RP, I'm not arguing about what was the cause of the tragic loss of 230 and its 14 occupants. Like other UK Military Air Accidents it is compromised by being investigated to all intents and purposes by the operator. The freeing of the MAAIB from the MOD is as vital to UK Military Air Safety as is that of the MAA being similarly free, and just as important is that they be freed of each other.

The point about the dry bay plumbing is that it was contrary to the Airworthiness Regulations and known to be. As with similar 'anomalies', they were suborned by the UK Military Airworthiness Regulator, aka the MOD, aka the Operator. This Forum is littered with UK Airworthiness Related Fatal Military Air Accidents where the cause of the accident is disputed. So be it, for they were all investigated by the operator anyway. The point is that whatever the causes they were all unairworthy, and an Air Force riddled with unairworthy aircraft faces a bleak future, especially if it has to go to war with one that has respected and sustained its airworthiness.

In this country it took a 700 year old institution to tell its Air Force, not yet 100 years old, that 'there is something wrong with its bloody aircraft'. High time it took note instead of sneering at such warnings.

Regardless of personal opinion, the irrefutable facts are;

1. MoD (specifically, Alcock, Graydon and Bagnall) were advised by the RAF's Inspector of Flight Safety that Nimrod (and other types) were not airworthy. The specific failings with regard to fuel systems were advised in 1996 by DRA. The systemic failings were first reported in detail in January 1988 by civilian staffs, and in general terms by RAF engineers in 1985. These notifications were supported in reports by Director Internal Audit, Equipment Accounting Centre, Man(S)Org and others; the DIA one submitted direct to PUS in June 1996.

2. All were ignored.

3. More detailed evidence, expanding upon all of the above, was submitted to both the XV230 Coroner and Haddon-Cave.

4. Both agreed with IFS and the later submissions (although neither was told about IFS's evidence in any great detail, as MoD withheld it. It was made available in detail to Lord Philip, who accepted it in full. Not that he had much choice!).

5. Government accepted the findings and established the Military Aviation Authority (not the Nimrod Aviation Authority, thereby accepting that the failings were systemic).




Much is made in the press of Rivet Joint not meeting "new" regulations. It doesn't meet the old ones either, an inconvenient fact bodyswerved by the MAA. It has NEVER been deemed safe for an aircraft not to be under configuration control and have an invalid safety case or safety argument. The press can be forgiven for not understanding this, but MoD/MAA are being highly disingenuous.


Like most, I eagerly await Philip Hammond's decision. Does he refuse to issue a waiver and face castigation because his department has made the same mistake yet again. Or does he sign, and drive a bus through Haddon-Cave and, effectively, negate the need for the MAA. Think about that last one. The MAA has, effectively, recommended to Hammond that they need not exist.

If he signs, he is sending out a powerful message. Mandated Airworthiness regulations are optional. That is, we're back to square one, as this is what his predecessors ruled so many times in the past, killing so many in the process.

Whose old ones? I'm guessing that the USAF might argue slightly differently.

That's quite a leap. Surely this is what risk management is all about? If he accepts that we can never achieve the safety case that you, DV and Chug want because the evidence simply does not exist (because the aircraft is one that has been operated for many years by a nation with different requirements and regulations) then he passes the waiver and he accepts the risk.

RP,

Indeed, Hammond personally will be accepting the risk and imposing it on the servicemen and women who have to fly in the aircraft. I wonder if he will be able to accurately quantify that risk for them? "Duty of Care" is the phrase that springs to mind.

If he does accept the risk he is also waiving his own requirement for the probability of a life endangering accident to be less than 1 in 10-6, which tucumseh quoted in detail above. If that level of safety is not required for RJ why is it different to the other a/c operated by the Services?

N

he may of course take into account the risks of NOT having Rivet Joint in service and the losses to British servicemen and women and British interests that might thus occur......................

damned whatever he does I beleive

Well, it's about identifying the risk, mitigating it and preventing recurrence. Importantly, assessing whether it applies elsewhere and preventing compartmentalisation.

