Shaft 109
 

You are correct there are standard repairs but these are limited by size and location to critical areas.

Once you go outside these limits you require a design organisation repair scheme, this is not a problem with civil gliders as the manufactures will for known reliable repair companies turn these around in a few days.

The design organisation for the Vikings is a large defence contractor............ I shall say no more !

Pilot Magazine article
 

Dave

I read your excellent article in Pilot magazine all those months ago, and have followed your posts on this forum. Sadly it appears that the key people involved with Air Cadet gliding and flying have not read your article, so well done for including it above for us all to see.

Keep up the good work, we must get those cadets back in the air.

Venture Adventure, as we used to say!

Dave Unwin


I enjoyed reading that. Well said.



It is 5 years since I last spoke to the MAA; they seem to be going backwards. However, if that is backwards to the correct starting point (refusal to implement regs, not the regs being wrong) then it may be for the best in the long run. The tragedy is they’ve existed for 6 years and simply will not acknowledge facts. Some of their papers resemble the old, discredited, CDPIs from 1993/4. They were cancelled because DPP, having immediately got definitions wrong (e.g. the process that maintains the Safety Case and airworthiness), they immediately went off at a tangent. The MAA’s equivalent document makes precisely the same mistake. You can implement it to your heart’s content, but you won’t achieve anything. That’s the situation you describe, perfectly.



I do not know the official reason for disbanding the Chief Engineer post in the late 90s but with hindsight, and now the various ARTS from 1992-98 have been released, it would not be unreasonable to link it to the abysmal job the 1991-96 incumbent did. The Nimrod ART of 1998 is infinitely more critical than Haddon-Cave ever was. You may recall these reports were buried by the CE until revealed during the ZD576 campaign. You mention Haddon-Cave’s confirmation (not revelation – he was told this in evidence) that unqualified staff were let loose. That was stated policy under that CE in AMSO/AML in 1991, and became so in MoD(PE) in 1996 under the Chief of Defence Procurement. Both systematically ran down airworthiness and safety in general. It may have been directed from above, but their subsequent rulings and attitudes suggest not.


Finally, composites. While I know nothing about the gliders, I do know the officer (retired Sqn Ldr, now in his 70s) who oversaw the award of the original contract. (He also lectured on Air Legislation). He assures me that having the necessary certifications only got them to our door. Each and every engineer was then required by MoD to go back to school and retrain on composites. The regression you describe is not unrelated to the CE/CDP policies I outlined above. They may have been issued 25 years ago, but if nobody challenges them they remain.



Best wishes

Great post TelsBoy, absolutely spot on.

What annoys me the most, is how the cadets have been doubly let down.
Firstly, gliding was 'paused' and they lost the opportunity to fly, (I know there is the AEF, but that amounts to one trip every 2 years in my experience).

Then, to rub salt into the wound, the organisation did NOTHING to replace to loss of flying or compensate for it. Would it really have been that hard to arrange extra visits to willing civvie gliding clubs, or, laid on extra jollies in Chinook, Merlin, Puma, Herc etc?

I was at a squadron open night last month, and the staff were still talking about the opportunities to go gliding. The enrolled cadets had that knowing look on their faces!

The organisation should have been open and honest about the 'pause' right from the start and said, "Look guys, there's a problem with gliding and it might take a while to fix. But don't worry, we're launching 'Project CadetFly' to get you all maximum air-time!"
Heck, someone might even have been promoted or got a Queens honour for it.

This is a bigger problem than they realise. They probably think every cadet just wants to go and do 30 minutes of aeros, but actually a great deal want to learn how to fly... even if once they leave the cadets they never get at the controls of an aircraft again.


I was lucky and had over 10 AEF flights in my time (although 2 were air experience flights but not at "AEF" units or on a Tutor).
Only one of those was of useful value as well as enjoyment.

