIPg3x). So now it is just a "one horse race" and I cannot see how this can possibly offer value for money as there is no competition!

Surely for a contract of this size there is a legal requirement to compete under the Public Contracts/Utilities Regulations 2006? - unless Carillon are being awarded work under a framework, in which case the obligation to run a mini-competition would lie with the Authority.

The FM/Building world is quite competitive - it would be interesting to know how Carillion's services are being procured.

Here is another link better than the FT one: Carillion plc - Carillion joint venture signs contracts with the Defence Infrastructure Organisation for a further three Next Generation Estate Contracts

Whenurhappy

(sorry - got carried away with this one)

Corruption perception indexes - Global:

2014 Corruption Perceptions Index -- Results

Within the UK there was a scale for each industry - usually Oil & Gas, Building, Defence took 1st, 2nd and 3rd.

Personally I can't see how Health did not make it into the top running as it is still common to see fund controllers awarding themselves contracts.

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c84ead24-c...#axzz3NaHwGJjI

Uk Bribery Act 2010 puts an obligation on organisations to prevent fraud and replaces previous legislation on corruption.

There is still a duty to report and the presumption of innocence does not automatically apply. (If you don't report you are considered to be part of the scam).

Fun to view webpage at the Serious Fraud Office

Latest press releases | Press room | SFO - Serious Fraud Office

Bigbux,

The reason health didn't make it onto the list, is because it's a corruption perception index, not an index of actual corruption, and health is not perceived to be corrupt.

Sun.

Whoever, or whatever coalition or mix we finish up with in May, they will have a fiscal mountain to climb. You should be so lucky!!

I think it vanishingly unlikley that Defence, with such fragile public support post Afghan, will not be an early major target - and that doesn't mean waiting 'til 2016 unfortunately.

All the Pollies at the moment are fighting shy of addressing or even acknowledging the extent of the Defecit and its seriousness.

Listen in Best Beloveds, because - without being patronising - many (most?) seem not to know the difference between Debt and Defecit.

Debt is what you owe, Defecit is all about cashflow - and we've all been there (I certainly have!) Say you earn £3k a month, but you're spending £3.5k. Whatever you actually owe, that £500 is your defecit. And we get over it temporarily with the help of the plastic or a nice Bank Manager. (and we haven't touched the Debt)

Temporarily is the key - it cannot be sustained. At present, even in so-called "austerity" and with supposed actual and planned "cuts", UK plc is spending about £3k per second more than its income, or if you'd prefer, £10.9M per hour, £250M+ per day. Between now and 7th May that's nearly £33Bn of just defecit, not a penny reducing the debt, not a penny contributing to servicing that increasing debt.:eek:

One is not optimistic against that background, at how successfully MoD will be able to compete against NHS and DHSS. :{

And cynical moi still doesn't expect any Pollie to come clean on the Defecit until 8th May when - foolishly - someone will have a guaranteed 5-year tenure .......

Ok, now my headache has subsided can I just confirm that so far on this thread that we serving, ex-serving and interested thread posters acknowledge that:

1. The pseudo ring fencing of Defence and the ability to deliver operationally trained, equipped and experienced forces (less so Navy) due to Afghan will stop abruptly in 2015.
2. The Defence budget will be cut by a significant amount over the next 4 years.
3. Any funding savings requested by HMT will be delivered by the MoD via savings found in DE&S and DIO, in what appears to be the way that procurement and Defence contracts are awarded.

Have I got that right, or is last night's ale blurring my naive judgement?

Just one more question if you don't mind, is there a military definition for the term strategic, specifically in the timeframe that any SDSR should review - 5, 10, 15 years? Is there a set time metric, or is it decided upon every SDSR or by its very (political) timing it only looks out to the next 5 years acknowledging that a change of Government of the day will invariably result in a change to Defence?

Itr wouldn't be so bad if the politicians said "we'll look at the NHS/SocSec/Defence budget after the election" but they will gave ANY promises they htink will get the votes - and that means they will tie themselves absolutely to the NHS etc


They don't leave themslves any wriggle room and Defence will be massacred again

Unless President Putin goes totally off the rails it all looks bad from here on in