In this case, the basic risk (flat refusal to implement mandated regs) was identified, but neither mitigated nor recurrence prevented. So, it has happened again, and again. The same risks have recurred with monotonous regularity; the issue I have is that some have mitigated them with effortless competence, while others have ignored them or failed miserably to mitigate them. Yet MoD prefer to endorse the latter while vilifying the former.



No, it is the Safety Case HE DEMANDS, and legislates for in law. DV, Chug and myself merely point out that his predecessors have ruled that VSOs were correct in issuing orders that this legislation, and the direct orders they were under from SofS, could be ignored and false declarations made that they had been implemented.

I infer from this that you do not see a need for a compliant Safety Case, so perhaps you could offer an alternative? I have said before, if he signs a waiver and a viable alternative means of assuring safety is agreed, then I'm fine with that. What worries me is that this programme is some years old now, the first aircraft was delivered last October (?), and here we are 6 months later asking for a waiver of supposedly mandated regulations. If MoD had identified all the risks (as they claim), and they could not be mitigated, why was the request for waiver not on Ainsworth's desk all those years ago? As I said before, no-one in MoD has the authority to proceed with expenditure under such circumstances. (Or, even if Bernard Gray has been granted such authority recently, then he'd be foolish to sign given the "novel and/or contentious" nature of the risk. And given his background, I wonder if he CAN be granted such delegation? Or if he even wants it!).

Tuc

Gratifying though it is to have those like yourself trying to keep us safe, you seem to believe that the safety of the aircrew should be of paramount importance.

It shouldn't.

If you want safe then don't join the military.

Military is about operational capability.

People trying to make us safe have pretty much destroyed ours.

We now have vastly more capable aircraft than when I joined but a reduction in capability because we are not allowed to operate them to the limit or anywhere near the limit or even get them airborne because nobody can prove it's safe!

It never was safe!!
"safety" will make us lose the next war. Lets see how "safe" that is.

Not just operators...
 

Tourist,

Whilst I applaud your 'can do regardless' attitude, airworthiness is not there just for you to agree to accept the risk - airworthiness is also there to protect third parties. Would YOU be willing to underwrite the liability if a Rivet Joint came down in the middle of Lincoln due to a risk that hadn't been mitigated and demonstrated to be ALARP?

Tourist, we've threads here on the Reds 0/0 ejection (1), the Sea Kings' collision (7), the Tornado blue on blue (2), the Hercules in Iraq (10), the Nimrod in Afghanistan (14), and of course the Mull Chinook (29), and that's your conclusion?

Yes, the idea is to keep you alive and your aircraft intact, not for your ultimate survival, but so that you can do what we pay you for, to close with our enemies and to destroy them. If instead you are killed by your ejection seat, so blinded by your HISLs that you switch them off, cannot be seen and suffer a mid-air, unwarned of your IFF failure and hence shot down, destroyed by as little as a small arms round penetrating your tactical aircraft's fuel tanks, destroyed by your aircraft's AAR system, or simply ordered to fly a grossly unairworthy aircraft that kills you and all its occupants, then you are poor value for money and the enemy prevails. Is that the good operational capability of which you speak?

This forum (Military Aircrew) is like MoD in microcosm.

After spending years becoming a "Suitably Qualified and Experienced Person" (which notably excludes proven competence, but that's MoD for you) you are granted Airworthiness & Technical and Financial Approval Delegation. (Two different, but related things). Your letters of delegation spell out your legal obligation, and point you to the laws that say how long you can be imprisoned for if you fail in that obligation.

At no point does your delegation permit you to waive this obligation just because aircrew don't want you to implement the safety regulations.

Then an Unsuitable, Unqualified and Inexperienced (and incompetent) Person self-delegates and instructs you to ignore your legal obligation, ordering you to make false written declarations, exposing yourself to legal action.


When you meet your legal obligation and refuse, he has a hissy fit and runs to his boss, the very man who has granted you your delegation. The boss delegates the matter downwards and instructs the UN-SQEP to judge his own case. He rules in his own favour.

You escalate, in accordance with the regulations. At each stage you are simply going back up through the airworthiness chain, with the odd diversion into Personnel. At each stage, all the way to PUS, you are knocked back. How dare you try to keep our aircrew safe. You MUST obey the order to commit fraud. The disciplinary action taken against you stands, and will remain in your personnel record for all time.