It was when I was 19, on a camp at Leuchars. The pilot was an ex-F3 jockey who had left the mob and was now at BA. I was a G1, had been on the ACPS the year before, and was wearing my flying suit so he could see my "G" wings name badge.

He spent 5 minutes on the ground before startup discussing what my experience was and what I'd like to do. After establishing that I was quite proficient and experienced (from a powered fixed wing point of view) compared to the vast majority of cadets he flies, and explaining that I was going to be training for my PPL the next year, he taught me some useful navigation and PFL techniques and tips which I still used even in my CPL cross country years later.

He let me taxi out, whilst covering the rudder pedals himself, so that he could draw some things on his kneeboard, and briefed me on a few things whilst holding, then got me to fly the take off, again whilst he covered the controls as I don't believe cadets are supposed to fly the Tutor below a certain height. Once a few hundred feet up he began explaining what he was going to teach me. Considering it was a last-minute and improvised brief, it was very concise and structured... I don't know whether he was a QFI in the past, or a TRI/TRE at BA, but from my experience he would have made an excellent instructor no matter what he was teaching on.

It is a shame it was not a longer flight, as it was invaluable.
It was an even bigger shame he was an exception rather than the norm.

I take my Squadron Cadets to my local aero club to watch the aeroplanes. The Club are very supportive of them and allows them to climb inside the Club aeroplanes on the ground, visit the aerodrome tower, visit engineering, etc so at least they know what an aeroplane looks like.

They are regularly asked if they want to fly with some of the aircraft owners and club members which unfortunately we have to refuse due to health and safety, vetting issues and the fact that the pilots are non-AEF, RAF or dont hold an ATPL.

It seems such a shame that given the goodwill shown to the Air Cadets by many in the world of Aviation that we are unable to capitalize on it in some way but instead we have to wait until "The Management" get their act together which I suspect may be some time.

The post I made at #1480 seems to be the most likely course of action according to my various mates and the rumour network. Exact detail still remains sketchy although I did hear that due to the sensitivity that further ministerial involvement is happening and that we might hear something in the last week of Feb (don't forget it's a leap year!). I suspect the last minute meddling will be about MP's constituencies and border sensitivities, so the final die is yet to be cast...

Another high-grade rumour is that 2-3 extra AEFs might be formed, as well as bolstering the current ones. So I suspect the "Lord will giveth as He taketh away". I still wonder where the pilots for that will come from unless there is a change of rules?

As Telsboy wrote, but seems to have deleted, it is better to have some news than none at all. So let's just get on with it!

They really have kept a tight wrap on all of this. The information available through normal channels has been well compartmented - maybe 2FTS should do provision of OPSEC strategy instead of gliding. They seem to have found their niche! :p

The B Word

That's good of you, I know many squadron staff who unfortunately have better things to do than give up additional time for their cadets.


It's been a number of years now, but I seem to recall we made use of one of the Unauthorised Activity disclaimer forms in ACP20A. Appendix E of Section 1 or something like that rings a bell.
Basically a parental permission slip that says the RAF/MOD have absolutely nothing to do with the activity, there is no public insurance in place, and they will not accept any liability for any incident or accident.

We used it a few times for various activities.

DC10

Don't need an ATPL - do need a DBS clearance (and so they should), but don't have to be AEF/RAF.

Please look at the current rules, which I hear have just been changed - is it ACTI or ACTO 30-something - 34 or 35? The pilots don't even need to be FIs for Air Experience.

And just which bits of Health & Safety would you have them ignore????

B Word

Hmmm - fewer Vigis, more Tutors - there's a logical answer there somewhere..... And they're RAF/ACO rules, so they could be changed.

But that's far too logical! :ugh:

I believe these are the latest minima from ACTO 35 unless someone still serving can confirm otherwise. This of course applies where it is looking to be classed as an official ACO activity and not a private arrangement:

a. Passenger Flying:
1. 250 Hrs Total.
2. 10 Hrs on Type.
3. 2 Hrs Last 30 days.

b. Flight Instruction:
1. 500Hrs Total
2. 50Hrs on Type.
3. 2Hrs Last 30 days.