On the occasions (plural) it happened to me, the airworthiness chain was (dis)graced by, variously, Senior Captain (RN), Commodore (RN), Retired Admiral (RN) - by now the Chief of Defence Procurement, Air Commodore and Air Vice Marshal. To be fair to the Senior Service, they only gave me a formal warning. The Junior Service threatened dismissal. The action they took was immaterial; the point is they took action against those who sought to protect aircrew, and aircrew died. The direct linkage was accepted by Haddon-Cave and Lord Philip, and various Coroners.

But, if that's who you want looking after your skin, then I'd love to be a fly on the wall if you showed your family this post and the fully verifiable evidence.

tuc,
Is it not also an offence to obey an illegal order ? I seem to recall that this was so in English Common Law long before the Nuremburg trials made it explicit.

I've been reading cpants' book.

What particularly impressed me is the fact the US "system" acknowledges the concept of civilian staffs being unfairly disciplined for meeting legal obligations, and provides various independent redress routes. In MoD, the system simply cannot cope with such a concept and permits offenders to judge their own case. Yes, you can pursue redress to PUS, the final arbiter (you are expected to resign if you disagree with his decision), but in practice PUS simply sends it back down to the offender to uphold his original ruling. So, PUS is seldom seen to actually issue a decision.

There is one notorious and well known exception. The victim (ex-RAF, then civvy Principal/Grade 7) appealed to the Cabinet Secretary, who over-ruled PUS and awarded an enhanced pension as compensation. However, the Cabinet Secretary is no longer Head of the Home Civil Service; that is now a separate post and the incumbent Sir Robert Kerslake has reverted to type and ruled refusal to commit fraud is an offence. In writing. Got the letter.

Also, early on, cpants hints at making recordings of interviews at which he was bullied and harassed. :D:D I was once told by a V senior RN officer, if someone lies to you, record all subsequent conversations. I have some very interesting ones, including one of the VSOs I mentioned above acknowledging I had been instructed to commit an offence, that the person issuing the order had done no wrong, whereas I was guilty as charged because I'd refused to commit fraud. MoD deny this interview took place. :ugh: Which is another reason for recording it. When I asked for the minutes, the minutes secretary had been mysteriously posted. Much to her relief probably. Who'd want to work for Baker?

ancient

Correct. But in the above cases it has been formally ruled no illegal order has been issued, and God+1 has said so. Due to the process I describe, you go round in circles as the issuer of the order is the one who decides if it is legal. It is probably easier to fight such a case if you are a serviceman?

Chugalug2
 

Chug, that is slightly disingenuous. Just as there isn't enough evidence to say that the Mull crash was gross negligence on behalf of the pilots, there is also a lack of evidence that (un)airworthiness caused the crash. Please don't use the Mull as an example of how people have died due to a failure of the airworthiness system; we simply cannot make that assumption.

"Is it not also an offence to obey an illegal order ? I seem to recall that this was so in English Common Law long before the Nuremburg trials made it explicit."




Yes, but you may well get the comment in your ACR "...is overly rule-bound" after asking your Boss (politely) to switch off his non-authorised personal laptop during flight! (the more immediate response was to tell me to "f*** O**").

cgb, you are quite right, we do not know why 29 people died on the Mull, principally because it was investigated by a compromised BoI (ask the CAS!) which in any case was overruled by the operator (thank God the civvies can't do that). The point I was making to Tourist is that the aircraft was Grossly Unairworthy and 29 people died in it. Its unairworthiness was not even considered a possibility as a cause by the BoI, giving us some clue as to the degree of that compromise.

I have already raised my concern and bewilderment that those fighting the Wratten and Day infamous finding discounted airworthiness also. Are the Armed Services now given a lecture following attestation about the evils of airworthy aircraft? Some of the hostility raised by those challenging airworthiness beggars belief. It is cheaper simply to retain fully qualified airworthiness engineers and have them implement the Regulations than have the present system whereby they have been got rid of and their places taken by the unqualified, inexperienced, obedient, and pliant. Simply finding fault in the crew in the inevitable subsequent fatal accidents fools fewer and fewer. Of course you have a right to your beliefs, but the RAF has a right to airworthy aircraft. If it went to war now in a hostile air environment it would be 1939 all over again IMHO.

Seriously? In case you hadn't noticed, the RAF (and FAA and AAC) have been to "war" a few times in recent years. I'm not quite sure why any of the aircraft that have operated successfully in those relatively benign environments would be any less successful in a more hostile operation??

Cows Getting Bigger - Re post 575 – and also referring back to your post 528.

Would it be too disingenuous to suggest that if the 'airworthiness system' had worked 'properly' as some here would wish, the Chinook RTS might possibly have been withheld pro tem (ie - it would not have been released to squadron service) while certain issues were examined ? If so, is it then a step too far to suggest that that specific flight would not have taken place on that specific day and therefore that specific accident would not have occurred – might never have occurred - at least not in the circumstances and terms we know about ?

LFH

Chug, I think we are both barking up the same tree albeit from opposite sides. It is my view that there has to be some 'wriggle room' within the airworthiness system. Taking my previous example of not being allowed to stick a red cross on the side of an SH asset, it is clear that the tail was wagging the dog. There was not safety or capability related issue in that scenario but the Hels staff in the UK were clearly process driven and would not issue an authorisation until the defined process was followed; we were task driven and took the 'risk' in ignoring the UK directive.

OK, that relatively small issue does not even compare to Nimrods in Afghanistan or Chinooks which should have been locked-up in hangars rather than playing in the mist with a load of important people on board. However, it does make one wonder whether the processes are fit for purpose.

Lordflash, how far do we take that argument? Should I not pop down to the shops at risk of being knocked down? My point about the Mk2 and the Mull is that it may have been a Mk1 instead - we just don't know. The only truly safe answer was to never task any asset in the first place.

Likewise there is no guarantee that ESF would have stopped 179 going down.

RPI'm sure that much the same was thought by the heroic crews of the Battles and Blenheims pre '39. As I said, it is only my honest opinion and I pray that I be proved wrong were that day ever to come. My fear though is that the RAF would be then revealed to be what I now suspect, thoroughly riddled with unairworthiness. Who would have thought that an Emergency Escape System of all things could turn out to be unairworthy!

My list of Fatal Airworthiness Related Accidents in which 63 died had enemy presence in only one instance. Talk about doing their work for them! I'm afraid that the flat earthers will only be proved wrong after the event. At least in the last big bit unpleasantness we had time to introduce self sealing tanks, armoured windscreens, armour plating behind pilots, etc, in the light of bitter experience. Next time it will be decided 'as is' I suspect. The MAA do not even know what the 'as is' is though. Time to get UK Military Airworthiness sorted, not forever sabotaged!

Didn't the Argosy (of all aircraft) actually have self-sealing tanks, in contrast to the Herc?
If so, why the difference, all those years ago?

cgb:-
Just how much wriggle room do you want? tuc has already confirmed that it is official MOD policy, confirmed up to SoS level, that it is correct to issue an order to suborn UK Military Airworthiness, ie to disregard the Regulations but sign that they have been complied with, and that it is a disciplinary offence to disobey such an order. Surely that is sufficient for any coach and horse combination that the MOD has in mind?

The MAA? I suspect that they are about to realise just how peripheral they are in such matters...

Chug

I think you are confusing operational capability with airworthiness - 2 very different things. Those Blenheims and Battles were probably very airworthy, but they were just outclassed by the opposition's capabilities.

Well, I wasn't RP, merely pointing out that both then and in my future scenario the RAF could be flying aircraft unfit for purpose, for whatever reasons. Your aircraft can only be destroyed once whether it be because it is too slow, unable to defend itself, or self destructs with the entry of a small calibre round into its vitals, or entirely on its own unaided.

I take your point that you make, mine is that it would be entirely theoretical if the day is lost anyway.

The Argosy's wing was derived from that of the Shackleton which in turn used the wing from the Lincoln, which was a modified Lancaster wing, which had its own origins in the Manchester a medium bomber design from the late 1930s, a time when integral fuel tanks were unknown.
The Hercules wing was a clean sheet design from the late 1940's early 1950's.