Do AEF pilots have an ATPL or do they have to be ex-RAF or service trained to fly Cadets?

Teeteringhead. I wouldn't have them ignore any Health and Safety, vetting rules, medical status/licencing, Low flying Rules, Rules of the Air or the Air Navigation Order.

I think that's similar to the form we used at Halton in the '90s to give AEF to cadets in microlights, however although the forms said clearly it was not an official Air Cadet activity, Rob (the boss) had insurance which covered all service personnel including cadets.

Yeah insurance was always in place, but it was under the insurance of the activity provider rather than the ATC insurance which covers cadets on any authorised activity.

I'm not quite sure why there are so many "Old Timer" VGS folk who are quite so vociferous about the "Pause to flying" declaration by the ODH. Why is it not so surprising that the whole fleet has been grounded when there has been so many discrepancies within the (none) recording of Engineering practices of the ACO aeroplanes?


The ODH was 100% correct with his assessment of the lack of ACO engineering expertise and the "fudges" that have been made with respect to "none authorised repair schedules" that have been made to the fleet aircraft.


The ODH signs-off the "Risk to Life (RtL) Register" of all of the items on the Risk Register (an MAA requirement) and that, in this instance, he was not satisfied with the lack of authorised engineering support with respect to authorised repair schedules to the ACO aeroplanes.


With respect to VGS Flying Instructors and other voluntary staff, no one is blaming the standards of your particular area of expertise. If there is one area that the volunteer staff of the VGS should recognise, it should be the heightening of awareness of the MAA regulations and NOT the "old school" dictat that... if it aint broke; don't fix it! It WAS broken AND it required fixing!


To all of the VGS part-time staff... get a grip upon the MAA Regulations; like it or hate it... the MAA is here to stay! If you have no wish to participate in any part of the regulatory requirements of the MAA... might I suggest that origami might suit you better!


Stop whinging and start making plans with respect to how you might best serve the ACO with whatever expertise that you might have within your armoury. YOU owe it to the remaining kids, no matter how few they might be, to deliver your best!


Get on with it!


TCF

TCF, from my perspective CFAV's have been getting on with it. Personally, I completely get why the fleet was grounded. What I don't get is how poorly the recovery plan has been communicated.

Astonishingly some don't seem to get why it's grounded.

However, ALL don't get why it's been grounded for soooooo long!

TCF

Excellent post.

One comment....

While true, and mandated policy since God knows when, although terms have changed, what the MAA refuse to get to grips with is the formal rulings that a 2nd or even 3rd Risk Register may be created, excluding all MoD-owned risks (such as you describe), to be wheeled out come audit time or investigation. This occurred, for example, after a multiple fatality crash in 2003, which 3 weeks ago (19/1) was submitted to the Defence Select Committee by an MP representing the family of one airman. The MAA are fully aware of this, but won't talk to you about it. Matters aren't as clear cut as they would have you believe. I think they are well-intentioned, but lack of independence stifles them.

Unfortunately from some of the posts above I think it will be some time before we are allowed the full story on what happened, for commercial reasons. This is a disgrace but the whole contracting out thing goes much higher up the food chain than the ACO.

For those doubting A and C's motives... he does have an insider view of part of the recovery process but he is an ex ATC cadet and just wants to see the recovery completed.

TCF - most people do understand the original 'pause'.


AFAICS - there may be at least 3 or 4 different factors to the problem...


(1) The glider fleet engineering management lost control of the situation and failed to keep up with modern MOD/MAA life.

(2) (and this has not yet been mentioned yet AFAIK) There may be a problem with some (or most) VGS Hangars not meeting MAA standards.

(3) MOD are desperate to save money and may want to decrease the number of Gliding Units down to ??? (insert your own guess).

(4) Some of the maintenance 'errors' highlighted are a bit of a red herring and the situation could have been partly eased by the application of good common sense engineering quite quickly.