VX275,
Ah, yes , many thanks, I do remember the early Shacks' bag tanks.
My question came from a remark I heard at Cottesmore in the early 70's when an Argosy man stated that he would rather not be in a Herc. in a combat zone as it did not have self-sealing tanks, unlike his steed.
Unfortunately it seems to have been a prescient remark.

If you wanted dodgy fuel tanks then you couldn't beat the Fairey Fawn from 1926. The over-wing tanks would leak all over the pilot and with sparks coming from the exhausts..... No wonder that the regular RAF decided to keep its DH9As and handed the Fawns over to the Reseve Squadrons in the UK. (This one from 503 Special Reserve Sqn at Waddington).


https://encrypted-tbn1.gstatic.com/i...gC0C3do1dAzjmQ

'Twas an optional extra, which naturally 'we' chose not to option. ****ers.

So how does this work then?
 

A number of USAF C-135B-04-BN, Boeing Model 717-166 were converted to RC-135M then RC-135W.

New build RC-135-01-BN, Boeing Model 739-445B subsequently became RC-135C, then RC-135V or U.

UK purchases KC-135A-27-BN, Boeing Model 717-148, subsequently converted to KC-135R, and now converted to RC-135W by L3.

For starters, how much does the difference in Boeing Model numbers contribute to lack of read-through evidence for UK certification? This is going to get interesting.....

SS

The picture I have in my head is of buying three custom build Cadillacs from GM ... except they were a prior model year.

Chug



CGB



This is the interesting bit of this thread. How do you explain "wriggle room" in regulations? Tuc already said it is a matter of engineering judgment and I know he's right. But if the MAA have to go to the secretary of state for Defence every time what does that mean? The Military Aviation Authority don't have the authority or don't have the judgment? Both?

dervish, to be honest I don't know. I do know that dogmatic application of overly restrictive regulation encourages people to find ways around regulation (Health & Safety, Tippex sniffing and sharp edges on sheets of A4 paper spring to mind). If the airworthiness rules, as they stand, are felt to be overly restrictive I can understand (not condone) people finding ways around them.

Of course, the problem arises in identifying things that do affect airworthiness against those that don't. I have come across engineers who have refused to sign-off aircraft because of the most minor divergence from the procedure (ie, seats have been recovered in the same leather as before but the audit trail is wrong). Clearly the only airworthiness issue here is that a specified paperwork process has not followed - there is nothing inherently unsafe in what has been done. Conversely, a poorly fitted fuel line which does not have an EASA Form 1 (or equivalent) is most definitely a very major issue.

I don't have an answer other than suggesting a root-and-branch review of airworthiness processes in line with guiding principles of ALARP and/or 'proportionate and risk based'. Perhaps a clearer or more expanded definition of the very word 'airworthiness' is a good starting point? We certainly cannot continue writing regulation and then flagrantly ignore it when we see fit.

Maybe Tuc is right with the 'engineering judgement' bit but this judgement has to be at the right level. Otherwise if every man with a spanner was allowed to exercise his engineering judgement we would quickly see divergence of standards and safety.

CGB and others,

I think that the point Tuc (and I) are making is that it's not the regulations, and it's not the 'processes'. They aren't great, but they are sufficient for the job of producing safe and airworthy combat aircraft.

The main problem is that the regulations and processes just aren't being followed. And not 'down in the weeds' (type of leather on seats), but right at the core of the system. Configuration control, management of modifications, maintaining proper records of decisions, requirements management, effective project management - you name it, I can guarantee that there are areas of the MoD that no longer even know how to carry out these basic tasks properly.

Why? Lots of reasons, in my view mainly dilution of technical expertise and over-reliance on project management as a substitute, coupled with an obsession at senior level with meeting schedules, not requirements.

Way forward? Rebuild a bit at a time. Give just one PT a chance to rebuild around a strong technical core with hand picked managers, watch them excel and then apply the lessons across the piece. Utopia, i know....

Best Regards

Engines

Chugalog

You keep spouting off about airworthiness related fatal accidents.

I have knowledge of only one, the Seaking 7 crash.

I, and every single seaking pilot, will tell you that the HISLs did not cause or contribute to that accident, but you, and other non-pilots who frankly have no clue still use it to add to your statistics. That brings the rest into doubt for me.

We used to turn off the previous lights before HISLs were fitted because they also bounced distractingly off the water/clouds at low level.

It is in the very nature of light that it is bright and bounces off things.

What would you have them do?
Invent a light that does not light things up?

We are all trained to operate silent and dark anyway because in a real shooty war we would leave everything turned off fitted and airworthy or not!

It did not cause or contribute to that accident!!

You might as well say that an enormous 200ft thick bouncy shield would have stopped the fatalities so the aircraft was un-airworthy because they had not fitted it.

The 200ft bouncy shield does not exist and neither does the strobe which is not distracting at low level.

Tourist, the point about the baggers HISLs is that they were not fitted IAW the Regulations (see engines post above about not following them) they were simply swapped for the anti-collision lights, without testing per the mandatory procedures. That automatically made the fit, and hence the aircraft, unairworthy. Surprise, surprise the forward ones were then found to cause excess glare under the conditions you describe and it became customary to switch them off. I am not saying whether that caused the mid-air between the i/b-o/b changeover, which seems to have been a classic Swiss Cheese affair anyway. Indeed the BoI carried out specific trials that discounted the HISLs as a possible cause.

What I do say is that it was an airworthiness related accident along with all the others listed. That is all we can say about them all, for they were all both regulated and investigated by the operator, ie the MOD and its subsidiary Services. That is the root problem here, if the regulation and the investigation were independent of the MOD and each other we would then know if the first had provided for an airworthy aircraft (it hadn't) and the second had revealed that (it didn't). We can all huff and puff about wriggle room and Service pride as much as we like. Quite frankly aviation doesn't give a damn and will kill given half a chance. Give it an unairworthy aircraft and its chances of doing so are then greatly increased.

Engines, your post makes sense and you are obviously better placed to provide expert comment. For sure, rebuilding experience levels is a must but this will take a generation to achieve. I find myself asking why did the hierarchy choose to circumvent process? Were there operational/budgetary imperatives? Were the VSOs naive/ignorant? Had the rot already set in? This clearly takes us back to Haddon Cave who threw the pebble (or should I say hand grenade?) in the pond. Do we just ensure a return to compliance with the process(es) or also take the opportunity to ensure that the regulations are wholly fit for purpose?

Chug, we crossed posts. Take my favourite example of a Red Cross on a helicopter. By definition, that aircraft was unairworthy - we had implemented a modification without proper approval. Did that particular unairworthiness 'greatly increase' the chances of the aircraft killing me and some others?

Chugalug

"Surprise, surprise the forward ones were then found to cause excess glare under the conditions you describe "


No, you are not listening.

It had always been the case that we had turned off the previous flashing lights!

It was not a new phenomena!

The old flashing lights flashed and the new flashing lights flashed. Both were routinely switched off at low level.

To say that the crash was airworthiness related is totally misguided at best and dishonest at worst.

If one of the crew was wearing a t-shirt rather than an aircrew sweater, then that would also by your definition make it un-airworthy, but it does not make it crash.

Indeed as you say the BOI discounted it as a factor so stop citing it as an airworthiness related accident.

Guys,

Perhaps I can help defuse the temperature a bit. Lion's den and all that, but I think it's worth a go.

Aircraft crash for all sorts of reasons. Fact. In almost all cases, there's what used to be called a 'chain of events' (these days it's the 'holes in the cheese lining up') that leas to the eventual accident/incident. In a lot of accidents, there's an airworthiness 'link' or 'hole' somewhere. It may, or may not, have been the 'primary' cause of the accident, or it may have been a 'contributory'. It might not have even been in the chain.

It's clearly over-egging the case to state that EVERY accident where an airworthiness angle was present was therefore an 'airworthiness related' event.

However, it's the job of us engineers to ensure that when a military aircraft enters the operational world (at the 700 desk) , it's as free as practicable (choosing my words carefully here) from potential airworthiness 'links'. Where the skill (and training, and experience) comes in is recognising potential airworthiness issues and using the proven systems to remove them.