However because of the various agendas at play - I really do not think that 'They' want the situation sorted quickly - as I posted previously they in effect dismantled the old system by grounding all the aircraft and completely ignoring the VGS volunteers,they can now take as much time as they like to decide how many Gliding units will emerge in the future.

tuc, your post #1618 is an indication to anyone who wishes to see beyond their only little corner that nothing here is new, but merely the latest consequence of a ball that was set rolling in 1987.

As you say, the MAA is unable to stop its inexorable progress of gathering more accidents and more lives in its path other than by grounding entire fleets, be they Nimrods or Vigilants. That is because it lacks the prime need of any Regulator, that of independence. It is instead shackled to the operator, the MOD and its subsidiary Armed Forces, that has a higher priority than Air Safety, which is to cover up illegal actions by retired VSO's.The same goes for the Investigator, the MilAAIB, which is shackled to the Regulator as well as the Operator. All three need to be separated from each other to do their work, or the ball will go on gathering yet more casualties.

If "multiple fatality crash in 2003" refers to a multiple crash as much as to multiple fatalities, I assume that to be the mid-air collision between two Sea King baggers that killed all 7 occupants. Yet another example of where pre-existing airworthiness shortcomings were not made known to the invstigation by the Regulator (aka the MOD), and which is a matter of controversy still.

Independence is not a bonus, it is essential in maintaining Air Safety!

Chug

Correct. The 3 contributory factors noted by the BoI had been front and centre in the Risk Register since 1996. Mitigation plans had been drawn up, approved and contracts let. They were cancelled by an official who had no authority to do so, and who then quietly employed two consultants to (separately, and unknown to each other) create a 2nd and 3rd Register which omitted these risks. This was approved by 2 Star (same as Chinook and Nimrod) and 4 Star. When revealed to investigators post-crash, the investigation was halted when they realised the ranks/grades involved. The BoI remains incomplete. The Inquest was misled.

I won't apologise for thread drift, as it's not. Work your way down from that 4 Star ruling and you will get to this current problem.

Longer Ron
 

In your post above I can't comment on items 2 & 3 but you underestimate the problems in items 1 & 4.

I would like to comment further but I think that we are nearing the point when the contract process for the support contract will start and any accurate comments made that are critical of one party or another are likely to be grasped by the company lawyers of those who who fail to win the contract and be used as evidence of unfairness in the awarding of the contract. The result of this would likely be a contract re-run and further delay in the full return to service of the fleet.

Only when the support & type certificate holder contracts have been awarded will the full truth of the matter come to light, the good news is that both of these contracts are likely to be hotly contested by some very good companies using expertise from outside the defence sector.

Despite the contract bunfight I would hope to see some cadets in the air this summer, gliders will be avalable to fly but it is for the VGS to sort out how they get the training program up and running.

If the MoD get the right people in to run the contracts I see a bright future for air cadet flying with the technical side supplying substantial number of servicable airframes by mid 2017.

This may seem a like slow progress to some but the limiting factor is the capacity of the small gliding maintenance industry to take on the large number of VGS airframes and still support its regular civil gliding commitments.

I've said the same thing. Hopefully they are doing some sort of prioritisation. I imagine quite a few of the Vikings will pass their inspections, but I hope work on the ones that need it is deferred until all have been inspected, and those that need work are done from best to worst.

Cats
 

This is being done I am told, at the moment selection of the airframes is being done and some are being pushed to the back of the line with the aim of getting airframes returned to service as quickly as posable.

I don't share you optimism that the airframes will simply pass inspection, it seems that most of the airframes will require some work as there seems to be quite a lot of unreported minor damage and minor mechanical problems as result of basic husbandry.

As always there is the unexpected, unrecorded ( or undocumented ) repairs have been found and these have to be investigated to check compliance with approved repair data or if found to be non-compliant re-repaired.