But remember that engineers are military personnel as well, and should be committed to fighting the war as hard as they damn well can. That means making aircraft available to the aircrew to go and do the stuff. With my background, where the engineers and aircrew (and everyone else) was floating around on a large war canoe in harm's way, the engineers were accorded the same level of respect and regard that they accorded the aircrew. Lots, usually. I could never have done their job. They could never have done mine. Together, as a team, we kicked serious ass in the name of HM Queen. And all of our squadron came back, thank the Good Lord.

So, my job was, and remained for some time, to get aircrew into the air as often as possible, as safely as possible. That meant judgement calls all the time. Later on, the job remains the same but in the environs of the MoD. Your job as a project engineer is to focus like a killing laser on delivering military capability as safely as possible. Identify the big issues and hound them mercilessly until they fall at your feet screaming for mercy. Then kill them. Then find the next one and kill that. Sounds aggressive? Meant to be. Our aircrew deserve nothing less.

'Nit Picking' is usually the last refuge of the truly incompetent engineer who has too much experience (in one area) and not enough learning. They are best countered by strong and technically aware managers.

I suppose what I'm saying is that taking any argument to extremes usually leads in stalemate or worse, name calling. Even worse, it can obscure the issues. What guys like Tuc and Chug are flagging up is that the system in the UK MoD is failing to deliver the correct level of airworthiness (safety) to the aircrew. it's doing that by not observing its own systems and processes. (Example - Read the recent Hawk SI and see how the BoI had to admit that they couldn't find records of meetings at which airworthiness decisions were made). Why? Tons of reasons, main ones (I think) are lack of technical training and experience and application of 'schedule fear' forcing people into short cuts.

I hope this little rant helps - we are all trying to fight the same battle, I think.

Best Regards as ever to absolutely everyone

Engines

Tourist, what you did or didn't do with or without the 'previous flashing lights' (Anti-Collision ones?), which I have no reason to believe were not airworthy, is between you and your SOPs. I'm talking about the 'later Flashing Lights' (High Intensity Strobe Lights) which are far more intense, as their name implies. You can't simply swap them over like changing a light bulb, the new fit requires trials not only because of the potential for blinding the crew, which is obviously greatly enhanced, but also because of the internal potential to induce unwanted radiation interference with the electronics fit. That's not my idea, that is the mandated requirement of the Regulations, in order that the modification works safely. As this was a UK Military mod the Regulations were ignored of course and the aircraft was made unairworthy. That's not my idea, it is a direct result of the Regulations being thus suborned.

The problem is not with the Regulations, which as engines says are perfectly adequate for the job. The problem is people. People who give illegal orders to suborn the Regulations. People who discard the Regulations, lest they be quoted. People who cover up the suborning. People who subvert Accident Investigations so that the suborning remains covered up. People who hound qualified and experienced engineers out of the airworthiness posts and replace them with unqualified and inexperienced non-engineers so that the suborning continues. Those people shared one thing in common, they were all VSOs. They have now reduced UK Military Aviation to the point where it cannot go out and order a new aircraft without getting it spectacularly wrong, hence this thread.

As to not calling the Sea Kings mid-air Airworthiness Related, I'm afraid it was and I'll go on calling it that unless and until the BoI is recalled to consider new evidence (ie new evidence, not new evidence that the MOD says is not new). That BoI/SI should be convened by a truly independent MAAIB. Unacceptable? Then I go on calling it airworthiness related (not 'caused' though, until so found by the SI).

Ridiculing airworthiness says more about your mindset than mine, you can't pick and choose which Regs you will comply with and which not. Anyway, are aircrew sweaters subject to an airworthiness process? They may well be approved aircrew wear rather than non-approved t-shirts, but airworthy?

Cgb likewise, why is a Red Cross painted on the side of a helicopter a cause of unairworthiness? I'm afraid that playing the 'HSE' card, or having it played upon you, isn't what this is about. I'm not a jobsworth, I simply want UK Military Aircraft to be airworthy so that they can serve our purpose and not that of our enemies. That requires an independent military airworthiness authority, something that the Military Aviation Authority is not.