It is the lack of reliable maintenance records that have forced the need for such detailed inspection, someone would do well to find out just how some of the aircraft records went walkabout.

A+C


[quote] - In your post above I can't comment on items 2 & 3 but you underestimate the problems in items 1 & 4. [quote]


I would say that I did not underestimate items 1 and 4 because almost 2 years ago I posted that I believed it would be cheaper and easier to just replace the fleet - but that would have involved planning before we got to this sorry state.
I do actually have a fair bit of experience with MAA audits and generally speaking if it is a problem with a log carded item - it is usually easier to just change the component !I have changed many serviceable components purely because of a log card anomaly and quite often the replacement item was in worse condition - but the log cards were filled in correctly.


rgds LR


still cannot get the quote facility working on this pc LOL

The first off the line and to fly in December had previously snapped it's tail so maybe not just easy ones first.

Tingger
 

The problem with this sort of project is finding out what you don't know, even a major repair is not a problem if the repair is fully documented and well executed.

They would have had to start planning and buying a replacement fleet more or less when the Grobs were brought.

Indeed not. I saw a K21 having it's snapped tail boom repaired when I happened to visit Zulu Glasstek a few years back.

If the Viking mentioned by Tingger was well documented and the repair was done correctly then it was one of the easy ones. The hard ones are where close inspection reveals undocumented repairs, especially if they are in crucial areas. Suspect they are looking at as much of the internal surfaces as the external ones.

Longeron

Thank goodness we haven't got to fight a war under these rules...............

Oh wait a minute...............

Arc

If the Vikings are regenerated, I presume the fleet will still need to undergo either a Life Extension Programme (RA5724) or an OSD Extension Programme (RA5725) if they are to go on until 2025. Both of these are substantial pieces of work which should have been completed some time ago. Does the PT have the capacity to carry this out at the same time as the recovery, and if not will the MAA require it to be completed before the aircraft can return to service?

Snook
 

These are good questions that need answering by people who understand composite structure to get the correct answers so it is critical that the design organisation are composite experts or it will become a long and unnecessary expensive program plagued by inappropriate technical restrictions.

Relifing gliders is based on hours flown rather than actual age. About how many hours do the Vikings have?

Would it not be more complex than that due to winch launching?

1 hour airtime could result from one launch, or it could come from 10. Would that not need consideration?

It's on hours pure and simple.

Hooks are on number of launches, though the formula for that isn't straightforward.

Do they make an assumption that each frame has a high high launch/hr ratio then, as per a normal 5-launch GIC? Any lower launch/hr ratio thereby being less stress on the airframe.

There is nothing especially stressful about a launch for the glider if the correct weak link is used as it will break if necessary. I have no idea what a 5-launch gic is, but at a civilian club that winch launches, a 2 seat glider can easily fly twice that and more in a day. Our k21s do about 500 hours most years.

I should add that the special case for a k21 isn't launches but total hours of aerobatics. A requirement for relifeing is that it can be shown it doesn't exceed a certain amount. Don't think the odd loop is a problem, it isn't, but k21s are used for aerobatic training and lower level competition and are designed for +6.5 to -4 g.

Composite glider life hours are an arbitrary number, put in because the certification process requires it to have one. There has never been (I am willing to be corrected here) an instance of fatigue failure of a composite construction glider, and examples are flying that were built over 50 years ago with many hours airborne. The manufacturers can (and do) produce a life extension process when one reaches the certification life.

Release hooks have a number of launches before exchange and replacement or refurbishment; this is a manufacturers (TOST GmbH) figure. Since many have separate aerotow and winch releases, it is theoretically possible to have a glider which has only used one form of launch, but has to have an unused release replaced. (The one never used for launching would of course be exercised every time the other was used for launching).

Other items, such as harnesses, have a calendar life (normally 10 years before replacement or refurbishment).

It would probably be logical in a sane environment to do a life extension as part of the Viking return to service, as the inspection is all being done in any case, but this is unlikely to be in the commercial interest of anyone involved.